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This is a study of the evolution of the strategic policy of Mexico and Canada during the 
advent and consolidation of neoliberalism in North America. The thesis examines the 
interaction between the various strategic approaches rooted in policy elites in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. In the case of Mexico, the struggle between the 
historical nationalist doctrine and emerging continentalist practices is analysed. In the case 
of Canada, tensions between the liberal internationalist tradition, the Atlanticist strategic 
approach, and the renewed continentalist notion are evaluated. This dissertation pays special 
attention to the socio-political context in which foreign, trade, and security policies were 
formulated; as well as the cultural dynamics of the strategic decision-making process. The 
study reconsiders the responses of Mexican and Canadian policy elites to domestic and 
external pressures that occurred from 1988 to 2015. Based on a structuralist-constructivist 
approach focused on practice, this work provides a new interpretation of continuity and 
change in strategic policy before and after the political transitions of Mexico and Canada in 
2000 and 2006, respectively. This thesis shows why and how the major strategic traditions 
of Canada and Mexico were gradually replaced by continentalist ideas, which were much 
more influential throughout this period than is commonly recognised. The result is a 
comprehensive reassessment of the foreign policy and security strategies of the middle 
powers of North America from an emerging perspective in the discipline of international 
history and international relations during a pivotal period in contemporary history: the 
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‘What is History?’ asked E.H. Carr some thirty years ago. The answer now 
seems obvious. ‘History’, with apologies to the venerable Carr, ‘is the 
conceptual space, the time of human experience, in which social scientific 
knowledge – and, most of all, prediction – is proven wrong’. Or, if you 
prefer, ‘any succession of rupturing events which together bring to light 
our misunderstandings and misrecognitions of the present’ In the past few 
years, pace Francis Fukuyama’s prognosis of the ‘end of history’, there 
has been an awful lot of it about. Indeed, if History is Dead, its rigour 
mortis appears unusually vigorous.1 
 
John Comaroff (South African anthropologist), 1995. 
 
1 John Comaroff and Stern Paul, ‘New Perspectives on Nationalim and War’, in Perspectives on Nationalism 
and War, ed. by John Comaroff and Stern Paul (Abingdon: Routledge, 1995) p.1. 
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The period from 1988 to 2015 represented more than a change of the millennium. A series 
of political, economic, and social transformations worldwide had profound repercussions on 
states’ strategic behaviour and the dynamics of the international system. The origins of these 
changes occurred years before. One of the most critical facts, which is rarely given the 
importance it deserves in the discipline of international history and international relations, 
was the effect that the exhaustion of the Keynesian post-war consensus had globally, having 
lasted from 1945 to 1980.2 On the eve of the so-called ‘Second Cold War’, the world 
experienced severe socio-economic problems that generated political spaces for a new 
political-economic paradigm to be adopted by the policy elites of most of the western world.3 
Throughout the 1980s, neoliberalism was presented as a novel and winning formula, as it 
would allow states to adapt to emerging structural conditions, overcome socio-economic 
difficulties, and benefit from new global dynamics during the final stage of the Cold War. 
Private property without limits, freedom as the absolute value, market dominance, state 
reduction, and the primacy of individualism were some of the principles of the Washington 
Consensus from which the new liberalism or technocratic liberalism shaped strategic 
thinking and political practice in the west.4 The end of the Cold War meant not only the 
cessation of world political tensions but also the advent of an American-built neoliberal 
international order. From the 1990s onwards, the structural position of superpower held by 
the United States and the pervasive influence of neoliberalism on the strategic culture of the 
states significantly redefined their external identity, strategic behaviour, and interaction with 
the outside world, especially with the superpower. The case studies on Mexico and Canada 
test this opening assumption. 
Research Topic 
This thesis presents a comparative analysis of the evolution of the strategic culture of the 
middle powers of North America during the advent and consolidation of neoliberalism. In 
particular, it examines the impact of the post-Cold War structural environment and the 
neoliberal doctrine on the politics of strategic politics in Mexico and Canada. Through a 
 
2 David Dutton, British Politics Since 1945: The Rise, Fall and Rebirth of Consensus (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1997); Dennis Kavanagh, ‘The Postwar Consensus’, Twentieth Century British History, 3.2 (1992), 175–90; 
Paul Addison, The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World War (London: Cape, 1975). 
3 John Diggins, Ronald Reagan: Fate, Freedom, And the Making of History (NY: Norton, 2007) p.267; Michael 
Cox, Beyond the Cold War: Superpowers at the Crossroads (NY: UPA, 1990) p.18; Fred Halliday, The Making 
of the Second Cold War (London: Verso, 1983) p.2. 
4 Taylor Boas and Jordan Gans-Morse, ‘Neoliberalism: From New Liberal Philosophy to Anti-Liberal Slogan’, 
Studies in Comparative International Development, 44.2 (2009), 137–61; Campbell Jones, Martin Parker, and 
René Ten Bos, For Business Ethics (London: Routledge, 2005) p.100; John Williamson, ‘What Washington 
Means by Policy Reform’, in Latin American Readjustment: How Much Has Happened (Washington: PIIE, 
1989); John Williamson, A Guide To John Williamson’s Writing (Washington: PIIE, 1989). 
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structuralist-culturalist approach focused on practice, this dissertation follows the interaction 
between the various strategic approaches that prevailed within the policy elites in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries: nationalism and continentalism in Mexico; and 
internationalism, Atlanticism and continentalism in Canada. This study pays special 
attention to the social and cultural context in which the strategic policy was created and the 
cultural dynamics of the decision-making process on diplomatic, commercial, and security 
matters. It also provides an alternative interpretation of how and why Mexican and Canadian 
policy actors responded in the manner in which they did to domestic and external pressures 
that took place between 1988 and 2015. 
One of the most relevant effects of the end of the Cold War was the emergence and 
consolidation of a new political-economic paradigm promoted by the United States and the 
United Kingdom. The adoption of neoliberalism in much of the western world had 
significant effects on states’ international identity and strategic behaviour, as well as on the 
norms and rules that governed the dynamics of international relations. This dissertation 
argues that neoliberalism had profound effects on the institutional and ideological sources 
from which decision-makers formulated foreign policy and designed security strategies. The 
social pressures generated by the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s, as well as the 
changes in the structural environment in the 1990s and 2000s weakened traditional strategic 
conceptions and created political spaces for new continentalist doctrines on diplomacy, 
trade, and security to play a role every more dominant in policy-making. Neoliberalism was 
one of the most pervasive. In the case of Mexico, the adoption of this doctrine played a 
crucial role in the dismantling of the nationalist defensive approach and the construction of 
a soft-bandwagoning continentalist notion. In the case of Canada, the establishment of 
neoliberal policies deepened the weakening of the tradition of liberal internationalism and 
led to the reconstruction of a soft-bandwagoning continentalist approach. Beyond the realist 
explanations that argue that the states’ strategic behaviour derived from the structural 
changes produced by the end of the Cold War, this dissertation offers an alternative and 
complementary interpretation focused on how the change in states’ strategic behaviour was 
the product of the effects of emerging ideas on cultural reflexes and institutional culture from 
which policy actors responded to structural environment conditions.5 
 
5 Kenneth Waltz, ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics’, International Security, 18.2 (1993), 44–
79; Edward Kolodziej, ‘Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector!’, International Studies Quarterly, 
36.4 (1992), 421–38; Stephen Walt, ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, International Studies Quarterly, 
35.2 (1991), 211–39; John Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, 
International Security, 15.1 (1990), 5–56. 
22 
This study considers that the strategic policy formulated by policy elites in response to 
changes in the structural environment in the final years of the Cold War must be understood 
within the broad socio-cultural context that housed the articulations on foreign policy and 
debates on national security. In this way, it is possible to identify the interactions among the 
contending strategic approaches that aspired to position themselves as the best source to 
meet the strategic challenges. The thesis’ methodology is explained in greater detail in the 
next chapter. To give an overview; this work recovers the French sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of ‘culture’ as a set of historically forged predispositions that 
interact with the broad structural environment to form a basis for everyday practices. This 
process generates what Bourdieu defines as ‘practical logic’, which conditions the 
production of strategies by social actors.6 Under these considerations, the central argument 
of this thesis is that a practical logic based on a strategic continentalist conception gradually 
dominated the cultural reflexes of political, diplomatic, bureaucratic, and military leaders in 
the final years and immediately after the Cold War. Traditional strategic notions that were 
widely accepted by Mexican and Canadian policy actors came under pressure from the early 
1980s, as neoliberal precepts gained popularity among right-wing policy actors and business 
sectors of the public sphere. It is possible to identify the influence of neoliberal ideas on the 
policy prescriptions of prominent policy-makers in the Mexican and Canadian governments 
of the 1990s. However, the Mexican nationalist and Canadian internationalist strategic 
approaches did not lose their category of practical logic until the coming to power of right-
wing political parties in 2000 and 2006. 
The general question that guides the development of this research is: what role did culture 
play in the evolution of strategic policy in Canada and Mexico during the neoliberal era? 
This attempt to systematically examine the role of ideational factors in strategic policy-
making processes focuses attention on secondary questions such as: where do ideas come 
from? How do they affect decision-making? These questions put the theme of culture at the 
centre, specifically the role of the sociocultural context in which ideas arise and policies are 
developed. The objective of this dissertation is to understand how strategic culture evolved 
and the factors that guided the development of the strategic policy of Canada and Mexico 
 
6 Rebecca Adler-Nissen, Bourdieu in International Relations, ed. by Rebecca Adler-Nissen (London: 
Routledge, 2013); Vincent Pouliot, International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy 
(NY: CUP, 2010); Peter Jackson, ‘Pierre Bourdieu’, in Critical Theorists and International Relations, ed. by 
Jenny Edkins and Nick Vaughan-Williams (London: Routledge, 2009) pp.89–101; Peter Jackson, ‘Pierre 
Bourdieu, the “Cultural Turn” and the Practice of International History’, Review of International Studies, 34.1 
(2008), 155–81; Frédéric Mérand and Vincent Pouliot, ‘The World of Pierre Bourdieu’, Canadian Journal of 
Political Science, 41.3 (2008), 603–25; Michael Williams, Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the 
Politics of International Security (London: Routledge, 2007). 
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throughout the advent and consolidation of neoliberalism. Achieving this objective will 
allow this study to provide a reinterpretation of the continuity and change in the international 
identity and strategic behaviour of the middle powers that share a neighbourhood with the 
United States since the end of the Cold War onwards. Through both case studies, this thesis 
seeks to understand how the interaction between the subjective understandings of policy 
actors and the power structures established the parameters for the formulation of foreign 
policy and the design of national security strategies. 
Avenues of research 
There are four lines of research that guide the development of this thesis. First, this 
dissertation focuses on the study of strategic culture based on a conception centred on 
practice. This study is inserted in the efforts of the fourth generation of culturalists in 
strategic studies, which seeks to identify strategic cultures that compete within states to 
occupy a dominant position in the processes that shape states’ international identity and 
strategic behaviour. This generation does not consider states to have a permanent, unique, 
static, and immutable strategic culture. This current argues that, within each state, several 
strategic cultures are interacting with each other and with the structural environment 
simultaneously and permanently. From this approach, the central issue is to identify which 
strategic culture dominates over others and to explain why and how it prevails. The fourth 
generation of strategic studies suggests that, although a strategic culture can remain static 
for several decades, it can change entirely due to disruptive events generated by intense 
internal or external pressures. Also, and this is something significant for this work, this 
generation recognises that there is a direct and robust interaction between systemic structural 
pressures and the predominant strategic culture. 7 It should be noted that the importation of 
Bourdieu’s theoretical approach is fundamental in this thesis, as it allows it to overcome the 
theoretical biases and methodological problems involved in the use of the concept of 
strategic culture. 
 
7 Francois Vreÿ, ‘From Theory to Culture: Emergent South African Strategic Culture’, Journal of Military and 
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307; Darryl Howlett, The Future of Strategic Culture (Virginia, 2006); Iver Neumann and Henrikki Heikka, 
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Strategic Culture after World War II: From a Local to a Global Perspective’, Cooperation and Conflict, 40.1 
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The second line of research is aimed at studying the interactions between strategic 
approaches and their role in the reorientation of strategic policy. This thesis draws on the 
concept of strategic approach, which is conceived as a central element of the strategic 
culture. Academics like Jack Snyder argue that strategic culture allows us to explain the 
persistence of distinctive strategic approaches in the face of ‘changes in the circumstances 
that gave rise to it, through processes of socialisation and institutionalisation and through the 
role of strategic concepts in legitimating these social arrangements’.8 It is also possible to 
conceive ‘strategic approaches as historically specific regimes of knowledge’ that integrate 
visions of national security.9 In this sense, a strategic approach is identified as the central 
component of the strategic culture. It harbours the cultural predispositions that persist within 
a state’s policy elite on the use of available resources to achieve strategic objectives, taking 
into account the role that force or threat of force plays in the international system.10 The 
second element that makes up this research avenue is that of strategic policy. As in the case 
of strategic approach, strategic policy is established as the central element of what is known 
as grand strategy. According to John Ferris in his case study on the United Kingdom, the 
strategic policy is the policy prescriptions that ‘seek to coordinate in a rational fashion the 
diplomatic, financial, and military elements of British strength in order to support its aims 
as a great power’.11 The relevance of this concept, that has rarely received the attention it 
deserves in the literature, is that it allows a systematic analysis of the politics of its 
formulation, tracking of its evolution, and identifying its reorientation.12 It should be noted 
that this concept has been used in combination with that of strategic culture and sometimes 
under the term of national security policy or strategic foreign policy.13 The last element of 
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this second line of research is the assessment of the reorientation of the strategic policy as a 
result of the complex internal and external dynamics during its formulation and evolution. 
The reorientation of strategic policy is understood as the changes experienced by foreign, 
commercial, and security policy prescriptions as a result of the political conditions created 
by transformations in domestic and external contexts.14 This conception validates that the 
strategic culture is dynamic, that its strategic approaches interact permanently with the 
structural environment, and that this interaction defines the orientation of the strategic 
policy. 
The third line of research is focused on examining the effects of neoliberalism on the cultural 
roots and dynamics of the strategic policy-making. This dissertation does not address the 
issue of neoliberalism from a technical and economic perspective but a culturalist 
perspective. Publications abound in the literature on how the neoliberal model drove deep 
structural reforms in many Western countries intending to increase their economic 
performance and solve social problems in the late 1970s and early 1980s.15 However, few 
studies have examined the effects of neoliberal doctrine in the political, social, and cultural 
context in which policy actors have made strategic decisions over the past 40 years. This 
thesis does not focus exclusively on the structural changes that arose after the end of the 
Cold War. This work pays much greater attention to the parallel process of adopting 
neoliberal political-economic precepts and the role they played in shaping how policy-
makers understood and responded to the broad environment of international politics. In other 
words, this research takes neoliberalism as a penetrating ideological force that reconfigured 
not only the structural environment and international relations but also the socio-political 
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context in which the international identity and strategic behaviour of Mexico and Canada 
were defined.  
Considering that the United States was one of the leading promoters of this political-
economic paradigm, it is relevant to re-examine from a structuralist-constructivist 
perspective how the middle powers of North America responded to the new conditions of 
the American-built neoliberal international order that emerged after the end of the Cold War. 
In this sense, the concept of medium power establishes the fourth line of research. This thesis 
examines how the post-Cold War unipolar world order redefined the normative standards of 
state behaviour and the rules for international relations.16 Beyond assessing the change in 
the structural position of Mexico and Canada, this study investigates the ideas and beliefs 
that fed the formulation of foreign policy and the design of national security strategies. In 
this sense, elements of the theoretical current of structural realism are retaken to identify the 
character of the strategic movements defined by policy elites. The concepts of balancing and 
bandwagoning, both belonging to the theory of the balance of power, are fundamental in the 
development of this research.17 The consideration of the structural position and the study of 
cultural factors will develop an understanding of the similarities and differences in the 
reactions of both countries to events that produced external pressures such as the end of the 
Cold War, the 9/11 attacks, the financial crisis global, the War on Drugs and the War on 
Terror. This line of research tests the arguments of academics such as Eduard Jordaan, Laura 
Neack, Fenton Cooper, Richard Higgott and Kim Nossal, who in different ways argue that 
traditional and emerging middle powers, such as Canada and Mexico, have obtained that 
status based on compliance and agreement with the global status quo established by the 
United States, as the ‘states that deviate from hegemonic orthodoxy cannot be conceived of 
as middle powers’.18 The systemic pressures that arose after the end of the Cold War and 
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during the neoliberal period favoured the tying of the position and disposition of Western 
middle powers to the political position and strategic vision of the United States.19 These 
interpretations nurtured the debate about whether some middle powers had gone from 
aspiring to be major powers to become satellites of the United States to preserve the benefits 
that were granted through being an ally of the superpower in the new neoliberal and unipolar 
world order.20 From the culturalist perspective proposed by this research, it is possible to 
understand that neoliberalism shaped a context that conditioned the strategic behaviour of 
the middle powers, especially in Mexico and Canada. 
Relevance and Contribution 
The relevance of this thesis lies in three elements that distinguish it from other academic 
works. The first aspect is that this dissertation pays special attention to the relationship 
between cultural predispositions of policy elites and the broad structural environment in 
which strategic policy was formulated. This study overcomes the theoretical and 
methodological problems presented by the research programme on strategic culture by 
incorporating conceptual and analytical elements of Bourdieu’s theory of practice. The study 
of strategic culture from a practice-centred approach is a trend that arose just a few years 
ago. This research is located within this cultural current. The second significant element of 
this study is that it integrates theoretical perspectives and research areas that have usually 
been addressed in isolation. Firstly, the structuralist-constructivist approach inspired by 
Bourdieu’s thinking allows the creation of a bridge between realist and constructivist 
theoretical traditions oriented to the analysis of international relations. This linkage increases 
the chances of obtaining a comprehensive analysis of the effects of power and the importance 
of ideas in the practices of world politics. Secondly, this work draws on elements of the 
disciplines of social sciences, international history, international relations, and strategic 
studies. The development of the case studies on Mexico and Canada incorporates the 
examination of issues such as the composition of power elites, the characteristics of foreign 
policy, and the evolution of national security. The third aspect that distinguishes this thesis 
is the period it addresses and how it examines it. In the literature, the study of the final years 
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of the Cold War and the consequences generated by the structural change in state behaviour 
and international relations is recurrent. However, this work does not consider that the 
strategic change of the states had begun in the late 1980s. Further, the existing literature has 
only considered that strategic change was the product of only structural factors. This thesis 
recognises that the change in strategic policy in middle powers such as Mexico and Canada 
originated in the late 1970s due to political spaces generated by international tensions and 
economic crises that favoured the adoption of neoliberal doctrine. Also, this work recognises 
that the effects of the advent and consolidation of neoliberalism in the socio-political context 
and cultural roots of policy-making have had repercussions until today. 
From these distinctive elements comes is the modest contribution of this research. One of 
the main contributions of this work is that it provides two case studies that test the 
relationship between power and ideas in world politics. When inserted in one of the primary 
theoretical debates of international relations, this study validates the complementarity 
relationship between realism and constructivism. Another contribution derives from the fact 
that this thesis recovers arguments from Mexican and Canadian historians that have been 
gradually overlooked in the literature. Reflections on the role of beliefs and narratives related 
to the identity of Canada and Mexico make it possible to elucidate more clearly the causes 
and motives of specific policy choices. The third contribution of this work is the product of 
its systematic analysis of how the interaction between the subjective understandings of 
policy elites and power structures established the parameters for the formulation of foreign 
policy and the design of strategies for national security. Finally, it should be noted that to 
date, no work analyses the evolution of the strategic policy of Mexico and Canada during 
the neoliberal era from a structuralist-constructivist perspective. In the Canadian case, the 
contribution of this thesis is limited because there is currently a strong academic tradition 
dedicated to the study of Canada’s strategic culture from various perspectives. In the 
Mexican case, the contribution is substantial because, in the literature, few publications 
address the strategic issues of Mexico from a perspective that values the relationship between 
material and ideational factors. 
Chapter outline 
This thesis is organised into seven chapters. With the exception of the first, each of them is 
organised chronologically. Chapter one presents the theoretical foundations from which the 
politics of strategic policy of Mexico and Canada is examined. In it, the theoretical 
implications of this research topic are discussed, a review of the literature of the strategic 
culture research programme is made, and the framework of Bourdieu’s theory of practice is 
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reviewed. The analytical framework designed is also outlined and the methodology deployed 
in this project is presented. 
The case study on Mexico is developed from chapter two to four. Chapter two examines the 
institutional and ideological sources of Mexico’s strategic policy in two sections. First, the 
socio-cultural context in which the formulation of foreign policy and the design of national 
security strategies took place is described. It then investigates the origin and development of 
the nationalist and continentalist strategic approaches. Chapter three addresses the process 
of dismantling defensive nationalism in Mexico from 1988 to 2000. The first section 
discusses the nationalist construction of international identity, the habitus of the political 
elite, and the field of strategic policy-making. In the second part, the evolution of the 
strategic policy is traced from the relations between the nationalist and continentalist 
strategic approaches, as well as their interaction with the post-Cold War structural 
environment. Chapter four describes the process of building soft-bandwagoning 
continentalism in Mexico from 2000 to 2012. It examines the role of continentalism in the 
construction of external identity, the dispositional logic of policy actors, and the positional 
logic of the social space in which strategic decisions were made. The reorientation of the 
Mexican strategic policy is also tracked through considering the ways in which the policy 
elite responded to events such as the 9/11 attacks, the global financial crisis, and the War on 
Drugs. 
Chapters five, six and seven make up the case study on Canada. Chapter five studies the 
institutional and ideological sources that fuelled Canada’s foreign policy and security 
strategies. It reviews the social and cultural context that housed the strategic policy 
formulation process, as well as the foundations that sustained the internationalist, Atlanticist, 
and continentalist strategic approaches. Chapter six focuses on the process of weakening 
defensive internationalism in Canada from 1993 to 2006. The first part investigates the role 
of internationalism in the definition of external identity, the predispositions that shape the 
habitus of the political elite, and the positions that constitute the field of strategic policy 
formulation. In the second part, changes in foreign, commercial, and security policy are 
traced, as well as internal and external dynamics that involved the predominant strategic 
approaches to respond to new structural conditions after the end of the Cold War and the 
9/11 attacks. Chapter seven examines the process of rebuilding soft-bandwagoning 
continentalism in Canada from 2006 to 2015. It addresses the continentalist construction of 
Canada’s international identity, the habitus of policy-makers, and the field where decisions 
on strategic issues were made. Subsequently, the evolution of the Canadian strategic policy 
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is traced, examining how the policy elite sought to adapt Canada to the structural 
environment after 9/11 and generate effective responses to the global financial crisis and the 
War on Terror. 
Finally, the conclusion of this thesis condenses the results of each chapter to identify the 
causes of the similarities and differences in the strategic responses of Mexico and Canada to 
the domestic and external pressures that took place throughout the neoliberal era. 
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Strategy will never be an exact science, but that is no reason why it should 
remain a primitive art.21 
 
Ken Booth (British academic), 1979. 
 
21 Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm, 1979) p.151. 
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Introduction 
This chapter lays out the theoretical and methodological framework deployed to analyse the 
politics of strategic policy of Mexico and Canada. The study of this topic takes as its starting 
point the premise that external structural and domestic ideational factors influence the 
policy-making process and lead the evolution of the strategic policy. This dissertation 
engages with one of the central debates in the discipline of international relations: the 
theoretical divide between realism and constructivism. This chapter argues that the contrasts 
between both schools of thought offer an opportunity to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of world politics. Notably, the strategic culture research programme enables 
us to examine how ideas influence decision-makers’ interpretations of the international 
system and how this affects state strategic behaviour. However, the existing literature 
contains theoretical limitations and has overlooked the crucial role of domestic politics in 
shaping global affairs. 
The main contribution of this chapter lies in the importation of elements of the theory of 
practice of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu to the study of strategic culture. His theory 
allows us to overcome the biases generated by the dichotomy between structural objectivism 
and constructivist subjectivism. This work contributes to the efforts of the academic current 
that contends that Bourdieu provides conceptual resources to combine the realist focus on 
the effects of power with constructivist attention to the importance of beliefs and practices.22 
Based on the reconceptualisation of the relationship between culture and strategy, the 
practice-centred analytical framework proposed in this chapter enables us to examine the 
dynamic relationship among the conditions of the structural environment and the cultural 
predispositions of the policy elites during the strategic policy-making process. 
This chapter sets out the theoretical-methodological framework in five sections. The first 
introduces the theoretical debate in which this dissertation intervenes. It presents the realist 
and constructivist approaches through which academics have explained the role of power 
and ideas in international politics. The second section reviews the literature on strategic 
culture. It evaluates the various ways in which the concept has been applied to explain the 
impact of ideational factors on state strategic behaviour. Part 1.3 shows the central aspects 
of the theory of practice. It elucidates the concepts through which this thesis articulates 
realism and constructivism to overcome the biases that have predominated in the study of 
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strategic culture. The fourth section outlines the analytical framework used in this project. It 
articulates theoretical elements to examine the evolution of strategic policy systematically. 
Finally, part 1.5 introduces the research methodology and the types of sources consulted. 
1.1. Theoretical debate: rationality versus interpretivism 
This work assesses the role of culture in the strategic policy-making process of Mexico and 
Canada. This theme is located within one of the most relevant theoretical debates in the study 
of international relations. The dichotomy between realism and constructivism confronts two 
ways of conceiving world politics. While the former lies on the examination of material 
capabilities and systemic variables to explain it, in the latter ideational factors and domestic 
variables are investigated to understand it.23 Beyond the ontological and epistemological 
divergences between both schools of thought, this dissertation takes them as complementary. 
Despite the theoretical challenges involved in combining these approaches, the realist and 
constructivist precepts allow us to consider the state strategic behaviour as a product of the 
interaction of ideas, beliefs, and identities with the broad structural environment of the 
international system. 
The roots of political realism go back to the thinking of historians and philosophers, most 
importantly Thucydides, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes. The realist tradition was 
born from their dissertations on the importance of power, the criticism of the moral tradition, 
and the anarchic nature of the state.24 Throughout the twentieth century, academics such as 
Edward Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz developed the realist theoretical 
spectrum. Their works challenged utopian idealism, established realist principles based on 
human nature, and aspired to raise the rigour of the study of international politics through a 
scientific approach.25 Realism is characterised by founding its study of world reality on 
objective laws that identify states as the key actors and power as the primary attribute in their 
relationships. The realists argue that the fundamental nature of international relations is 
conflictive and competitive since the states are unitary and rational entities with fixed and 
uniform preferences, whose objectives are opposed to those of the other actors. Therefore, 
states interact in an anarchic international system, in whose structure material capacities are 
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vital assets.26 The various theoretical strands that have emerged within realism distinguish 
by the perspective from which they examine state behaviour in the international system.27 
The classical realists have done so from human nature, the neorealists from the anarchism 
of the international system, and the neoclassical ones from the importance of domestic 
factors.28 
Particularly, neoclassical or structural realism recognises that state behaviour is a result of 
pressures exerted and uncertainty produced by the anarchy of the international system.29 This 
condition motivates states to seek their security at the expense of those of the other actors. 
Material capabilities play a central role since they determine the distribution of economic 
and military power that drive world politics.30 Neoclassical realism examines international 
relations considering the distribution of power as an independent variable, domestic 
perceptions and incentives as an intervening variable, and policy-making process as a 
dependent variable. This theoretical current explains state behaviour based on foreign and 
security policy because it emphasises the role of alliances as a cooperative means to 
maximise their security. Also, it takes into consideration the structural changes in the balance 
of power of the international system since they condition the strategic decisions of states.31 
Neoclassical realism has been criticised for ontological and epistemological inconsistencies, 
incorporating theoretical elements outside of realism, and its ad hoc addressing of domestic 
variables.32 In recent years, representatives of this current have focused on the policy-making 
process to understand the interpretations of decision-makers on the situation of the 
international system.33 
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In contrast, constructivism emerges from the theory developed in the 1960s by Peter Berger 
and Thomas Luckmann on the sociology of knowledge. They return to the ideas of 
philosophers like Émile Durkheim and George Mead to affirm that the social order base on 
the premises: ‘Society is a human product. Society is an objective reality. Man is a social 
product’.34 In other words, constructivism emphasises the socially created nature of social 
life. The study of international reality from a constructivist perspective gained strength in 
the 1970s through the so-called ‘cultural turn’. During the 1990s, academics such as 
Nicholas Onuf, Alexander Wendt, and Peter Katzenstein pointed out the relevance of 
examining ideas, norms, and culture as sources of policy choices. Their studies developed 
understandings of how states are configured and limited by the conceptions rooted by the 
social actors that constitute them.35 The application of the sociological theory of 
constructivism in the discipline of international relations takes as its starting point the 
argument that the identity, interests, and values of states are historically and socially 
constructed, and are not determined solely by geopolitical situations or human nature.36 
Constructivism arises as a critique of determinism produced by scientific approaches applied 
to the study of social reality. From a reflectivist perspective, constructivism contends that 
social facts are the result of human action and distinguish from the natural facts in which the 
latter are phenomena of the human condition.37 In this divergence lies the gap between 
constructivist and realist stances in the study of international relations. Constructivism 
denies the existence of objective laws about structural forces and material conditions that 
determine state behaviour. On the contrary, the constructivists argue that the distribution of 
power in the international structure is subjective because it is a product of the interpretation 
of decision-makers immersed in specific historical, social, and cultural contexts.38 Taking as 
a reference the phrase coined by Wendt of ‘anarchy is what states make of it’, the distribution 
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of power has no inherent meaning.39 Its sense depends on the interpretation of policy elites. 
The main criticisms of constructivism point to its lack of systematisation to understand the 
role of culture as a source of policy-making, dismissal of the conditioning produced by 
structural conditions in decision-making, and inability to identify the relationship between 
power and ideas.40 
This dissertation argues that realism and constructivism can work in tandem to enrich the 
analysis of world politics. Their complementary nature derives from the fact that neither of 
them manages to address the diversity of factors that shape state behaviour. The case studies 
on the strategic policy of Mexico and Canada test the scope of both theoretical approaches. 
The political-economic order that emerged after the crisis of the 1980s and the unipolar 
system developed in the early 1990s consolidated the hegemonic role of the United States. 
The reconfiguration of the international structure was a fact interpreted in different ways by 
the Mexican and Canadian policy elites. The new flow of systemic forces influenced the 
formulation of foreign and security policy in Mexico and Canada. The new power 
relationship in the North American region represented a challenge for decision-makers. This 
situation generated external and internal pressures on the policies that Mexico and Canada 
should implement to adapt to the new scenario. The socio-cultural background of the policy-
makers was fundamental to guide their responses to changes in the structural environment. 
One of the main obstacles facing this thesis is to understand how the interaction among the 
subjective understanding of policy elites and objective power structures established the 
parameters for policy-making. To overcoming this challenge, elements of the strategic 
culture research programme are employed to examine how decision-makers’ interpretations 
of the international system in specific socio-political contexts drive state behaviour. 
1.2. Strategic culture: an evolving idea 
The concept of strategic culture emerged in the 1970s as a proposal to overcome the 
limitations of rationalism in the analysis of states’ strategies during the Cold War. The 
development of constructivism in the field of social sciences since the 1950s motivated 
historians, internationalists, and political scientists adopting culturalist approaches to 
counteract the structuralist bias that had prevailed in the study of world reality. The cultural 
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turn provided a new framework of interpretation to understand human behaviour. This 
academic movement positioned the concept of culture at the centre of the theoretical 
debate.41 The strategic culture research programme appeared as an alternative focused on 
examining state strategic responses based on how policy-makers interpret their structural 
environment. According to Alastair Johnston, the evolution of the notion of strategic culture 
comprise the work of three generations.42 Various academics agree that each of these 
generations diverges concerning the concept and methodology used to analyse the role of 
cultural factors in strategic behaviour.43 Beyond the firsts academic efforts, this dissertation 
is inserted in a fourth generation that emerged in recent decades.44 
The first generation is orientated to identify national cultural environments to understand 
the formulation of the nuclear strategy in the context of the Cold War. The academic works 
of Jack Snyder, Colin Gray, Carnes Lord, and David Jones adopts a holistic conception of 
strategic culture.45 In his seminal work of 1977, Snyder employed for the first time the 
culturalist approach to explain the differences between American and Soviet strategies 
regarding the use of their nuclear weapons. He defines strategic culture as 
the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and 
patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic 
community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share 
with each other with regard to nuclear strategy.46 
Snyder focuses his analysis on the set of attitudes and beliefs that guide and circumscribe 
the strategic thinking of the members of the national strategic community. He contends that 
these attitudes and beliefs influence the definition of a conceptual and methodological 
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framework that governs the debate and formulation of strategic issues. Also, he argues that 
government elites articulate a unique strategic culture, which reflects the values socialised 
by public opinion and translates into specific strategic thinking. This generation recognises 
that organisations play an essential role in the transmission and perpetuation of strategic 
attitudes and beliefs. 
Snyder’s conceptual proposal was endorsed in 1981 by Gray, who argues that strategic 
culture makes it possible to identify a national style about the use of force for political 
purposes. In his case study on the United States, Gray argues that strategic culture refers 
to modes of thought and action with respect to force, derives from 
perception of the national historical experience, aspiration for self-
characterisation […], and from all of the many distinctively 
American experiences […] that characterise an American citizen.47  
He asserts that national styles explain the particular way in which states address their 
strategic issues, as they are the product of geographical conditions and historical experiences 
specific to each country. The works of Snyder and Gray illustrate how the first generation 
uses a broad conception of strategic culture to understand the strategy-making process. 
Despite the valuable theoretical contribution, their analyses generated criticism due to the 
limitations of the approach. Johnston and Darryl Howlett contend that their definition of 
strategic culture is so broad that it makes it unintelligible and simplifies the intricate 
relationship between foreign policy and domestic factors. Both point out that the approach 
fails in recognising the instrumentality factor, specifying the dependent and independent 
variables, as well as distinguishing between the concepts of strategic culture and strategic 
behaviour.48 
The second generation is characterised by more rigorously addressing the instrumentality of 
culture in strategic matters. Academics such as Bradley Klein and Robin Luckman agree 
with the first-generation conception that each nation has a distinctive strategic culture, but 
stress that its relevance lies in its function as a socialising tool for government elites.49 They 
contend is that strategic choices are a result of the self-interest of decision-makers and not 
of the national strategic culture. Klein’s work on the nuclear doctrine of the United States 
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illustrates this approach. In his 1988 publication, he highlights the difference between the 
conception of strategic culture and the notion of strategic behaviour. His study aims to 
identify the differences among doctrines publicly declared by government elites and hidden 
agendas that explain their behaviours more accurately. This analytical framework is used to 
examine manipulation mechanisms used by decision-making elites to impose certain 
positions on strategic issues in public opinion and official discourse.50 His work also reveals 
that the challenge of the second generation is to distinguish and understand how cultural 
ideas reflect on strategic behaviour.  
Klein’s work of 1989 extends the analysis of the instrumentality of culture. In his second 
publication, he studies ‘the way strategy, in the form of strategic discourse, manifests itself 
as a set of power relations governing both domestic and international politics’.51 From this 
perspective, he inquiries about how decision-making elites instrumentalise culture. Klein 
examines the process through which political and military representations are produced and 
circulated to be adopted and become part of cultural life. He argues that it is possible to 
identify hidden strategies behind the official strategic discourse. His approach is also 
characterised by assessing how ordinary ideas converts to material behaviour. Klein’s works 
were significant, as they promoted the use of ethnographic methods to assess the techniques 
employed by military institutions to translate strategic culture into strategic behaviour. 
Despite his methodological contribution, Johnston’s criticisms of the second-generation 
approach indicated the lack of clarity in the definition of the causal link among its variables.52 
The third generation derives from the ideas of Johnston’s cultural realism, who broke with 
the neorealist theoretical tradition. Integrated by academics such as Elizabeth Kier, Jeffrey 
Legro, and Johnston, this current maintains that the conception of strategic culture must be 
much narrower than in previous proposals and must establish logical elements to be 
verifiable.53 For them, it is critical to distinguish between ideas and behaviour, as well as to 
omit the behavioural factor of the independent variable. Otherwise, the definition becomes 
tautological and loses all meaning. These inaccuracies were attributed to the mechanical 
determinism of the first generation’s approach, strand accused of being unable to distinguish 
 
50 Klein, ‘Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence Politics’. 
51 Bradley Klein, ‘The Textual Strategies of the Military: Or, Have You Read Any Good Defence Manuals 
Lately’, in International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics, ed. by James Derian 
and Michael Shapiro (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989) pp.97–9. 
52 Johnston, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’ pp.39–41. 
53 Alastair Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (New Jersey: 
PUP, 1995); Elizabeth Kier, ‘Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars’, International Security, 
19.4 (1995), 65–93; Jeffrey Legro, Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II 
(NY: CUP, 1995). 
40 
between the strategic culture and the effects it produces. Taking this criticism as a starting 
point, Johnston presented his conceptual and methodological proposal in 1995. In his first 
publication, he conceptualises strategic culture as 
an integrated system of symbols […] which acts to establish 
pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating 
concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate 
political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an 
aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely 
realistic and efficacious.54  
Additionally, the work of this generation emphasises that identity formation is the result of 
organisational, historical, and cultural processes. 
In a second publication, Johnston exposes his methodological proposal and tests it by 
developing a case study on Chinese policy. He argues that his definition of strategic culture 
enables the verification of its existence using a positivist approach. His proposal supports 
the need to establish a clear causal link between cultural factors and strategic behaviour. To 
avoid tautological reasoning and solipsism, Johnston suggests treating strategic culture as an 
independent variable and the behaviour derived from culture as a dependent variable.55 
Despite the refined approach of the third generation, it did not go unchallenged. Johnson’s 
proposal unleashed criticism from Gray, who rejected the existence of the dichotomy 
between realism and constructivism. Gray contended that ‘anyone who seeks a falsifiable 
theory of strategic culture (as does Johnston) commits the same error as the doctor who sees 
people as having entirely separable bodies and minds’. Also, he claimed that ‘a definition 
driven by the needs of theory-building rather than by the nature of the subject is unusually 
likely to lead scholars astray’.56 Johnston replied by arguing that Gray’s conception reduces 
strategic culture to ‘ethnonational’ terms, as it prevents recognition of the existence of 
‘contested strategic cultures or […] cross-national or transnational strategic cultures’.57 In 
terms of the theoretical debate between realism and constructivism, this generation promoted 
the counter position of explanations derived from strategic culture against others based on 
objectivist approaches, especially those that emerge from neorealism and institutionalism. 
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The fourth generation maintains that several strategic cultures interact within each state. 
Academics such as Mikkel Rasmussen, Iver Neumann, Henrikki Heikka, Alan Bloomfield, 
Kim Nossal, and David Haglund analyse how various narratives shape strategic behaviour. 
They reject the idea that countries have a unique and immutable strategic culture. Their 
purpose is to identify contending strategic cultures within the states and recognise which of 
them predominates over the others. They also try to explain why and how strategic cultures 
prevail.58 This generation is particularly critical of the third-generation approach. For 
example, Bloomfield and Nossal disagree with Johnson’s positivist proposal. Both consider 
it problematic because it is not consistent with its definition and seeks to separate ideational 
factors from behaviour. They concur to a greater extent with Gray’s contextual and 
interpretative conception. Bloomfield and Nossal maintain that the strategic culture is 
the habits of ideas, attitudes, and norms toward strategic issues, and 
patterns of strategic behaviour, which are relatively stable over 
time. Put another way, if norms and behaviour are both stable, this 
period of stability can be characterised as a particular strategic 
culture.59 
Another example of a fourth-generation writer is Haglund, who states that the scientific 
rigour of Johnson’s proposal resembles the neoclassical realists’ approach. He points out 
that the third generation shares the structural realists’ conviction that it is possible to reach a 
causal explanation, a situation that moves them away from other approaches that emphasise 
cultural variables. For Haglund, the relevance of the ideational variables is that they not only 
seek to produce an explanation but also offer an understanding of the strategic reality 
causally. He emphasises that in this last aspect lies the main contribution of the strategic 
culture as a research programme, as it provides tools for an ‘explanatory understanding’ of 
state’s security policy.60 Neumann and Heikka synthesise the fourth-generation approach 
properly. Both reject the idea that strategic culture is immutable and static, or that it is 
immune to material elements or structural factors. They recognise that strategic beliefs are 
deeply rooted in political culture, so they tend to change slowly and to constrict the effects 
that changes in a state’s environment have on its security policy. Both also maintain that, 
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although a strategic culture can remain static for an extended period, it can change entirely 
in the face of critical situations derived from very intense internal or external pressures.61 
The approach of the fourth generation is highly relevant for this thesis, as it facilitates the 
examination of the dynamics that describe the interaction among various national strategic 
cultures, as well as among the predominant strategic culture and systemic structural 
pressures. 
The literature regarding strategic culture exhibits a series of theoretical troubles. A first 
problem feeds the epistemological debate about strategic culture. The discussion has focused 
on whether its study should address scientific rigour or encourage a holistic approach.62 
Johnson argues that culture is an independent variable of strategy and can be proven through 
behaviour. For this reason, he proposes a conceptualisation of strategic culture that allows 
us to verify its existence and make falsifiable predictions about its effects on strategic 
behaviour.63 In contrast, Gray criticises Johnson’s scientific vision because it undermines 
the holistic character of strategic culture. He argues that ‘all strategic behaviour is cultural 
behaviour’.64 Therefore, culture is not an independent variable from behaviour and its impact 
cannot be measured. Bloomfield, Nossal, and Haglund also argue that Johnston’s positivist 
proposal is inconsistent. They contend that trying to explain behaviour as a product of 
strategic culture ignores the fact that both are mutually constitutive.65 For Stuart Poore, this 
theoretical problem is far from being solved. However, he points out that the debate has 
delimited the scope of the study of strategic culture and has opened the door to address it 
from an empirical approach.66 
The relevance of culture is a second problem. Jeffrey Lantis and Howlett point out that in 
the literature, the importance attributed to culture as an explanatory factor of behaviour often 
varies.67 They identify a first academic current that employs strategic culture as a 
complement to rationalist or structuralist explanations about state behaviour. Academics like 
Michael Desch believe that culturalist theory can complement realism to explain the delays 
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among structural changes and state responses, irrational behaviour and the state inability to 
adapt, as well as state preferences in undefined structural conditions. A second current has 
positioned strategic culture as the central resource to explain strategic behaviour. In this 
strand, the academics have created scientific research frameworks that seek to verify the 
impact of culture as an independent variable. The third current conceptualises strategic 
culture as the sum of expressions of human behaviour that cannot be measured scientifically. 
The complexity of this notion considers that some cultural traits can only be understood by 
being immersed in the culture under study and, therefore, its falsification is futile.68 In 
general terms, the relevance of culture as an explanatory element of strategic behaviour 
depends on how culture is conceptualised, the practical difficulties posed by its 
operationalisation, and the implications of the concept in the elaboration of specific policies. 
The identification of change in strategic culture is the third problem. Most scholars recognise 
that culture is not immutable, even though it is constituted by ideas and norms firmly rooted 
in a social group. However, Gray warns that culture is not a set of fashionable attitudes or 
opinions, nor ephemeral patterns of behaviour.69 Academics accept that both structural and 
domestic factors can produce cultural changes. On the one hand, Neumann and Heikka point 
out that strategic beliefs are likely to change progressively due to the intermediary role they 
play between the structural environment and policy decisions. Like the constructivists who 
recognise the influence of structural factors, both argue that culture must be studied 
considering its dynamic interaction with its specific environment.70 On the other hand, 
Howlett and Lantis assert that the change can also be disruptive in the face of unforeseen 
structural phenomena that they define as ‘strategic shocks’. They argue that these events 
trigger ‘strategic cultural dilemmas’ in which the prevailing strategic preferences are 
reassessed to respond to the new structural environment.71 The crisis conditions can 
accentuate domestic competition among social groups with different identities and accelerate 
the process of cultural change. 
Beyond the difficulties in the application of the concept of strategic culture, academics like 
Ken Booth point out that the study of culture lies mainly in discerning trends and not 
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determining conditions.72 Haglund defends its usefulness because it favours the 
understanding of strategic behaviour even when culture is not established as an independent 
variable.73 For these reasons and given the intellectual challenge it represents, this thesis 
considers strategic culture as the appropriate means to examine the evolution of the foreign 
and security policy of Mexico and Canada in a period of structural change. However, 
problems related to the causality of behaviour, function and relevance of culture, as well as 
the identification of the interaction between ideas and structure, demand an adaption of the 
concept of strategic culture. The importation of elements of Bourdieu’s theory of practice 
allows us to recognise the cultural contexts through which agents interact with the systemic 
structure during the policy-making process. This approach provides elements to overcome 
the realist-constructivist dichotomy and to understand the dynamic relationship between 
agents and structures. 
1.3. Theory of practice: culture in action 
The critical and reflective study of human practice gained relevance in the discipline of 
international relations in the late 1980s. Bourdieu’s sociological thinking established as a 
reference in the theoretical debate between rationalists and post-positivists. His ideas 
inspired a new academic current to challenge the determinism that predominated in the 
academy.74 The so-called ‘practical turn’ provided elements to question the prevailing 
thinking about human life and social reality. This movement maintains that the mind, 
rationality, and knowledge are constituted through individual action and social practices. In 
this way, social life is organised, reproduced, and transformed.75 In the last decade, several 
scholars have agreed that Bourdieu’s theoretical proposal favours the integration of 
structuralist and constructivist elements to assess the effects of power and the role of ideas 
in world politics. They recognise that his theory makes it possible to overcome theoretical 
divisions and provides an analytical framework to examine the practices that constitute 
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international relations.76 The starting point to understand the relevance of the theory of 
practice is situated in the ontological debate about causality. 
The causes and effects of human behaviour and social structure are the focus of the structure-
agency debate. This discussion has been a source of divergences in the discipline of 
international relations and has influenced the relevance given to culture in the study of 
strategic behaviour.77 One of the most notable efforts to overcome this dichotomy is 
attributed to the sociologist Anthony Giddens. Through the structuration theory, he argues 
that the interaction between agents and structures allows us to understand causation. Giddens 
states that ‘social structures are both constituted by human agency, and yet at the same time 
are the very medium of this constitution’.78 He also argues that ‘to examine the structuration 
of a social system is to examine the modes whereby that system […] is produced and 
reproduced in social interaction’.79 However, William Sewell places human practice at the 
centre of the study of culture from an anthropological perspective. He challenges Giddens’ 
rigid notion of structuration. Sewell contends that ‘the simplest way of conceptualising 
structures would be […] to assert that structure refers only to rules or schema, not to 
resources and that resources should be thought of as an effect of structures’. He also 
emphasises that the ‘agency is the actor’s capacity to reinterpret and mobilise an array of 
resources in terms of cultural schemas’ and, therefore, the ‘human practice […] is structured 
simultaneously both by meanings and by other aspects of the environment in which they 
occur’.80 The structure-agency debate is overcome by placing human practice as a starting 
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point to study social reality. This approach has allowed us to understand the relevance of 
culture in the interaction of ideational factors with the structural environment. 
In the context of the above debate, Bourdieu’s conceptual framework about how to conceive 
the nature of culture and how it shapes social interaction is hugely influential. His conception 
of social reality sought to overcome the false dichotomies that confronted structural 
objectivism and constructivist subjectivism. For him, this gap limits the possibility of 
achieving genuine knowledge of social reality. Bourdieu describes his theoretical project as 
constructivist structuralism or structuralist constructivism: 
By structuralism or structuralist, I mean that there exist, in the social 
world itself, and not merely in symbolic systems, language, myth, 
etc., objective structures which are independent of the 
consciousness and desires of agents and are capable of guiding or 
constraining their practices or their representations. By 
constructivism, I mean that there is a social genesis on the one hand 
of the patterns of perception, thought and action which are 
constitutive of what I call the habitus, and on the other hand of 
social structures, and in particular of what I call fields and groups, 
especially of what are usually called social groups.81 
At the centre of his theoretical proposal, he argues that social interaction simultaneously 
produces social structures and schemes of perception, thought, and action. In other words, 
Bourdieu provides elements to understand how the agents’ practices reflect their mental 
structure, which is the product of the social structure.82 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice connects the subjectivist agency-centred and objectivist 
structure-centred approaches. His proposal synthesises the dialectical relationship among the 
processes of internalisation of the external and externalisation of the internal. Moreover, his 
theoretical work delves into the cultural context of human practice. The theory of practice 
founds on an assemblage of concepts that explain the dynamics that constitute the social 
world. The formula ‘[(habitus) (capital)] + field = practice’ is the axis through which 
Bourdieu examines what he calls practical logic.83 His theoretical project based on this 
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conceptual framework and an empirical methodology focused on studying the cultural 
dynamics of domination. For Bourdieu, cultural practices and representations legitimise and 
reproduce social hierarchies and power relations.84 His work is recognised by studying the 
material and symbolic character of power, as well as its daily manifestations in social life. 
The adoption of his work in the discipline of international relations has promoted the study 
of social practices, considering them as an expression of political ideas of social groups that 
interact from different cultural contexts. This academic trend asserts that through the theory 
of practice ‘it is possible to map political units as spaces of practical knowledge on which 
diverse and often “unconventional” agencies position themselves and therefore shape 
international politics’.85 From this perspective, the analysis of international relations is 
deconstructed and reformulated as the study of the political and cultural sociology in the 
world arena. 
One of the key concepts that make up the theory of practice is habitus. Bourdieu defines it 
as 
systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as 
principles of the generation and structuring of practices and 
representations which can be objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ 
without in anyway being the product of obedience to rules, 
objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious 
aiming at ends, or an express mastery of the operations necessary 
to attain them, and being all this, collectively orchestrated without 
being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor.86 
Through the concept of habitus, Bourdieu identifies the cultural origins of social action and 
synthesises the cultural sources of the social agents’ subjectivity. Habitus is a cluster of 
predispositions that agents internalise from their cultural environment, consciously through 
experiences learned, and unconsciously through exposure to everyday practices.87 The socio-
cultural background, the historical trajectory, and the socio-economic position are factors 
that shape habitus. It should be noted that habitus is not only individual but also collective. 
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This feature means that actors in similar social positions and cultural environments develop 
analogous dispositions that will guide their practices in a parallel way. In this sense, 
academics describe habitus as the engine of cultural action, as it provides social actors with 
an orientation towards the external world that forms a basis for practice.88 
Durability and transposability are the main features of habitus. On the one hand, it is durable 
because it is forged during extended periods through socialisation processes. Bourdieu 
argues that it is ‘embodied history, internalised as second nature’, the result of ‘the 
permanent internalisation of the social order in the human body’. 89 In this sense, habitus is 
the core of practical knowledge. It is the ‘bodily knowledge’ that precedes the reflection and 
intention of human practice.90 On the other hand, it is transposable because it is ‘an acquired 
system of generative schemes objectively adjusted to the particular conditions in which it is 
constituted’.91 The habitus’ dynamic nature is the result of its permanent evolution according 
to the prevailing conditions in external structures. This aspect emphasises the agents’ 
improvisation capacity and allows them to adapt to different social environments in a semi-
conscious manner. Habitus is also structured and structuring, it is ‘a structuring structure, 
which organises practices and the perception of practices’. It is structured because it is the 
result of the individual’s position in the social structure. It is structuring because it moulds 
the practices through which the actor interacts with the social structure. For Bourdieu, 
habitus is ‘the product of structure, producer of practice, and the reproducer of structure’.92 
This triple attribute explains the role of habitus in the perpetuation of hierarchical structures 
in society. The dispositions that constitute the habitus can be studied through the mapping 
of the proclivities acquired by experience or exposure in specific cultural settings. The 
application of this concept to the study of world politics makes it possible to know the 
cultural dispositions that condition the responses of political actors or social groups to 
changes in their structural environment. 
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The understanding of culture and how it shapes social interaction is only possible by 
articulating the concept of habitus with that of field. Bourdieu conceptualises it as 
a network, or a configuration of objective relations between 
positions. These positions are defined objectively in their existence 
and in the determinations that they impose on their occupants, 
agents or institutions, by their current and potential situations (situs) 
in the [wider] structure of the distribution of different currencies of 
power (or of capital), possession of which provides access to 
specific profits that are up for grabs in the field, at the same time, 
by their objective relations to other positions (domination, 
subordination, equivalents etc.). In highly differentiated societies, 
the social cosmos is constituted by the sum of these relatively 
autonomous social microcosms, spaces of objective relations which 
have a logic and a necessity that is specific and irreducible to those 
that govern other fields.93 
Field is a space of social organisation constituted by power relations, objective positions, 
objects of struggle, valuable resources, and rules taken for granted.94 Its relevance lies in the 
fact that the field and the overlap of several of them make up the social world. The field 
shapes how social actors are conceived and determines the susceptible positions to be 
occupied. The agents’ position results from the interaction among their habitus, their 
resources, and the rules inherent in the field. However, the field does not determine how 
social actors get involved or the way they evolve. It only exerts enough force to influence 
the formation of their habitus and the conditioning of their actions. 
Field is also a network of objective social relations, a social sphere in which the actors 
involved compete for tangible and intangible resources that provide power. It is defined by 
the distribution of sources and assets of power, as well as by a specific logic understood as 
‘the sum of the structural constraints on the action of its members’.95 Although the logic of 
each field is unique, the social actors in all of them aspire to a differentiation that gives them 
symbolic power. The asymmetries among the statuses acquired by the actors produce 
hierarchies of power relations. For Bourdieu, the struggle for distinction is a fundamental 
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feature of social life.96 The field is semi-autonomous because it is ‘constantly in the process 
of progressive differentiation’.97 It is permanently moulded by internal struggles among its 
members and by external changes in correlated fields. The study of the field is possible 
through a topographic analysis that examines its population, the position of the actors 
involved, the social relations it harbours, and the scope of its effects. For the discipline of 
international relations, this concept provides a relational approach that enables the 
identification of a level of analysis different from conventional ones since it focuses on the 
totality of relationships beyond the predominance of state structures. It is for this reason that 
the concept of field has direct implications in rethinking the idea of sovereignty, the 
specificity of the international, and the constitution of world politics.98 
Capital is the catalyst of the relation between habitus and field because it is the resource that 
drives actors to get involved in the social space. Bourdieu argues that 
the system of dispositions people acquire depends on the position(s) 
they occupy in society, that is, on their particular endowment in 
capital. […] Capital is any resource effective in a given social arena 
that enables one to appropriate the specific profits arising out of 
participation and contest in it.99  
Capital is distributed within the field as power currencies and is accumulated by the 
participating actors to improve their position. It also represents the stake by which the agents 
involved in a field compete. Upon obtaining it, the participants mobilise it in the form of 
power and influence to achieve their objectives.100 Bourdieu points out that in the social 
game in which the actors participate by being immersed in a field, the aim is to accumulate 
the highest volume of capital to guarantee to obtain more capital and to have the capacity to 
modify the structure of the field in their favour. Likewise, the accumulation of a considerable 
volume of capital allows the actor to preserve a dominant position in the field and the related 
privileges.101 It is important to note that the value attributed to capital depends on the logic 
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prevailing in the field so that only the actors immersed in it have full knowledge of its 
significance. This understanding is possible because of the permanent interaction between 
the objective structure of the field and the subjective dispositions of the habitus.102 
According to Bourdieu, 
capital comes in three principal species: economic (material and 
financial assets), cultural (scarce symbolic goods, skills, and titles), 
and social (resources accrued by virtue of membership in a group). 
A fourth species, symbolic capital, designates the effects of any 
form of capital when people do not perceive them as such (as when 
we attribute moral qualities to members of the upper class as a result 
of their ‘donating’ time and money to charities).103 
The forms of capital are historically constructed and determined by the logic of the field. 
This logic determines the power structure of the hierarchy of social domination. Despite the 
relative exclusivity of capital to the specific logic of a field, it may be exchanged and used 
in other fields. Like habitus, capital is transposable and can be invested in different fields to 
achieve several objectives. The process of exchanging capital from one field to another may 
involve the degradation of the effectiveness of its effects because it is subject to different 
rules and regulations. It should be noted that the logic of the field defines the distribution of 
capital, as well as the type and volume of capital required to access the field and to aspire to 
dominant positions. The importation of capital from one field to another can modify the 
structure and logic of the receiving field. This effect leads the habitus to adjust and the 
participants to adapt to the new conditions of the social game.104 The study of capital is 
possible through examining the habitus-field correlation. While the topographic analysis of 
the field reveals the sources and distribution of capital, the evaluation of socio-cultural 
backgrounds and personal trajectories exposes the methods of capital acquisition. For the 
discipline of international relations, capital is a pivotal concept in the redefinition of the state 
as a meta-field and its sovereignty as a meta-capital.105 
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In short, human practice is the product of the dialectical interaction between habitus and 
field. Bourdieu argues that  
the relationship between the habitus and the field is foremost one of 
conditioning: the field structures the habitus which is the product of 
the incorporation of the immanent demands of the field […] but it 
is also a relationship of knowledge and of constructive cognition: 
the habitus contributes to the constitution of the field as a world of 
meaning, endowed with sense and value, worthy of the necessary 
investment of energy.106 
Bourdieu’s theoretical proposal grounds on the premise that practice is the result of the 
dynamic interrelation of ideas and beliefs with the structural environment that hosts social 
action. It is for this reason that the logic that governs practice is simultaneously dispositional 
and positional. By placing itself in the midpoint between agency and structure, the logic of 
practice overcomes the biases of instrumental rationality and structural determinism. For this 
thesis, it is essential to underline that the theory of practice is also a cultural theory of 
action.107 It is from this perspective that this dissertation employs a specific analytical 
framework to reformulate the understanding of the relationship between culture and strategy. 
1.4. Analytical framework: strategic culture from a practice-
centred approach 
The theory of practice provides a bedrock that allows us to reconstruct the notion of strategic 
culture and overcome the troubles that its use implies. The reformulation proposed in this 
dissertation lies on two fundamental conceptual elements. The first is Peter Jackson’s 
translation of the concept of culture. Based on Bourdieu’s ideas, Jackson points out that 
culture is the set of historically forged predispositions that are embodied by social actors to 
interact with the broad structural environment. This dynamic interrelation forms a basis for 
everyday practices, a practical logic that conditions the strategies generated by social 
actors.108 The second element is the redefinition of the concept of strategy provided by 
Michael Williams. He argues that strategy refers to how social actors pursue their interests, 
as it highlights the individual capacity of agency, choice, and action. The strategy takes place 
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in the context of habitus, field, and capital. Therefore, the strategy must be conceived within 
the structure from which it arises and operates.109 Both conceptual proposals uncover the 
limitations of the traditional notion of strategic culture, which has focused on the 
unidirectional impact of ideas on behaviour. Instead, the practice-centred conception of 
strategic culture focuses on the causes and consequences of the dynamic process of 
interaction between ideational and structural factors that originate human practice. The new 
notion of strategic culture arises from the identification of culture as the context that frames 
social relationships and provides social actors with a range of tools and resources to build 
strategies for action.110 Inspired by Jackson’s work on France’s national security policy 
during the Great War, the next paragraphs describe the analytical framework employed to 
understand and explain the way policy-makers ‘responded in the way that they did to 
profound transformations in both the internal and external environment’.111 
The starting point of this thesis is the identification of the context of the formulation of the 
strategic policy of Mexico and Canada from 1988 to 2015. Firstly, the interaction between 
external pressures and the domestic environment in which the policy-making processes take 
place is reviewed. The relevance of this examination lies on the premise that the internal 
reality determines how the outside world is understood.112 For this analytical framework, the 
policy-making context is defined as the cultural, social, and political circumstances that 
condition how policy elites interpret their environment and make decisions. The context in 
which policy-makers operate is shaped by structural conditions derived from internal and 
external ideational and material phenomena. The context is important because it delimits the 
practices of decision-makers. It also frames the tensions and consensus that constitute the 
policy-making processes. This dissertation pays special attention to the role played by the 
articulations on foreign and security policy in the context configuration. Through the 
examination of the context, it is possible to trace the sources of the strategic policy. For this 
revision, culture plays a central role because strategic notions have their origin in specific 
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socio-historical contexts.113 The understanding of ideas is reduced without assessing the 
context in which they emerge and evolve. The conceptualisation of culture offered by 
Bourdieu and translated by Jackson allows us to reconstruct the socio-cultural dimension of 
the context that hosts the strategic policy-making process. 
This analytical framework employs two elements to examine the sources of strategic policy. 
First, the social dynamics of policy-making. Its analysis enables the identification of 
institutional sources. The theory of practice provides elements to understand the nature and 
function of culture in this process. Through the concept of habitus, it is possible to recognise 
the origins and evolution of the predispositions that condition the institutional responses. 
Through the notion of field, it is feasible to identify the relationships, ends, resources, and 
rules to which policy-makers are subject. In this sense, the social dynamics of policy-making 
establish as the process of interaction between the dispositions of the decision-makers’ 
habitus and the positions of the strategic policy-making field within a specific context. The 
continuous interrelation is crucial for this study, as it allows us to know the institutional 
sources of the strategies that constitute foreign and security policy. This approach examines 
the anatomy of the intricate relationship between the cultural predispositions of policy-
makers and the external structures that condition their strategies and limit their policy 
options. In this way, this conceptual tool enables us to evaluate the evolution of the strategic 
policy of Mexico and Canada in the context of the end of the Cold War and the consolidation 
of global neoliberalism. 
The second element used to identify the sources of strategic policy is strategic approaches. 
Their analysis enables the elucidation of ideational sources. For this dissertation, strategic 
approaches are the doctrinal corpus that produces visions of national security to respond to 
strategic issues. They are also conceptions, beliefs, and assumptions based on long-standing 
practices that play an essential role in decision-making. Strategic approaches provide the 
conceptual and methodological framework employed in the policy-making processes. It 
should be noted that strategic approaches are not static or isolated knowledge regimes. They 
are continuously interacting and adapting according to the conditions of the internal and 
external context.114 The emergence, evolution, and predominance of the conventions of the 
approaches within the policy elites depend on the circumstances of the domestic politics and 
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the conditions of the structural environment to which the policy-makers are forced to react. 
The prescriptions that constitute the strategic visions delineate the parameters and relatively 
influence the proclivity of the policy elites to use of force in the face of security incidents. 
Strategic approaches are a fundamental piece of policy machinery because they catalyse the 
consensus and trigger struggles within the policy elite in search of dominance and 
preservation of their status as practical logic. They manifest themselves through speeches 
and practices, expressions of belief systems, and cultural reflections embodied by politicians, 
diplomats, bureaucrats, and generals. In this sense, strategic approaches support the basis of 
practical logic in the field of strategic policy-making.  
Practical logic is the core of the analytical framework. Also known as practicality, it is 
embedded in the field of strategic policy-making and incorporated by decision-makers. It is 
the result of institutional and ideational sources of strategic policy within a specific context. 
Practical logic is the rooted orientations of policy-makers towards their external 
environment. It is the prevailing logic in the field that conditions the thoughts, perceptions, 
and actions of social actors. It is also a basis for dispositions that guide how decision-makers 
understand their environment and get involved in it through everyday practices.115 Practical 
logic shapes the strategic choices of policy elites as it produces schemes of understanding 
about how to proceed and an ideal vision of how the world should be. Practicality is the 
result of long-standing traditions, is based on lasting predispositions, and evolves according 
to the challenges presented by the structural environment. Practical logic is formally 
acquired through experience and is reinforced informally through daily practice. It is through 
this concept that it is possible to understand how policy-makers respond to changes in the 
structural environment. The fact that the strategy shaped by human practice is at the same 
time a constitutive element and a consequence of culture portrays the enduring condition of 
strategic culture. 
In summary, the analytical framework employed in this dissertation to examine the strategic 
culture that has governed the strategic policy-making in Mexico and Canada consists of four 
main elements: context, social dynamics, strategic approaches, and practical logic. As shown 
in Figure 1-1, the context frames the institutional and ideational sources of strategic policy. 
Social dynamics and strategic approaches shape the practical logic embodied in decision-
makers and embedded in the policy-making process. Practical logic evolves as a result of its 
interaction with the internal and external environment, as well as its adaptation to profound 
 
115 Michael Williams p.25. 
56 
structural transformations. This analytical framework allows us to understand and explain 
why policy-makers acted as they acted. 
Figure 1-1. Analytical framework 
 
Own elaboration. 
1.5. Methodology and sources: identifying practices, 
reconstructing habitus, and constructing fields 
One of the main challenges in the application of the analytical framework is the 
configuration of a consistent strategy and viable methodology. This thesis takes as reference 
the sobjective methodology developed by Vincent Pouliot for ‘putting practice theory into 
practice’.116 The proposal outlines that the study of practicality must meet the double interest 
of examining the social structures and intersubjective composition of the social world.117 His 
approach allows us to overcome theoretical dichotomies and avoid the reification of culture 
that has predominated in much of the literature on strategic culture. Pouliot describes his 
approach as a methodological consideration in which the researcher ‘begins with the 
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inductive recovery of agents’ realities and practical logics, then objectifies them through the 
interpretation of intersubjective contexts and thereafter pursues further objectification 
through historicisation’.118 This argument delineates the three phases of the methodological 
strategy employed in this dissertation. 
The first phase focuses on access to the daily practices that constitute the policy-making 
process. The objective is to collect data directly from decision-makers in the strategic policy-
making field. This information enables the generation of a projection of the local space that 
circumscribes the practice of policy-makers. The second phase of the methodology involves 
the reconstruction of the dispositional logic of the policy elites’ habitus. This phase is aimed 
at recovering the meanings and beliefs of policy-makers about their reality, which give sense 
to their practices. The purpose is to generate an image of practical knowledge that makes 
politicians, diplomats, bureaucrats, and generals competent to participate in decision-
making. The third methodological phase is the construction of the positional logic of the 
strategic policy-making field. The goal is to generate a topographic map of the social space 
in which the policy-making takes place. This phase bases on the interpretation of the rules 
of the political game, the recognition of the distribution and volume of capital, and the 
tracking of the historical trajectory of the disputes that shape the field. 
The implementation of this strategy is carried out through a mixed methodology. 
Ethnographic methods are used to access the practices, such as participant observation in the 
spaces where policy-making takes place and semi-structured interviews applied to decision-
makers. For the reconstruction of the dispositional logic, quantitative and qualitative 
methods are employed. The statistical analysis examines the composition of the policy elite 
and the trends that describe its evolutionary trajectory. Prospographic study explores the 
socio-cultural context and educational background that shapes policy-makers’ habitus. For 
the construction of positional logic, ethnographic methods such as participant observation 
and semi-structured interviews are also used. Through them, it is intended to inspect the 
intersubjective dimension of the structure to reconstruct what Bourdieu calls doxa, common 
sense prevailing in the field. In all three phases of the methodology, the study of various 
records is fundamental to recovering the articulations emitted by decision-makers. The 
enunciations portray their strategic dispositions, the dominant positions in the field, and their 
interpretations of the context that harbours their practices. 
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This dissertation focuses on a comparative analysis of two case studies, which were 
developed through the analysis of three types of primary sources. First, speeches and debates 
that expose the articulations of decision-makers on foreign and security policy. The 
expressions contained in these sources are not only valued for their narrative content, but 
also for the context in which the discursive act takes place. Second, diaries and memoirs in 
which the policy-makers externalise their reflections on their socio-cultural backgrounds, 
educational trajectories, and daily practices. Documents published by Mexican presidents, 
Canadian prime ministers, and members of their cabinets provide meaningful information to 
understand the logic from which they made strategic policy choices. Third, conversations 
and interviews with politicians, diplomats, bureaucrats, and generals who participated 
directly or indirectly in the strategic policy-making process. It should be noted that most of 
the interviews were conducted anonymously to motivate genuine responses and obtain more 
meetings. The off-the-record conversations encouraged the interviewee to make judgments 
without jeopardising their professional situation. Due to this and the many meetings held, 
only the most significant are referred directly. 
This study has also consulted three types of secondary sources. First, documents and 
publications that disseminate information about prevailing codes, procedures, ideas, and 
beliefs in government departments and agencies. Second, newspaper articles that report 
events related to strategic issues. Media sources are carefully assessed with an awareness of 
the political biases of the issuing media outlet. For this reason, the content is corroborated in 
more than one journalistic source or with interviewed actors. Third, leaks revealed by non-
profit organisations and bibliography produced by academics who were linked to the 
institutions that make up the field of strategic policy-making. Finally, the integration of 
qualitative and quantitative data collected in the three phases of the methodological strategy 
aims to provide a synthesis of the evolution of the practical logic that shaped the policy 
elites’ strategic choices. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has set out the theoretical foundations from which this thesis studies the politics 
of strategic policy of Mexico and Canada. The configuration of the analytical framework 
deployed in this dissertation takes as its starting point two key considerations. The first refers 
to the implications of the research topic’s position in one of the central debates in the 
discipline of international relations. The discussion between realism and constructivism 
confronts two ways to tackle the analysis of world politics. Realism bases its explanation on 
objective laws that determine the distribution of economic and military power in the structure 
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of an anarchic international system. In contrast, constructivism grounds its understanding on 
the role of identities, ideas, and norms as sources of political decisions. The second 
consideration is the relevance of the strategic culture research programme as a framework to 
understand the impact of ideational factors on state strategic behaviour. The debate among 
the four academic generations of the strategic culture research programme exposes a series 
of difficulties attributed to the scientific or holistic nature of the concept, the relevance given 
to culture as an explanatory variable, and the identification of continuity and change in 
culture. Furthermore, the literature reveals a set of analytical limitations that prevent us from 
understanding how strategy and culture interact and evolve. 
This chapter has demonstrated that Bourdieu’s sociological theory makes it possible to 
bridge the structural objectivism of realism and ideational subjectivism of constructivism for 
the study of strategic culture. This theoretical link permits us to assess the effects of power 
and the relevance of beliefs in the formulation of strategic policy. The reinterpretation of the 
concepts of culture and strategy provided by Jackson and Williams sustains the redefinition 
of the study of strategic culture proposed in this chapter from a practical perspective. They 
offer a useful translation of Bourdieu’s thinking to generate an analytical framework aimed 
at examining strategic culture through the interrelation of policy-making contexts, socio-
cultural dynamics, strategic approaches, and practical logics. Given the challenges involved 
in this analytical framework, the methodological strategy proposed by Pouliot allows the 
organisation of methods and systematisation of sources to put the theory of practice into 
practice. In this sense, the modest contribution of this chapter enables the examination in the 
following chapters of how the interaction between the subjective perceptions of policy elites 
and the objective power structures shaped the national security strategies of Mexico and 


























































Mexico is an extraordinarily easy country to dominate, as it is necessary 
to control only one man; the president. We must abandon the idea of 
installing an American citizen in the Mexican presidency, as that would 
only lead us, once again, to war. The solution requires more time: we must 
open the doors of our universities to young, ambitious Mexicans and make 
the effort to educate them in the American way of life, in our values, and 
in respect for the leadership of the United States. Mexico will need 
competent administrators, and over time, these young people will come to 
occupy important positions and will eventually take possession of the 
presidency itself. And without the United States having to spend a single 
cent or fire a single shot, they will do what we want, and do it better and 
more radically than we ourselves would have done.119 
 
Richard Lansing (United States Secretary of State, 1915-1920), 1924. 
 
119 James Cockcroft, Mexico’s Revolution Then and Now (NY: MR, 2012) p.77. 
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Introduction 
The study of strategy from a cultural approach requires the analysis of the specific socio-
historical contexts from which the ideas that shape it emerge. Otherwise, it is not possible to 
properly understand the effects of the social imaginary of policy actors on the strategic 
decisions that guide state behaviour. Based on this premise, this chapter describes the social 
and cultural context in which Mexico’s foreign and security policy was formulated from 
1988 to 2012. It also examines the origins, development, and interplay of the predominant 
strategic conceptions within the Mexican policy elite: nationalism and continentalism. 
Considering the analytical framework presented in the previous chapter, the following 
paragraphs pay special attention to the institutional and ideological sources of Mexican 
strategic policy. The review of the institutional culture of government departments and the 
cultural reflexes of decision-makers allows us to elucidate where ideas come from and how 
they affect the formulation and evolution of strategic policy. This chapter provides the 
necessary elements to comprehend in the two subsequent chapters how and why Mexican 
policy-makers responded in the way they did to the transformations of the domestic and 
international environment during the neoliberal era. 
The central argument of this chapter contends that the Latin American debt crisis that 
originated in the late 1970s triggered a deep change in the cultural roots of policy-making in 
Mexico. The need to adapt the country to the emerging international order in the 1980s 
generated political spaces for a practical logic based on a continentalist strategic conception 
which would gradually dominate the cultural reflexes of politicians, bureaucrats, and 
generals. During this period, neoliberalism was established as a pervasive ideological force 
that reformed the nationalist cultural predispositions of the policy elite and conditioned their 
strategic decisions until the 2010s. This chapter contributes to the literature with a 
comprehensive analysis of the role of the two contending strategic conceptions in the 
formulation of Mexico’s foreign and security policy. Most of the works published to date 
have examined in isolation issues such as the composition of power elites, the characteristics 
of foreign policy, and the evolution of national security. Prominent studies by academics 
such as Roderic Camp, Ana Covarrubias, Olga Pellicer, and Leonardo Curzio have provided 
valuable findings and reflections on how Mexican strategic behaviour has evolved.120 
 
120 Olga Pellicer, ‘Principios Constitucionales de Política Exterior. Mito y Realidad’, in Cien Ensayos Para El 
Centenario, ed. by Gerardo Esquivel, Francisco Ibarra, and Pedro Salazar (Mexico: UNAM, 2017); Ana 
Covarrubias, ‘El Reacomodo de México En Una América Latina Cambiante: De La Euforia Democrática a La 
Introversión’, Pensamiento Propio, 21.44 (2017), 325–50; Ana Covarrubias, ‘Mexico’s Foreign Policy under 
the Partido Acción Nacional: Promoting Democracy, Human Rights, and Interests’, in Latin American Foreign 
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However, their analyses have been the product of approaches that have overlooked the role 
of cultural roots and dynamics in strategic decision-making. Considering this gap in the 
literature, the small contribution of this chapter lies in the description of the sociocultural 
context in which the subjective understandings of the Mexican policy elite that shaped their 
institutional responses to national security issues emerged. 
This chapter is made up of two sections. The first reviews the social background, formal 
education, and daily practices of members of the political, bureaucratic, and military elite. It 
delineates the cultural and institutional framework that harboured the evolution of ideas on 
foreign affairs and national security. The social dynamics of the policy-making process 
during the period of consolidation of the neoliberal model are also identified. The second 
section sets out the two main strategic approaches that shaped the official articulations on 
foreign and security policy. It shows the origins and evolution of the nationalist and 
continentalist strategic conceptions. The prevalence of both visions within the policy elite 
before and after the political transition of 2000 is also evaluated. The review of institutional 
and ideological sources provides an overview of the socio-cultural context in which the 
strategic policy evolved. This analysis will allow us to understand in the subsequent two 
chapters how Mexican policy-makers responded to the profound changes in the national and 
international contexts. 
2.1. Social dynamics of strategic policy-making 
During the last quarter of the twentieth century, politicians, bureaucrats, and generals began 
to discuss strategic policy jointly. Internal divisions distinguished each of these 
constituencies. Their members occupied different positions of power and had distinctive 
predispositions that shaped their everyday practices and institutional responses on foreign 
policy and national security. The following paragraphs portray the socio-cultural 
background of the political, bureaucratic, and military elites, as well as the architecture of 
the policy-making machinery. The central argument is that the social, cultural, and 
institutional change that began in the 1970s was consolidated after the political transition of 
 
Policies: Between Ideology and Pragmatism, ed. by Gian Gardini and Peter Lambert (NY: Palgrave, 2011); 
Leonardo Curzio, La Seguridad Nacional de México y La Relación Con Estados Unidos (Mexico: UNAM, 
2007); Leonardo Curzio, La Seguridad México-Estados Unidos: Una Oportunidad Para Coincidir (Mexico: 
UNAM, 2006); Olga Pellicer, Mexico: A Reluctant Middle Power?, 2006; Roderic Camp, Mexico’s 
Mandarins: Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First Century (Berkeley: UCP, 2002); Roderic Camp, 
Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico (Oxford: OUP, 1992). 
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2000. The trend was consistent throughout the implementation of neoliberalism, a model 
that profoundly influenced the evolution of the contemporary strategic policy of Mexico.121 
2.1.1. Politicians 
In hyper-presidential political systems such as in Mexico, presidents are the main actors in 
strategic policy-making. The role of the congresspeople has been secondary since usually 
the legislative majorities have belonged to the party in power and aligned to the presidential 
dispositions. After the creation of the Institutional Revolutionary Party in 1929, this party 
governed each of the 32 federal entities without interruption until 1989, retained the majority 
in the Congress until 1997, and the Presidency of the Republic until 2000. The period from 
1988 to 2012 housed the birth of an apparent political opposition that failed to exert a 
counterweight to the presidential power due to their socio-cultural affinities and common 
political-economic interests. 
In the last decades of the twentieth century, the Institutional Revolutionary Party undertook 
a process of dismantling its revolutionary nationalist ideology to move to the centre-right of 
the political spectrum. The economic crisis of the 1970s triggered this transformation, which 
deepened from 1982 onwards. The Miguel de la Madrid administration (1982-1988) 
promoted the advent of a new political elite. It was the product of the gradual rise of the 
middle class in partisan structures. From 1970 to 2000, three-quarters of Institutional 
Revolutionary Party politicians came from this social stratum.122 About 60 per cent were 
descendants of professionals, businesspeople, or bureaucrats; and about 30 per cent were 
children of peasants, workers, or military, influential social sectors in post-revolutionary 
politics.123 The electoral victory of the National Action Party in 2000 intensified this trend. 
The Vicente Fox administration (2000-2006) hosted the highest number of politicians from 
the middle class and consolidated a select group of the upper-middle class that had been in 
power since 1988. National Action Party politicians were distinguished by belonging to 
family circles of medium and small entrepreneurs of the services and commerce sectors.124 
The social background shared by the members of the Institutional Revolutionary Party and 
 
121 For a more detailed review of the composition of the Mexican policy elite, see Appendix A: Mexican Policy 
Elite, 1988-2000; and Appendix C: Mexican Policy Elite, 2000-2012. 
122 Roderic Camp, Politics in Mexico: The Democratic Consolidation (NY: OUP, 2007) p.119. 
123 Camp, Mexico’s Mandarins: Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First Century pp.72–83,107,234–8; 
Roderic Camp, ‘Generales y Políticos En México’, Nexos, 82.October (1984), 17–29 pp.17-29; Lucio Mendieta 
and José Gómez, Problemas de La Universidad (Mexico: UNAM, 1948). 
124 Roderic Camp, Metamorfosis Del Liderazgo En El México Democrático (Mexico: FCE, 2010) p.18; Tania 
Hernández, ‘La Elite de La Alternancia: El Caso Del Partido de Accion Popular Nacional’, Revista Mexicana 
de Sociología, 68.4 (2006), 617–66 pp.646–8. 
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National Action Party contributed to the development of common interests and ideological 
affinity. The result was the appearance of neoliberal technocracy. 
One factor that contributed to the birth of a new ruling elite was the concentration of political 
power in Mexico City. During the first half of the twentieth century, the political class was 
representative of most regions of the country. However, being born in an urban area from 
the 1950s was a factor that dramatically increased the chances of being part of power 
groups.125 Like the middle class, the citizens of the capital city gained representativity in the 
political arena. This situation was a consistent trend as the number of politicians from 
Mexico City increased from 23 per cent in 1970 to 65 per cent in 2006.126 The concentration 
of political power in the capital city is not only attributed to the fact that it harbours the 
headquarters of the political parties and governmental institutions. The quality of education 
in the capital was a crucial factor for the self-selection of the members of the political elite. 
At least half of the partisan cliques were incubated at university campuses in Mexico City 
between 1970 and 2000. This dynamic was possible because about 90 per cent of the 
politicians of this period settled permanently in the capital city during and after their 
career.127 This situation allowed influential politicians to co-opt select student groups 
through which they intended to extend their political activity. 
Another reason that explains the consolidation of the neoliberal technocracy was the gradual 
sophistication of professional education of politicians. During the nationalist socio-political 
context from 1930 to 1970, public schools such as the National Preparatory School and the 
National Autonomous University of Mexico trained the majority of politicians in law, 
political science, and social sciences.128 From 1988 to 2000, more than half of the politicians 
had baccalaureate degrees and just over a third had postgraduate studies. Almost two-thirds 
completed their higher education solely in Mexico.129 The establishment of neoliberalism in 
the 1980s and the beginning of the democratic transition in the 1990s influenced the 
instauration of a meritocratic logic that redefined the value of cultural and symbolic capital 
 
125 Peter Smith, Labyrinths of Power. Political Recruitment in Twentieth-Century Mexico (Princeton: PUP, 
1979) pp.69,71–2. 
126 Camp, ‘Generales y Políticos En México’; Camp, Politics in Mexico: The Democratic Consolidation 
pp.117–9. 
127 Roderic Camp, Las Elites Del Poder En Mexico: Perfil De Una Elite De Poder Para El Siglo XXI (Mexico: 
Siglo XXI, 2006) p.87; Camp, Mexico’s Mandarins: Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First Century 
p.23,29,68. 
128 Camp, Mexico’s Mandarins: Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First Century pp.163–4; Camp, 
‘Generales y Políticos En México’; Roderic Camp, Los Líderes Políticos de México: Su Educación y 
Reclutamiento (Mexico: FCE, 1983) pp.91–122; Peter Smith, Los Laberintos Del Poder: El Reclutamiento de 
Las Élites Políticas En México, 1900-1971 (Mexico: COLMEX, 1981) pp.95–102. 
129 Camp, Mexico’s Mandarins: Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First Century pp.126,154. 
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within the political elite.130 Private academies such as the Mexico Autonomous Institute of 
Technology and Ibero-American University gained significance since their graduates in 
economics, finance, and administration occupied salient political positions. Furthermore, at 
least three-quarters of the political leaders who were born after the 1950s studied abroad, 
especially in the United States.131 Harvard University, Yale University, Princeton 
University, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology become the foremost educators of the 
leaders of the new ruling elite. During the period of consolidation of neoliberalism from 
1988 to 2012, graduating from a private and American university became an essential 
resource to gain political influence and reach power positions. The change in the professional 
education of politicians describes how Institutional Revolutionary Party and National Action 
Party members adopted common ideas and practices that, beyond their partisan ideologies, 
distinguished the new profile of the Mexican técnico-politician. 
Although members of the neoliberal technocracy shared socio-cultural backgrounds, the 
process of political training shaped their distinctive reflexes. In the case of the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party politicians, indoctrination took place at the Institute for Political 
Training since the 1930s. Its courses were oriented mainly to the effective use of political 
power since it was the hegemonic party. Complementarily, its affiliates were instructed on 
partisan principles, dynamics of the political system, and economic-administrative 
theories.132 Those militants with the best skills and linked to power elites were promoted to 
the Institute of Political, Economic, and Social Studies, the ideological heart and intellectual 
core where they engaged with ‘eminent professionals, intellectuals, scientists, technicians, 
and artists’.133 This body was vital because it was responsible for the formulation of political 
platforms, a process that contributed to some coreligionists being summoned to be part of 
the policy elite. In contrast, political education in the National Action Party was 
institutionalised until the 1950s as a mechanism to overcome internal crises. The Institute of 
Studies and Political Training distinguished itself by teaching humanist doctrine to reinforce 
partisan conservative ideology.134 Unlike the Institutional Revolutionary Party, ideological 
production and indoctrination were diversified. The National Action Party leaders 
established organisations such as the Carlos Castillo Peraza Foundation, Rafael Preciado 
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Hernández Foundation, and Miguel Estrada Iturbide Foundation. These bodies generated 
and taught the partisan doctrine. While political education was a mechanism to reproduce its 
hegemony in the Institutional Revolutionary Party, it was a mechanism of political survival 
in the National Action Party. 
The origins, structures, and partisan dynamics also shaped the distinctive practices of the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party and National Action Party politicians. In the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party, the military background was the source of its organisational and 
functional logic. Plutarco Calles, Lázaro Cárdenas, and Manuel Ávila were the military that 
forged the Institutional Revolutionary Party from 1929 to 1946. The arrival of Miguel 
Alemán to power in 1946 as the first president of civil origin brought an end to the 
institutionalisation of the revolutionary movement in the political structure.135 The military 
heritage of the Institutional Revolutionary Party mirrored itself in a rigid hierarchical 
structure, a strict regime of authority and discipline, as well as absolute respect and 
institutional loyalty. These factors produced reflexes as the unquestionable respect for 
superiors, the concentration of power in the party apex, and the centralisation of functions 
such as indoctrination and ideologisation. In political practice, these factors gave rise to 
hyper-presidential and authoritarian governments that characterised the hegemonic regime 
of the Institutional Revolutionary Party.136 In contrast, the National Action Party emerged in 
reaction to the loss of power of the clergy during the Calles’ government in the 1920s and 
opposition to the nationalist policies of President Cárdenas in the 1930s.137 The National 
Action Party politicians responded predominantly to business and ecclesiastical interests, a 
situation that was projected in their managerial reflexes and humanist doctrine.138 Although 
the National Action Party also had a vertical structure, its internal processes were 
characterised by being decentralised and relatively democratic. These features caused 
internal crisis and divisionism in the 1950s. In practice, conservative politicians aspired to 
decentralise presidential power, to promote the human rights agenda, and to protect the 
interests of the economic elite. 
The hegemony exercised by the Institutional Revolutionary Party for more than 70 years led 
to some of its practices being replicated by other parties and becoming cultural practices of 
the Mexican political system. One of the most representative practices is the self-
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reproduction of the political elite through the so-called camarillas (cliques).139 Through 
them, influential politicians establish informal relationships to co-opt coreligionists with 
political potential.140 Under a mentor-disciple logic called padrinazgo (patronage), the 
progress of the members of the clique depends on the political capacity of the padrino 
(godfather).141 This mechanism of social and political mobility based on trust, loyalty, and 
discipline allows the ascent of militants in the party structure and perpetuate the interests of 
the political leader.142 This dynamic is also replicated within the government. The 
perpetuation of power groups is sought through the so-called grupos compactos (compact 
groups). These intimate circles are made up of politicians from the same clique or with 
common interests.143 This practice of power concentration deranged the formal decision-
making process, as the compact groups gradually displaced the deliberative role of the 
cabinets. One of the most illustrative cases was the clique of the Bank of Mexico led by 
Miguel Mancera, ‘a monetarist-orthodox and anti-statist who had been head of the Bank of 
Mexico until 1982’.144 These practices explain the birth of a generation of técnico-politicians 
with similar socio-cultural backgrounds and close ties with the financial sector, which 
remained in power for more than thirty years. 
The presidents are representatives of the generation of politicians that emerged since 1982. 
Carlos Salinas, Ernesto Zedillo, Vicente Fox, and Felipe Calderón exemplify the arrival of 
the upper-middle class to power from 1994 to 2012. As de la Madrid, the four leaders studied 
their baccalaureate in Mexico City and completed their postgraduate studies at elite 
universities in the United States in economic-administrative disciplines. The institutional 
differences between the Institutional Revolutionary Party and National Action Party shaped 
their distinctive reflexes in the exercise of power. In the case of Salinas and Zedillo, their 
membership in the Bank of Mexico clique defined the homogeneity of their cabinets and 
compact groups. The strict discipline of the Institutional Revolutionary Party explains their 
power concentration and orthodox attachment to the neoliberal vision undertaken by de la 
 
139 Roderic Camp, ‘Reclutamiento Político y Cambio En El México de Los Setentas’, Foro Internacional, XX.3 
(1980), 463–83 pp.467–70. 
140 Merilee Grindle, Bureaucrats, Politicians and Peasants in Mexico: A Case Study in Public Policy 
(California: UCP, 1977) p.44; Lester Seligman, Recruiting Political Elites (Indianapolis: GLP, 1971) p.17. 
141 Camp, Mexico’s Mandarins: Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First Century pp.27–8. 
142 Joy Langston, ‘An Empirical View of the Political Groups in México: The Camarillas’, Documentos de 
Trabajo Del CIDE, 1997 pp.3–4; Roderic Camp, ‘Camarillas in Mexican Politics: The Case of the Salinas 
Cabinet’, Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, 6.1 (1990), 85–107 pp.86–7; Guerrero Díaz, Psychology of the 
Mexican: Culture and Personality (Austin: UTP, 1975) p.26. 
143 Jorge Gil and Samuel Schmidt, Estudios Sobre La Red Política de México (Mexico: UNAM, 2005) pp.108–
10. 
144 Redacción, ‘Cuando Los Tecnócratas Alcanzaron El Poder: El Primer Gabinete’, Proceso (Mexico, April 
1999). 
69 
Madrid. In the case of Fox and Calderón, their cliques forged between National Action Party 
factions and business groups delineated the heterogeneity of their cabinets and compact 
groups. Their inexperience in the exercise of power and desire to differentiate themselves 
from the Institutional Revolutionary Party regime explain their political heterodoxy and 
intention to decentralise power. Despite these partisan discrepancies, the political elite 
agreed that neoliberalism and globalisation were the right way to develop the country. 
However, these preferences jeopardised the sovereignty that defended nationalism for 
decades. The period from 1988 to 2012 exposes how the new political-economic model 
shaped the strategic choices of neoliberal technocracy. 
2.1.2. Bureaucrats 
The bureaucratic elite is the second most powerful group in strategic policy-making. The 
ideological affinity of secretaries and directors with the president has positioned them as 
highly influential actors. Historically, the Office of the Presidency of the Republic, the 
Secretariat of the Interior, the Secretariat of Finance, and the Centre for Investigation and 
National Security have been the pillars of bureaucratic machinery. However, the location of 
the nucleus of bureaucratic power has changed according to presidential preferences. As of 
1982, secretaries of the economic portfolio gained significant influence in decision-making. 
After the political change of 2000, the restructuring of the national security system shifted 
power to the secretariats of the domestic policy portfolio. The period from 1988 to 2012 
describes the consolidation of influence of Mexican technocracy in strategic decision-
making. 
The crisis of the 1970s not only triggered the ideological metamorphosis in the political elite 
but also aroused the interest of President José López in adopting new ways of organising the 
federal government. The technocratic revolution he envisioned required the adoption of 
novel public administration theories and methods to improve decision-making.145 As of 
1982, this process empowered the nascent figure of the técnico-politician, ‘the técnicos who 
also have political skills who are increasingly important in policy-making functions, and it 
is this type of actor who is increasingly found in positions of power and influence’.146 The 
technocrats distinguished themselves by their apoliticism and underestimation of politics, as 
well as by basing their decisions on instrumental rationality. The técnico-politicians’ logic 
was based on their belief ‘that specialised knowledge can be successfully applied to solving 
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specific problems. […] the identification of problems, and the formulation of policies to 
solve these problems, may be more important than their execution’.147 The political change 
of 2000 consolidated the technocracy, ‘a cohesive elite with specialised training, who claims 
to be able to maximise collective well-being by applying a set of rational instrumental 
techniques and success criteria’.148 The members of this new elite were characterised by 
‘their unity and control of the policy process also led to a special air of arrogance, labelled 
technocratic elitism […], an attitude reflected in their view that they actually had the right 
to rule, and that they alone could determine the course of social change’.149 
The social background of politicians and bureaucrats were very different at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, but from the 1970s their profiles began to converge. Since the 1940s, 
bureaucracy and military distinguished themselves by providing opportunities for social 
mobility to individuals of humble origin.150 The post-revolutionary bureaucrat came from 
the modest urban middle sector and, like soldiers, believed that ‘social mobility was possible 
through conformity, hard work, and education’. By then, the bureaucrat ‘was insulated from 
all forms of political activity and association: worker unions were portrayed as discouraging 
individual initiative and talent’.151 As of 1950, the integral administrative reform of the 
federal government redefined the profile of the bureaucrat.152 For three decades, the middle 
class of Mexico City began to gain representation in the bureaucracy. This situation is 
attributed to the fact that the reform centralised the entire government structure in the capital. 
After the demographic explosion that Mexico City experienced during the second third of 
the twentieth century, the capital concentrated on average more than 65 per cent of the 
country’s middle class.153 It was from the 1960s that the bureaucracy multiplied significantly 
and began to strengthen close ties with the political elite. The number of bureaucrats 
quadrupled between 1962 and 1972, and the number of high-level officials grew from 134 
to 257 between 1970 and 2012.154 The networks created within the federal government 
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allowed politicians to hold positions in the bureaucracy and bureaucrats to occupy political 
positions. 
The parallelism in the evolution of the professional education of politicians and bureaucrats 
is another factor that illustrates the emergence of technocracy.155 During the nationalist 
period, it was popularly known that if someone wanted to start their career in the public 
sector, they had to go to the National Autonomous University of Mexico. Beyond its 
academic quality, this institution was described as  
an excellent place to make contacts, alliances and friendships; where 
teachers and students could observe each other’s talents where they 
used to meet informally, introduce themselves to friends and 
acquaintances in government; and where they provided each other 
with levers for subsequent use.156 
Bureaucrats who studied law and graduated from a public university predominated from 
1970 to 1982. The first technocrats were distinguished because ‘were younger, had more 
training in the quantitative techniques required for economic planning, and were more 
willing to accept a powerful public role in economic development’.157 The implementation 
of neoliberalism from 1982 established a new logic in which the most valuable cultural and 
symbolic capital was provided by private universities, postgraduate degrees in the United 
States, and degrees in economic-administrative disciplines. From 1982 to 2012, the trend 
changed dramatically, as officials with postgraduate degrees in economics graduated from 
private universities began to predominate.158 The increasing number of private education 
institutions from the 1940s onwards, the integral administrative reform, and the economic 
opening of the country were some factors that explain the evolution of the bureaucrat’s 
education. As in the political elite, the pattern was similar. The crisis of the 1970s triggered 
the rupture with an old model, while the political change of 2000 only intensified the trend 
started in 1982. 
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Just as the indoctrination centres of the political parties moulded the distinctive reflexes of 
politicians, four institutions shaped the characteristic responses of bureaucrats. The first is 
the National Institute of Public Administration. Since 1955, this civil association positioned 
itself as a pioneer in the formation of officials in administrative sciences. It has also been the 
leading promoter of the logic under which contemporary bureaucracy operates, especially 
the political-bureaucratic ties. The influence of this institute was illustrated in the 1950s 
when its founders advised President Adolfo López to undertake an integral administrative 
reform and generate a new regulatory framework to reorganise the federal public 
administration.159 The second centre is the National Institute of Criminal Sciences. Since 
1976, this body of the Attorney General’s Office has trained officials who administer and 
enforce justice. The role of this institute has been fundamental for the professionalisation of 
the agents involved in criminal justice and public safety systems. In these two training 
centres, the teaching of the national strategic doctrine has been a secondary subject in their 
curricula. This situation has generated a disarticulation between the small strategic 
community and the rest of the federal public administration. 
The third training centre is the Matías Romero Institute. Since 1974, this diplomatic academy 
of the Secretariat of Foreign Relations has focused on the professionalisation of members of 
the Mexican foreign service. Its function has been the development of diplomatic-consular 
and technical-administrative competences in the diplomatic and consular bodies. Its doctrine 
is made up of subjects in international law, diplomatic history, international politics, and 
diplomatic method.160 The fourth is the Intelligence School for National Security. Since 
2009, this decentralised body of the Secretariat of the Interior has been responsible for 
training the agents of the Centre for Investigation and National Security. This school also 
did not escape the technocratic current, since its courses favoured the teaching of marketing 
techniques and training in operational intelligence.161 Unlike the previous institutes, these 
last two schools participate directly in the national security plan-making process.162 It should 
be noted that the National Defence College and the Centre for Naval Higher Studies began 
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admitting civil servants in their academic programmes in 1989. These academies provided a 
select group of officials with a unique cultural, symbolic, and social capital that positioned 
them as experts on strategic issues within the bureaucratic machinery. 
The socio-cultural convergence between politicians and bureaucrats enabled the 
development of shared cultural practices. After the integral administrative reform in the 
1950s, the bureaucracy ceased to be an appendix compliant to the regime and instead became 
into a useful platform of political mobility. The cliques reproduced the técnico-politician, as 
they facilitated their movement between political and bureaucratic structures.163 These 
dynamics encouraged informality in government and generated discretionary practices that 
resulted in opacity and corruption. The cliques served as an instrument to cover up practices 
that deviated from legality, while the symbolism of institutionality allowed them to simulate 
compliance with the law.164 The arrival of the técnico-politician to power displaced the 
political negotiation for technocratic rationality as the primary method for policy-making. 
President de la Madrid eradicated the traditional practice of appointing secretaries with 
political experience and knowledge of the sector that they would lead.165 Financial experts 
began to occupy the leading positions of the cabinet, such as the position of secretary of 
foreign relations. One of the mechanisms they used to strengthen their privileged position 
was the instrumental legitimation of their profession. The role that the technocrats assumed 
in the decision-making process underpinned the figure of the expert. The government 
fostered confidence in specialised knowledge and the real usefulness of the economics 
profession through official speech. After the crisis of the 1970s, this discourse displaced of 
nationalist bureaucrats with Keynesian preferences for technocrats attached to the neoliberal 
doctrine.166 
The cabinets illustrate the technocracy that led to strategic policy-making since 1982. 
Compact groups exemplify the technocratic symbiosis in which ‘politicos monopolise 
political skills as a foundation of their power positions while técnicos derive influence from 
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their control over technical information’.167 Salinas and Zedillo established the centre of 
their governments at homogeneous circles made up of inexperienced actors in politics. José 
Córdoba, Manuel Camacho, Jaime Serra, Pedro Aspe, Luis Téllez, José Gurría, and 
Guillermo Ortiz were some of the orthodox technocrats who headed the secretariats of the 
economic portfolio. They distinguished themselves by their preferences for the neoliberal 
doctrine acquired during their postgraduate studies at elite universities in the United States. 
The predominance of actors belonging to the clique of the Bank of Mexico was the product 
of a tendency forged since the 1970s by highly influential mentors and intellectuals such as 
Mancera, Leopoldo Solís, and Gustavo Petricioli. Fox and Calderón replicated the practice 
of generating power cores. However, they distinguished themselves by being heterogeneous 
and heterodox, the result of bringing together businesspeople and far-right politicians. In the 
case of Fox, actors such as Carlos Rojas, Ramón Muñoz, Marta Sahagún, Juan Castro, and 
Eduardo Sojo concentrated power at the Office of the Presidency of the Republic. In the case 
of Calderón, actors such as Juan Mouriño, Francisco Ramírez, Juan Molinar, Ernesto 
Cordero, and Gerardo Ruiz headed secretariats of the domestic policy portfolio. The political 
change of 2000 managed to diminish the influence of the clique of the Bank of Mexico in 
strategic decision-making, but it did not alter the predominance of economic power over 
political power because the interests of the neoliberal technocracy prevailed. 
2.1.3. Generals 
The military elite is the third most influential group in strategic policy-making in Mexico. 
Historically, the Secretariat of National Defence has been the leading player in the military 
sphere. Its political power is the product of the role played by generals in the founding of the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party and the military presence in the Presidency of the Republic 
during the first half of the twentieth century. The military elite is made up of the officers of 
the general staff at Secretariat of National Defence, which simultaneously serves as a state 
department and headquarters of the army and air force. The following analysis demonstrates 
how, during the period 1988 to 2012, a process of generational change in the military elite 
redefined its role in the strategic policy-making process. 
Before 1988, the military elite was made up of generals called troperos (mustangs), who had 
been conscripted and ascended in the hierarchical scale from the rank of soldier. The 
members of this generation came from illiterate peasant families, belonged to a low socio-
economic stratum, and proceeded from rural regions throughout the country. Many had not 
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completed their high school studies and saw in the army an opportunity to improve their 
social position.168 The professionalisation process undertaken in the armed forces restricted 
the access of troperos to the Heroic Military College since 1944. This situation dramatically 
reduced the possibility of reaching generalship for conscripts born after 1930.169 The impact 
of this reform was not visible until 1994, the year in which the new generation of generals 
began to occupy positions in the military leadership. Before the gradual disappearance of 
troperos, the military elite began to be led by orthodox professionals graduated from the 
Heroic Military College.170 The professionalisation process also modified the socio-
economic profile of those who aspired to a military career. Since the 1950s, the cadets began 
to come from working families of the middle class, from urban areas of the central-Western 
region of the country, and generally with high school studies.171 The professionalisation 
process made the internal filters sophisticated and undermined the social mobility that had 
historically distinguished the military institution.  
The troperos and orthodox generals came from contrasting socio-cultural backgrounds. The 
four generations of the military elite that evolved during the twentieth century portray this 
divergence: the revolutionaries, those trained during the Second World War, the Higher War 
College graduates, and the National Defence College graduates.172 The first two generations 
were mostly made up of troperos and the last two of orthodox officers. The period of the 
late 1980s and early 1990s harboured the generational transition between the Higher War 
College graduates and the National Defence College graduates. The generals of this last 
generation are distinguished by their middle-class background, coming from urban areas of 
the central region of the country, as well as having started their career in the Heroic Military 
College during the second half of the twentieth century.173 In this academy, the cadets are 
taught a ‘high sense of honour, discipline, and morals’. After four years, they graduate as 
infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineer, or armoured officers.174 The reform of the military 
 
168 Thomas Weil, The Armed Forces. Area Handbook for Mexico (Washington: GPO, 1975) p.351; Morris 
Janowitz, Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis (Chicago: 
UCP, 1964) p.60. 
169 EFAM, ‘Editorial’, Revista Del Ejército y La Fuerza Aérea (Mexico, September 1955) p.3; Raúl León, 
‘Bienvenidos Los Sargentos Primeros Al H. Colegio Militar’, Revista Del Ejército y La Fuerza Aérea (Mexico, 
August 1955) pp.64–5; Rangel Medina, ‘El Nuevo Curso de Formación de Oficiales En El H. Colegio Militar’, 
Revista Del Ejército y La Fuerza Aérea (Mexico, June 1955) pp.3–5. 
170 Camp, Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico p.25. 
171 Lyle MacAlister, The Military in Latin American Socio-Political Evolution: Four Case Studies 
(Washington: AIR, 1970) p.221; Edwin Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism: The Political Rise and Fall of the 
Revolutionary Army, 1910-1940 (Albuquerque: UNMP, 1968) p.147; Javier Romero, Aspectos 
Psicobiométricos y Sociales de Una Muestra de La Juventud Mexicana (Mexico: DIA, 1956) pp.49,52. 
172 Camp, Generals in the Palacio: The Military in Modern Mexico pp.109–19. 
173 Camp, ‘Generales y Políticos En México’. 
174 DOF-15-11-1949 SEDENA, ‘Reglamento Del Heroico Colegio Militar’ (Mexico: DOF, 1949) art.3. 
76 
education system progressively raised the minimum levels of schooling required to access 
this institution, as well as the academic degrees granted upon graduation.175 The trend of 
professionalisation gradually reduced the possibility of promotion to the military leadership 
to a small sector of society. The fact that the middle class of Mexico City positioned itself 
as the primary social source of the military elite allowed the strengthening of its link with 
the political-bureaucratic elite. 
At the apex of the military structure is the general staff. Passing the courses of the two most 
senior academies in the military education system is essential to occupy a leadership position 
on the general staff. One of these is the course of command and general staff taught at the 
Higher War College. There captains and majors acquire the tactical-strategic doctrine 
required for the conduct of military operations and to advise the commanders of large 
units.176 Upon graduation, officers receive the general staff diploma and academic degree of 
military administration.177 The second course taught by this academy is the master’s degree 
in strategic management. In this programme, lieutenant colonels of the general staff acquire 
the skills required to participate in the strategic planning process.178 This academic degree 
serves as an important differentiator among the general staff officers. From 1932 until the 
early 1980s, graduating from the Higher War College was an essential factor in aspiring to 
the generalship, since it was then the highest step in military training.179 The generation of 
generals graduated from this academy embodied a cultural paradigm forged by memorisation 
techniques, technocratic approaches, and an unconditional subordination to authority.180 
These aspects defined the limited role that the military elite assumed in the strategic policy-
making process until the 1980s. 
By 1981, the National Defence College was established as the most relevant source of 
symbolic and cultural capital in the armed forces. Its creation responded to the interest of the 
military elite in improving the intellectual formation of generals and colonels. Its main 
objectives have been to develop strategic knowledge and generate political-strategic 
doctrine.181 The master’s degree in military administration for internal security and national 
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defence has been the course through which officers are trained for analysis and planning in 
strategic issues.182 As of 1989, the academy established itself as a fundamental provider of 
social capital for military and bureaucrats, as officials were authorised to be part of the 
programme. This situation allowed members of the secretariats involved in the strategic 
policy-making process to socialise and share knowledge and skills. The networks generated 
inside the college laid the foundations for the advent of a strategic community. This academy 
has been set at the core of the military elite’s self-selection and self-reproduction system, 
since graduating from it is the prelude to occupy a position of influence within the general 
staff. The generals belonging to this generation acquired enough symbolic, cultural, and 
social capital to assume with greater confidence a leadership role in the strategic policy-
making since the 1990s.183 
Additionally, two informal practices have characterised the rise of officers to the elite. The 
first replicates the political-bureaucratic cliques. Along the military trajectory, mentor-
disciple relationships are generated in which senior officers support the promotion of 
protégés, either because of their desire to preserve common interests or under the argument 
of institutional benefit. This dynamic has produced the concentration of power among 
infantry and artillery generals.184 The second practice refers to the trajectories that facilitate 
access to the general staff. Various positions provide vast social capital to be supported by a 
sponsor or symbolic capital to acquire influence power. In the academic field, the post of 
director of the Heroic Military College expands the network of links with members of the 
political, bureaucratic, military, and cultural elites. In the diplomatic domain, the position of 
military attaché in the United States, called ‘the cream of the officer corps’, provides the 
opportunity to develop idiomatic and diplomatic skills, as well as socialise with the 
American military elite.185 In the political level, the position of region commander allows 
‘officers who aspire to such a degree to be politically astute and establish relations with 
politicians or other officers who could influence the civilians who make the decisions’.186 
Although the president appoints the members of the general staff, the secretary of defence 
proposes senior officers based on personal relationships, leadership capacity, ideological 
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affinity, institutional loyalty, professional career, and their membership of the same 
academic generations or power groups. 
It should be noted that generational relays usually produce tensions within the military elite. 
During the 1960s, young officers called pencillinos were very critical of the lack of 
effectiveness of government policies. In the 1970s, zone commanders expressed their 
frustration over the meagre defence budget and the resource waste by politicians and 
bureaucrats. Throughout the 1980s, young officers opposed the limited role assigned to the 
military in aid efforts after the 1985 earthquake in Mexico City. In this last case, the decision 
responded to the fear of civil leadership that the military could acquire higher political power 
and a prominent position in the public arena.187 However, strict obedience to authority and 
rigid self-discipline have allowed such disagreements to be overcome. The military elite has 
distinguished itself by the homogeneity and self-reproduction of its values, beliefs, and 
attitudes. These attributes are a result of effective indoctrination processes and endogenous 
socialisation. They also have been vital for military leaders to be recognised as 
a unified and well-disciplined corps. Indeed, while factional 
divisiveness has sometimes appeared publicly within three major 
institutions responsible for Mexico’s historical political stability 
(namely, the Institutional Revolutionary Party, the executive 
administration, and the Catholic Church), the one national institution 
in which elite integration has consistently appeared to persist is the 
military.188 
In practice, discipline and loyalty translate into the ‘right attitude’. The exercise of 
subordination and submission to authority is essential to rise though positions in the military 
structure, sometimes at the expense of initiative and leadership.189 
The secretaries of defence who took office from 1988 to 2012 embodied the tense 
generational transition within the military elite. The first was Antonio Riviello (1988-1994). 
He undertook cultural change within the military elite despite being the son of a 
revolutionary general and a graduate of the Higher War College. The fact that two-thirds of 
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the general staff under his tenure belonged to the same generation did not diminish his efforts 
to encourage the involvement of the military elite in the strategic policy-making process. 
The second was Enrique Cervantes (1994-2000). He was also a graduate of the Higher War 
College. His commitment to the process of change was conditioned, as he was protégé of 
former Secretaries of Defence Felix Galvan (1976-1982) and Marcelino Garcia (1964-1970). 
They, like Cervantes, belonged to an orthodox current of generals who ‘subordinate 
themselves, without bargaining, to the civil power’ and defend the benefits granted by being 
complicit in the regime of the Institutional Revolutionary Party.190 The third was Clemente 
Vega (2000-2006), who supported Riviello to generate the new doctrine for the military 
elite.191 The distinction of having been the first secretary graduated from the National 
Defence College gave him enough symbolic capital for the new political elite of the National 
Action Party to identify him as an intellectual talent. Finally, Guillermo Galván (2006-2012) 
concluded the generational shift. He was the second secretary graduated from the National 
Defence College. His support for the change process was limited. Like Vega, Galván had to 
deal with the resistance of the orthodox current related to Cervantes and the interests of the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party. The clashes between the power groups from 2000 onwards 
were a sign that the interests of an old generation of senior officers were being replaced by 
those of an emerging stream of young and intellectual generals disposed to adapt the armed 
forces to the conditions of the new domestic and international order. 
2.1.4. Policy-making 
The strategic policy-making machinery underwent a process of expansion and 
professionalisation from the late 1980s onwards. Inside the government structure, exclusive 
spaces were created for politicians, bureaucrats, and generals to discuss strategic affairs 
jointly. The Specialised Cabinet in Foreign Policy and Specialised Cabinet in National 
Security were the most important.192 These presidential bodies were created to define the 
government agenda and coordinate the formulation of the strategic policy. The following 
analysis of the period from 1988 to 2012 exposes the construction of a robust bureaucratic 
system that symbolically aspired to democratise and decentralise decision-making, but in 
practice strengthened the authority of technocrats on strategic matters.193 
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Throughout the twentieth century, the Institutional Revolutionary Party led a hegemonic 
regime in which the direction of the party, the government, and the country depended on the 
will of one person: the president. Hyper-presidentialism was the product of the excessive 
concentration of power in the president, her/his legitimate control of the executive branch, 
the dominance of her/his party in Congress, and her/his influence over the Supreme Court.194 
From the 1980s, the aspiration to sophisticate government capabilities and technify policy-
making led to the institutionalisation of technocracy.195 In the strategic policy realm, the 
creation of the Office of the Presidency of the Republic and its specialised cabinets 
exemplify this process. The Constitution of 1917 established the president as head of state, 
head of government, head of the federal executive, and supreme commander of the armed 
forces. These roles position the president as the most important actor in decision-making.196 
One of her/his responsibilities was to convene the specialised cabinets to analyse high 
priority issues and make decisions on matters on the strategic agenda.197 The president was 
empowered to convene cabinet members and chair the sessions in which the strategic policy 
was made. Informal rules of the Mexican political system gave prerogatives to the president 
to discretionally establish power groups within the presidential cabinet and legislative 
chambers to underpin her/his authority.198 
The configuration of the hegemonic and hyper-presidential regime undermined Congress’s 
ability to act as a counterweight to presidential decisions. The power held by lawmakers was 
restricted to the ratification of government plans and programmes, international treaties and 
agreements, as well as cabinet members appointments.199 The legislative authority on the 
strategic agenda was exercised indirectly through three bodies: the Foreign Relations 
Commission, National Defence Commission, and National Security Bicameral Commission. 
The members of the cabinet were obliged to appear before these commissions to report on 
the status of the country’s foreign and security policy.200 The overwhelming legislative 
majorities that prevailed in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate were mirrored within 
the commissions. The commissions were made up by coreligionists to the president, who 
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usually lacked knowledge on strategic issues. The Diaries of the Debates reveal the absence 
of legislative disposition to question the presidential decisions and the proceeding of her/his 
secretaries. This situation diluted the legislative oversight function and congressional 
authority. 
In contrast, the presidential cabinet exercised direct control over strategic policy. The 
function of its members was to advise the president in decision-making, participate in policy-
making, and coordinate the implementation of programmes. Three actors of the bureaucratic 
elite were dominant within the Specialised Cabinet in National Security. First, the secretary 
of the interior. Her/his role as executive secretary of the cabinet and responsible for ensuring 
the country’s governance provided her/him with the ability to guide the policy-making. 
Her/his political capital and control over the national police force and civil intelligence 
services fed her/his influence on decision-making. Second, the director of the Centre for 
Investigation and National Security. Her/his power was the product of her/his close ties with 
the president and the operational capacity of the intelligence agency. Furthermore, he/she 
was responsible for providing the cabinet with the National Risk Agenda, an essential input 
for the strategic policy-making process. Third, the head of the Office of the Presidency of 
the Republic. Despite not being a formal cabinet member, the chief of the presidential staff 
controlled the technical secretaries of the specialised cabinets. The absolute ideological 
affinity and the close friendship with the president positioned her/him as her/his first 
confidant and most persuasive advisor.201 
The Specialised Cabinet in Foreign Policy was the second space for deliberation on strategic 
issues. Its structure was characterised by excluding the military elite and bringing together 
three members of the Specialised Cabinet in National Security. The secretary of finance was 
highly influential because he/she was responsible for administrative planning and public 
finances. In 1992, the Secretariat of Finance incorporated functions of the mighty Secretariat 
of Planning and Budget, which was head of the cabinet. Also, the Secretariat of Finance 
acted as a platform for political promotion of the Bank of Mexico’s clique. The secretary of 
foreign relations was less influential. However, her/his refined socio-cultural capital allowed 
her/him to serve as a companion to the most prominent cabinet members. Because of her/his 
mastery of the legal framework of Mexican foreign policy and broad knowledge of 
international law, it was vital to consult her/him before every deliberation relating to 
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strategic affairs. The case of the attorney general was similar. Her/his participation in the 
policy-making process was confined to oversee the adherence of policies to the rule of law. 
The power of influence came from the symbolic and political capital of the person who held 
the position, which was usually occupied by renowned lawyers and academics.202 
The participation of the military in policy-making was restricted since the 1940s. The Latin 
American military dictatorships of the twentieth century discouraged the political elite from 
involving generals in decision-making publicly.203 However, presidential discretion allowed 
to the head of state summons politicians and bureaucrats with military backgrounds to the 
cabinet. The symbolic and cultural capital of the secretaries of defence was an essential 
factor, so the presidents usually did not make crucial decisions on without first having heard 
their opinion. The influential role played by the military elite on issues such as Mexico’s 
position on Central American conflicts and the nationalisation of banking in the 1980s 
illustrate the relevance that they gradually gained in decision-making.204 The creation of the 
Specialised Cabinet in National Security in 1989 formalised the participation of the defence 
and navy secretaries in the strategic policy-making process. The general staff officers were 
responsible for providing technical advice on military planning, departmental operation, 
budgetary management, personnel deployment, and programmes implementation. In the 
cabinet, both secretaries distinguished themselves by proposing policy guidelines following 
the diagnosis set out in the National Risk Agenda and validating the strategic relevance and 
operational feasibility of the roles assigned to the armed forces.205 
There was no exclusive coordination space for the strategic policy-making process until 
1989. The specialised cabinets were distinguished by being configured and convened at the 
discretion of the president. Due to presidential agreements were the only legal instrument 
that backed the operation of the cabinets, they were continuously modified and adjusted ad 
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hoc to the presidential preferences. After the political change of 2000, the reformist impetus 
of the government of the National Action Party motivated the replacement of both cabinets 
with the Commission of Order and Respect. The bureaucratic restructuration produced 
functional ambiguities and power vacuums. Due to the high ineffectiveness y frequent 
struggles, so the original structure of the specialised cabinets was restored in 2002. It was 
not until 2005 that the balance between the political forces within the congress allowed the 
enactment of the National Security Law. This act created the National Security Council, but 
it did not replace the cabinets. The council resembled the structure and functions of the 
specialised cabinets but did not depend on the president’s discretion. The law prevented the 
council from being modified without congressional approval and forced the president to 
accountability to the legislators every six months. It also established that the council must 
meet twice a year and its membership must be permanent. The law granted Congress higher 
authority in the strategic policy-making process and laid the foundations for integrating a 
national security system.206 However, as the following chapters will demonstrate, despite the 
robust bureaucratic framework, strategic decisions continued to depend on the preferences 
and interests of the president and her/his compact group. 
2.2. Strategic approaches 
The 1970s were not only marked by the climax of the Cold War, but also by a severe 
economic crisis. This scenario created the conditions for a nascent elite to come to power. 
Technocracy drove a change on strategic priorities. In the 1980s, there was be a 
confrontation within the policy elite between two currents that disagreed on how to approach 
foreign policy and national security. On the one hand, the nationalist approach prioritised 
the defence of sovereignty. This isolationist conception was based on neutral and reactive 
diplomacy, a statist and protectionist economic model, as well as a traditional notion of 
security. In contrast, the emerging continental vision championed the promotion of economic 
development. This approach aspired to develop an interdependence relationship with the 
United States. It was fostered through critical and participatory diplomacy, an open market 
economy, and a broad concept of security. The following paragraphs examine the origins 
and foundations of both approaches, as well as their influence in Mexican strategic policy-
making. The central argument is that despite the growing predominance of the continentalist 
 
206DOF-26-12-2005 Congreso, Ley de Seguridad Nacional art.12; DOF-11-12-1995 Congreso, Ley General 
Que Establece Las Bases de Coordinación Del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública (Mexico: DOF, 1995) 
art.12. 
84 
vision since the 1980s, the historical nationalism continued to rule cultural reflexes of policy-
makers in the background. 
2.2.1. Nationalism 
Mexican nationalism was founded as powerful symbolic engineering based on Novohispano 
Creole patriotism aimed at building the idea of a nation independent of Spanish rule and 
American influence.207 This representation fed the legal, nationalist, and defensive nature of 
the strategic policy that prevailed from the revolution. Although it is possible to affirm that 
the origins of this form of nationalism date to the independence text of the Feelings of the 
Nation of 1813, the Carranza doctrine of 1915 can be established as its cornerstone. The 
principles of international neutrality and non-intervention promoted by President Venustiano 
Carranza defined Mexico’s position after the Great War and the spirit of the Constitution of 
1917.208 Its ideological validity was extended through the Isidro Fabela doctrine of 1920, the 
Estrada doctrine of 1930, the Cardenas doctrine of 1938, and the Díaz Ordaz doctrine of 
1969.209 After the crisis of the 1970s, the nationalist approach was diluted due to the rise of 
a new international insertion model. From then on, a tension arose within the policy elite 
between the historical desire to defend the sovereignty and the growing aspiration to 
integrate into the global economy.210 
Diplomat Genaro Estrada promoted nationalist foreign policy since 1930. He fostered a 
sovereign vision based on the principles of non-intervention and self-determination of 
peoples. His thesis was influenced by the refusal of the United States to recognise post-
revolutionary governments until the repealing of the constitutional articles that affected 
American interests in Mexico.211 International law, peaceful conflict resolution, and a close 
relationship with Latin America were established as the drivers of the nationalism-based 
Mexican diplomacy.212 This policy was an essential strategic instrument. On the diplomatic 
level, it granted Mexico enough symbolic capital to dissent from the United States in 
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multilateral forums. On the political level, it allowed the Institutional Revolutionary Party 
regime to avoid criticism and foreign intervention in the face of the authoritarian and 
undemocratic character of its governments.213 The Estrada doctrine was not incorporated 
into the Constitution of 1917 until 1988, due to fears generated by the change in the country’s 
political-economic model.214 Article 89 held the president responsible for 
directing foreign policy and agreeing on international treaties, 
subjecting them to the approval of the Senate. In conducting such 
policy, the head of the executive branch shall observe the following 
normative principles: the self-determination of the peoples; non-
intervention; the peaceful resolution of disputes; the proscription of 
the threat or the use of force in international relations; the legal 
equality of the States; international cooperation for development; 
and the fight for international peace and security.215 
The national security policy was the other side of the coin. In the context of the Cold War, 
security policy was exclusively influenced by a select group of military personnel trained in 
the United States and officials of the Secretariat of the Interior assigned to the civil 
intelligence services. The creation of the Federal Security Directorate in 1947, under the 
tutelage of the Central Intelligence Agency, was part of the Truman doctrine of Soviet 
containment. Its objective was ‘preserving the internal stability of Mexico against all forms 
of subversion and terrorist threats’.216 The American strategy to face the communist threat 
in Mexico was to incubate a new political category. The implementation of the traditional 
concept of national security was possible through the creation of the Federal Security 
Directorate, the infiltration of American agents into the Mexican government, and the 
indoctrination of the strategic community.217 The national security doctrine promoted 
defence through military counterinsurgency techniques to deal with internal enemies that 
supported threats such as revolution, anti-capitalism, and nuclear weapons.218 The traditional 
concept of national security privileged the use of force outside the law to meet the demands 
of the United States. The official discourse was based on the preservation of internal order, 
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but the political practice was founded in the protection of the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party regime.219 
The nationalist strategic policy was the backbone of post-revolutionary governments and the 
political-economic model of ‘shared development’ promoted during the 1970s. On the 
political level, the nationalisation of strategic industries was meant to strengthen the state 
and drive it towards national self-sufficiency. The concentration of decision-making power 
in the president and the absence of internal counterweights were crucial to its operation. This 
condition motivated and facilitated the United States to infiltrate the core of the Mexican 
policy elite to influence strategic decisions.220 In the bureaucratic field, a double discourse 
prevailed. The moments of crisis reflected that Mexico and the United States were formal or 
informal allies, but only for convenience. While the sovereigntist ideology distinguished the 
official discourse domestically, the discretion of decision-making allowed the Mexican 
government to cede to American pressure without high political costs.221 In the military 
domain, the influence of generals in decision-making reinforced the authoritarian reflexes of 
the Institutional Revolutionary Party politicians.222 The adoption of the national security 
doctrine based on the American mentality of the Cold War promoted an anti-communist 
sentiment that encouraged the practice of political persecution.223 The use of force became 
a recurring resource to preserve internal order, a situation that normalised the deployment of 
soldiers to perform police tasks.224 
This section has demonstrated that the nationalist strategic policy was based on a defensive 
approach and oriented to soft-balancing strategies. It reflected the desire of the policy elite 
to counteract the influence of the United States to preserve its relative independence in 
political and economic matters.225 After the revolution, the nationalist project aspired to 
reaffirm the identity and sovereignty of Mexico through a foreign policy that endowed it 
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with enough symbolic capital to dissent from the United States. However, the context of the 
Cold War drove the policy elite to adopt a traditional national security approach, since 
Mexico’s political stability was linked to the American security system.226 The pressure of 
the United States on Mexico increased progressively during the second half of the twentieth 
century. The Mexican elite gave in to American demands in the face of the need for an 
understanding that diminished the impact of the economic slowdown and restored the 
political confidence lost after diplomatic disagreements on Cuban and Central American 
issues in the 1970s.227 Defensive nationalism privileged an isolationist strategy of self-denial 
to preserve relative independence. This strategic position allowed Mexico to diversify its 
supply of weapons and equipment for the development of military capabilities. It also 
enabled the Mexican elite to have autonomy in deciding on cooperation with the American 
government on international security.228 The geographical proximity to the United States, 
the power asymmetry in the bilateral relationship, the emergence of shared political-
economic interests, and the limited strategic options of Mexico were some factors that 
diluted the nationalist approach and facilitated the rise of a continentalist vision since the 
1980s. 
2.2.2. Continentalism 
Continentalism is conceived as the Mexican policy elite’s aspiration to adopt Western values 
and integrate the country into the political-economic project of North America. Its main aim 
is to enjoy the benefits of being a partner of the American superpower in the unipolar 
international system.229 The roots of this approach date to the Porfiriato (1876-1911), a 
period dominated by the precepts of the positivist philosophical doctrine of order and 
progress promoted by an influential political-bureaucratic elite called ‘the scientists’.230 
President Porfirio Díaz distinguished himself by his ‘harsh nationalism […] of plebeian and 
anti-American dye’, which ‘was diluted in the waters of diplomatic pragmatism and the […] 
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diversification of foreign investments’.231 So that the United States recognised his 
government, Díaz yielded to American pressures and modified laws to facilitate the flow of 
foreign capital and the appropriation of national resources. Similar actions were taken under 
the administration of President Álvaro Obregón. He sought that the United States recognised 
his government through the signing of the Bucareli Treaty in 1923. Intending to preserve 
American endorsement and keep the foreign investment, Obregón made concessions in 
agricultural and oil sectors, since the nationalist character of the Constitution of 1917 
affected foreign interests. The Bucareli Treaty condensed the ideas of the Obregón doctrine, 
which boosted economic development at the expense of national sovereignty.232 
Continentalist foreign policy emerged after the exhaustion of the shared development 
model.233 Since the 1980s, technocratic cabinets adopted the principles of the Washington 
Consensus as a measure to overcome the crisis. The new policy elite broke with the pattern 
of strategic confrontation with the United States. Within the Mexican elite, the prevailing 
belief was that economic interdependence would guarantee that the American government 
would not throw Mexico off the ‘cliff’.234 In other words, the close and deep ties with the 
United States would be Mexico’s economic life insurance. After the political transition of 
2000, Secretary of Foreign Relations Jorge Castañeda formalised this policy. He pointed out 
that the Estrada doctrine was ‘the result of the altruistic and noble desire to achieve the 
constant application of international law’, but for the new democratic times, it was obsolete. 
The Castañeda doctrine aimed to bring Mexico to assume an active role in the defence of 
democracy. Mexico would be open to external criticism and taking a partial position vis-à-
vis other governments based on national values and interests.235 The opposition accused that 
this policy responded to American interests and was ‘dominated by fear and cowardice. The 
Castañeda doctrine is very clear: attack the weak and obey the strong’.236 Whereas Mexico 
began to become distanced from Latin America, the North American Free Trade Agreement 
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of 1994 and the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America of 2005 confirmed 
that the new direction of the Mexican foreign policy pointed towards regional integration.237 
The ideas of collective security date back to the Pan American doctrine of President Manuel 
Ávila in 1940 and the Continental doctrine of his Secretary of Foreign Relations Ezequiel 
Padilla in 1941. Both backed the adoption of the Monroe doctrine in Latin America, 
supported hemispheric defence, and encouraged cooperation with the United States within 
the framework of the Good Neighbour policy.238 It was not until after the 2000 political 
change that regional security ideas from a broad approach gained importance within 
Mexican policy elite. The multidimensional concept of national security promoted in the 
Organisation of American States was adopted in 2003 as a platform to reform the national 
security framework inherited by the Institutional Revolutionary Party regime. This approach 
established 
that the threats, concerns and other security challenges of the 
hemisphere are of diverse nature and multidimensional scope and 
that the traditional concept and approaches should be widened to 
encompass new and non-traditional threats that include political, 
economic, social, health and environmental aspects.239 
The process of transition from the traditional to the multidimensional concept produced 
inconsistencies in the strategic positioning of Mexico. The policy elite was willing to make 
international commitments symbolically to be considered as a credible player in multilateral 
forums. However, the elite shunned responsibilities that they interpreted as a violation of the 
relative independence that Mexico had forged through discourse based on international 
law.240 
The continentalist strategic policy was the axis of the neoliberal model. The neoliberal 
doctrine, also referred to as ‘neoportifism’ in the nationalist conception, recovered the 
positivist precepts that guided the Díaz government to establish an ‘elite and surrendered 
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economic policy’.241 In the political sphere, the practice of privatisation was the mechanism 
to minimise state participation in an economy that was beginning to open up. The weakening 
of the state allowed political power to gradually be subject to the interests of economic 
agents, mainly foreigners.242 In the bureaucratic domain, the process of dismantling the 
nationalist regime required the reconstruction of a technocratic machine that aspired to 
maximise administrative efficiency. The decentralisation of power, the adoption of 
managerial methods, and the creation of institutions inspired by American models were 
recurring practices that reflected the reformist impulses of the policy elite. The National 
Security Law that gave rise to the robust national security system was the means to 
institutionalise the broad concept of national security.243 On the military level, the hyper-
securitisation process allowed a wide range of public administration actors to be involved in 
the formulation and implementation of strategic policy. However, contrary to the aspiration 
to limit the use of force, the incorporation of new threats to the national security agenda 
diversified the intervention of the military and legitimised their participation in public safety 
activities.244 
This section has demonstrated that the continentalist strategic policy was based on a 
cooperative approach oriented to soft-bandwagoning strategies.245 Since 1982, the policy 
elite broke with the traditional conception of sovereignty. The policy-makers conceived it as 
a differentiator and fragmentary element of national communities. Sovereignty was an 
obstacle to development. In their attempts to project Mexico as a modern country and ally 
of the Western powers, the technocratic elite began to adopt doctrines and articulate speeches 
that symbolically reflected their commitment to democracy, free market, human rights, and 
international security.246 Soft-bandwagoning continentalism gained strength since the 1990s. 
It was characterised by the role of subordination that Mexico played in its asymmetrical 
bilateral relationship with the United States. To develop an interdependence relationship 
with the United States, Mexico gave its strategic industries and services to foreign 
corporations, attached the development of military capabilities to the regional security 
agenda, privileged the acquisition of American military weapons and equipment, cooperated 
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in matters of regional security, and tolerated unilateral actions in the bilateral relationship.247 
Both in the approach of defensive nationalism and soft-bandwagoning continentalism, 
Mexico’s strategic policy was restricted to building alliances with American rivals, to 
establishing a foreign policy that undermined regional security, and it could not develop 
military capabilities that could threaten the United States’ stability. The Mexican strategic 
policy of the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries describes the process of transition from 
a soft-balancing strategy of self-denial that distinguished defensive nationalism, to a soft-
bandwagoning strategy of subordination that characterised continentalism. 
Conclusion 
This description of the social and cultural context in which Mexico’s foreign and security 
policy was formulated from 1988 to 2012 makes it possible to elucidate its origins and 
evolution, especially since the economic crisis of the late 1970s. First, the institutional source 
of Mexican strategic policy underwent a deep transformation. The pervasive force exerted 
by the growing neoliberal ideology modified the social background, formal education, and 
daily practices of politicians, bureaucrats, and generals, as well as their subjective 
understandings about the conditions of the international environment. Knowledge in 
economics, managerial skills, and technocratic impulses became the primary inputs of the 
new institutional culture and cultural reflexes developed by the policy elite. Second, the core 
ideological source of Mexico’s strategic policy entered a phase of decline. The need to adapt 
the country to the emerging American-built neoliberal international order motivated 
decision-makers to modify the parameters for all strategies of national security. Nationalism 
gradually lost its status as practical logic within the policy elite to be replaced by the 
continentalist strategic approach, which provided more convenient resources to interact with 
the nascent unipolar structural environment, particularly with the United States. The review 
of the sources of Mexico’s strategic policy validates the argument that the sociocultural 
context was a fundamental factor in shaping how Mexican policy-makers responded to the 
profound transformations of the domestic and international environments during the period 
of the adoption and consolidation of neoliberalism in Mexico. 
The contribution of this chapter rests in the description of the sociocultural context in which 
the Mexican strategic policy was formulated between the late twentieth and early twenty-
first century. The review of the institutional and ideational sources that nurtured foreign and 
security policy has been the guiding thread of this text. This work has validated that much 
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of the existing literature has addressed the composition of power elites, the characteristics of 
foreign policy, and the evolution of national security in Mexico as isolated topics and from 
a structuralist perspective. In the integration of these elements that compose the Mexican 
strategic culture and in their comprehensive study from a constructivist-structuralist 
approach lies the contribution of this chapter to the valuable findings and reflections 
provided by academics such as Roderic Camp, Ana Covarrubias, Olga Pellicer, and 
Leonardo Curzio.248 The results of this chapter are essential to reconstruct the dispositional 
logic of the political elite and construct the positional logic of the strategic policy-making 
field in the next two chapters. These aspects are vital to understanding the practical logic 
that guided the evolution of foreign and security policy. Finally, it should be noted that this 
analysis of the specific socio-historical context in which the ideas that fuelled the strategic 
policy emerged allows us, in chapters three and four, to properly understand the effects of 
the social imaginary of the policy actors on the strategic decisions that guided Mexico’s 
behaviour throughout the neoliberal era.  
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Chapter three. The politics of strategic policy in Mexico, 1988-


















Born-winners [neoliberal technocrats] lack collective views and cannot 
have them because they see in the reality a succession of video-clips, the 
fragments linked by minimum units. What do they care, for example, of 
the millions of Mexicans thrown into the economic vacuum if the 
macroeconomy is saved? In their code, the macro is the only susceptible 
to be taken care of and the micro only exists as a point of comparison. And, 
also, “The Mexican”, as a rule, they find it boring. At times that repertoire 
is useful (in conversations with foreigners as local colour, at parties, at 
moments where you have to show sensitivity and tenderness), but usually 
it seems to them a nuisance. Salinas declaims nationalism, but he never 
finds in it a useful function on the way to the [North American] Free Trade 
Agreement. If nationalism does not tell them anything, it is because a 
financial politician sees the small homeland in the nation, and locates the 
major homeland in the Global Villa, without their cosmopolitanism going 
very far, for them there is only one other nationality conceivable: the 
American. And if they are bothered by a cultural origin weighed down by 
the devotion of the singular, it is because of the question that leads: Who 
wants to be different?; that is, who wants to be pre-modern?.249 
 
Carlos Monsiváis (Mexican writer), 1995. 
 
249 Carlos Monsiváis, ‘Ya No Un Semidios, Sino Un Funcionario. El Ocaso Del Presidencialismo’, Revista de 
La Universidad de México, July.534–535 (1995), 15–21 pp.15–6. 
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Introduction 
The decade before 1982 was distinguished by the dramatic increase in political tensions and 
economic instability worldwide. The effects of the Cold War globally and the ravages of the 
debt crisis in Latin America amplified the issue of national security in the official discourse 
and public discussion. From the 1980s, two currents of thought were established as the main 
ideological inputs of the political conceptions advocated addressing diplomatic, economic, 
and security issues in Mexico. Nationalism and continentalism provided contrasting visions 
of national security and influenced the strategic policy-making process to differing extents. 
From the sociocultural context described in the previous chapter, the following paragraphs 
examine the role played by these two historically specific regimes of knowledge in the 
evolution of Mexican strategic policy from 1988 to 2000. This study pays special attention 
to the habitus of the policy elite, which was dominated by the orthodox technocracy of the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party, and to the international, domestic, and bureaucratic 
spheres that constituted the field of formulation of Mexico’s strategic policy. How 
politicians, bureaucrats, and military interacted with the broad structural environment 
throughout the 1990s demonstrates that the nationalist approach underwent a deep process 
of dismantling in which the design of soft-balancing strategies to the hegemony of the United 
States lost relevance, as they were incompatible with the norms and rules of the nascent 
American-built neoliberal international order. 
The central argument of this chapter is that the practical logic based on the nationalist 
strategic conception had less and less dominance over the construction of Mexico’s 
international identity, the institutional culture of the Mexican government, and the cultural 
reflexes of the policy elite during the period of adoption of neoliberalism. This logic came 
under pressure at the late 1970s, as continentalist notions and neoliberal precepts gained 
popularity, especially in the political and bureaucratic spheres. It is possible to detect the 
influence of these ideas on the political prescriptions of several key actors since the Miguel 
de la Madrid government began in 1982. However, the nationalist approach did not lose its 
status as practical logic until the National Action Party came to power in December 2000. 
The main conclusion is that only the nationalist approach could claim the status of practical 
logic of the Mexican policy elite in the decade before the first political change by democratic 
means in the history of Mexico. This work makes two main contributions. The first is that it 
provides an analysis from a different perspective to the structuralist approach that 
95 
predominates in the literature.250 The practice-centred approach deployed in this study 
allows us to understand how the interaction between the subjective understandings of the 
policy elite and the structures of power modified the parameters for the design of national 
security strategies. The second contribution is that it develops an argument rarely recognised 
in the literature on the Mexican case.251 This work shows that the decline of nationalism 
generated political spaces that allowed continentalist security doctrines to play an 
increasingly influential role in the definition of international identity and the formulation of 
strategic policy. Within the framework of this dissertation, this chapter fulfils the function 
of evaluating the effects of the social imaginary of the political actors on the strategic 
decisions that shaped the behaviour of Mexico during the advent of neoliberalism. 
The following chapter reviews in four sections the cultural dynamics that constituted the 
strategic policy-making process of Mexico during the governments of the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party before the political transition of 2000. The first presents a brief review 
of the central aspects of the nationalist construction of Mexico’s international identity that 
prevailed during the first half of the twentieth century and in the 1970s. This section also 
approaches the process of dismantling defensive nationalism that began a decade later. Part 
3.2 examines the predispositions that shaped the habitus of the policy elite to understand the 
role played by the various views on Mexico’s international identity in the formulation of 
foreign and security policy. It also evaluates the role of institutional culture and cultural 
reflexes of the most influential constituencies in decision-making. The third section maps 
the configuration of the strategic policy-making field to identify the forces that conditioned 
the choices of the policy-makers. This section pays special attention to the superposition of 
the fields that made up the structural environment in which the strategic policy was made. 
Finally, part 3.4 tracks the interaction between different strategic approaches throughout the 
administrations of Carlos Salinas and Ernesto Zedillo. This section focuses on the evolution 
of the dynamic relationship between the objective power structures and the subjective 
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understandings of the decision-makers that established the parameters for national security 
strategies since the administration of President Miguel de la Madrid. 
3.1. Construction of Mexico’s international identity: 
nationalism 
For much of the twentieth century, the conviction to consolidate Mexico as a sovereign 
nation free of the former Spanish dominance and independent of the growing American 
influence prevailed in the Mexican security establishment. The defensive nationalism that 
emerged from the Mexican revolution and fed the Constitution of 1917 positioned itself as 
the core element that shaped the social imagination of policy-makers. The potent symbolic 
engineering inherited by the Creole patriotism of the early nineteenth century established the 
ideological foundations that defined what was possible and what was unthinkable in matters 
of foreign policy and national security.252 Until 1946, the nationalist vision promoted by the 
presidents of military origin of the Institutional Revolutionary Party had the preservation of 
sovereignty, safeguarding of independence, and defence of the territory as strategic 
objectives. These priorities justified the diplomatic confrontation with the United States in 
international forums, the political closeness with Latin America, and the implementation of 
a protectionist economic policy.253 Nevertheless, it also set the limits of the strategic choices 
of decision-makers. The policy elite was aware of Mexico’s weakness to exercise a hard-
balancing to American power, so it was unthinkable that diplomatic tensions would escalate 
to the military domain. The attachment of Mexican diplomacy to international law gave 
Mexico the ‘right to dissent’ from the superpower without the risk of conflict.254 The legal, 
nationalist, and defensive nature of the Mexican strategic policy provided room for Mexico 
to manoeuvre in the international arena. This trend reflected the construction of Mexico’s 
international identity as that of a sovereign nation attached to the principles of international 
law, but one that did not wish to make significant commitments to preserving the world 
order. It also revealed that Mexico assumed the structural position of emerging middle power 
with limited interests abroad, inclined to a soft-balancing strategy, and aimed at isolationism 
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and self-denial to preserve its relative independence from the only credible source of threat 
to its security: United States.255 
The dismantling of defensive nationalism is understood as the gradual weakening and 
replacement of the dominant approach on Mexican strategic policy. This process occurred 
in parallel to the decline of the political-economic model of ‘shared development’ promoted 
by Presidents Luis Echeverría and José López in the 1970s.256 This model was distinguished 
by its sovereigntist and populist nature, as well as by recovering distinctive features of the 
nationalist government of President Lázaro Cárdenas in the 1930s. The political alliance 
with labour sectors, the nationalisation of the banking system, the strategic relevance of the 
national oil industry, and the diplomatic differences with the United States over the Central 
American conflict were some signs that defensive nationalism had regained its status as 
practical logic in the policy elite.257 The fundamental purpose was to return to the 
revolutionary principles of progressive and nationalist policy rescinded since the 1940s. 
Their nullification was a result of the support provided by President Miguel Alemán, the first 
of civilian origin, to a vision of economic developmentalism based on capitalist liberalism 
and the assimilation of American hegemony.258 However, the depletion of the shared 
development model became evident between 1976 and 1982. Domestic conditions generated 
by the drastic decline in oil prices, the failure of the economic model based on the internal 
market, and the aggressive foreign policy of the American President Ronald Reagan 
influenced the emergence of a new policy elite willing to build a development-based 
strategic approach oriented to the cooperation with the United States, the open free-market 
economy, and a broad security completion.259 Despite the gradual dominance of the soft-
bandwagoning continental strategic vision in the 1990s, ideas and practices of defensive 
nationalism remained in the background within the policy elite.260 
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3.2. Habitus of policy elite: the homogeneous orthodox 
technocracy 
The concept of habitus allows us to examine the role played by the various constructions on 
the international identity of Mexico during the strategic policy-making process. It also helps 
us to understand the relevance of institutional culture during the dismantling stage of 
nationalism and the technical reflexes of the most influential politicians and bureaucrats in 
strategic decision-making. The policy elite of the Institutional Revolutionary Party of the 
1980s and 1990s distinguished themselves by being relatively homogeneous in political and 
ideological terms. The technocrats were the guild that possessed the most appropriate 
cultural sense to adapt to the structural environment of the final years of the Cold War. The 
distinctive formal training and shared cultural practices among the new generation of 
politicians and bureaucrats explain their preponderance. The core of the cabinets of Salinas 
and Zedillo illustrate the primacy of neoliberal technocracy that emerged from 1982. In the 
Salinas cabinet, the ‘compact group’ was made up of bureaucrats inexperienced in politics. 
The influence of its members is attributed to the fact that they were orthodox adepts of the 
neoliberal economic doctrine acquired during their postgraduate studies at elite American 
universities. The incorporation of actors with this profile was the product of a tendency 
forged since the 1960s by an influential clique of intellectuals and economists from the Bank 
of Mexico led by Miguel Mancera, Leopoldo Solís, and Gustavo Petricioli.261 The Zedillo 
cabinet gave continuity to this type of officials but from a more moderate stance. The 
‘economic group’ was also forged by the elite of the Bank of Mexico. Its influence was the 
result of the formative, professional, and ideological affinities of its members with the 
president. This first circle was a derivation of the Salinas cabinet, as its most relevant 
members were protégées of former Secretaries of Finance Pedro Aspe and David Ibarra.262 
Throughout these two administrations, military and diplomatic elites lost relevance in 
strategic decision-making. The predominance acquired by politicians and bureaucrats who 
were members of the neoliberal technocracy is attributed to two main factors.263 
The first reason is that, in the political-economic environment produced by the crises of the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, it became less and less feasible to prolong the validity of 
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nationalist policies that put the country’s stability at risk and hindered its insertion to the 
emerging global order. A distinctive skill of the new generation of politicians and 
bureaucrats was to support their policy choices with positivist arguments and specialised 
knowledge. The technical capacity, academic orthodoxy, and apolitical disposition of 
technocrats influenced their ability to solve economic difficulties, political problems, and 
undertake diplomatic negotiations, maximising benefits and avoiding confrontations.264 The 
influence of diplomats and military, groups historically identified with defensive 
nationalism, diminished as the Central American crisis and tensions with the United States 
eased in the late 1970s, and matters relating to macroeconomics and public finances took 
precedence in the early 1980s. In the case of diplomats, the gradual marginalisation of 
Mexican foreign service personnel in decision-making progressed since the 1970s. This 
situation weakened the pillars of Mexican diplomacy based on the principles of the Estrada 
doctrine. The position of secretary of foreign relations began to be occupied by politicians 
with limited diplomatic training or by technicians with extensive knowledge in economics. 
By the end of the 1980s, foreign policy priorities were in the process of change, since the 
reconfiguration of the world system in the last years of the Cold War positioned the economy 
as the primary medium of interaction with the world.265 In the case of the military, despite 
the formalisation of their participation in the formulation of foreign and security policy, they 
were gradually relegated to address domestic matters. Notwithstanding the growing military 
presence in the cabinets, resistance prevailed within the military elite regarding their 
involvement and commitment in the formulation of national security policy. The military 
elite was the least trained guild to contribute to policy-making in a context where military 
force was increasingly discarded as a legitimate foreign policy instrument.266 This practical 
perspective explains the rise of technocrats to a position of dominance in the establishment 
of a new political-economic paradigm and the weakening of the influence of diplomats and 
military in the formulation of strategic policy in the 1990s. 
The second reason for the rise of the members of the neoliberal technocracy refers to the 
ability of the técnico-politician to adapt to the emerging global order of the post-Cold War. 
Their adaptability is attributed to the fact that they received privileged training in economics 
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as part of their intellectual training. This situation reflected that instrumental rationality was 
the central component of the political culture that would predominate during the neoliberal 
period and configure a new hierarchical, administrative, and technocratic logic in the policy 
elite. While the number of officials educated in law began to decline since 1970, the presence 
and influence of economists in the federal government reached its highest point in 1994.267 
The proportion of renowned Mexican politicians who belonged to the financial sphere is 
significant. More than a third of the actors who held a cabinet position from 1988 to 2000 
had training or experience in some economic discipline, including the two presidents and 
three out of five foreign relations secretaries.268 Specialised training and professional 
practice in economic matters was a trend that began in 1982, especially in the bureaucratic 
elite. Postgraduates in macroeconomics and financial economics became the distinctive 
element of the curricula of officials graduated from American Ivy-League universities, 
which had incubated the neoliberal doctrine promoted by academics such as Milton 
Friedman and Friedrich Hayek. Also having professional experience in economic agencies 
such as the Secretariat of Finance, Bank of Mexico, World Bank, or International Monetary 
Fund was an essential aspect of belonging to the nascent political elite.269 The socio-cultural 
background of the bureaucratic leaders who emigrated to the political domain facilitated 
their adaptation to the national and international political-economic crisis scenario to place 
commercial diplomacy, collective security, and regional multilateralism at the centre of 
Mexican strategic policy. 
The crisis of 1982 generated favourable conditions for technocrats to assume power with 
their discourse of rescuing what nationalist politicians could not save. The result was the 
beginning of a process of dismantling defensive nationalism through the profound 
reorientation of the Mexican political-economic model. The strategic policy went from 
prioritising the defence of sovereignty through strategic confrontation with the United States 
and diplomacy attached to international law, towards the promotion of development through 
a relationship of dependence with the superpower and diplomacy based on free trade. The 
international identity of Mexico was in transformation: the country moved from defensive, 
self-denying, and legal nationalism based on the oil industry to open, subordinate, and 
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economist continentalism based on a close relationship with the United States.270 
Significantly, this transition altered the distribution of decision-making power and influence 
in the strategic policy-making process. The secretaries of defence, navy, and foreign 
relations gradually lost sway due to their historical affinity with the nationalist strategic 
approach distinguished by their reactive assessment of the international environment. On the 
other hand, the secretaries of the economic portfolio improved their position because of their 
socio-cultural background and formal training allowed them to adapt to the reconfiguration 
of national and international environment structures. These attributes enabled them to 
establish a new strategic conception that combined some elements of legal diplomacy 
attached to international law with a greater emphasis on free trade and regional 
cooperation.271  
Coupling and accommodating on the side of American hegemony in the nascent unipolar 
order was established as the main objective of the new strategic policy. This aim was 
achieved by integrating Mexico into the emerging system of global neoliberalism to reflect 
its adherence to the new rules established by the United States. The cultural reflexes of the 
diplomatic and military establishments generated opposition to this process. However, the 
resistance of both elites was limited. In the diplomatic elite, their understanding of the 
conditions of the structural environment, their knowledge about the legitimising power 
required to get involved in global economic dynamics, and their institutional reflexes 
towards mediation facilitated their alignment with the new policy. In the military elite, 
despite constant frictions with the civil leadership, the ongoing process of cultural change 
within the armed forces and the predominance of institutional reflexes tending towards the 
abnegation to presidential decisions diminished their refusal of the change of strategic vision. 
1982 marked the end of a period in which the nationalist influence of generals and diplomats 
was significant in strategic decision-making. 1988 consolidated a new generation of 
politicians and bureaucrats specialised in economics in power that led Mexico’s strategic 
policy to develop a dependency relationship with the United States, based primarily on 
regional trade. This change occurred because the habitus of the técnico-politician allowed 
the conception of a strategic approach that was more aligned with the emerging international 
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norms that governed the new unipolar order of the post-Cold War, a central element of the 
field in which the policy was made. 
Figure 3-1. Habitus of the Mexican policy elite, 1988-2000 
(Reconstruction of the dispositional logic) 
 
Own elaboration based on Pierre Bourdieu, Practical Reason. On the Theory of Action (Stanford: SUP, 1998), 
p.5. Note: the dotted line indicates probable orientation toward the nationalist or continentalist approaches. 
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As portrayed in Figure 3-1, the concept of habitus allows us to generate an image about the 
space of social positions and cultural predispositions that shaped how policy-makers 
interacted with the broad structural environment to respond to international challenges. The 
reflexes acquired in the institutions in which the decision-makers operated were decisive in 
the production of new policy practices and a new strategy to preserve national security. 
3.3. Fields of strategic policy-making: international conflict and 
domestic crisis 
The concept of field and the identification of the superposition of several fields allows the 
evaluation of the external forces that conditioned the decisions of the Mexican policy elite. 
The structural environment in which Mexican strategic policy was formulated after 1988 
was made up of three fields. The first was the field of international relations; the second was 
Mexico’s political, cultural, and social environment; and the third was the inter-institutional 
context in which the policy-making process was carried out. These three spheres were 
severely affected by the political-economic crisis of the 1980s and the end of the Cold 
War.272 Considering the superposition of these three domains allows us to assess the 
interrelation between them. Although each of these fields operated under its own internal 
logic, they were not isolated or immune to external pressures. The relevant changes in one 
field had repercussions in the other two. The strategic policy was formulated as a response 
to the prevailing conditions in these three fields and simultaneously shaped their continuous 
reconfiguration. This way of organising and analysing the environment in which the policy 
evolved provides a framework to integrate the main strategic dilemmas with less understood 
issues within the policy elite. On the one hand, the bilateral relationship with the United 
States, the policies of the superpower towards Latin America, the rise of global 
neoliberalism, and the political-economic crisis of the 1980s. On the other hand, the impact 
of new practices and discourses in world politics on democratic values, human rights, and a 
broad concept of security.273 These practices and speeches had repercussions in the 
international and domestic fields. 
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The international relations field was the space for interaction of state and non-state actors. 
The conditions of this realm in the final years of the Cold War were defined by the 
redistribution of military power in the international system, the strategic policy of the 
participating actors, and the norms that redefined the nature of foreign affairs. The first two 
factors have been extensively addressed in the literature on the strategic behaviour of the 
middle powers. A decade after the Carsten Holbraad study, a current emerged focused on 
examining the international norms that shaped the foreign policy practices of the 
middlepowerhood in the post-Cold War era.274 Traditional security practices based on the 
use of large-scale military force and alliance politics were discredited, especially those of 
systemic balancing and revisionism against the order imposed by the American 
hegemony.275 In contrast, the bandwagoning strategy and multilateralist practices for global 
governance gained popularity through international organisations that emerged in the 1990s, 
such as the G-20 and the World Trade Organisation.276 The new approaches to international 
relations adopted by the middle powers focused issues of the so-called ‘low politics’ such as 
human rights and environmental protection, elements of niche diplomacy that reinforced the 
American-built neoliberal international order.277 As a result, new regulatory standards for 
state behaviour emerged that changed the character of international relations after the end of 
the Cold War. The core of these new practices of world politics was a greater emphasis on 
the power of multilateralism to solve international problems and collective responsibility in 
the preservation of the global order.278 Speeches about multilateralism, democratic values, 
human rights, economic liberalisation, and collective security created pressure on policy 
elites, who hardly ignored the new approach to international relations.279 
The political, cultural, and social field of Mexico was dominated by the impact of the 
political-economic crises of 1976 and 1982. The geographical location of Mexico, the 
position it assumed during the Cold War, and the representation of the crisis and conflict to 
society reflected that the Mexican strategic vision was different from that of other middle 
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powers. The result was a series of apparent contradictions within popular opinion and the 
policy elite. On the one hand, the oil boom and populist governments of the 1970s fuelled a 
robust patriotic feeling of self-reliance oriented to the conviction that Mexico should 
exercise its sovereignty by assuming a leadership role in Central America and confronting 
the United States politically to counteract its influence.280 On the other hand, the economic 
and social consequences brought about by the gradual deterioration of the import substitution 
industrialisation model led to businesspeople and political actors to the centre of the Mexican 
political spectrum. They rejected old diplomatic practices and nationalist policies to replace 
them with new methods and institutions to avoid the worsening of the crisis and adapt the 
country to the emerging world order.281 This situation was part of a broad trend in 
international relations, mainly in small and medium powers. Evidence of these 
contradictions was the rise of the National Action Party in national politics and the rupture 
in the leadership of the Institutional Revolutionary Party between the new generation of 
centre-right technocrats and the old centre-left wing of politicians. The political-economic 
crises exacerbated the tensions that already existed between the nationalism of the liberals 
and the neoliberalism of the conservatives.282 These contradictions shaped the domestic 
context in which the strategic policy was made. They combined internal historical trends 
with external emerging currents to complicate the task of decision-makers to formulate a 
strategic policy that would guarantee national security and economic development in the 
country. 
The inter-institutional field includes the bureaucratic context in which the strategic policy 
was formulated. The characteristics of this sphere were the centralisation of power in the 
president, the influence of the economic team, and the public management reform promoted 
by international financial organisations.283 Of the 46 substitutions that took place in the 
cabinet from 1988 to 2000, two of them stood out. Firstly, the dismissal of the secretary of 
the navy in 1990 was the first change in leadership in the armed forces in the middle of an 
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administration since 1955. Secondly, as of 1988, the position of secretary of foreign relations 
passed from professional diplomats to be occupied by bureaucrats specialised in economics. 
It should be noted that in the late 1980s, there were two bureaucratic changes aimed at 
professionalising the strategic decision-making. The first was the creation of Specialised 
Cabinet in Foreign Policy and Specialised Cabinet in National Security. The second was the 
creation of the Centre for Research and National Security. During the same period, 
hierarchies within the Mexican foreign service and the armed forces changed gradually. The 
relative instability generated in the bureaucracy sector in charge of national security was the 
product of a clash of currents within the secretariats. While nationalist attitudes prevailed 
among experienced diplomats and orthodox military officers, newly appointed officials 
aligned themselves with the president’s neoliberal vision to preserve privileges.284 This 
situation contributed to the reorientation of the strategic policy. Since 1982, the secretaries 
of finance, communications, energy, and commerce; the directors of the Bank of Mexico 
and Mexican Petroleum; as well as the chief of the presidential staff, were predominant 
actors in strategic decision-making. The power of the homogeneous economic team derived 
from the fact that they shared socio-cultural backgrounds, formal training, professional 
careers, social relations, and ideological preferences with the president. In the case of the 
national security team, the influence of diplomats is attributed to the fact that they mobilised 
their cultural capital more effectively than the generals. The expertise of the members of the 
Mexican foreign service in diplomatic negotiation and international law were fundamental 
cultural assets that complemented the political practice of technocrats. In contrast, the 
military’s experience in strategic planning and the growing American pressure on the anti-
drug campaign relegated them to take care of internal security issues. Also, the symbolic 
capital of the military was a constant concern that motivated the political elite to limit their 
participation in emergencies caused by natural disasters, as they felt threatened by their deep 
nationalism and political potential.285 The symbolic capital of the military was subject to 
constant wear and tear due to the recurring deployment of troops to carry out public safety 
tasks that ended in human rights violations. In the late 1980s and during the 1990s, the 
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influence of military and diplomats on strategic policy gradually diminished, while the 
power of politicians and bureaucrats in decision-making increased.286 
Mexico’s strategic policy evolved as the cultural practices of the policy elite adapted to the 
structural conditions prevailing in the three fields. Increasingly, policy choices ceased to 
favour the defence of sovereignty through traditional strategies such as soft-balancing to 
American influence. This situation implied the abandonment of policies such as economic 
protectionism, diplomatic confrontation, and adherence to international law. Since the mid-
1980s, the strategic policy aimed at development through a soft-bandwagoning approach 
founded on economic openness and multilateralism. Various scholars agree that defensive 
nationalism entered a period of crisis from 1982, but few recognise that it was gradually 
replaced by a soft-bandwagoning continentalist approach that emerged after the end of the 
Cold War.287 Although American pressures were crucial in this process, these forces do not 
fully explain the reasons behind the reaction of the policy-makers. This thesis’ practice-
centred perspective allows us to assess how the policy elite understood their situation and to 
recognise that their policy decisions were conditioned by the cultural context in which policy 
actors were immersed. This consideration reveals that decision-makers were responding to 
national and international conditions, several of which are not addressed in depth in the 
literature. The review of the habitus of the policy elite and the fields in which they operated 
shows that the problem with the nationalist strategic policy was not how the policy-makers 
adapted to the structural environment of the Cold War. The issue was their inability to adapt 
to the changes that took place in that environment from the late 1980s and early 1990s. The 
next section examines the dynamics of Mexican strategic policy before the political change 
that took place in 2000 taking into consideration the habitus of the policy elite and the field 
of strategic policy-making illustrated in Figure 3-2. 
3.4. Evolution of the strategic policy: from confrontation in 
Central America to dependency in North America 
This exploration of the evolution of Mexico’s strategic policy in the 1980s and 1990s reveals 
a struggle between two contending conceptions: the historical nationalism aspired to 
preserve its status as practical logic in the policy elite while the nascent continentalism aimed 
to establish itself as the new predominant approach. 
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Figure 3-2. Field of the Mexican strategic policy-making, 1988-2000 
(Construction of the positional logic) 
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The domestic political and cultural context, as well as the global political environment, were 
equally important in the decisions made about economic, foreign, and security policy. The 
interaction between the subjective understandings of the new policy elite and the regional 
power structures established parameters to produce strategies. The central argument is that 
the development of strategic policy from 1988 to 2000 was founded in a process of 
dismantling defensive nationalism undertaken by the emerging neoliberal technocracy from 
1982. Tracking the interaction between nationalist and continentalist approaches illustrates 
the rupture of the pattern of strategic confrontation with the United States, the integration 
into North America, and the consolidation of a regional dependence. The following analysis 
of the configuration of the national and international political contexts allows us to 
understand the complex relationship between endogenous and exogenous dynamics that 
drove the evolution of strategic policy. 
3.4.1. Breaking the strategic confrontation pattern, 1982-1988 
After the end of the Second World War, Mexico assumed a low-profile isolationist stance in 
world politics in order to avoid involvement in conflicts during the Cold War. For this 
reason, the Mexican government abandoned the idea of aspiring for a place in the United 
Nations Security Council in 1947. Mexico exercised a strategy of defensive soft-balancing 
to American influence through the practice of diplomacy aligned with international law. 
Until the late 1970s, foreign policy played a marginal, secondary, and merely defensive role 
in the internal project; it was a retaining wall against global dynamics. However, the 
beginning of the Central American conflict in 1979 made evident the mutual geostrategic 
relevance between Mexico and the region. This situation forced the Mexican government to 
take a stand and get directly involved.288 The emergence of what some academics define as 
a proxy war in Central America during the so-called ‘Second Cold War’ configured the 
geopolitical scenario for Mexico. The regional context produced interests in the south and 
pressures in the north, which conditioned Mexican strategic behaviour.289 Internally, the 
1982 crisis exposed the exhaustion of the shared development model promoted by the most 
traditionalist faction of the Institutional Revolutionary Party. The newly elected president de 
la Madrid said: ‘We live in an emergency. […] We will not abandon ourselves to inertia; the 
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situation is intolerable’.290 The debt crisis and the Central American conflict generated 
conditions for the arrival of neoliberal technocracy to power and the fundamental 
reorientation of strategic policy. During the 1980s, three situations reflected the breaking of 
the pattern of strategic confrontation with the United States, a distinctive practice of 
defensive nationalism. 
The first milestone was the change of focus on Mexico’s relations with the United States and 
Central America. After assuming power in 1982, de la Madrid modified nationalist practices 
and speeches that fuelled his predecessor’s activism in favour of the Central American 
revolution.291 Progressive activism was replaced by a traditional and regional multilateralism 
that recovered some normative precepts of the old Mexican diplomacy. The purpose was to 
position Mexico as a mediator, justify disagreements with the United States, and mend the 
worn ties with the superpower. By 1983, Secretary of Foreign Relations Bernardo Sepúlveda 
declared that 
Mexico has joined its efforts to those of other countries in the region 
to more effectively achieve the objectives of its foreign policy […] 
Mexico’s position in relation to the Central American conflict and 
its active and supportive participation in the Contadora Group 
derives from the traditional postulates of its foreign policy.292 
The Contadora Act on Peace and Co-operation in Central America of 1984 was the most 
meaningful initiative through which Mexico promoted diplomatic agreements, retained its 
regional influence, exercised an active soft-balancing strategy to aggressive American 
policy, and avoided confrontations with the superpower.293 By 1985, the stagnation of the 
peace negotiations in the south and the increase in pressures from the north motivated 
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Mexico to move the Central American issue from its strategic agenda.294 World peace, 
nuclear disarmament, and economic cooperation were issues that allowed the Mexican 
government to extend its multilateralism without risk of disturbing the relationship with the 
United States or generating internal problems.295 In this way, a new strategic behaviour was 
shaped based on an active counterweight and pragmatic diplomacy that sought to reduce 
confrontations with the United States and claim the regional leadership of Mexico in its role 
of medium power. Mexico’s interests had begun to migrate from Central America to North 
America. 
The disputes with the United States since 1979 were the product of the divergent perceptions 
of the American and Mexican policy elites on the regional conflict. The American 
government perceived the presence of the communist threat in Central America, while the 
Mexican government saw an opportunity to support a revolution against oppression and 
project itself as a regional leader. The change in foreign policy since 1982 was the response 
of the new policy elite to a complicated situation. Its objective was to break with the inertia 
that hindered the country’s adaptation to emerging structural conditions. The domestic 
scenario was defined by the electoral period and the economic crisis. This last factor was 
especially relevant, as it encouraged conservative, religious, and business groups to attribute 
the sanctions imposed by the United States to the progressive activism of the 1970s. Fears 
that this policy would negatively influence the renegotiation of the external debt pressured 
the new government to abandon nationalist practices and speeches.296 In the external 
environment, progressive activism lost support from Costa Rica and Venezuela, and a smear 
campaign was launched in the United States against the Mexican government. Activist 
policy toward Central America had worn out the bilateral relationship and the crisis had 
weakened Mexican negotiating capacity. Moreover, the aggressive measures of American 
President Reagan increased the risk of the conflict spreading to the southern region of 
Mexico.297 In this context, the formulation of the strategic policy from 1982 to 1988 was 
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distinguished by adopting two central elements that were intended to stop exercising a 
defensive counterweight to the United States. The return to the normative principles of 
foreign policy was the proven formula that had projected Mexico as a neutral state in the 
face of international conflicts. Regional, bounded, legal, selective, and active multilateralism 
in matters of niche diplomacy would allow the rebuilding of the relationship with the United 
States and position Mexico as a trustworthy and impartial interlocutor.298 These changes 
impacted the Mexican strategic objective. It shifted from the defence of national sovereignty 
and identity to the avoidance of actions that would lead to a confrontation with the United 
States since that could have a high political and economic costs for Mexico. 
The second situation was the establishment of a new political-economic model. Parallel to 
the Central American conflict, the crisis caused by falling oil prices and rising interest rates 
undermined the Keynesian project of shared development.299 The background, training, and 
preferences of the new policy elite influenced the turn the country would take towards 
neoliberalism. By 1982, Mexico declared itself insolvent before the international financial 
community, which considered it an economic pariah. The Mexican government was forced 
to request a loan from the International Monetary Fund, which would condition the redesign 
of the political-economic model. The letters of intent issued to that body in 1982, 1984, and 
1985 specified the policies that Mexican decision-makers were willing to apply. Public 
management reform, trade liberalisation, and openness to foreign investment were just some 
of the measures that generated a break with nationalist strategic thinking.300 These changes 
allowed the admission of Mexico to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1986. 
For de la Madrid, it was a fundamental step to enter the international market, since Mexico’s 
alignment with neoliberal orthodoxy would project it as a reliable ally of the West. He 
asserted that 
we assumed a firm and energetic negotiation stance, refusing […] to 
rhetorical and sterile confrontations […] If we had followed the path 
of the conflict, we would have prevented the access of our exports to 
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external markets, the international financial markets would have 
closed us.301 
His words confirmed that the objective of breaking with the pattern of strategic confrontation 
with the United States involved eradicating nationalist discourses and practices that 
prevented Mexico from enjoying the benefits of being a partner of the superpower in the 
nascent global neoliberal system. 
These events were in line with the new multilateralist discourse that aspired to develop a 
kind of internationalism. However, the practices of the policy elite led to the building of a 
continentalist approach. This inconsistency revealed a gap between the economic and 
diplomatic dimensions of strategic policy. On the one hand, the need to solve the debt 
problem and attract investors motivated the policy elite to prioritise issues such as 
negotiation with international financial organisations, especially with private banks and 
American economic authorities. Mexico ruled out the option of coordinating with other 
debtor countries to demand a reform of the norms of the global financial game. The Mexican 
government preferred to take advantage of its position as a neighbour of the United States, 
considering that the development of an interdependence relationship would prevent 
Americans from abandoning Mexico into crisis scenarios.302 On the other hand, in order not 
to affect negotiations with financial institutions, the Mexican government opted for 
segmented management of its strategic agenda. While in economic matters Mexico sought a 
rapprochement with the United States, in diplomacy and security issues it followed a policy 
of relative independence. The participation of Mexico in multilateral initiatives pointed to 
counterbalance American policies actively. The active counterweight strategy is interpreted 
as a residual practice of defensive nationalism, as the growing financial dependence and 
geographical proximity established parameters for the policy elite to continue developing 
strategies aimed at protecting their political autonomy.303 The inconsistency in the strategic 
policy of the 1980s was that foreign policy based on multilateralism was aimed at 
diversifying international relations to avoid complete alignment with the American stance. 
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However, simultaneously, the economic policy based on neoliberalism sought to deepen 
financial dependence with the United States in order to have a lifesaver in cases of crisis. 
The weight that economic policy gained on the strategic agenda influenced the areas of 
foreign policy and national security. In this way, neoliberalism built the foundations of what 
would later become the continentalist strategic approach. 
The third milestone was constitutional reform and political schism. The reorientation of the 
strategic policy in 1982 had consequences for domestic politics. Towards the end of the 
1980s, tensions within the federal government and the Institutional Revolutionary Party 
exposed the clash of ideological currents that struggled to control the hegemonic party and 
the country’s direction. In 1985, a group of left-wing legislators and nationalist lawyers 
promoted a reform initiative to incorporate the normative principles of foreign policy into 
the Constitution, because until then they were not a state policy that forced the president to 
abide by them. The initiative was intended to ensure that the principles had a legal basis and 
their compliance would not be subject to presidential subjectivity or the ‘swings of internal 
politics’.304 In 1986, the initiative was promoted before the Senate by Secretary of Foreign 
Relations Sepúlveda, whose influence on the strategic policy-making was in decline. The 
education of the secretary in international law and the nationalist attitudes that prevailed in 
the chancery still allowed him to exercise a limited counterweight to the growing 
predominance of continentalist preferences of bureaucrats, experts in economics.305 In 1987, 
during the legislative process and on the eve of the electoral period, the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party experienced a deep fracture. The faction so-called Democratic Current 
formed by the more traditionalist left-wing politicians demanded that the partisan leadership 
return to nationalist and social-democratic principles that had been replaced by the neoliberal 
ideology promoted by the new generation of técnico-politicians. The displacement of the 
party to the centre-right of the political spectrum and irregularities in the selection of the 
presidential candidate motivated the separation of this current.306 By 1988, the Constitution 
was reformed to introduce the normative principles of foreign policy and the emancipated 
group from the hegemonic party institutionalised itself as the nucleus of the left-wing 
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opposition. The newly formed Party of the Democratic Revolution aimed to defend the 
validity of defensive nationalism by political means. 
The constitutional reform and political schism were an attempt by the more traditionalist 
sector of the policy elite to rescue the status of defensive nationalism as practical logic of 
the strategic policy-making. The motivations of internal and external order reflected that the 
struggle in domestic politics and the growing ideological gap fuelled the strategic policy 
inconsistencies. In the domestic order, the nationalists sustained the constitutional reform 
with the argument that the foreign policy principles were a product of the historical 
experience of Mexico and an expression of the struggles during their independent life to 
survive as a nation, resist foreign interventions, and materialise revolutionary ideals. This 
sector saw the reform as a way to limit presidential power since the changes in the political 
field awoke the anticipation of the arrival of a president who was not rooted in the nationalist 
traditions of the Institutional Revolutionary Party. In contrast, de la Madrid’s decision to 
incorporate some principles into his foreign policy and not to interfere in the legislative 
process was a signal of the pragmatism that distinguished neoliberal technocracy. The 
president sought to compensate nationalist groups who complained about changes in 
strategic policy to avoid further internal divisions in the federal government and the 
hegemonic party.307 In the external order, the nationalists considered it necessary to 
strengthen the legal bases and the nationalist tradition of foreign policy to deal with 
exogenous pressures, since diplomatic moderation since 1982 did not reduce tensions with 
the United States. Instead, the pragmatism of de la Madrid motivated him to allow reform in 
the face of the American President Reagan’s disenchantment and concern for Mexican 
politics. De la Madrid objective was to use the constitutional reform as a symbol to make 
the American government feel the depth of the values that inspired Mexican diplomacy in 
Central America.308 The relevance of this first phase of the process of dismantling defensive 
nationalism lies in the weakening of the prevailing practical logic, in the resistance of a 
sector of the political elite, and in the reflexes that shaped the responses of the emerging 
neoliberal technocracy. The result of this period of change was the beginning of a new 
reorientation of Mexico’s strategic policy. 
 
307 Rafael Velázquez, ‘“Pragmatismo Principista”: La Política Exterior de México’, Revista de Relaciones 
Internacionales de La UNAM, 120–121.September (2015), 151–64 pp.158–9; DOF-11-05-1988 Presidencia, 
‘Exposición de Motivos’ (Mexico: DOF, 1988). 
308 Claude Heller, ‘Tendencias Generales de La Política Exterior Del Gobierno de Miguel de La Madrid’, Foro 
Internacional, 30.3 (1990), 380–97 pp.382–3; Jorge Chabat, ‘Los Instrumentos de La Política Exterior de 
Miguel de La Madrid’, Foro Internacional, 30.3 (1990), 398–418 pp.406–7. 
116 
3.4.2. Opening and integration to the north, 1988-1994 
During the final years of the Cold War, the Mexican policy established the bases to develop 
a strategy of coupling to the hegemony of the United States and thus enjoying the benefits 
of being an ally of the superpower in the new unipolar order. The nationalist strategy of soft-
balancing to counterweigh the American influence lost force due to the arrival of the 
neoliberal technocracy to power and the intensification of economic globalisation. In the 
1980s, Mexican strategic policy was characterised by the disconnection between financial 
objectives and the relationship with the United States. However, the new geopolitical 
scenario of the early 1990s allowed Mexico to rebuild its link with the superpower. In the 
international environment, the end of the Cold War favoured the resolution of the Central 
American conflict. For Mexico, that situation represented the significant reduction of 
American pressures and an opportunity to redefine its strategic objectives. Economic 
openness and close association with North America became the priorities of the new 
government.309 In the domestic context, political-economic change gained strength. In the 
political sphere, the rupture in the Institutional Revolutionary Party caused a legitimacy 
crisis, the consolidation of technocrats, and the strengthening of the opposition. In the 
economic field, neoliberal policies deepened the privatisation of state enterprises, economic 
liberalisation, and deregulation of foreign investment.310 The end of the Cold War and 
internal political-economic change created conditions for the rupture of the pattern of 
strategic confrontation with the United States in the 1980s to evolve towards the opening 
and integration into North America in the 1990s. Three parallel periods during the 
administration of Salinas portray this trend in the reorientation of strategic policy. 
The first period exposed the revalidation of continentalist strategic priorities incubated in the 
de la Madrid government and the persistence of cultural predispositions of defensive 
nationalism. Firstly, the continentalist priority of the economic association with the United 
States. By 1988, the elected presidents of Mexico and the United States held a meeting in 
Houston to find commonalities in their agendas. While President Salinas put issues such as 
external debt and bilateral trade on the table, American President George H. W. Bush 
proposed to discuss the Mexican policy in Central America and the fight against drug 
trafficking. The affinity, empathy, and willingness of both to establish a new relationship 
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were labelled as the ‘Spirit of Houston’.311 By 1990, the symbolism of the renewed link 
would be the basis for starting talks towards a free trade agreement. Secondly, the nationalist 
predisposition to defend political autonomy. One of the implications of Mexico’s economic 
opening in the 1980s was the acquisition of commitments with international organisations. 
However, the discourse of neoliberal technocracy on multilateralism had its practical limits. 
In the early 1990s, Mexico consistently opposed foreign interference in internal policy 
matters, especially the adoption of mechanisms promoting democracy and human rights. The 
Mexican government maintained strong reservations against initiatives to incorporate 
democratic clauses of the Organisation of American States such as the 1991 Santiago 
Commitment and Resolution 1080, the 1992 Protocol of Washington, and the 1993 Protocol 
of Managua.312 In this way, the Mexican strategic behaviour of active counterweight evolved 
into a nascent continentalist stance that sought regional economic integration without 
sacrificing its political autonomy. 
These economic and political dimensions that fed the strategic policy of Salinas 
simultaneously produced a growing connection with North America and a distancing from 
Latin America. In South America, the Mexican position in multilateral forums generated 
criticism, especially from Argentina and Brazil. These regional middle powers indicated 
Mexico’s breach of ‘the most favoured nation’ principle of the Latin American Integration 
Association Treaty since it did not consider the extension of the possible trade agreement to 
other member countries in the negotiations with the United States. In response to criticism, 
the Salinas government undertook selective diplomacy in the southern hemisphere. By 1992, 
the Economic Complementation Agreement with Chile was intended to send signals that 
Mexico’s interest in establishing strategic alliances in the region remained in force, 
especially in economic matters.313 In Central America, Mexican activism reoriented towards 
a new agenda of economic cooperation and trade liberalisation. Mexico promoted the 
Mexican Commission for Cooperation with Central America in 1990 and Tuxtla Mechanism 
for Dialogue and Coordination between Mexico and the Central American Countries in 
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1991. From 1989 to 1994, Mexico encouraged the creation of the G-3 Free Trade Agreement 
with Colombia and Venezuela, members of the Contadora Group.314 Mexico’s policy toward 
Latin America aspired to counteract the unpopular image generated by the rapprochement 
with the United States, promote positions compatible with the northern agenda, and link with 
potential allies in multilateral negotiations. Diplomatic pragmatism and selective 
multilateralism allowed Mexico to exert a relative regional influence through ad hoc 
mechanisms that were outside of inter-American institutions and did not jeopardise its 
political autonomy. 
The second period redefined the Mexico-United States relationship. De la Madrid aspired to 
diversify Mexican relations in an increasingly globalised world. However, that objective 
evolved towards economic openness and regional integration during the administration of 
Salinas. The simultaneous arrival of Bush and Salinas to power in 1988 allowed them to 
redefine the direction of the bilateral relationship. The Spirit of Houston was the beginning 
of a new linking scheme that would gain strength in 1989, the year in which two official 
meetings and the Seventh Meeting of the Binational Commission among secretaries of state 
took place.315 The affable relationship motivated Salinas to propose the negotiation of a 
commercial agreement to Bush, who received it positively. The Mexican president supported 
his proposal stating: ‘We want to trade, not help’.316 By 1990, Salinas and Bush announced 
the agreement to establish a commercial link. During this period, the incorporation of Canada 
was a strategic necessity for Mexico, as it would enable to balance the American weight in 
negotiations. The trilateral negotiation rounds formally began in 1991 and concluded in 1992 
with the signing of the treaty. William Clinton’s arrival in the White House in 1993 would 
imply a delay in legislative ratification, as he conditioned it to the inclusion of labour and 
environmental agreements. In contrast, the Salinas government avoided including the 
sensitive immigration issue so as not to contaminate the negotiation. In 1994, the North 
American Free Trade Agreement entered into force after receiving legislative ratification.317 
This process not only revealed the disposition and interest of the Mexican government but 
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also exhibited that behind the trade agreement there was an accumulation of complex issues 
that in the medium term would condition the course of the bilateral relationship. 
The free trade agreement marked the breaking of the pattern of confrontation with the United 
States and the integration of Mexico into North America. Its negotiation was the product of 
the Mexican policy elite’s ability to displace nationalist reflexes to adapt to the post-Cold 
War unipolar system. In the external context, the rules of the new neoliberal order generated 
a favourable scenario for the agreement. One factor was the image that Mexico projected 
after sticking to the orthodoxy of the Washington Consensus.318 Another factor was Bush’s 
arrival in power because, during his tenure as vice president, he valued the importance of 
the bilateral relationship with Mexico.319 Furthermore, the Canada-United States Free Trade 
Agreement set a precedent that indicated the potential of the regional economy. In contrast, 
in the domestic environment, the continentalism of the policy elite and the nationalism of 
Mexican society generated frictions. During the election campaign period, Salinas rejected 
the option of seeking an agreement with the United States, as he was aware of the 
unpopularity of that idea. Even, Secretary of Foreign Relations Fernando Solana affirmed 
categorically at the beginning of the administration that ‘the common market with the United 
States and Canada, as these two countries have resolved and raised, is not for Mexico’.320 
However, after achieving the renegotiation of the external debt in 1989, the trade agreement 
with the United States became the new strategic objective. The ethos of neoliberal 
technocracy allowed the government to simultaneously maintain the discourse of denial and 
the practice of discretion. For Secretary of Commerce Jaime Serra, it was absurd to submit 
a referendum on the idea of negotiating the treaty because of the passions it would awaken 
among Mexicans.321 The presidential decision had no political counterweight, as the cabinet 
and most legislators approved it. Although official rhetoric projected the trade agreement as 
an opportunity to bring Mexico to the first world, the roots of nationalism in society triggered 
the armed uprising of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation in 1994. Defensive 
nationalism counterattacked, now from the social trench through paramilitary means. 
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The third period exhibited a new inconsistency in Mexican strategic policy. The opening 
project undertaken in the 1980s positioned economic diplomacy as the preferred foreign 
policy instrument in Mexico. The objective was to attract foreign investment and expand 
international trade to boost national development. Mechanisms such as the Pacific Basin 
Economic Council of 1988 and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum of 1993 made 
it possible to meet these goals without jeopardising political autonomy. However, the logic 
under which the economist-led policy elite operated was based on an erroneous premise. The 
Mexican decision-makers assumed that economic and commercial openness was possible 
without opening up to interaction in political and security matters.322 The pressures that arose 
in 1994 put that belief to the test. On the one hand, joining the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development represented an improvement in Mexico’s position in the 
international structure. However, its acceptance was conditioned on its resignation from the 
G-77. The Mexican government yielded to the condition stating that: ‘Mexico will cease to 
participate in any coordination of positions of developing countries versus industrialised 
countries’.323 This position belied the policy elite and reflected the predominance of 
economic interests over political convictions. On the other hand, the Association Agreement 
with the European Union of 1991 represented a relevant international diversification 
opportunity to balance the weight that the regional association was acquiring. In this case, 
the renewal of the agreement in 1994 was conditioned on the acceptance of a democratic 
clause, which would be adopted during the Zedillo government.324 The disconnection that 
had prevailed in the 1980s between economic and diplomatic aspects of the strategic policy 
was resolved. However, a new disconnect arose between economic openness and political 
openness in the 1990s. 
The year 1994 highlighted the weakness of Salinas’ strategy of opening the country at two 
speeds. This inconsistency was the product of the interaction between continentalist 
priorities and nationalist predispositions. In the economic sphere, the continentalist 
predominance influenced the adaptation of the diversification promoted by de la Madrid to 
the geographical and economic conditions of the country. The economic facts could not be 
overcome by the diplomatic narrative that aspired to position Mexico as a hinge of multiple 
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belongings, the bridge between North and South America. The confrontation generated after 
the entry into force of the North American Free Trade Agreement was caused by the policy 
elite’s inclination towards continental economic association and the opposition of Mexican 
society to the erosion of its Latin American sovereignty and identity. For the Mexican 
foreign service, this ideological clash led the country to ‘an identity crisis’ that inhibited its 
‘traditional summoning capacity inside and outside Latin America’.325 In the political sphere, 
nationalist predispositions that fuelled the resistance of social sectors also prevailed in 
neoliberal technocracy, but conveniently. The signs of political instability in 1988 and 1994 
increased internal and external pressures for the government to adopt measures on 
democracy and human rights. The residual nationalist reflexes in the policy elite founded 
their institutional response of aversion to the intervention and monitoring of international 
organisations on issues that had historically been marginalised in Mexican political culture. 
Pragmatism and authoritarianism manifested through the deployment of troops in response 
to the political crisis and American pressures on the issue of drug trafficking, a situation that 
resulted in human rights violations and repression of political opponents.326 These practices 
were far from the vision of modernity that Salinas projected in his political rhetoric. The 
reading of strategic decisions during this period reveals two central aspects. First, nationalist 
predispositions motivated the slowdown of political openness in defence of the decadent 
regime. Second, continentalist priorities influenced the acceleration of economic openness 
in favour of the consolidation of the neoliberal model. The result was a strategic policy aimed 
at regional economic openness and the preservation of political autonomy. 
3.4.3. Between dependence and diversification, 1994 -2000 
The conclusion of the renegotiation of the external debt in 1989 meant the end of the debt 
decade, while the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1992 marked the 
beginning of the decade of trade in Mexico. During the Zedillo administration, the latter 
milestone significantly influenced the reorientation of the coupling strategy undertaken by 
Salinas towards an accommodation strategy within the American hegemony. The strategic 
policy of the early 1990s was distinguished by accelerating economic openness and curbing 
political openness, as well as by approaching North America and moving away from Latin 
America. However, the forces that emerged from 1994 conditioned decisions on foreign 
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policy and national security. In that year, the regional context was defined by the political 
change in the United States, the exodus of Cuban migrants to Florida, and the American-led 
military intervention in Haiti. This last event revealed the limits of the association with the 
United States and the coexistence of continentalist priorities and nationalist predispositions 
within the Mexican policy elite. At that year’s United Nations General Assembly, Salinas 
criticised American President Clinton’s intervention by stating that ‘the use and threat of 
force, when world peace is not in danger, are no longer valid frames of reference for 
achieving the ends sought today by sovereign nations’.327 In the domestic environment, the 
Zapatista uprising and the murders of the presidential candidate and the secretary-general of 
the Institutional Revolutionary Party generated social and political pressures that increased 
demands on the government for a clean and peaceful electoral process. Political instability 
and government financial attrition resulted in the steep decline in international reserves 
during the period of administrative transition.328 This scenario generated conditions for 
economic openness and trade integration in North America to evolve rapidly towards 
financial dependence and political conditioning with the United States. Three vectors of 
strategic policy reflected the tensions between the inertia of the consolidation of the 
continental bloc and the need to diversify Mexico’s international relations. 
The national security vector pointed to conditioning, as it was one of the most sensitive to 
the pressures produced by the 1994 political-economic crisis. The North American Free 
Trade Agreement addressed the economic interests of Mexico in the north, but also the 
security priorities of the United States in the south. Continentalist predispositions of 
decision-makers and the role played by the American government during the crisis were 
fundamental in the redefinition of the security agenda. The ideas that prevailed during the 
1980s among the Mexican policy elite about the importance of generating an 
interdependence relationship with the United States paid off in 1994. The severity of the 
Mexican crisis motivated the American Department of Treasury to alert Clinton that the 
‘collapse of Mexico could have severe consequences for the United States’.329 Given the 
high possibility that the ‘economic meltdown’ would harm American companies, intensify 
illegal immigration, and increase drug trafficking at the border, Clinton decided to resort to 
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the Exchange Stabilisation Fund to rescue Mexico. In addition to being a threat to the 
national security of the United States, two reasons justified the unilateral decision of the 
American government despite the refusal of the American Congress, cabinet members, and 
79% of American citizens.330 One was the confidence generated by the leader of the Mexican 
policy elite. Clinton saw in Zedillo ‘an economist with a doctorate from Yale who had 
stepped into the breach when his party’s original candidate for president, Luis Colosio, was 
assassinated. If anybody could bring Mexico back, Zedillo could’. The other motivation was 
disclosed in 1997, the year in which Mexico would pay off its debt. Clinton said that ‘Zedillo 
had also instituted the reforms he had promised […] the loan turned out to be not only good 
policy but also a good investment’.331 The idea of interdependence proved counterproductive 
for Mexico, as the financial rescue undermined its political autonomy. The pattern of 
strategic confrontation with the United States was in the process of becoming a pattern of 
financial dependence and political conditioning. 
The interaction between the continentalist predispositions of neoliberal technocracy and the 
pressures generated by the 1994 crisis influenced the redefinition of national security policy. 
The American financial rescue resulted in the establishment of the fight against drug 
trafficking as a priority in the Mexican security agenda and the institutionalisation of the 
binational security alliance. The anti-drug campaign was one of the priorities promoted by 
the American government since the 1970s. However, the frictions generated by the Central 
American conflict and the nationalist predispositions of the Mexican policy elite hindered 
any attempt at cooperation. Until the 1980s, the United States undertook unilateral offensives 
and resorted to political and economic blackmail to force Mexico’s involvement, primarily 
through the drug certification process.332 By the 1990s, the coercion exerted by the United 
States was discordant with the new logic of the bilateral relationship. The 1994 crisis created 
an opportunity for the American government to exercise conditioning through financial aid, 
which the Mexican policy elite did not reject. In 1995, the historic visit of the United States 
secretary of defence to Mexico to establish a ‘third link’ marked the beginning of a long 
process of institutionalisation of the binational drug fight.333 The Plenary Group on Law 
Enforcement, High-Level Contact Group for Drug Control, United States-Mexico Bilateral 
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Drug Threat Assessment, Declaration of the United States-Mexico Alliance Against Drugs, 
and the United States-Mexico Bi-National Drug Strategy were just some mechanisms created 
from 1994 to 1998. This new cooperation framework redirected the efforts of the Mexican 
government towards the fight against drug trafficking. This situation was confirmed by the 
Drug Czar of the United States Barry McCaffrey. He justified before the American Congress 
that the questionable certification of 1997 was granted because Mexico had met six 
conditions: 
the arrest of Amado Carrillo and the Arellano Félix brothers within 
six months; the extradition of 12 Mexican drug traffickers […]; 
diplomatic immunity for the 39 Drug Enforcement Administration 
agents officially assigned to Mexico; permission for Drug 
Enforcement Administration personnel to carry arms in Mexican 
territory; authorisation for American Coast Guard ships to enter 
Mexican waters to carry out interdiction; full participation of the 
Mexican armed forces in an American ‘multinational force’ to 
combat drug trafficking.334 
The American pressures and continentalist strategic approach shaped a soft-bandwagoning 
strategy that gained strength in the successive administrations. Mexico was conditioned. 
The commercial policy vector was redirected towards diversification, as it was reactive to 
the effects of the growing influence of the United States on Mexican political autonomy. 
Amid the convoluted situation of 1994, the policy elite was forced to adjust trade policy to 
give credibility to their neoliberal economic reforms. Zedillo gave continuity to negotiation 
processes initiated during the Salinas government, despite their political and ideological 
differences. The Mexican government succeeded in ratifying the Association Agreement 
with the European Union in 1994 and joining the World Trade Organisation in 1995. 
However, the pressures generated by the crisis motivated the policy elite to diversify 
Mexican relations to counteract the weight that the link with the United States was acquiring. 
The policy-makers raised the desirability of extending trade liberalisation to other countries 
through a network of free trade agreements, especially in Latin America. Mexican economic 
diplomacy signed agreements with Costa Rica, Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela in 1995; 
Nicaragua in 1998; Chile in 1999; and Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras in 2000. The 
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Economic Complementation Agreements were also established within the framework of the 
Latin American Integration Association, although these negotiations were only successful 
with Peru in 1995 and Uruguay in 1999. Furthermore, the Zedillo administration gave a new 
impulse to the Tuxtla Mechanism for Dialogue and Coordination between Mexico and the 
Central American Countries in 1996.335 These agreements showed that nationalist 
predispositions inclined towards diversification prevailed in the policy elite since it allowed 
them to limit American pressure, protect political autonomy, and exert influence in Latin 
America. 
The commercial diversification undertaken by the Zedillo government was a response to the 
growing dependence and conditioning with the United States. The means to generate a 
counterweight to the high concentration of relations with North America was based on a 
defensive formula tested in the 1970s and 1980s. The strategy of developing a network of 
trade agreements resorted to active economic diplomacy with a selective nature and a 
subregional approach to Central and South America. Foreign trade policy tried to consolidate 
Mexico as an actor with a double international role: it would serve as a ‘radio’ in agreements 
with more developed countries and assume the role of a ‘node’ in relations with less 
industrialised states. The absence of deals with analogous middle powers such as Argentina, 
Brazil, China, India, or South Korea reflected the intention of not opening the Mexican 
market to competing economies.336 Two internal factors were significant for the formulation 
of this strategic response. One of them was the rejection of progressive politicians, labour 
unions, peasant associations, and indigenous groups to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement. Another more important factor was the traits of the policy elite. The fracture of 
the neoliberal technocracy in 1994 revealed the political and ideological differences within. 
Salinas was an orthodox neoliberal with medium liberal preferences, while Zedillo was a 
moderate neoliberal with more a progressist inclination. The break between the two called 
into question the continuity of Salinas’ strategic policy. In contrast to the predominance of 
strong continentalist preferences in the Salinas cabinet, the plurality of the Zedillo cabinet 
gave room to the subsistence and operation of nationalist reflexes. The weight that the 
diplomatic elite acquired in policy-making from 1997 influenced the redefinition of 
 
335 Guadalupe González, ‘México Ante América Latina: Mirando de Reojo a Estados Unidos’ pp.23–5; 
Humberto Garza, ‘La Política Exterior de México: Entre La Dependencia y La Diversificación’, Foro 
Internacional, 36.4 (1996), 641–66 pp.650–3. 
336 Alicia Puyana and José Romero, ‘La Estrategia Comercial Mexicana: ¿Superando La Fuerza Centrípeta 
Estadounidense?’, Foro Internacional, 44.3 (2004), 392–429 p.411; Guadalupe González, ‘Las Estrategias de 
Política Exterior de México En La Era de La Globalización’, Foro Internacional, XLI.4 (2001), 619–71 
pp.645,656. 
126 
commercial policy. Secretary of Foreign Relations Rosario Green, who unlike her 
technocratic predecessors had a diplomatic career, recognised that 
the geographical location of Mexico, precisely in the middle part of 
the Americas, would theoretically place it in an ideal position to 
develop useful links with both North as with the South. However, 
the type of ties that the country has built with both parts of the 
continent has been very different.337 
The strategic objective was to find a balance that would position Mexico as a bridge between 
the north and the south, a hinge between the first and third world. 
The foreign policy vector was redirected towards political openness. Like trade policy, 
foreign policy ranged between bilateralism and multilateralism, between the United States 
and the rest of the world. During the 1994 crisis a pattern of active and selective diplomacy 
emerged. This approach implied accelerating political openness and adhering to 
transnational norms on democracy, international security, and human rights. One of the first 
milestones was the decision of the government to resort to the United Nations Electoral 
Assistance Office for the observation of presidential elections and the professionalisation of 
the Mexican electoral body. It also gave continuity to the participation of Mexico in the 
United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador until its conclusion in 1995. By 1997, 
criticisms of the government’s actions during the Zapatista conflict and the massacres of 
Aguas Blancas and Acteal forced the policy elite to tolerate the increase of foreign observers 
and modify their position regarding external conditioning.338 For example, the Zedillo 
government had to agree to a democratic clause before negotiations of the Free Trade 
Agreement between Mexico and the European Union could begin.339 By 1998, the 
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the support for 
the establishment of the International Criminal Court, and the criticism of the human rights 
situation in Cuba validated the change of attitude towards the political issues of the 
international agenda. In 1999, Zedillo expressed his disagreement on the use of force without 
 
337 Raúl Benítez, ‘México. La Trampa Diplomática Entre Estados Unidos y América Latina: Soft Power Sin 
Hard Power’, Pensamiento Propio, 20.43 (2015), 79–106 pp.82–3; Rosario Green, ‘México En Las Américas. 
Entre Un Norte Económico y Un Sur Político’, Foreign Affairs En Español, 4.3 (2004), 28–41. 
338 Alejandro Anaya, ‘Transnational and Domestic Processes in the Definition of Human Rights Policies in 
Mexico’, Human Rights Quarterly, 31.1 (2009), 35–58 pp.37–9; Chris Gilbreth and Gerardo Otero, 
‘Democratization in Mexico: The Zapatista Uprising and Civil Society’, Latin American Perspectives, 28.7 
(2001), 7–29 pp.14–7. 
339 Gerhard Niedrist, ‘Las Cláusulas de Derechos Humanos En Los Tratados de Libre Comercio de La Unión 
Europea’, Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional, 11 (2011), 463–85 p.472; Szymanski and Smith 
pp.179–81. 
127 
the explicit consent of the United Nations Security Council to the Canadian Prime Minister, 
Jean Chrétien. Also, he expressed the need to overcome the narrow conception of security 
based on military instruments and coercive measures before the Organisation of American 
States.340 This tendency of political openness derived started to project Mexico as a middle 
power aligned to the norms of the neoliberal global order. However, this image 
simultaneously eroded the political autonomy and hegemony of the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party. 
Mexico continued to open up to the world at two speeds during the Zedillo government. In 
economic terms, 12 trade agreements were signed with 32 countries. In the political sphere, 
defensive practices based on the principle of non-intervention were diluted. The acceleration 
of political openness is understood as the reaction of the Zedillo government to pressures 
inherited from the Salinas administration that impacted other areas of strategic policy. In the 
external context, criticisms from non-governmental organisations, civil society, and the 
United Nations about human rights violations and anti-democratic practices compromised 
Mexico’s image as a reliable actor. The link between political and commercial matters in the 
neoliberal global order was evident in the uncertainty that was generated by the 1994 crisis 
in the economic sectors of the United States and Canada; as well as in the European demands 
to negotiate a commercial agreement. The policy elite saw the need to adopt a more open 
attitude towards currents in favour of higher responsibility in the international community 
in defence of human rights and the promotion of democracy. In the domestic environment, 
the 1994 crisis undermined the legitimacy of the political regime, so Zedillo took steps to 
rebuild the image of the government. The political diversity in his cabinet and the loss of the 
legislative majority of his party in 1997 generated political spaces for the opposition to 
pressure the government. The Salinas orthodox group’s gradual loss of influence gave rise 
to new actors that promoted a moderate approach that fluctuated between nationalism and 
continentalism. The most representative example was the appointment of Green as 
chancellor in 1998, who dismissed the discretional practices of technocracy and saw in the 
institutionalisation of the diplomatic relationship with the United States as ‘the key to 
handling what are, unquestionably, the most complex and singular bilateral relations in the 
world’.341 As portrayed in the following figure, the strategic policy from 1994 to 2000 was 
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erratic and ambivalent as a result of the pragmatism of the decision-makers, the 
fragmentation of the policy-making process, and the defensive reflexes that remained within 
the policy elite. The most significant features were the primacy of the economic agenda, the 
alignment to the continental bloc at the United Nations, the institutionalisation of the 
bilateral relationship with the United States, and the selective commitment to international 
actors. The direction of the long and unequal evolution of the strategic policy pointed 
towards greater openness abroad to obtain elements to manage its rapprochement with the 
United States. The strategic policy of this period left two lessons, which will be further 
evidenced in the following chapter: the political openness generated the conditions for the 
political change of 2000 and the historical defence of political autonomy was simultaneously 
the defence of the hegemonic regime. As a synthesis, Figure 3-3 shows the gradual 
predominance that the continentalist strategic approach acquired within the Mexican 
political elite, as well as the effects generated by the dismantling of nationalism from 1982 
onwards. 
Conclusion 
The analysis presented in this chapter has oriented systematically towards the understanding 
of the complex interplay of internal and external dynamics that drove to the evolution of 
Mexico’s foreign and security policy from 1988 to 2000. Until before the 1970s, the 
consolidation of Mexico as a sovereign nation independent of the former Spanish domain 
and the growing American influence was one of the most entrenched convictions within the 
Mexican security establishment. The nationalist construction of Mexico’s external identity 
was a crucial element in the definition of the legalist, sovereigntist, and defensive character 
of foreign policy, as well as in the design of soft-balancing security strategies to the 
American hegemony for much of the twentieth century. However, the gradual change in the 
cultural dispositions of the policy actors and the positions occupied by the decision-makers 
in the field of strategic policy-making triggered a process of dismantling nationalism from 
the 1980s onwards. On the one hand, the reconstruction of the dispositional logic of the 
policy elite led by the orthodox technocracy of the Institutional Revolutionary Party reveals 
that institutional culture and cultural reflexes were shaped by intense instrumental rationality 
induced by the adoption of neoliberal doctrine. 
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Figure 3-3. Evolution of the Mexican strategic policy, 1988-2000 







On the other hand, the construction of the positional logic of the strategic policy-making 
field demonstrates that the dominant role assumed by politicians and bureaucrats in decision-
making influenced the eradication of nationalist speeches and practices, as well as the 
modification of parameters for the formulation of national security strategies. These changes 
in the components that shaped the practical logic make it possible to elucidate the pervasive 
effect of neoliberalism on Mexican strategic thinking and practice from which policy actors 
responded to situations such as the Central American conflict in the 1980s and the economic 
crisis of the 1990s. 
The findings in tracking the evolution of Mexico’s strategic policy during the period of 
adoption of neoliberalism validate the argument that the practical logic founded on a 
nationalist strategic notion gradually lost its influence on Mexico’s international identity, 
government institutional culture, and cultural reflexes of policy actors. The process of 
dismantling nationalism was a product of the political and economic pressures of the late 
1970s, as well as the effect that the orthodox adoption of neoliberal precepts had on the 
cultural roots and dynamics of policy-making since the early 1980s. The weakening of 
nationalist predispositions in the policy elite and the dominant role assumed by politicians 
and bureaucrats specialised in economics in the field of strategic policy-making were 
fundamental factors in the reorientation of Mexico’s foreign and security policy throughout 
from the 1990s. The main conclusion is that, despite the effects of this dismantling process, 
the deep roots of the nationalist approach within the policy elite allowed it to preserve its 
status as a practical logic until the disruptive political-ideological change produced by the 
arrival of the National Action Party to power in December 2000. This chapter has contributed 
to the existing literature by providing an alternative explanation on how the subjective 
understandings of the policy elite and the structures of the international environment 
gradually modified the parameters for the design of national security strategies in Mexico. 
The comprehensive analysis provided by this study complements the theses that predominate 
in the literature, many of them from a structuralist perspective.342 Likewise, this work has 
reinforced the arguments of historians, anthropologists, and sociologists such as Héctor 
Aguilar, Sarah Babb, Roger Bartra, and Lorenzo Meyer about the decline of Mexican 
nationalism and its effects on the strategic vision of the policy elite.343 From the reflections 
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expressed in the previous pages, it is possible to understand in the next chapter how the 
decline of nationalism generated political spaces that allowed continentalist doctrines of 
national security to play an increasingly influential role in shaping the strategic behaviour of 
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Neoliberalism abandoned the principle of national sovereignty. The 
weakening of sovereignty took place in full force since 1995, when the 
neoliberals in the government submitted the country to a project that gave 
foreigners strategic areas for sovereign development. […] It was an internal 
strategy that favoured the great international interests […] the neoliberals 
handed over the country’s payment system to foreigners and weakened the 
national oil industry […] the neoliberals hindered the defence of 
sovereignty and, according to the maxim that “he who pays the piper, calls 
the tune”, the Mexican government accepted foreign resources for the fight 
against drugs.344 
 
Carlos Salinas (Mexican President, 1988-1994), 2008. 
 
344 Carlos Salinas, La Década Perdida (Mexico: Debate, 2008) pp.39,161. 
134 
Introduction 
The 1990s were marked by the consolidation of rules and norms that established the unipolar 
and neoliberal character of the post-Cold War international order. The new structural 
conditions had profound implications in the normative standards of state behaviour and the 
character of international relations. For example, transnational discourses and practices on 
the defence of democracy, the protection of human rights, and the promotion of free trade 
generated pressures for political regimes such as Mexico’s to modify their ways of 
interacting abroad, especially with the United States. As of 2000, the reconfiguration of the 
domestic political scenario and the abrupt change in the international security environment 
generated conditions that intensified the struggle between the two major currents of strategic 
thinking in the Mexican policy elite. The weakening of nationalism years before created 
political spaces that were progressively filled by new continentalist doctrines that reoriented 
the evolution of strategic policy. Taking into account the socio-historical context portrayed 
in chapter two and the analysis of the strategic policy of the late twentieth century developed 
in the previous pages, this study focuses on the cultural dynamics that drove the evolution 
of Mexico’s foreign and security policy between 2000 and 2012. This work focuses on the 
habitus of the policy actors that integrated the business technocracy of the National Action 
Party and on the dimensions that comprised the field of strategic policy-making. Tracking 
the interaction between the predispositions of policy-makers with the broad structural 
environment during the 2000s demonstrates that the continentalist conception was subject to 
a process of building in which the design of soft-bandwagoning strategies with the United 
States increasingly gained more acceptance because they allowed the country to adapt to the 
post-9/11 structural conditions. 
This chapter argues that the logic that governed the practices of the Mexican policy elite was 
increasingly based on a conception of continentalist security as a result of the dismantling 
of the nationalist strategic approach and the changes in the conditions of the broad structural 
environment. Continentalism gradually established itself as the most prominent ideological 
source in shaping the construction of international identity, the institutional culture of 
government, and the cultural reflexes of decision-makers in Mexico during the consolidation 
period of neoliberalism. This logic was widely promoted since the 1980s, as nationalist 
notions and sovereign principles lost appeal among politicians and bureaucrats. It is possible 
to identify the relevance that these ideas acquired in the political directives of key officials 
since the government of Carlos Salinas in 1988. However, it should be noted that nationalism 
did not lose its category of practical logic until the electoral defeat of the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party in 2000. The central conclusion is that only the continentalist strategic 
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conception could obtain the status of practical logic of the political elite after the political 
transition, despite the hard resistance that diplomats and generals rooted in the nationalist 
tradition exerted. One of the contributions of this study is that it offers a different 
interpretation of how Mexico’s foreign and security policy was formulated in the post-9/11 
international environment. Unlike the works that assess the impact of structural factors, this 
analysis focuses on the socio-political context and the institutional and ideational sources 
that fuelled the strategic decisions of policy actors to respond to endogenous and exogenous 
pressures.345 A second contribution lies in the highlighting of continuity and change in the 
parameters under which national security strategies were designed. Few works in the 
literature recognise the cultural factors that led to the reorientation of strategic policy and 
the development of soft-bandwagoning strategies that allowed Mexico to forge a cooperative 
alliance with a limited scope with the United States from the 2000s.346 In the framework of 
this thesis, this chapter meets the objective of assessing how the political imagination of the 
political elite shaped the strategic decisions that redefined the state behaviour of Mexico 
throughout the consolidation of neoliberalism. 
This chapter examines the cultural dynamics that shaped the Mexican strategic policy-
making process in the administrations of the National Action Party after the political change 
in 2000. The first section reviews the central elements of the continentalist construction of 
the Mexican international identity that emerged early in the Cold War and gained relevance 
in the 1990s. It also examines the building process of soft-bandwagoning continentalism that 
prevailed in the early twenty-first century. Part 4.2 inspects the dispositional logic that 
governed within the policy elite to understand the function of different conceptions of 
Mexican international identity in the formulation of strategic policy. It also investigates the 
role of the institutional culture and cultural reflexes of the dominant groups in decision-
making on foreign policy and national security. In the third section, the positional logic of 
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the field of strategic policy-making is investigated to distinguish the pressures that delimited 
the strategic choices of the policy elite. The identification of the overlapping of the fields 
that constituted the broad structural context in which the strategic decisions took place is 
fundamental in this mapping. Part 4.4 tracks the interplay between various strategic 
conceptions during the governments of Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderón. This last section 
tracks the evolution of the dynamic link between the subjective interpretations of the policy 
elite and the objective power structures that set the framework for decision-making on 
strategic policy. 
4.1. Construction of Mexico’s international identity: 
continentalism 
From the 1980s, a tense dynamic emerged in the Mexican policy elite between the historical 
desire to defend national sovereignty and the growing aspiration to integrate into the global 
economy. Soft-bandwagoning continentalism, promoted by the neoliberal technocracy, was 
established as the cornerstone in the political imagination of decision-makers. As in the 
periods of the Porfiriato and the ‘stabilising development’, the philosophical positivism, 
technical pragmatism, and economic liberalism set the ideological pillars that shaped what 
was feasible and unthinkable in security matters national.347 From 1946 until the 1970s, the 
continentalist approach backed by the first civilian presidents of the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party aimed at building a modern nation, economically stable, and open to 
foreign investment. This priority justified the stabilisation of the relationship with the United 
States, the formulation of economic policies based on capitalist liberalism, and the 
implementation of coupling and accommodation strategies within American hegemony.348 
Nevertheless, simultaneously, it limited the strategic options of the decision-makers. They 
knew the risks of violating the normative principles of Mexican foreign policy on the self-
determination of peoples and non-intervention. Therefore, a hard-bandwagoning strategy to 
the United States based on an open military alliance was unimaginable. The adherence to 
international law, the diversification of international relations, and the exercise of limited 
opposition in multilateral forums allowed Mexico to manage its distance from the United 
States and to preserve its relative independence.349 The strategic policy acquired an 
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economistic, continentalist, and multilateralist character, aspects that ensured access to the 
benefits of the American-built neoliberal international order. This trend illustrated the 
construction of a new international identity for Mexico as that of an actor aligned to global 
norms, promoter of Western values, and open to regional cooperation, but not willing to 
assume international responsibilities that compromised its political autonomy. This approach 
also reflected Mexico as a nation with specific regional interests and aspirations to 
consolidate itself as a middle power inclined to a soft-bandwagoning strategy and tending 
towards subordination to preserve the alliance with its new partner: The United States.350 
The building of soft-bandwagoning continentalism was a process of articulation of a new 
predominant approach in strategic policy, which displaced defensive nationalism as the 
practical logic of the policy elite. The implementation of the neoliberal political-economic 
model in the 1980s required the formulation of a new strategic vision, as nationalism was 
not compatible and represented an obstacle.351 A developmental character, modernist 
aspirations, and pragmatic style characterised the neoliberal model. Economic opening, 
privatisation of public companies, dependence on foreign capital, regional integration, and 
assimilation of the hegemony of the United States were some signs of the reorientation of 
Mexican strategic policy.352 The objective was to generate conditions that would boost the 
self-sustained growth of the economy and project Mexico as a consolidated, Western, 
reliable, competitive, and modern middle power. To achieve these aims, it was essential to 
improve relations with the United States and adhere to the Western norms that would govern 
the post-Cold War unipolar order. The consolidation of the neoliberal model during the 
1990s expanded the intentions of the policy elite to diversify Mexico’s international 
relations. However, the limited Mexican interests abroad and the weight acquired by the ties 
with the United States generated a deep relationship based on conditioning and dependence 
with the superpower.353 In addition to the internal conditions produced by the crises of 1976 
and 1982, the socio-cultural background of neoliberal technocracy encouraged the 
construction of a developmental strategic approach focused on cooperation with the United 
States, an open-market free economy, and a broad vision of regional security. Despite the 
preponderance that soft-bandwagoning continentalism acquired, the resistance within the 
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policy elite allowed nationalist ideas and practices to persist and manifest themselves along 
the strategic policy-making process.354 
4.2. Habitus of policy elite: the heterogeneous business 
technocracy 
The habitus of the political elite allows us to understand how the various constructions of 
Mexican international identity influenced decision-making. It also illustrates the role of the 
institutional culture that drove the new government in the building of continentalism and the 
managerial reflexes of politicians and executives with significant power in the strategic 
policy-making process. The policy elite of the National Action Party characterised itself by 
a relative ideological pluralism, as well as its heterodoxy and political pragmatism. This 
renewed version of technocracy was the most capable of adapting to the norms prevailing in 
the neoliberal order. The privileged formal education and similar daily practices between 
politicians and businesspeople equipped them in a cultural sense. Fox and Calderón’s closest 
circles expose the dominance of a heterogeneous business technocracy. In Fox’s cabinet, the 
select group summoned to the ‘darkroom’ was made up of leaders linked to ultraconservative 
politicians and northern entrepreneurs who occupied important bureaucratic positions. The 
influence of the so-called ‘Pinos group’ is attributed to the personal relationships that Fox 
developed during his executive career in Coca-Cola Mexico and his administration in 
Guanajuato.355 Calderón’s cabinet did not change significantly even though his socio-
cultural background contrasted with that of Fox. Within it, the influence of ultraconservative 
and business groups prevailed. The group of decision-makers convoked to ‘the bunker’ was 
made up of politicians linked to the right-wing of the National Action Party, businessmen 
who shared interests with the president, and moderated bureaucrats who came from the Fox 
administration. The power of the so-called ‘Calderonist group’ was the product of formative, 
professional, and ideological affinities of its members with the president.356 It should be 
noted that members of the Bank of Mexico clique linked to the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party continued to lead the most prominent secretariats of the economic portfolio during the 
two administrations.357 After the political change of 2000, the military elite played a 
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secondary role in the cabinet and the diplomatic elite managed to reposition itself in strategic 
decision-making. There were two main reasons for the predominance of business 
technocracy between 2000 and 2006.358 
First, the failed nationalist project. In the political-economic context of the 1990s, it was 
unattractive to return to the nationalist policies of the 1970s. The consolidation of 
neoliberalism required that Mexico commit itself to Western values and American 
hegemony. The democratic change of 2000 strengthened technocracy, neoliberalism, and 
conservatism despite the growth of the liberal and nationalist left-wing that emancipated 
from the Institutional Revolutionary Party in the late 1980s. A distinctive skill of the 
members of the new business technocracy was their praxis based on principles and methods 
of management. Marketing thinking, pragmatic style, and political heterodoxy influenced 
their ability to reconfigure the bureaucratic machinery and reorient the strategic policy to 
protect economic interests that would guarantee the country’s economic development.359 
The influence of diplomats and military personnel were affected in different ways as a new 
foreign policy was promoted and the internal security situation worsened. In the case of 
diplomats, the federal government’s trust in intellectual talent markedly improved the 
position of Mexican foreign service personnel in strategic decision-making. The intention of 
the new administration to differentiate itself from the regime of the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party required experienced diplomats to reformulate the foreign policy. 
Academics in economics and international relations with diplomatic experience were 
appointed to the position of secretary of foreign relations. Furthermore, in the early 2000s, 
the Castañeda doctrine pointed to an open, critical, proactive, pragmatic, democratic, and 
globalist foreign policy, compatible with the American post-Cold War vision.360 In the case 
of the military elite, the historical ties of the orthodox current of the armed forces with the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party generated distrust in the new government. The political 
background of the military, the nationalist profile of their doctrine, and the increase in crime 
rates were factors that relegated military officers from strategic decision-making. In addition 
to the fact that the use of the armed forces abroad was unthinkable in the imaginary of the 
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policy elite, the specialised training of the military elite contributed to their assignment to 
the development and implementation of internal security and public safety policies.361 
Thinking in practical terms, managerial skills and continental vision explain the rise of a 
new generation of politicians, bureaucrats, and diplomats to a dominant position in the 
strategic policy-making process, as well as the generals’ loss of influence in the 2000s. 
The second factor that led to the rise of the business technocracy was the ability of the new 
generation of technocrats to understand the role of Mexico within the American hegemony 
and to adapt to the norms of the neoliberal international order. This adaptability was the 
product of their intellectual training in economic and administrative sciences, as well as their 
business experience. These attributes revealed that managerial rationality was the backbone 
of the political and bureaucratic culture that governed the dynamics of the policy-making 
process. While the presence and influence of officials with studies in economics began to 
decrease since 1994, the number of officials trained in engineering and business 
administration reached its peak in 2000. After the political change, the number of lawyers 
increased steadily. By 2012, it was the profession with the most significant presence in the 
federal government. These trends were mirrored in the composition of the cabinets. From 
2000 to 2006, more than half of the secretaries lacked a political or bureaucratic trajectory 
and, like Fox, had business administration training or experience in the private sector. From 
2006 to 2012, three-quarters of the secretaries had governmental expertise and, like 
Calderón, had education in law or public administration.362 In both cases, links with the 
business sector and training in private national and foreign universities were distinctive 
elements of the policy elite. Although the influence of orthodox technocrats declined, 
postgraduate degrees in economics and experience in international economic organisations 
remained valued.363 The social and cultural backgrounds of the new business technocracy 
was a significant factor that enabled their adaptation to the neoliberal logic that governed the 
dynamics of national and international politics. Their backgrounds also influenced the 
reorientation of strategic policy priorities, leading to the focus on the bilateral relationship 
with the United States and a broad national security approach. 
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The strengthening of the neoliberal model during the 1990s produced the ideal scenario for 
the economic elite to position themselves above the political establishment. The result was 
the dismantling of defensive nationalism and the building of soft-bandwagoning 
continentalism, an approach that gained the status of practical logic in the policy elite. This 
transition explains the reorientation of the strategic policy towards a foreign policy focused 
on regional cooperation, economic policy based on free trade, and security policy founded 
on a broad conception. The political change of 2000 had an impact on the external identity 
of Mexico, as it projected itself as a modern state attached to the norms of the neoliberal 
global order headed by the United States. The new international image of Mexico as a 
democratic country was secured and extended its margins of manoeuvre in the international 
arena.364 The development of continentalism not only modified the status quo of Mexican 
politics but also reconfigured the decision-making space. The power of the military 
establishment was affected by the resistance of the most orthodox current of generals to the 
change promoted by the new government. In contrast, the political, bureaucratic, and 
diplomatic elites played a central role in policy-making. Their sociocultural background, 
formal training, and link with businesspeople and intellectuals facilitated their adaptation to 
the rules of the domestic and international environment. These factors equipped them in a 
cultural sense to build a new strategic approach that recovered traditional principles of 
Mexican diplomacy with a greater emphasis on multilateral activism, regional integration, 
and economic development.365 The conditions generated by the post-Cold War unipolar 
order limited Mexico’s strategic options. The domestic political change was the ideal 
situation to establish an open alliance with the United States and position it as a development 
lever. The tactic was the insertion of several issues to the bilateral agenda, many of which 
Mexico was at a disadvantage when negotiating. The asymmetry drove Mexico towards a 
relationship of dependence and submission to American preferences. The cultural reflexes 
of the generals and the traditionalist currents of bureaucracy and diplomacy motivated them 
to oppose this vision since they considered that it threatened national sovereignty. The 
resistance only generated frictions, divisions, and ineffectiveness within the federal 
government. In the diplomatic and bureaucratic sectors, structural and leadership changes 
 
364 Natalia Saltalamacchia, ‘Entre Liberales y Estatistas, México En La Gobernanza Global de Los Derechos 
Humanos’, in México y El Multilateralismo Del Siglo XXI, ed. by Guadalupe González (Mexico: Senado, 2015) 
pp.232–4; Jaime Preciado, ‘El Acuerdo de Libre Comercio de Las Américas y América Latina: Los Dilemas 
Del Estado y La Sociedad En México’, in El Estado Mexicano: Globalización, Poderes y Seguridad Nacional, 
ed. by Alberto Aziz and Jorge Sánchez (Mexico: CIESAS, 2005) pp.77–84. 
365 Covarrubias, ‘Mexico’s Foreign Policy under the Partido Acción Nacional: Promoting Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Interests’ pp.213–34; Riodan Roett, ‘Mexico and the Western Hemisphere’, in Mexico’s 
Democracy at Work: Political and Economic Dynamics, ed. by Russell Crandall, Guadalupe Paz, and Riordan 
Roett (London: LRP, 2005) pp.153–72. 
142 
facilitated the reduction of internal tensions. Furthermore, both groups were aware that there 
were few strategic options and that the new policy was the one that best suited the conditions 
of the structural environment. In contrast, in the military, leadership produced a fracture. 
While the secretary of the navy supported the alliance with the United States, the secretary 
of national defence limited himself to comply with presidential orders despite his 
disagreement. The political change of 2000 represented the bifurcation of neoliberal 
technocracy that emerged in the early 1980s. Business technocracy was the new policy elite 
led by politicians and bureaucrats, experts in administration and with business experience. 
At the same time, military, diplomatic, and bureaucratic orthodoxy related to nationalism 
lost influence, since their vision was not compatible with that of the dominant groups in the 
policy elite or with the conditions of the international environment. This new distribution of 
influence occurred because the habitus of politicians and businesspeople allowed them to 
cooperate in devising a new approach that conformed to the global rules of the neoliberal 
order, a fundamental aspect of the field in which the strategic policy was formulated. In 
summary, Figure 4-1 describes the source of the cultural reflexes of the decision-makers in 
Mexico since 2000. It also portrays how decision-makers responded to changes in the 
broader structures according to their reflexes to generate distinctive policy practices and a 
new strategy to ensure national development. 
4.3. Fields of strategic policy-making: domestic political 
democratisation and regional security crisis  
The analysis of the endogenous and exogenous pressures that constrained decision-making 
is possible through the dissection of the fields that constituted the environment in which the 
strategic policy was made. Three overlapping fields formed the broad structural environment 
in which Mexico’s policy elite operated from 2000. The fields that framed strategic decision-
making were the realm of foreign affairs; the political and socio-cultural situation of Mexico; 
and the bureaucratic context. The political change of 2000 and the 9/11 attacks impacted 
significantly on the prevailing condition in these three social spaces.366 Through the concept 
of field, it is not only possible to examine how their internal logics were affected by those 
events. We can also evaluate how the three spheres interrelated with each other. Through 
this approach, it is possible to assess strategic decision-making as a reaction to the 
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circumstances of the structural environment and, simultaneously, as one of the engines that 
trigger the constant structural updating. 
Figure 4-1. Habitus of the Mexican policy elite, 2000-2012 
(Reconstruction of the dispositional logic) 
 
Own elaboration based on Pierre Bourdieu, Practical Reason. On the Theory of Action (Stanford: SUP, 1998), 
p.5. Note: the dotted line indicates probable orientation toward the nationalist or continentalist approaches. 
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This arrangement of the elements that constituted the environment in which policy was 
developed permits the amalgamation of the best-understood issues and the least known 
subjects within the policy elite. On the one hand, the rules of global neoliberalism, the 
strategic balance with the United States, and the relevance of the free market in the stability 
of the international system. On the other hand, the significance of putting into practice the 
discourse of democracy and human rights, as well as the impact of practices linked to 
multilateral activism and the broad conception of security.367 These speeches and practices 
resonated significantly in the national and international fields. 
The field of international relations was configured by the distribution of economic power, 
the foreign policy of the actors of the neoliberal global system, and the consolidation of 
norms in world politics after the end of the Cold War. The literature extensively addresses 
these last two aspects. As of the 2000s, academics examined the structural impact of global 
neoliberalism and the 9/11 attacks on the strategic behaviour and international identity of 
middle powers.368 Traditional practices attributed to weak and non-Western states such as 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, sponsorship of terrorism, economic 
heterodoxy, and anti-democratic regimes were openly pointed as threats to international 
stability.369 In contrast, transnational discourses and practices based on the niche diplomacy 
agenda such as democracy, environment, nuclear disarmament, and human rights 
consolidated among the middle powers aligned to the world order.370 In the context of the 
American-led Global War on Terror, the roles of middle powers evolved in several 
directions. Those considered classic, traditional, or consolidated medium powers such as 
Canada, Australia, and the Nordic countries were inclined to a soft-bandwagoning strategy 
with the United States to preserve their status and benefits. In contrast, emerging, regional, 
or pivotal middle powers such as India, Brazil, and South Africa undertook a soft-balancing 
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strategy to counter American influence in their regions.371 The result was the progressive 
transition from the unipolar system to a multipolar order. The process eroded the normative 
standards that governed international relations in the post-Cold War era. At the centre of 
these world policy practices, the power of global governance persisted through multilateral 
forums such as the World Trade Organisation or the G-7/8, through which it was possible to 
pressure non-aligned states and legitimise the world order.372 Democracy, environment, 
human rights, multilateralism, and human security were just some of the issues on the 
international agenda adopted by the new Mexican policy elite.373 
The Mexican political and socio-cultural field was defined by the effects of the entry into 
force of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994 and the political change of 2000. 
The influence of the economic crisis, the discrediting of the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party, and how the opposition parties projected the situation of the country in the 1990s to 
society combined the desire and need for a change in strategic policy. Political pluralism and 
democratic transition resulted in a relative polarisation in Mexican society and the policy 
elite regarding the direction the country should take. On the one hand, the left-wing 
politicians of the Democratic Revolution Party revived the nationalist discourse aimed at 
revalidating the right of Mexicans to make decisions without outside interference or 
pressure. The preservation of sovereignty founded the demand for reviewing international 
agreements to bring them under the constitutional principles of foreign policy inspired by 
the Estrada doctrine.374 In contrast, the right-wing politicians of the National Action Party 
abandoned the old sovereigntist conception, as they considered it an obstacle to the country’s 
development. Businesspeople and conservatives adopted the discourse on the protection of 
human rights and the promotion of democratic values as a platform. The aim was to 
formulate a new foreign policy doctrine aligned with international standards to project 
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Mexico as a reliable partner for the West.375 Despite the victory of the National Action Party 
in 2000, polarisation within the political elite persisted and resulted in contradictions. The 
struggle between nationalists and globalists generated conflicts within the government, 
inefficiency in the cabinet, diplomatic tensions, and inconsistencies in the new foreign 
policy. Mexico’s limited interests abroad and the strategic relevance of the relationship with 
the United States reduced the discourse of international activism to the implementation of a 
soft-bandwagoning continentalist approach.376 These conditions reflected that defensive 
nationalism still operated in the background, even though continentalism had obtained the 
status of practical logic within the new policy elite. The process of political change 
confronted historic internal currents with emerging external trends. This scenario hindered 
strategic decision-making from guaranteeing national security. 
The bureaucratic field was defined by the reorganisation of the policy-making structure, the 
adoption of managerial methods, the encouraging of inter-institutional competition, and the 
ineffectiveness of the cabinet.377 Of the 44 substitutions that were in the cabinet from 2000 
to 2012, two of them had direct implications for strategic policy. The first was the removal 
of the presidential adviser on national security and the elimination of the position in 2002. 
The second was the change of the secretary of foreign affairs in 2003. Also, it should be 
noted that the National Security Council was created in 2005 and its head was replaced six 
times until 2012. A similar situation occurred with the director of the Centre for Research 
and National Security. In this context, hierarchies in the Mexican foreign service and the 
armed forces changed in a contrasting way. The instability that prevailed in the strategic 
policy-making structure was the result of the change promoted by the new government and 
the ideological clashes within the bureaucracy. While the internal generational struggles 
continued in the military elite, diplomats, and marines saw the redistribution of power in the 
cabinet as an opportunity to improve their position and influence.378 Since 2000, the 
secretaries of the interior, economy, finance, and foreign relations; the director of the Centre 
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for Research and National Security; the chief of staff; and the Mexican ambassador to the 
United Nations, were relevant actors in the formulation of strategic policy. The power of the 
members of this heterogeneous circle was the product of their privileged intellectual 
formation, membership of the cultural elite, and close ties with business leaders. In the case 
of the members of the Mexican foreign service, their influence improved as a result of the 
appointment of chancellors with diplomatic experience and the relevance that the president 
gave to cultural capital. The professional training of diplomats was essential to formulate 
and execute the new foreign policy doctrine that would redefine Mexico’s strategic 
behaviour and external identity. In contrast, the growing domestic security crisis confined 
the military elite to planning strategies and executing programmes to combat drug 
trafficking. This trend substantially reduced the symbolic capital of the military. The 
appointment of generals to head public safety institutions, the incorporation of soldiers to 
police corps, and the extensive deployment of troops in the anti-drug campaign resulted in a 
notable increase in the rates of violence and violation of human rights.379 Although both the 
army and the navy were involved in this scenario, the admirals significantly improved their 
position in the bureaucratic structure. Unlike the military elite, the marines showed greater 
acceptance and adaptation to cooperation initiatives with the United States on regional 
security and defence. During the 2000s and early 2010s, the influence of the military elite 
gradually diminished, while the power of politicians and bureaucrats prevailed in decision-
making.380 
The evolution of Mexican strategic policy took place as the cultural practices of decision-
makers adapted to the conditions of the structural environment. It is for this reason that 
policy choices favoured economic development through alternative strategies such as soft-
bandwagoning to American hegemony. This approach involved the consolidation of free-
market policies, regional cooperation, and a broad conception of security. Due to the 
dismantling of defensive nationalism from the 1980s, the policy elite abandoned traditional 
tactics of soft-balancing as economic protectionism and diplomatic confrontation. Few 
scholars recognise that in the late 1990s and early 2000s soft-bandwagoning continentalism 
displaced defensive nationalism as the prevailing practical logic within the policy elite. 
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Scholars have also overlooked how the nationalist roots of an orthodox sector allowed 
defensive nationalism to continue operating in the background to generate resistance and 
opposition to change.381 Although the structural forces were critical in the process, these 
pressures do not fully expose the motives that drove the responses of the decision-makers. 
From this practice-centred approach, it is possible to understand how policy-makers 
conceived the scenario in which they were immersed and how their strategic choices were 
limited by the cultural context that surrounded them. This assessment is key to understanding 
that the policy elite was interacting with the changing endogenous and exogenous structural 
conditions, several of which are neglected in the academy. The examination of the habitus 
of the policy elite and the field of strategic policy-making supports the argument that the 
inconsistencies of the continentalist strategic policy were not the result of how decision-
makers adapted to the post-Cold War structural environment. The reason was their inability 
to effectively adjust their habitus to the structural changes that took place during the 2000s. 
The next section evaluates the evolution of Mexico’s strategic policy after the 2000 political 
change taking as a base this review of the habitus of the policy elite and the field of strategic 
policy-making illustrated in Figure 4-2. 
4.4. Evolution of the strategic policy: from the international 
activism project to the new continental cooperation framework 
The development of Mexican strategic policy after the 2000 political change again illustrates 
the confrontation between two dominant strategic approaches. The continentalism that 
emerged in the 1990s aimed to consolidate itself as the only approach to strategic policy, 
while the nationalism dismantled since the 1980s sought to subsist in the renewed 
establishment of Mexican security. Endogenous and exogenous factors conditioned strategic 
decisions on economy, diplomacy, and security. The dynamic link between the broad 
structural environment and the subjectivity of decision-makers led the strategic policy-
making process. This section argues that the evolution of the strategic policy from 2000 to 
2012 was significantly influenced by the building of soft-bandwagoning continentalism 
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Figure 4-2. Field of the Mexican strategic policy-making, 2000-2012 
(Construction of the positional logic) 
 
Own elaboration based on Bourdieu, Pierre, The Field of Cultural Production. Essays on Art and Literature 




The subsequent analysis of the interaction between the continentalist and nationalist visions 
allows us to understand the international identity crisis of Mexico, the limits of integration 
in North America, the instability of the link with Latin America, and the scope of Mexican 
relations with the rest of the world. The following examination of the conformation of the 
domestic and global environments provides elements to understand the intricate relationship 
between internal and external dynamics that redirected the Mexican strategic policy from a 
project of international activism towards a new pattern of continental cooperation. 
4.4.1. From the project of change to strategic indefiniteness, 
2000-2006 
After the end of the Cold War, Mexico aspired to redefine its relationship with the United 
States to ally with the superpower. For this reason, the policy elite dropped counterweight 
practices that fed the nationalist pattern of strategic confrontation. Instead, Mexico 
undertook strategies for coupling and accommodating itself within the American hegemony 
though an economic, selective, and pragmatic diplomacy. In the 1990s, Mexico’s strategic 
objective was the trade association with the United States and to assume the role of the bridge 
between North and South America. However, the evolutionary trajectory of Mexican 
strategic policy was disrupted by the domestic socio-political context and the international 
security environment of the early twenty-first century. On the one hand, the 2000 elections 
represented the first political alternation by democratic means in Mexico. The arrival of the 
National Action Party to the Presidency of the Republic generated spaces for new actors that 
gradually weakened the traditional presidential power. Vicente Fox began his government 
with a significant social and political capital that allowed him to undertake a bureaucratic 
restructuring and the articulation of a new strategic approach. His purpose was to eradicate 
the defensive ideas and practices of the Institutional Revolutionary Party culture.382 
However, on the other hand, the 9/11 attacks affected Fox’s strategic project. The change in 
the policy of the United States towards Latin America generated pressures and limited 
options for Mexico. The reconfiguration of the international security environment not only 
altered the bilateral agenda but also divided the Mexican policy elite.383 The political 
alternation and the 9/11 attacks generated conditions that tested the scope of continentalism, 
the validity of nationalism, and the viability of a new internationalist strategic plan. During 
 
382 José Woldenberg, La Transición Democrática En México (Mexico: COLMEX, 2012) pp.123–36; Chappell 
Lawson, ‘Mexico’s Unfinished Transition: Democratization and Authoritarian Enclaves in Mexico’, Mexican 
Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, 16.2 (2000), 267–87 pp.274–80. 
383 Peter Hakim, ‘Is Washington Losing Latin America?’, Foreign Affairs, 85.1 (2006), 39–53 pp.39,42–3; 
Jorge Castañeda, ‘The Forgotten Relationship’, Foreign Affairs, 82.3 (2003), 67–81 pp.69–70. 
151 
the first half of the 2000s, the evolution of strategic policy shifted in three phases from the 
project of change to strategic indefiniteness. 
The first stage took place during the first year of government. Fox promoted the articulation 
of a new strategic vision that would position Mexico as an emerging power. He diagnosed 
that the country’s structural position did not correspond to its geographical, political, and 
economic weight.384 The ‘new Mexican international activism’ discourse aimed to deepen 
integration in North America and expand ties with the globalised world to maximise the 
benefits of neoliberal reforms. In practice, Fox continued Mexico’s political opening. The 
international pressures on democracy and human rights that led to domestic conditions for 
his electoral victory influenced the new policy elite to adopt this agenda. With the United 
Nations, the government managed the establishment of a human rights office in Mexico. The 
government also proposed the incorporation of the defence of human rights into the 
constitutional principles of foreign policy.385 Further, Fox privileged the diplomacy of 
rapprochement with the United States. After being elected, one of his first actions was to 
meet with the American political elite. By 2001, the visit of the new American President 
George W. Bush to Guanajuato raised expectations about a possible immigration agreement, 
which had been a Mexican aspiration for years. The Mexican policy elite considered that the 
‘Spirit of San Cristobal’ would be the beginning of the integration of the ‘North American 
Community’.386 That same year, the Mexican government unilaterally ratified its rejection 
of the traditional security approach that predominated in the Organisation of American 
States. Aligned with the ideas that prevailed in the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, Fox 
announced the departure of Mexico from the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance. He argued that the defence instrument ‘not only represents [...] a serious case of 
obsolescence and worthlessness but has prevented, against its purposes, the generation of an 
idea of security appropriate to the scope and needs of the hemisphere’.387 Beyond the 
discourse of change, the events of the first year of government revealed that the policy elite 
was willing to continue with practices that had allowed the democratisation of the country 
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and the rapprochement with the United States. They also demonstrated that the new elite 
would resort to a partial, open, and critical diplomacy to protect and exercise their relative 
political autonomy. 
The new Mexican international activism was the core of Fox’s strategic project. Secretary 
of Foreign Relations Jorge Castañeda, principal ideologist and promoter, maintained that the 
new approach recovered the activism practised during the formation of the multilateral order 
at the end of the Second World War. The objective was to position Mexico as an active agent 
of global change with enough weight to influence the ‘new international agenda’. Promotion 
of democracy, respect for human rights, combating transnational crime, environmental 
protection, conventional disarmament, and gender issues were the topics proposed for the 
renewed Mexican diplomacy. For the chancellor, democracy and international participation 
were opposed to authoritarianism and isolationism. Therefore, the end of the authoritarian 
regime meant entering democracy and leaving isolationism. This new strategic approach was 
the instrument to reformulate the identity of the country and project it as a modern actor 
engaged with the defence of democracy and human rights. Mexico’s international 
commitment to these issues would also serve to consolidate internal change.388 In the 
political elite, the prevailing idea was that by taking the initiative in the construction of the 
new international system, Mexico could exert a more significant influence than that provided 
by geopolitical and geoeconomic variables. This vision was supported by the president, 
whose project had two axes: to deploy strong multilateralism and deepen integration in North 
America.389 The idea of generating a new strategic approach is interpreted as a response of 
the policy elite to the nascent internal political environment and the social expectations of 
change. The challenge was to eliminate nationalist practices such as isolationism based on 
the principle of non-intervention and the multilateralism used as a defence mechanism.390 
The proposal was also a reaction to the international context derived from the American 
policy of approaching Latin America. The stance of the United States created conditions for 
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Mexico to play a more active role and position itself as a political-economic bridge between 
the north and south of the continent. For Castañeda, the consolidation of a democratic regime 
and an active foreign policy adjusted to the rules-based system were the best means of 
containing external pressures. He also argued that the conditions of the internal and 
international context represented an opportunity to demystify the historical strategic vision 
of the Institutional Revolutionary Party regime based on two premises: ‘Mexico’s identity 
is defined by nationalism; [...] Mexican nationalism must be characterised by its systematic 
opposition to the United States’.391 This analysis of the new approach demonstrates that Fox 
and Castañeda’s policy aspired to internationalism. However, its logic was continentalism, 
its tool multilateralism, and its antagonist nationalism. 
The second phase encompasses the years 2001 to 2003, a period that undermined the 
viability of the change project. Days before the 9/11 attacks, the Mexico-United States 
relationship reached its peak. During Fox’s visit to Washington, Bush acknowledged that 
‘the United States has no more important relationship in the world than the one we have with 
Mexico’.392 However, two Fox speeches marked a turning point, as the American 
government did not receive them well. One was before the United States Congress, where 
he urged the elimination of the drug certification and the establishment of a migration 
agreement. Another speech was in the Organisation of American States where Fox 
announced the departure of Mexico from the only collective defence treaty in force in the 
continent. Four days later, the 9/11 attacks abruptly changed the conditions of the national 
and international environment. Without internal consensus, the Mexican secretary of foreign 
relations defined the attacks as a direct attack on Mexico and proclaimed total support for 
the United States. Castañeda added: ‘The United States will seek reprisals; it is its right to 
do so’. After Fox supported these statements, legislators accused them of surrendering the 
country, involving it in foreign conflicts, and imposing a pro-American doctrine based on 
the logic of ‘attacking the weak and obeying the strong’.393 The secretary of the interior said 
that Mexico ‘cannot be pushed to subordination under the American government’. Amid 
internal tensions, Fox’s support was limited to a cold call to Bush and a late trip to the United 
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States.394 By 2002, the failure of the bureaucratic restructuring resulted in the appointment 
of Adolfo Aguilar as the Mexican Ambassador to the United Nations. The designation 
bothered Castañeda because he considered that it would cause disconnection with the 
positions of the Mexican chancellery. During that year, Mexico assumed the presidency of 
the United Nations Security Council at a critical moment. Castañeda’s predictions 
materialised when Aguilar voted against the invasion of Iraq, even though the chancellor’s 
position was to respond favourably to the support requested by the United States. During 
this conjuncture, Fox’s reaction was characterised by his lack of definition and evasion of 
the dialogue convened by Bush and Spanish President José Aznar.395 The response to the 
9/11 attacks and the posture against the Iraq War generated severe divisions within the 
Mexican government and intense pressures from the United States that conditioned the 
strategic decision-making throughout the rest of the administration.  
The inconsistent attitude of Mexico is understood as the response of an inexperienced and 
divided government in the process of change within the context of international crisis. 
Resistance to bureaucratic restructuring, opposition to the formulation of the new strategic 
approach, the fragmentation of the decision-making process, inter-secretarial rivalry, and the 
plurality of the cabinet had consequences at this juncture. Continentalist and nationalist 
predispositions coexisted in the heterogeneous policy elite that fought to control the official 
response to the emergency. On the one hand, Castañeda had positioned himself as the pillar 
of continentalist policy based on globalist discourse. Such was his influence that he marked 
his ideological preferences and personality traits through the so-called Castañeda doctrine. 
His heterodox practices motivated Aguilar, once Castañeda’s main ally, to distance himself. 
On the other hand, the secretaries of the interior and economy headed the cabinet group 
attached to the nationalist tradition. They opposed the change in the strategic vision and 
denounced that the roles of the chancellor and the presidential adviser on national security 
were outside the law.396 Three factors added to this tension between change and continuity. 
One was the anti-Americanism that prevailed in Mexican society. The government did not 
call for public demonstrations of support for the United States after the 9/11 attacks for fear 
of violent protests. Another factor was the nationalism that prevailed in Congress, in which 
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the government lacked the legislative majority. The historical normative principles that had 
dominated Mexican foreign policy influenced Aguilar, representing Mexico, to vote against 
the invasion of Iraq. The third factor was Fox’s lack of leadership. His inability to take 
control of the government to generate a consensus and articulate a consistent response 
reflected what Bourdieu defines as ‘hysteresis’. The president was unable to interpret the 
facts, readjust his dispositions, and react to the sudden reconfiguration of the environment.397 
The ambivalent Mexican response to the crisis had immediate consequences. Internally, the 
Fox government obtained social and political capital after opposing the Iraq War despite 
pressure from the United States and Spain. However, the sharpening of the division inside 
the cabinet resulted in the resignation of Castañeda and Aguilar in 2003.398 Externally, 
Mexican diplomacy faced hostility from the Bush government and its allies. Mexico went 
from being the most relevant partner for the United States to leading the uncomfortable 
‘undecided group’ of the United Nations Security Council. Additionally, the change in 
American priorities altered the bilateral relation and undermined the negotiations of the 
migratory agreement.399 Mexico’s response to the new context reflected the limits of the 
alliance it sought with the United States and the persistence of defensive nationalism in the 
Mexican policy elite. In less than a year, the Fox government realised that it had a poorly 
compatible policy for the domestic context and the new conditions of the strategic 
environment. 
The third stage took place during the second half of the administration. Secretary of Foreign 
Relations Luis Derbez, who came from the Secretariat of Economy, tried to reformulate the 
approach designed by Castañeda to adapt the strategic policy to the new scenario. The 
process was based on Aguilar and Fox’s ideas that Mexico should have an independent 
foreign policy that would allow it to claim its role of middle power and avoid confrontations 
with the United States.400 However, in practice, the evolution of the strategic policy from 
2003 to 2006 was inconsistent and contradictory. It fluctuated between internationalist 
multilateralism, continentalist bilateralism, and nationalist unilateralism. For example, the 
globalist character of the strategic policy was oriented towards keeping practices such as 
multilateral activism and international diversification. Despite Castañeda’s resignation, 
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within the Secretariat of Foreign Relations the idea prevailed that ‘the only way in which 
our country can really balance its foreign policy agenda and its interests abroad is to develop 
a more intense activity in the multilateral scenario’.401 Derbez’s period heading the 
Secretariat of Foreign Relations began with intense diplomacy, based on the organisation of 
international summits. Mexico hosted the World Trade Organisation Ministerial Conference 
of 2003 and the Latin America, the Caribbean and the European Union Summit of 2004. In 
2003, the Mexican government expressed interest in being part of the G-7/8 based on its 
position of the ninth world economy. Fox said that the international mechanism should 
evolve to provide a further presence to emerging powers.402 Mexico also organised the 
Special Conference on Security of the Organisation of American States in which it promoted 
the adoption of a broad and multidimensional concept of hemispheric security. By 2004, 
Secretary Derbez presented his intention to chair the general secretariat of the continental 
body.403 A year later, the Mexican government again presented its candidature to be part of 
the United Nations Security Council for the period 2009-2010.404 Fox’s ambitious 
multilateral agenda had little success. Mexico did not obtain permanent membership in the 
G-7/8 and United Nations Security Council, nor did it receive support to chair the 
Organisation of American States. There were a few achievements from 2005 onwards after 
the appointment of the former Chancellor Bernardo Sepúlveda as judge of the International 
Court of Justice and former Chancellor José Gurría as secretary-general of the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development. The globalist character that strategic policy 
partially acquired failed to reposition Mexico in the international structure. The presence of 
Mexico in multilateral forums and the hosting of international summits only provided value 
to its symbolic capital. 
From 2003 to 2006, the strategic policy also adopted a continentalist character based on a 
reactive diplomacy and accommodation strategy to the American hegemony. Its 
implementation resorted to practices of selective endorsement of the issues from the 
Washington agenda. The Mexican policy elite sought the gradual achievement of objectives 
through a pragmatic soft-bandwagoning strategy. The main driver was the integration project 
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promoted by influential political-intellectual-business circles of Canada, the United States, 
and Mexico. The objective was to increase regional competitiveness and face the growing 
economic power of China and India. Inspired by the European Union model, the project 
aspired to a common market through the North American Free Trade Agreement Plus, a 
political association through the North American Union, and a monetary unification based 
on the Amero.405 In this context, the decisions of the Mexican policy-makers aimed to avoid 
confrontations in the face of increased pressure from 2001 and to restore the bilateral 
relationship after the tensions of 2003. After Castañeda’s resignation, Mexico abandoned the 
aggressive strategy labelled ‘the whole enchilada’ that, under a logic of ‘all or nothing’, 
sought a migratory reform with the United States. The 9/11 attacks undermined the 
negotiations due to the abrupt change in American priorities that redirected the bilateral 
agenda from migration and trade issues towards security and defence affairs.406 Mexico 
partially aligned itself with the American interest in protecting its internal security, since the 
policy elite interpreted that this attitude would help to return to the talks on the migratory 
agreement. By 2002, Mexico corresponded to the American Smart Borders Programme 
through the Sentinel Plan, whose objective was to prevent the ‘transit of interests or people 
who jeopardise the United States’.407 The departure of the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance in 2001, the opposition to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the refusal 
to participate in the North American Aerospace Defence Command and the United States 
Northern Command in 2004 exposed the limits of the Mexican alignment to the United 
States.408 Despite this, the integration process strengthened through the Security and 
Prosperity Partnership of North America of 2005. This inter-governmental mechanism 
aimed to expand tri-national cooperation through a broad reference framework. Its objective 
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was to establish the foundations of regional security.409 The continentalist strategy of the 
Fox government also failed to achieve the expected success, as it had a high internal political 
cost and received little support in Washington to return to the migration dialogue. 
Conversely, the United States took unilateral measures such as the implementation of an 
anti-immigrant policy that considered the construction of a border wall which, it argued, 
would prevent the entry of terrorists and illegals into its territory. Despite this, the 
development of the new continental cooperation framework was under construction. 
The third character of strategic policy during the second half of the administration was rooted 
in defensive nationalism. Ironically, the practices of the strategic confrontation pattern were 
not directed towards the United States but to Latin America. This position contrasted with 
the ‘multilateral bilateralism’ that Mexico aspired towards to balance American influence.410 
In economic matters, the policy elite again took up aspects of Central American activism 
and the ‘node and radio’ strategy implemented in the 1980s and 1990s. In this case, decision-
makers were not aiming to develop a counterweight to the United States. It was a reaction to 
the socio-economic problems on the southern border. By 2004, Mexico entered the Central 
American Integration System as an observer and promoted regional development through 
the Puebla-Panama Plan. Mexico also signed a free trade agreement with Uruguay and 
economic complementation agreements with Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. However, 
those initiatives gave poor results due to the weak leadership and low credibility of Mexico 
in the region.411 In political matters, the disagreements with Latin America were constant. 
Since 2002, Fox’s meeting with Cuban dissidents, his request to Cuban President Fidel 
Castro to leave Mexico after the conclusion of an international summit, and the Mexican 
government’s support for the United Nations condemnation of the human rights situation on 
the island, generated frictions. By 2004, Fox broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba as a 
reprisal to the Castro’s remarks about Mexico’s submissiveness to the United States.412 
Tensions spread south after Latin American countries rejected Mexico’s requests to chair 
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the Organisation of American States and join the Southern Common Market. These tensions 
influenced the failure of Mexico’s attempt to play the role of mediator in the guerrilla conflict 
in Colombia and the territorial dispute between Bolivia and Chile. The regional discrediting 
of Mexico was exacerbated after the diplomatic confrontation with Bolivia over a gas trading 
issue and its refusal to participate in the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti.413 By 
2005, tensions deepened with Argentina and Venezuela. During the Summit of the Americas, 
Fox confronted Presidents Hugo Chávez and Néstor Kirchner in defence of the creation of 
the Free Trade Area of the Americas. This event marked Mexico as the leading defender of 
the commercial integration project promoted by the United States. By 2006, the crisis with 
Venezuela escalated to the mutual breakdown of diplomatic relations and the Venezuelan 
resignation from the G-3 Free Trade Agreement.414 Chile was the only country with which 
Mexico maintained a stable link. This situation is attributed to the role played by the Mexican 
Ambassador Raúl Villanueva, the chief promoter of Mexican activism in Latin America 
since 2004. He argued that Mexico, in its role of ‘geopolitical bridge’ between the south and 
north of the Western hemisphere, was called to transform ancient cultural and economic 
relations with the United States to create a unique community by integrating the north and 
south of America.415 However, the multilateral activism attempted by Mexico clashed with 
the anti-American positions prevailing in Latin America. Within the Mexican political elite, 
continentalist predispositions significantly influenced the erosion of Latin American 
confidence in Mexico and nationalist predispositions shaped Mexico’s responses to Latin 
American rejection. 
The lack of definition that prevailed from 2003 to 2006 was the result of a failed process of 
reorientation of the strategic policy. The objective was to overcome the incompatibility that 
arose between the approach formulated by Castañeda and the new structural conditions. The 
external changes and internal pressures derived from 9/11 attacks and the Iraq War 
conditioned that process. One of the main exogenous factors that motivated policy-makers 
to try to recover the international diversification model was the abrupt modification of the 
bilateral agenda with the United States. The change in American priorities led Mexico to 
seek new links. In this context, domestic factors played a significant role in formulating the 
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inconsistent responses of the policy elite. One was the misunderstanding of changes in 
American policy and regional balances in Latin America. The policy choices also reflected 
a limited understanding of the scope of Mexico’s capabilities, the international role that the 
country could play, and the conditions of social consensus to promote a globalist 
approach.416 A second factor was the division between continentalists and nationalists. While 
politicians and bureaucrats encouraged regional integration and Mexico’s involvement in 
global affairs; military and lawmakers resisted international cooperation, especially with the 
United States. Also, the rivalry that arose between officials of the economic portfolio and 
the Secretariat of Foreign Relations fragmented the decision-making process.417 A third 
factor was the reconfiguration of Congress and the cabinet in 2003. The legislative 
dominance of the Institutional Revolutionary Party and the Party of the Democratic 
Revolution allowed them to exercise a nationalist counterweight to the continentalist 
preferences of the National Action Party government. Furthermore, the progressive 
decomposition of the cabinet and Fox’s inability to take control of internal dynamics 
prevented the articulation of a coherent policy.418 The result of these three factors was 
strategic indefiniteness. Mexico went from the policy of ‘the whole enchilada’ to that of 
‘partial enchiladas’. Derbez’s speeches revealed that the approach to which he aspired was 
a diluted version of Castañeda’s vision. The rhetorical axis remained international activism, 
while integration into North America continued to be the primary objective.419 At the end of 
the administration, Castañeda criticised that the policy elite had returned to the old 
diplomacy of the Institutional Revolutionary Party. He claimed that ‘what changed was the 
concept, not the policies. […] They cared more about anti-war and anti-American discourse 
than efficiency’.420 The evolution of the Mexican strategic policy from 2000 to 2006 portrays 
tensions and contradictions between continentalist aspirations to integrate into North 
America and nationalist desires to preserve relative political autonomy. Multilateral 
internationalism failed to consolidate itself as a consistent strategic approach with the 
potential to become the practical logic of the policy elite. It was only a tool to lessen internal 
pressures and counteract American influence. This period also reveals that the limits of 
integration to North America were not only defined by the United States, but also by the 
nationalist predispositions that prevailed in the Mexican policy elite. Mexico’s lack of 
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willingness and commitment to using its material capabilities for the preservation of the 
American-built international order hindered its ambition to integrate into North America and 
access the global elite. 
4.4.2. Towards a new pattern of cooperation, 2006-2012 
The political change of 2000 generated conditions that allowed the policy elite to articulate 
a new strategic approach. In their speech, international activism pointed to the deployment 
of intensive multilateralism; but in practice, the priority was to deepen integration into North 
America. The change in strategic policy was superficial because a continentalist practical 
logic based on a strategy of accommodation to American hegemony prevailed in the 
background. The pressures that arose after the 9/11 attacks and the Iraq War undermined the 
viability of the globalist project and revealed the limits of integration in North America. As 
of 2003, the fragmentation of the decision-making process, the lack of leadership in the 
policy elite, and its inability to interpret the context to redesign strategies were just some of 
the factors that led Mexico to indefiniteness. By 2006, conditions opposed to those of 2000 
framed the strategic policy-making process. Three factors defined the tense calm of the 
external context. One was the distancing between Mexico and Latin America. Another was 
the real estate bubble that preceded the 2008 global financial crisis. The third was the 
incorporation of the so-called Bush doctrine into the United States National Security 
Strategy. This scenario gave the new government relative freedom to aspire to ‘reposition 
Mexico in its rightful place on the global and regional stage’.421 In contrast, the domestic 
environment was defined by instability. The rejection and challenge of the results of the 
presidential elections in 2006 generated a scenario of political polarisation that undermined 
the legitimacy of the new government. Also, the increase in crime rates produced a public 
safety crisis. These situations that threatened presidential authority and the governability of 
the country motivated the policy elite to prioritise domestic issues on the strategic agenda.422 
The contrasts between the contexts in 2000 and 2006 made it possible to assume that there 
would be a disruptive reorientation of the strategic policy. The new government expressed 
its intention to give a ‘ship’s wheel blow’ to amend the mistakes of the Fox administration.423 
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However, Mexico’s interactions abroad reflected that its strategic policy remained 
subordinated to economic interests and oriented towards the United States, leaving a very 
narrow margin to exercise its limited political leadership capabilities in the rest of the world. 
The price of commercial ties with the United States and regional integration with North 
America was the adoption of a new pattern of continental cooperation, now in security 
affairs. The strategic policy of the Calderón government was defined by three asymmetric 
vectors that did not represent a profound break concerning the policy implemented by Fox. 
The first was oriented towards Latin America. The restoration of relations with the region 
was a priority for the policy elite. On the economic level, Mexico played an active and 
pragmatic role in promoting free trade. In 2007, Mexico reasserted its commitment to Central 
American development through the relaunch of the Puebla-Panama Plan. Calderón also 
fostered the integration of Latin American markets in the Southern Common Market and the 
Organisation of American States to increase regional trade and competitiveness. By 2009, 
Mexico signed commercial deals with Brazil, Colombia, and Uruguay. In 2011, Mexico 
formalised its participation in the Pacific Alliance and deepened free trade agreements with 
Colombia, Peru, and Central America.424 In contrast, at the political level, Mexico 
maintained a low profile, assumed a prudent stance, and exercised modest activism. The 
intention was to regain regional influence through the restoration of bilateral relations and 
the promotion of Latin American integration. In 2006, Calderón’s official visits to Latin 
America, meetings with the presidents of Argentina and Brazil, as well as the appointment 
of Mexican ambassadors for Cuba and Venezuela, were the first steps to fix the damages of 
the diplomatic crisis. The relationship with Cuba improved significantly. In 2007, Mexico 
reproached the United States’ economic sanctions against the island, while Cuba condemned 
the construction of the wall on the United States-Mexico border. The Mexican government 
also supported the inclusion of Cuba in the Rio Group in 2008. The diplomatic meetings in 
2008, 2009, and 2012 sealed the restoration of the bilateral relation. Diplomatic relations 
were also restored with Venezuela, despite its predispositions. Calderón avoided 
confrontation despite the besiege and hostility of the Venezuelan government to Mexican 
companies. Mexico also assumed the role of mediator in the tensions between Colombia and 
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Venezuela in the Rio Group in 2010.425 In this context, Mexico aspired to recover its 
influence through regional forums. By leading the Rio Group from 2008 to 2010, the 
Mexican government insisted on the need to integrate subregional processes. By 2010, 
Mexico hosted the Latin American and Caribbean Unity Summit. There, the Community of 
Latin American and Caribbean States was established, a regional coordination mechanism 
promoted by Mexico. However, the parallel consolidation of the Bolivarian Alliance for the 
Americas headed by Venezuela was a sign of the growing geopolitical polarisation and 
geoeconomic fragmentation. This situation called into question the viability of regional 
integration.426 These events also demonstrated that Calderón’s policy towards Latin America 
oscillated between economic pragmatism and political prudence. The balance was mixed, as 
Mexico managed to restore its commercial and diplomatic ties, but its search for regional 
influence proved mostly fruitless. 
Calderón’s policy towards Latin America did not represent a significant reorientation of the 
agenda promoted by Fox. Multilateral activism remained the means to try to retrieve regional 
presence and influence. The main change took place in the practices used to interact with the 
outside world. Mexico went from the democratic euphoria of Fox to the diplomatic 
introversion of Calderón. The regional context in which Calderón assumed power was 
complex. The absence of almost all Latin American leaders at his inauguration was a sign 
that relations with the region were at their lowest point. Moreover, contrary to the trend of 
the growing number of Latin American countries led by left-wing politicians, Calderón’s 
arrival to power further displaced the Mexican government to the right-wing of the political 
spectrum. This environment anticipated the deepening of tensions with Latin America.427 
However, three domestic factors make it possible to elucidate why the Calderón 
administration preferred reconciliation. The first was the configuration of the policy-making 
process. As a result of the centralisation of decision-making in Calderón, his orthodox profile 
and legalistic reflexes influenced the formulation and implementation of policies. 
Centralisation is attributed to the fact that the government’s leadership depended highly on 
his political capacity. Also, Calderón formed a relatively homogeneous cabinet with low-
 
425 Rodríguez and Prado pp.20–2,27–8; Olga Pellicer, ‘México Como Potencia Media En La Política 
Multilateral, 2006-2012’, Foro Internacional, LIII.3–4 (2013), 873–96 pp.875–80. 
426 Francisco Rojas, ‘La Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños’, Foreign Affairs 
Latinoamérica, 10.3 (2010) pp.24–31; Olga Pellicer, ‘La Seguridad Regional: Los Caminos Divergentes de 
Latinoamérica’, Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica, 10.3 (2010) pp.45–50. 
427 Octavio Amorin and Andrés Malamud, ‘What Determines Foreign Policy in Latin America? Systemic 
versus Domestic Factors in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, 1946–2008’, Latin American Politics and Society, 
57.4 (2015), 1–27 pp.9,21–2; Natalia Saltalamacchia, ‘México y América Latina: La Vía Multilateral’, in Los 
Retos Internacionales de México; Urgencia de Una Nueva Mirada, ed. by Guadalupe González and Olga 
Pellicer (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 2011) pp.61-75. 
164 
profile actors, moderate predispositions, and aligned with his strategic vision oriented 
towards the centre of the ideological spectrum. This factor explains why foreign policy 
acquired a personalist style based on the practice of presidential diplomacy.428 The second 
factor was the prevailing ideas within the policy elite, especially among bureaucrats and 
diplomats. Diplomat Gerónimo Gutiérrez acknowledged that ‘Mexico has lost a certain 
presence in the region’. Similarly, Diplomat Jorge Montaño asserted that the relationship 
with Latin America had gone from ‘the disinterested neighborship of the 1990s to the 
belligerence that led us to isolation through the confrontation’. Both concurred that the goal 
remained to make Mexico ‘an equilibrium factor’ and ‘a bridge’ between the north and 
south.429 Diplomats Miguel Ruiz and Carlos Rico also perceived this construction of Mexico 
as a country of divided identity and ‘multiple belongings’. Both agreed that Mexico is ‘a 
nation located in North America, with Latin American identity, and with the opportunity to 
influence the hemisphere’.430 The third factor that prompted reconciliation was the 
conditions of the domestic environment. Calderón had no incentive to continue the 
confrontation. On the contrary, the rapprochement was valued as an internal policy strategy. 
Calderón saw in the reconstruction of the link with the regimes of Cuba and Venezuela a 
means to obtain external recognition, lessen the internal pressures exerted by the left-wing 
political forces, and replenish the legitimacy of his government.431 In contrast to the 
confrontational practices of the Fox government, as of 2006, Mexico’s multilateral activism 
in Latin America was defined by modest positions and lukewarm attitudes. Calderón’s policy 
towards Latin America revealed that economic diplomacy remained the favourite tool of the 
policy elite and that the political affairs of the region were far from being a priority in the 
strategic agenda. 
The second vector of the strategic policy was oriented towards the rest of the world. The 
international activism through which Mexico sought to vindicate its role as middle power 
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was based on ideas promoted by the Fox administration. However, the main difference was 
again in the orthodox diplomatic practices employed to implement foreign policy. 
Multilateralism was the means through which the policy elite aspired to diversify 
international alliances and project Mexico’s leadership. In parallel and in tune with the 
implementation of the policy towards Latin America, Mexico actively participated in global 
forums. For example, from 2006 to 2007, Mexico chaired the United Nations Human Rights 
Council, where it proposed to exclude Cuba from the special observation mechanism.432 By 
2009, Mexico and Brazil managed to work together in the G-5 meeting, even though regional 
rivalry influenced their bilateral relationship to move forward with caution and distrust.433 
As an inheritance from the Fox government, Mexico once again held a place in the United 
Nations Security Council from 2009 to 2010. The Mexican delegation distinguished itself 
by its professionalism, prudence, and seriousness. That profile contrasted with the 
heterodox, challenging, and protagonistic style of the representatives of the previous 
administration. The policy towards Latin America was paying off because this time, the 
Mexican participation received full support from the Latin American countries.434 Mexico 
also established ties with the European Union, especially in economic matters. By 2008, 
both parties completed a strategic partnership to strengthen the free trade agreement signed 
in 2000. In addition to economic diplomacy, another practice that prevailed was diplomacy 
based in the organisation of international summits. Mexico hosted important international 
events such as the Latin American and Caribbean Unity Summit and the United Nations 
Climate Change Conference in 2010, as well as the G-20 meetings in 2012.435 The 
organisation of these types of events served as a platform for the Mexican government to 
show its interest in the affairs of the global agenda and establish diplomatic ties that could 
potentially lead to trade agreements. The policy elite had managed to rearticulate a relatively 
congruent foreign policy that surpassed personal agendas. The method was effective thanks 
to the orthodox exercise of multilateralism and adherence to international law. However, the 
lack of commitment on issues of world politics and niche diplomacy such as the promotion 
of democracy, the protection of human rights, and peacekeeping operations reveal that the 
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Calderón government was repeating the same error as its predecessor: the lack of clarity in 
the objectives of the strategic policy.436 
Calderón’s policy towards the rest of the world also did not mean a disruptive change in the 
evolution of strategic policy. Multilateral activism remained the mechanism to generate 
international ties to make the neoliberal reforms profitable and neutralise American 
influence. The economic pragmatism and political prudence that characterised the policy 
towards Latin America replicated itself in Mexico’s relations with the rest of the world. On 
the one hand, economic-material interests gained weight in decision-making, since the 
consolidation of the neoliberal model generated much of the country’s development and 
stability depended on foreign trade. The attraction of foreign investment, strengthening of 
commercial alliances, and economic diversification constituted one of the axes that guided 
the strategic policy-making process. On the other hand, the policy elite abandoned 
confrontational practices fuelled by political-ideological factors, since they reduced the 
effectiveness of economic diplomacy. Mexico assumed a position that fluctuated between 
impartiality and indifference in international debates about the effects of globalisation, the 
revenues of democracy, and the defence of human rights.437 Economic pragmatism is 
interpreted as the response of the policy elite to overcome the external conditions of 
economic uncertainty that prevailed during much of the administration. The 2008 global 
financial crisis not only impacted oil prices, an industry on which Mexico depended less and 
less. It also influenced the increase in trade protectionism and the stagnation of Mexico’s 
main trading partners, especially the United States. Additionally, the growing political-
ideological polarisation in Latin America and the consolidation of Brazil’s leadership in the 
region led the Mexican policy elite to recover traits of the selective and differentiated 
economic diplomacy implemented by Fox.438 On the other hand, political prudence was not 
only a product of Calderón’s orthodox legalist reflexes nor the lessons left by the diplomatic 
heterodoxy of the Fox government. It was a result of ideas rooted in the political elite, much 
of them anchored to the precepts of the Estrada doctrine on the determination of peoples and 
non-intervention. For example, Diplomat Gustavo Iruegas affirms that within the policy elite 
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the perception prevailed that ‘there is no consensus on whether the country should promote 
and defend regional leadership in Latin America, [...] sometimes it was even anti-diplomatic 
to talk about a Mexican leadership in the region’.439 This type of nationalist predispositions 
that were displaced by the continentalist inclinations of Fox and Castañeda gradually 
reacquired presence in the policy-making process during the Calderón government. This 
resulted from the low profile of the secretaries, the professionalisation of the policy elite, 
and the repositioning of the traditionalist sector of the diplomatic establishment in decision-
making. The clearest example was the role of the Secretary of Foreign Relations Patricia 
Espinosa. She came from the Mexican foreign service, was little known, and had extensive 
experience in multilateral diplomacy and international cooperation. Her moderate 
predispositions and negotiation skills were vital to avoid conflicts in the formulation and 
implementation of foreign policy. Her alignment with Calderón’s vision allowed her to 
remain in her position throughout the administration. From the beginning of the government, 
the chancellor revealed that Mexico would implement a foreign policy ‘without stridence, 
without protagonism, nor personal promotion, and would primarily boost the economic and 
commercial issues’. Also, she made it clear that the Calderón administration would adhere 
to the traditional principles of Mexican foreign policy.440 At the same time, diplomats like 
Montaño recognised that 
the formulation and execution of the foreign policy of a country that 
boasts of acting seriously on the international scene require the 
respect of certain basic rules. [...] The complexity of the subject 
advises to entrust a body of professionals [...] We have seen that in 
five months the current government has made an effort to rectify, 
with the support of the Mexican foreign service, the aimless work 
that characterised the predecessor.441 
Calderón’s policy abandoned democratic euphoria and adherence to niche diplomacy to give 
continuity to what in practice had become a state policy: the promotion of free trade through 
economic diplomacy. 
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The third vector of strategic policy attracted the most interest and efforts from the policy 
elite. It addressed two priorities: the relation with the United States and the security issues. 
The starting point of the Mexico-United States relationship during the Calderón government 
was the agendas of the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America of 2005. On 
the one hand, the prosperity agenda continued. It focused on promoting economic growth, 
competitiveness, and quality of life in the region. On the other hand, the security agenda 
intensified. It centred on protecting the region from internal and external threats.442 Within 
this renewed framework of cooperation, the bilateral relationship gradually reoriented from 
the migration issue to security affairs. Regarding migration, the Mexican government 
adopted an inconsistent speech after the 2006 elections, even though the topic continued to 
predominate in the debates of the policy elite. After the first working trips to Latin America, 
Calderón visited North America. In Ottawa, he criticised the American border wall. In 
Washington, he proposed to Bush that they should ‘demigratise’ the bilateral agenda.443 
Calderón’s speech not only contradicted his campaign proposals related to promoting a new 
migratory policy but also distanced him from the approach developed by Fox. The migration 
issue lost relevance to the policy elite throughout the administration. The position of the 
Mexican government on the topic of migration was dispassionate, while the United States 
unilaterally continued its anti-immigration policy.444 In contrast, security affairs were 
quickly positioned as a priority on the bilateral agenda. In 2006, the increase in crime rates 
motivated Calderón to meet with his closest circle and agents of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration in Mexico to plan a security strategy. The result was the Joint Operation 
Michoacán which sought to combat drug trafficking by military means.445 By 2007, 
Calderón took advantage of Bush’s visit to Mérida to express to him that the issue of drug 
trafficking was a shared problem and the fight required the strengthening of binational 
cooperation. The Mérida Initiative of 2008 established itself as the institutional mechanism 
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through which the United States would finance Mexico’s security strategy.446 The 
importance of security in the bilateral relation extended to the administration of American 
President Barack Obama. By 2009, both governments sought the creation of a Bilateral 
Implementation Office to work together in the fight against organised crime. Between 2009 
and 2010, the diplomatic tensions produced by the statements of American officials about 
that Mexico was a ‘weak and failing state’ on the verge of collapse, did not hamper security 
cooperation.447 The economic link with the United States and the security situation in 
Mexico led the progressive change in the priorities of the Mexican policy elite. Mexico’s 
interest in the region passed from the migration agreement to security cooperation. 
The transition from the failed ‘whole enchilada’ of 2002 to the promising Mérida Initiative 
of 2008 depicts the emergence of a new pattern of continental cooperation. The prevailing 
commercial link with the United States was complemented by an unprecedented security 
cooperation mechanism. This process was aligned with the integrationist aspirations and 
continentalist predispositions of the Mexican political elite, as well as with the American 
interest of protecting its domestic security and regional perimeter. The reorientation of the 
bilateral relationship was the Calderón government’s response to the complicated conditions 
of the internal context and the regional environment, especially in the United States. In the 
domestic sphere, four factors undermined the relevance of the migratory topic. One was the 
impact that the contesting of the electoral results had on the legitimacy of the government. 
The second was the effect of the increase of criminality on the governability of the country. 
Another was the prevailing perception in the policy elite that migratory and political issues 
contaminated the bilateral agenda and hindered economic diplomacy. Indeed, Secretary 
Espinosa agreed with Calderón’s position that ‘the immigration issue does not dominate the 
agenda’.448 The fourth factor was the null counterweight of actors with nationalist 
predispositions. Despite the historical aversion to collaborating with the United States, the 
military establishment saw security cooperation as an opportunity to encourage the 
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modernisation of the armed forces.449 In the external environment, three aspects channelled 
the agenda towards security issues. The first was the securitisation of the bilateral 
relationship as of 2001. The change in the United States’ priorities generated incompatibility 
with Mexican demands on migration. Also, Mexico lacked elements to negotiate or influence 
the definition of the bilateral agenda. Another aspect was the publication of the United States 
National Security Strategy in 2002 and its update in 2006. Under the vision of the Bush 
doctrine, the principles of unilateralism and the use of preventive war endowed American 
foreign policy with a threatening character.450 The third factor was the role that Mexico’s 
stability continued playing as a security issue for the United States. By 2010, American 
agents claimed that ‘Mexico is losing the drug war [...] the Mexican government’s anti-crime 
strategy has failed’. Similarly, to the 1994 political-economic crisis, the instability in Mexico 
still represented ‘a homeland security problem of immense proportions to the United 
States’.451 The Mérida Initiative marked an unparalleled milestone in the binational 
relationship. It entered into force despite the criticisms and pressures exerted by nationalist 
groups in Mexico that compared it with Plan Colombia and conservative sectors in the 
United States that opposed providing support to a corrupt government and violator of human 
rights. The point of convergence in the bilateral agenda that gave rise to the new pattern of 
continental cooperation was the issue of security, although both nations approached it from 
different perspectives. While it was an issue linked to border control and illegal migration 
for the United States, it was an issue related to the fight against organised crime and drug 
trafficking for Mexico. Both governments recognised the importance of cooperation and the 
shared responsibility to address those threats to their internal safety and regional security. 
The strategic policy from 2006 to 2012 did not represent a disruptive reorientation in its 
evolutionary trajectory. However, the character of Calderón’s government policy was less 
conflictive and more cautious than that which prevailed in the Fox administration. The 
reasons for this contrast were the predominance of orthodox legalistic reflexes, the 
centralisation of decision-making, and the moderate predispositions of policy-makers. 
 
449 John Feeley, ‘Cable from Oct. 28, 2009 (Mexico 003101)’, WikiLeaks. The Global Intelligence Files, 2012 
<https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/15/152825_-latam-wikileaks-update-mexico-.html> [accessed 15 
December 2018]; Gustavo Delgado, ‘Cable from Nov. 10, 2009 (Mexico 003195)’, WikiLeaks. The Global 
Intelligence Files, 2012 <https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/15/152825_-latam-wikileaks-update-mexico-
.html> [accessed 13 December 2018]. 
450 Singh p.20; The White House, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’ 
(Washington: BPA, 2006) pp.18,23; The White House, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America’ (Washington: BPA, 2002) pp.6,15–6; Charles Krauthammer, ‘The Bush Doctrine: In American 
Foreign Policy, a New Motto: Don’t Ask, Tell’, Time (Washington, 5 March 2001) p.42. 
451 John Feeley, ‘Cable from Jan. 29, 2010 (Mexico 00000083)’, WikiLeaks. The Global Intelligence Files, 
2010 <https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/87/877816_us-embassy-cables-mexico-is-losing-drug-war-says-us-
.html> [accessed 15 December 2018]; USDOD pp.33–6. 
171 
Although the dispute between nationalist and continentalist continued within the political 
elite, the low profile of cabinet members nullified counterweights and allowed consensus 
aligned to the president’s continentalist predispositions. The most significant features of 
Calderón’s government policy were the exercise of presidential diplomacy, the persistence 
of diplomacy based on summits, the pragmatism of economic diplomacy, and diplomatic 
prudence in political-ideological matters. The character of the strategic policy allowed the 
restoration of ties with Latin America and the extension of Mexico’s diversification efforts 
around the world. However, Mexico failed to position itself as a bridge between the north 
and south of the continent, as well as to consolidate its role as a relevant middle power. 
International activism and multilateralism were once again the formulae to try to balance the 
weight of the relationship with the United States. The strategic policy of this period left two 
central lessons. First, economic diplomacy had become a state policy as a result of the effects 
of the implementation of the neoliberal model in the 1980s. Second, the dismantling of 
defensive nationalism in the 1990s generated the conditions for the building of a new 
practical logic in the Mexican policy elite: soft-bandwagoning continentalism. To 
summarise, Figure 4-3 portrays the consolidation of the continentalist strategic approach 
between 2000 and 2012 as a result of the dismantling process experienced by nationalism in 
the 1990s. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has employed a structuralist-constructivist approach to analyse the complex 
link that entwined the endogenous and exogenous dynamics that reoriented the development 
of Mexican strategic policy from 2000 to 2012. Since the 1980s, within the Mexican security 
establishment, a tense relationship emerged between the historical desire to defend national 
sovereignty and the growing aspiration to integrate the country into the global economy. The 
continentalist construction of Mexico’s external identity was gradually established as the 
cornerstone from which the economicist, pragmatic, and selective character of foreign policy 
were defined. Likewise, this identity construction influenced the formulation of soft-
bandwagoning security strategies with the United States during the early twenty-first 
century. Two factors were decisive so that, in parallel to the dismantling of nationalism 
during the 1990s, the construction of a strategic continentalist approach was undertaken that 
would allow the country to adapt to the conditions of the American-built neoliberal 
international order. The first factor was the role that policy predispositions played in shaping 
institutional responses to national security issues. The reconstruction of the dispositional 
logic of the political elite headed by the business technocracy of the National Action Party 
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demonstrates that their policy practices were based on cultural reflexes fuelled by managerial 
rationality and forged during the adoption of neoliberalism. 
Figure 4-3. Evolution of the Mexican strategic policy, 2000-2012 





The second factor was how the space of the social relations was reorganised in which 
decisions were made on diplomatic, economic, and military matters. The construction of the 
positional logic of the strategic policy-making field reveals that the dominant role that 
politicians and bureaucrats held not only allowed them to eradicate nationalist speeches and 
practices, but also to establish new standards for the design of national security strategies. 
These changes in the habitus of the policy elite and the field of strategic policy-making 
illustrate the profound impact that the adoption of neoliberalism had on the institutional and 
ideological sources that shaped the responses of Mexican policy actors to events like the 
attacks of 9/11 and the financial crisis of 2008. 
The examination of the evolution of Mexico’s foreign and security policy throughout the 
consolidation of the neoliberal political-economic model reinforces the argument that 
practical logic based on a continentalist conception of security gradually dominated the 
cultural reflexes of political and bureaucratic elites, as well as of emerging sectors within 
the diplomatic corps and the armed forces. The process of building the continentalist 
strategic approach was the result of the rules and norms that redefined international relations 
in the late 1980s, as well as the effect that neoliberal structural reforms had on the cultural 
roots and social dynamics of policy-making since the 1990s. The undermining of nationalist 
dispositions within the establishment of security and the preponderant role held by 
politicians and bureaucrats with business ties and managerial experience in the field of 
strategic policy-making were fundamental factors that explain the reorientation of Mexican 
foreign and security policy during the 2000s. This study concludes that, despite the resistance 
exerted by policy actors rooted in the nationalist strategic tradition like diplomats and 
generals, the strength that the continentalist approach gained among politicians and 
bureaucrats enabled it to claim the category of practical logic after Mexico’s first political 
change in 2000. One of the contributions of this study lies in the systematic attention given 
to the relationship between the cultural predispositions of policy-makers and the broad 
structural context in which the policy was formulated after the 9/11 attacks. This practice-
centred analysis complements the structural explanations that predominate in the 
literature.452 Likewise, the approach deployed in this work contributes to highlighting the 
continuity and change in the cultural factors from which the strategies based on alliance 
politics and cooperation practices with the United States were designed. This chapter 
underpins the thesis that the reorientation of strategic policy involved the formulation of 
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soft-bandwagoning strategies that allowed Mexico to strengthen its link and dependence 
with the United States from the 2000s onwards.453  
The arguments, evidence, and reflections articulated in chapters two, three, and four develop 
a big picture that allows us to understand how the pervasive ideological force imprinted by 
neoliberalism triggered the decline of nationalism and created political spaces that facilitated 
a continentalist strategic notion to play an increasingly crucial role in the formulation of 
foreign policy and the design of national security strategies in Mexico. This case study on 
the politics of Mexican strategic policy from 1988 to 2012 confirms that the advent and 
consolidation of neoliberalism had profound effects in the socio-historical context and socio-
political imaginary from which the policy actors made strategic decisions that defined 
Mexico’s strategic behaviour. Mexico went from aspiring to full independence and 
sovereignty to seeking regional integration and depending on the United States because this 
guaranteed its security and development. The facts of recent years corroborate it.  
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If our centenary celebration is to mean anything, it must be about what we 
are, rather than about what we are not. And this problem of our identity we 
have yet to solve. […] However, I do not believe that Canada is a variant 
of the United States. […] A nation, like an individual, can achieve integrity 
and identity only out of its own experience and not derivatively from a 
parent. […] Our identity cannot emerge clear and dominant until 
sovereignty, both real and symbolic, is brought to rest in ourselves. […] 
Only in this way will the problem of Canadian identity be resolved.454 
 
John Conway (British historian), 1964. 
 
454 John Conway, ‘What Is Canada?’, The Atlantic, 214:5.November (1964) p.12. 
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Introduction 
As the first case study addressed in this dissertation has shown, the understanding of the 
political imagination of policy elites and the assessment of its effects on decisions that 
delineate the state strategic behaviour depends largely on knowledge about the socio-
historical contexts in which the most influential ideas have germinated. Considering the 
importance of the culturalist approach in strategic studies, this chapter examines the 
sociocultural context in which Canada’s foreign and security policy was formulated from 
1993 to 2015. This work also reviews the origins and evolution of the foremost strategic 
approaches that have shaped government thinking and practice: internationalism, 
Atlanticism, and continentalism. Based on the analytical framework outlined in chapter one, 
this study focuses on the institutional and ideological sources that feed Canadian policy. The 
evaluation of the cultural reflexes of policy-makers and the institutional culture of the 
departments in which they operated provide elements to identify the origin and effects of 
ideas on the evolution of strategic policy. The description provided by this study is useful to 
understand in the next chapters why and how the policy elite reacted to the abrupt changes 
of the wide structural environment in a period marked by the end of the Cold War, the 
consolidation of neoliberalism, and the beginning of the War on Terror. 
This analysis supports the argument that the cultural roots of policy formulation and 
decision-making in Canada underwent a process of change from the effects produced by the 
national economic stagnation during the 1970s. Canada’s adaptation to the rules and norms 
of the nascent American-centric unipolar international system in the 1980s created political 
spaces for continentalist doctrines to play an increasingly important role in the design of 
national security strategies. During this period, neoliberalism acquired enough strength 
inside and outside Canada to reorient the cultural predispositions of policy actors and 
condition their strategic decisions. Based on this argument, this chapter contributes to the 
literature through a comprehensive study of the predominant strategic notions within the 
Canadian policy elite. It should be noted that to date, there is a wide range of documents that 
examine Canada’s foreign and security policy, several of them from structuralist 
perspectives. Outstanding publications by academics such as Kim Nossal, John Kirton, Tom 
Keating, Andrew Cooper, and Stéphane Roussel have significantly expanded the 
understanding of Canadian strategic behaviour.455 However, this work joins an emerging 
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stream of academics who complement these studies through a constructivist approach in 
which more considerable attention is paid to the role of cultural roots and dynamics in 
strategic decision-making.456 Considering the gap between these structuralist and 
constructivist approaches, the contribution of this chapter lies in the examination of the 
social and cultural context in which the subjective understandings of Canadian policy actors 
were forged and shaped their institutional responses to issues of foreign policy, international 
trade, and national security. 
Below is a review of the institutional and ideological sources of Canadian strategic policy. 
The first section examines the social background, professional career, and usual practices of 
politicians, diplomats, and military. It exposes the cultural and institutional environment in 
which the development of the dominant ideas on foreign policy and national security took 
place. It also identifies the socio-cultural dynamics that governed the policy-making process 
since the 1980s. Part 5.2 addresses the main approaches that fuelled official articulations on 
strategic policy. It shows the fundamentals and evolution of the internationalist, Atlanticist, 
and continentalist conceptions. It also assesses the influence of these ideas in shaping the 
cultural practices of the policy elite before and after the 2006 political change. The review 
of institutional and ideological sources provides an overview of the socio-cultural context in 
which foreign and security policy evolved. This analysis will make it easier to understand, 
in the following chapters, how Canadian decision-makers reacted to the disruptive changes 
generated by the end of the Cold War and the emergence of neoliberalism. 
5.1. Social dynamics of strategic policy-making 
The formulation of Canadian strategic policy is the product of interactions between the 
political, diplomatic, and military elites. A diversity of actors constitutes each of these 
exclusive social groups. Also, each guild has a different capacity to influence and distinctive 
predispositions that condition their strategic choices. The following paragraphs review the 
social and cultural backgrounds of the most relevant constituencies that made up the policy 
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elite. It also examines the design of the policy-making machinery. The first section argues 
that the trend of socio-cultural and institutional change that began since the mid-1970s 
consolidated itself after the 2006 political transition. This pattern prevailed during the period 
of the exhaustion of the welfare state and the establishment of neoliberalism, a paradigm that 
has framed the evolution of Canadian strategic policy to date.457 
5.1.1. Politicians 
Canada’s form of government is based on the Westminster system. It positions the members 
of Parliament as the main actors in the formulation of strategic policy, especially those 
belonging to the two dominant parties in Canadian politics: Liberal Party and Conservative 
Party. The core of the policy elite is located in the executive branch of the federal 
government. This is where actors who are directly involved in decision-making operate: the 
prime minister and the cabinet ministers. An aspect of utmost relevance is the composition 
of the Parliament since the counterweight of the opposition depends on the distribution of 
political forces. Historically, parliaments have been formed by majority governments. From 
1867 to 2019, Canada has only had 14 minority governments throughout 43 parliamentary 
sessions. Two of these governments occurred between 1972 and 1980 and three between 
2004 and 2011. During the period from 1993 to 2015, there was a relevant process of political 
transition that drove the evolution of the Canadian political elite. 
Canada experienced a profound change during the last three decades of the twentieth 
century. The divisions within the Liberal Party moved it to the centre-right of the Canadian 
political spectrum. The crisis of the Keynesian model of the welfare state in the mid-1970s 
catalysed this fracture. The return of the Progressive Conservative Party to power in the 
1980s and the influence acquired by business liberals in the 1990s triggered a transition to a 
new political-economic order. During this period of change, the social class produced by the 
welfare state since the 1920s consolidated itself into power. From the 1960s to the 1980s, 
about three-quarters of the members of the political elite belonged to the middle class.458 
From the 1990s to the 2010s, there was a slight increase in politicians from the upper-middle 
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class and involved in business activities.459 Various academics argue that the 
overrepresentation of this social stratum in the political elite is attributed to the fact that 
political recruitment processes have not been designed to give opportunities to the working 
class. On the contrary, these processes have focused on the preservation of the status quo, 
consolidation of the ruling class, and satisfaction of their aspirations for social mobility.460 
These factors have favoured the development of a relative cohesion and rough consensus 
within the so-called ‘confraternity of power’ in which the various institutional leaders share 
attitudes and values.461 The similarities in the socio-economic background and the gradual 
ideological affinity between liberals and progressive conservatives allowed a common 
understanding of the need to reduce the welfare state and adopt the neoliberal model. 
One aspect that has allowed the generation and reproduction of attitudes and shared values 
among the institutional leaders of the Canadian political establishment has been their 
common socio-cultural origins. In addition to coming from the middle and upper-middle 
classes, most politicians came from urban areas during the second half of the twentieth 
century.462 Although the perception prevails that conservatives usually come from the west 
and liberals from the east, studies reveal that most politicians originated in central Canada, 
especially in the provinces of Ontario and Quebec.463 The overrepresentation of this region 
is attributed to the fact that it houses the poles of the political, economic, and cultural power 
of Canada. A similar pattern is observed regarding the ethnic profile of the political elite. 
During the second half of the twentieth century, about 80 per cent of politicians were British 
descendants and more than half grew up in the context of the Second World War.464 It should 
be noted that since the 1990s, the profile of Canadian politicians began to diversify slightly 
in terms of gender, occupation, and ethnicity; while homogeneity prevailed in attributes such 
as age, educational qualifications, social class, and political experience.465 Although the 
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political elite gave more representation to minority groups since the 2000s, the positions of 
higher political power continued to be occupied by politicians who were male, white, 
middle-class, middle-aged, Christian, Canadian-born, English speakers, and from central 
Canada.466 The origins of the political elite have not only contributed to the generation of a 
close bond with the corporate elite. They have also influenced the predominance of values 
and interests linked to British over Francophone heritage in the definition of Canadian state 
identity and strategic behaviour.467 
An investigation of formal training also explains the causes of relative understanding within 
the political elite and the evolution of the distinctive reflexes of its members. As in many 
Western countries, the legal profession has historically been one of the pillars of Canadian 
political culture. Since the 1960s, about one-third of the members of Parliament have had a 
legal education.468 17 of the 23 Canadian prime ministers since the Confederation of 1867 
had legal training. This fact is interpreted as an inheritance of the role that lawyers played in 
the British political elite since the seventeenth century.469 Also, a belief has prevailed in 
Canadian political culture that 
the lawyer will not be forgotten by the party when it becomes 
necessary for the government to select individuals to handle the 
enormous amount of its legal business. The position of the legal 
profession in and out of Parliament provides great opportunities for 
the distribution of patronage.470 
Thus, the legal profession established itself as a means of social and political mobility in 
Canada. Currently, politicians educated in law play fundamental roles within the national 
board of the Liberal Party and the national council of the Conservative Party.471 The change 
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in the Canadian political-economic model in the 1980s altered this trend. Between 1980 and 
2005, although politicians with academic degrees and professional experience in law 
continued to predominate, there is a consistent increase in the number of politicians with 
training or occupations in business and economics.472 It should be noted that the quality of 
academic credentials has not been highly relevant within the political elite. Usually, its 
members have not stood out for having high educational qualifications or graduating from 
elite foreign universities.473 The change in the formal education of politicians partially 
explains the transition from legalistic reflexes to managerial pragmatism in the decision-
making of the Canadian political elite. 
The political formation of institutional leaders has been linked to their formal training. The 
fact that colleges such as McGill University, University of Toronto, University of Alberta, 
Dalhousie University, University of Montreal, University of Ottawa, University of Western 
Ontario, and Queen’s University are considered as political hotbeds, is not only attributed to 
their academic prestige or that most of them are located in the region of central Canada.474 
Their relevance also derives from the fact that they facilitate access to partisan clubs such as 
the Young Liberals of Canada and the Progressive Conservative Youth Federation. These 
groups capture students with political potential under the argument of ‘encouraging the 
participation and recruitment of youth’.475 The objective is to involve them in electoral 
mobilisation, policy promotion, and organisation of conventions to develop political skills 
in the future cadres of the party. Only young people with leadership, negotiation, 
organisational, discursive, and social abilities tend to ascend in the partisan structure. Family 
and professional ties inside the political sphere play a key role in accelerating the mobility 
process. Although the Canadian political training system has been based on practice, most 
parliamentarians have little political experience or knowledge on the affairs of their elected 
office. This situation is attributed to the lack of a system of seniority, hierarchies, and 
rewards that encourages professionalisation and specialisation.476 By the 2010s, this trend 
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began to reverse with the emergence of the ‘career politician’ profile, especially in the 
Liberal Party.477 Amateurism in a large sector of the political elite has limited their 
understanding of the profound changes in the structural environment and their influence that 
they can exercise from parliamentary committees. This aspect has also reduced the 
credibility of legislators in the formulation of strategic policy and given greater relevance to 
technical advice provided by diplomats and military. 
The informality that has prevailed in the Canadian political training system has also given 
birth to practices that reproduce along the political trajectory and upset the policy-making 
process. One of the most relevant is that of political patronage. Institutional conditions in 
political parties have positioned this activity as an efficient resource to ascend to the political 
elite. This practice is conceived as a type of social transaction in which a political actor with 
power (employer) dispenses favours, rewards, and benefits, sometimes outside the law, to a 
political actor with less power (client) in exchange for loyalty and reciprocity.478 This 
dynamic has turned the positions of political aide and political staffer into privileged 
positions since they allow their occupants to acquire practical knowledge, generate 
patronage relationships, and socialise with interest groups.479 Since the origins of the 
Canadian political system, this practice has influenced the conformation of what David 
Savoie defines as ‘court government’: 
I mean that the effective political power now rests with the prime 
minister and a small group of carefully selected courtiers. I also mean 
a shift from formal decision-making processes in cabinet and, as a 
consequence, in the civil service, to informal processes involving 
only handful of key actors.480 
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This dynamic is not exclusive to liberals or conservatives. It is a norm rooted in Canadian 
political ethics since the Confederation of 1867.481 The establishment of court governments 
and the importation of administrative practices from the private sector became a trend that 
gained strength since the 1980s. Although this dynamic made policy-making more efficient, 
the informal structure that operates under the logic and interests imposed by the prime 
minister has produced centralisation of power, displacement of other actors, undermining of 
counterweights, dilution of bureaucratic roles, and reduction of accountability. The result is 
a policy-making process that runs at two speeds. When an issue satisfies the interests of the 
prime minister and her/his courtiers, the process secures funds and runs fast. When a topic 
is of little importance, the decision-making process becomes slow, porous, bureaucratic, and 
consultative.482 
An analysis of the governments from 1993 to 2015 illustrates the background, education, 
and distinctive practices of the generation of Canadian politicians that emerged since the 
1980s. For example, Prime Ministers Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin, and Stephen Harper came 
from the middle class, belonged to the Young Liberals Club, held positions as political aides, 
and were protégées of prominent politicians. In Martin’s case, his father’s background in the 
Liberal Party provided him with significant symbolic and social capital.483 The three prime 
ministers also illustrate the progressive change in formal education, professional vocation, 
and cultural reflexes that dominated the political elite. Chrétien and Martin were the last 
prime ministers trained in law. However, Chrétien did not perceive himself as a lawyer and 
Martin developed in the business field. The arrival to power of Harper, who was trained in 
economics, consolidated the managerial, economicist, and corporative reflexes of the 
political elite.484 The socio-cultural background of the prime ministers also influenced how 
they configured their cabinets. The values and interests they embodied were projected and 
reproduced through ‘elected Cabinet colleagues’ they convened for their court governments. 
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Through the practice of political patronage, college friends, business partners, related 
politicians, and even family members were appointed to occupy crucial positions for the 
formulation and implementation of the foreign and security policy such as chief of staff, 
policy advisor, cabinet minister, and ambassador to States United or United Nations.485 As 
will be analysed in detail in the next chapters, the main ethnocultural and ideological 
differences among the three prime ministers and their teams drove the metamorphosis of 
Canada’s external identity and redirection of the strategic policy. 
5.1.2. Diplomats 
Diplomats are the second most important group in the policy elite. The Department of 
Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development is the institutional core of Canadian diplomacy. At 
the top of the hierarchy are the ministers of foreign affairs, international trade, and 
international development. Their membership of the cabinet allows them to participate 
directly in decision-making. The diplomatic advisors of the Prime Minister’s Office and 
Privy Council Office occupy a second level. Their close relationship with the prime minister 
allows them to influence foreign policy deliberations. On a third level are the members of 
the foreign service deployed in the diplomatic representations of the Canadian government 
in other countries and international organisations. Their relevance lies in the linking of 
Canada with external actors and the interpretation they provide to policy-makers on the 
conditions of the structural environment. Due to the features of the court government, the 
influence of diplomats depends on their political-ideological affinity with the prime minister. 
The exploration of the period from 1993 to 2015 reveals the erosion of diplomatic power in 
decision-making and the parallel weakening of the internationalist tradition in Canadian 
strategic policy. 
The relationship between politicians and diplomats has not been the best, especially in recent 
decades. The differences in their socio-cultural backgrounds and their dispute over symbolic 
capital have fuelled tensions between the two elites. Historically, the Canadian diplomat has 
come from a privileged socio-economic stratum. In addition to belonging to the upper-
middle class, this guild has positioned itself as a ‘legion of superbly educated, urbane, 
multilingual career diplomats’.486 The remarkable work of the foreign service during the so-
called ‘golden ages’ of Canadian diplomacy (1947-1957 and 1967-1977) produced ‘a certain 
 
485 Postmedia News, ‘Is Patronage the Oil That Keeps Our Democracy Turning?’, National Post (Toronto, 1 
June 2012); Savoie, ‘The Rise of Court Government in Canada’ p.636. 
486 Paul Wells and John Geddes, ‘What You Don’t Know about Stephen Harper’, Maclean’s (Toronto, January 
2011) p.14. 
185 
amount of prestige in the popular imagination’.487 The officers earned respect and pride of 
the Canadians, who trusted the diplomatic elite to serve their interests and demand little in 
return.488 The reputation acquired by the diplomatic corps became an obstacle for the 
political elite in formulating policies and implementing austerity measures. In the 1970s, to 
justify budget cuts in the foreign service, a negative image of the diplomat was promoted: 
‘the idea of the “professional diplomat” has for many conjured up visions of “dithering 
dandies” in pearls or pinstripes […] lost in a haze of irrelevance somewhere between 
protocol and alcohol’.489 During the 1990s, something similar happened. Politicians and 
bureaucrats pointed out that the 
Foreign Affairs personnel had become pampered fat cats who 
enjoyed a lifestyle abroad that other Canadians could only dream 
about. The reality that the majority of staff worked most of their 
careers in unhealthy, difficult, and often dangerous environments 
was overlooked in the rush to condemn the handful who abused the 
system.490 
The socio-cultural and symbolic distinction of diplomats has catalysed the constant friction 
with politicians and bureaucrats in search of influence and resources. 
How the diplomatic elite is constituted and reproduced is another aspect that distinguishes it 
significantly. The foreign service is a select group that is not representative of Canadian 
social and cultural diversity. Historically it has been dominated by English-speaking white 
men. In 1946, the diplomatic corps was made up of 67 officers, all of them men.491 By 1970, 
the foreign service expanded to 725 diplomats. During the golden era, more than 90 per cent 
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of the officers were men and only 5 per cent were Francophone at the time of admission.492 
Reforms to the recruitment process in the 1970s and 1980s gradually reversed this trend. 
Women went from 20 per cent in 1990 to 44 per cent in 2017. By the early 2000s, the 
Francophones of the province of Quebec established themselves as the most important 
minority, representing a quarter of the foreign service.493 Another impact of these reforms 
took place towards the end of the 2000s. Although the foreign service extended to 1,174 
officers, the chances of entry significantly reduced. For example, only 120 of 8,500 
applicants (1.4 per cent) successfully gained admission to succeeded to enter the diplomatic 
corps in 2008.494 Academics argue that the diplomatic elite has evolved much faster than the 
bureaucracy to abandon a pattern characterised by a ‘market persistence of both social class 
and ethnic preferences in recruitment’.495 Attributes such as selectivity, homogeneity, and 
meritocracy have been inherent to the diplomatic corps. 
The dynamics of recruitment and professionalisation of the foreign service have consolidated 
it as a social group genuinely governed by the rules of meritocracy in which symbolic and 
cultural capital plays a central role. Retired Ambassador Abbie Dann says the diplomatic 
guild ‘it is not an elite, it is a profession first. Does it have some elitist aspects to it? Yeah 
[…] You have to be really qualified to do it. That is not elitist; that is just being qualified’.496 
Similarly to socio-economic background, formal education is one of the differentiating 
factors of this constituency of the policy elite. During the golden era, most of the officers 
had studied abroad. A large percentage graduated from the University of Oxford, Harvard 
University, and Sorbonne University in programmes in economics, history, and politics. The 
prestige and power of diplomats motivated academics to label them as ‘a kind of Oxbridge-
Harvard-Sorbonne cabal’.497 This trend gradually reversed towards the 1990s and 2000s. In 
this period, more than 75 per cent of the officers in an ambassadorial position had studied in 
Canada, especially in colleges of the central region such as Carleton University, University 
of Ottawa, University of Toronto, McGill University, University of Montreal, Laval 
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University, and Queen’s University. However, the pattern that prevailed was that of 
educational qualification. About two-thirds of the officers had postgraduate studies, mainly 
in politics, economics and history. By the early 2010s, the recruitment process became even 
more selective as it demanded high school studies as a minimum qualification.498 How the 
diplomat’s formal education evolved reveals the value given to cultural capital and the 
predominance of training in the humanities in the configuration of their institutional reflexes.  
A second factor that consolidates the distinction of diplomats in the policy elite is their 
institutional training. Canadian diplomats are part of the senior civil service, members of the 
permanent administration of the government.499 Studies by scholars John Porter and Dennis 
Olsen reveal that the Canadian bureaucratic system underwent a slow process of 
professionalisation and specialisation between the 1950s and 1970s. During that period, the 
bureaucracy became ‘more open, more heterogeneous, and probably more meritocratic’.500 
This trend had more significant effects within the diplomatic field due to the features of its 
small population. Politician and diplomat Barbara McDougall argues that ‘there is no 
question in my mind that the foreign service is the most professional of all the public 
service’.501 In addition to the high educational qualifications, this perception is based on the 
fact that the Canadian Foreign Service Institute has trained members of the foreign service 
since 1992. This academy has the mandate to train officers in ‘international affairs, 
professional and management development, corporate accountability, foreign languages, 
and intercultural effectiveness’.502 Further, Canadian universities have established training 
programmes focused on the development of skills in political communication, public 
engagement, mission management, and ‘niche diplomacy’.503 According to diplomats Daryl 
Copeland and Colin Robertson, the core competencies that distinguish the Canadian 
diplomat are ‘languages, local knowledge and history, analysis and reporting, negotiation, 
and effective networking’.504 In this way, the process of professionalisation and 
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specialisation has endowed officers with a select cultural capital and shaped the distinctive 
habitus of the diplomatic elite. 
The education and training of diplomats have been fundamental in the configuration of their 
institutional reflexes and ideological predispositions. The academic tradition of liberal arts 
played a central role in founding the principles of liberal internationalism that dominated the 
golden ages of Canadian diplomacy. Academics agree that the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade has not only been the home of many of the brightest members 
of Canadian society. They also agree that it has concentrated the most prominent free 
thinkers of the government.505 Terry MacDermot describes the educated mind of the 
Canadian diplomat as ‘a mind armed with the weapons of expression and trained in their 
use, well stocked with the knowledge appropriate to its age and educational opportunity, 
possessed of some critical sense, and above all, still curious to learn’.506 The intellectual 
sophistication and the ‘soft’ skills of diplomats have enabled them to translate their idealistic 
thinking into practical recommendations. A clear example has been their ability to interpret 
and embody the external identity of middle power that Canada aims to project. Through the 
practice of acting as ‘middlemen’ in international forums, Canadian diplomats have gained 
support for multilateral resolutions, avoided political confrontations, and reduced 
international tensions.507 These attributes not only distinguish the diplomats from politicians, 
but also from bureaucrats. Retired diplomat Tim Hodges observed this distinction when 
bureaucrats occupied positions in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. 
He argues that the bureaucrats were ‘non-risk takers, centrists, [...] promoted up through the 
organisation […] talented personalities, yes, but that is not the kind of people who would 
naturally think out of the box or think about new initiatives’.508 
Despite the features of the diplomatic corps, the dominance of politicians in the field of 
strategic policy-making has influenced the dissemination of patronage practices. This 
dynamic has devalued the symbolic and cultural capital of the professional diplomat. The 
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nature of the court government has allowed the prime minister and her/his closest circle to 
privilege social capital and political-ideological affinity in the appointment of ministers, 
advisors, and ambassadors. Furthermore, this dynamic has opened the possibility for 
politicians and bureaucrats without training or experience to occupy diplomatic positions. 
Patronage has not been exclusive to liberals or conservatives and has intensified since the 
1980s. During the government of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, 17 political appointments 
took place in the diplomatic establishment.509 Between 1984 and 1993, Prime Minister Brian 
Mulroney increased the problem by appointing friends and supporters to 36 diplomatic 
positions. This situation motivated the Professional Association of Foreign Service Officers 
to accuse Mulroney of using the diplomatic corps as his ‘personal Senate’.510 Despite the 
complaints, the trend prevailed. During the governments of Prime Ministers Chrétien, 
Martin, and Harper, family and friends held prominent positions such as the foreign minister, 
ambassador to Washington, and ambassador to the United Nations.511 In 2013, the 
persistence of patronage, severe budget cuts, and the guild’s distinctive esprit de corps 
motivated the foreign service to perform an unprecedented strike.512 The effects of this 
dynamic are significant in the morale of the diplomatic corps. Journalists claim that in the 
1990s, ‘the Liberals inherited a shrunken, dispirited ministry, uncertain of its mandate or its 
mission’.513 These cases reveal that patronage within the diplomatic field is driven by 
interests and distrust, mainly after a change of government. 
The period from 1993 to 2015 illustrates the complicated relationship between politicians 
and diplomats. The return of the Liberal Party to power represented the beginning of the 
weakening of the diplomatic structure and the marginalisation of professional diplomats 
from decision-making.514 Some of the most iconic cases took place during the Chrétien 
government. The prime minister appointed André Ouellet and John Manley as his ministers 
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of foreign affairs based on their relationship of friendship, ideological affinity, and political 
interests. These attributes were much more significant than the symbolic and cultural capital 
of Lloyd Axworthy, who was considered the natural candidate to occupy that position 
throughout the government.515 In Martin’s government, it was no different. Bill Graham’s 
appointment as minister of foreign affairs not only responded to his refined cultural and 
symbolic capital. His role as a liaison between the political groups of Chrétien and Martin, 
as well as the friendship he developed with Martin since their studies at law school, were 
significant factors for his nomination.516 The arrival of conservatives to power in 2006 led 
the diplomatic sector to an even lower point. Harper did not appoint any member of the 
diplomatic corps to the position of minister of foreign affairs. He designated politicians such 
as Peter MacKay, John Baird, and Rob Nicholson; as well as by entrepreneurs like Maxime 
Bernier, David Emerson, and Lawrence Cannon. A diplomatic officer argues that 
it was clear to me that the Harper government had created a 
noticeable climate of fear within the then Department of Foreign 
Affairs. Seasoned diplomats were particularly exercised about giving 
counsel that did not align with the government’s political or electoral 
agenda. […] they were expressly told that their advice and policy 
ideas were not welcome. Their main task was to simply implement 
the government’s wishes — however ill-conceived. […] We were 
told to shut up and do it […] just implement it.517 
Tensions between diplomatic meritocracy and political patronage, budgetary disputes, and 
political distrust drove to this problematic relationship. The period from 1993 to 2015 
witnessed the progressive erosion of the influence of professional diplomats in decision-
making and, with it, the weakening of the internationalist tradition in Canadian strategic 
policy.  
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5.1.3. Military 
The military elite is the third most influential group in the strategic policy-making process. 
The Department of National Defence is the institution that hosts the Canadian military 
establishment. Its operation is the result of the interaction of bureaucrats and military 
personnel that make up the administrative wing of the department and the operative wing of 
the armed forces. The actor with the highest decision-making power is the minister of 
national defence, who is a civilian appointed by the prime minister. Her/his position as a 
cabinet minister allows her/him to influence the strategic policy-making directly. In a second 
level, there are two actors whose influence is the product of their direct interaction with the 
defence minister. Firstly, the deputy minister of national defence, the senior civil servant 
who leads the bureaucratic apparatus. She/he is in charge of policy advice, departmental 
management, accounting officer, inter-departmental coordination, international defence 
relations, public service renewal, federal-provincial relations, and portfolio management. 
Secondly, the chief of the defence staff, the senior serving officer who leads the armed 
forces. She/he is responsible for the command, control, and administration of the forces, as 
well for the military strategy, plans, and requirements. Like the diplomatic elite, the 
influence of the leaders of the defence establishment depends on their alignment with the 
visions of the political class and the relationship they develop with the prime minister. An 
exploration of the period from 1993 to 2015 demonstrates the simultaneous weakening of 
Canada’s military capabilities and the increase in international commitments that required 
the intense involvement of Canadian Forces.  
The socio-cultural background of the military elite has been directly linked to the process of 
institutionalisation of the armed forces and the configuration of Canadian society. During 
the First World War, the hierarchical structure of the Canadian Expeditionary Force 
responded to British regimental traditions in which leadership was based on social class. 
While the bulk of the field force was made up of middle and middle-lower-class peasants, 
students, labourers, and office workers; most of the senior officers were middle and upper-
middle-class lawyers, engineers, businessmen, farmers, dentists, and military officers.518 
After the Second World War, a dispute between two factions emerged within the military 
establishment. On the one hand, traditionalist officers defended the model in which 
leadership was granted based on personal qualities and social class. On the other hand, 
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modernist generals promoted a system based on technical and academic merits that would 
allow officers to integrate with civilian elites to influence national security policy-making.519 
Despite the reforms promoted in the 1950s to professionalise the officer corps, the attempt 
to attract and retain talent failed in the 1960s and 1970s. Scholars argue that the army ‘was 
becoming a last-resort employment option and earning a reputation as a social daycare for 
misfits and reprobates’. Officers acknowledged that ‘the majority of recruits are persons who 
are pushed toward application after marginal employment experiences’.520 By the 1970s and 
1980s, most of the military were marginal worker-citizens from small towns and rural areas. 
These data alerted a sector of the military elite, as the trend observed in other Western 
countries was the recruitment of educated citizens from urban areas.521 Also, the gradual 
blurring of socio-cultural distinctions among applicants increased the difficulty of 
discriminating between non-commissioned members and officer cohorts. This 
differentiation was essential, as the objective was to assign junior command functions to 
non-commissioned members to restrict the size of the base of the elite officers’ body.522 
Thus, even though the Canadian Forces evolved from a traditionalist and aristocratic model 
to a modernising system that valued cultural capital, the complexity of Canadian social class 
shaped the predominant socio-cultural profile among the officers. 
The military elite has been defined as a small and homogeneous social group. The socio-
cultural background of its members has been subject to a slow process of change. During the 
Great War, of the 126 generals and admirals who were part of the Canadian Expeditionary 
Forces, more than three quarters were white Canadians from Ontario and Quebec. Their 
average age was 47 years and a third had university studies.523 That profile did not change 
significantly during and after the Second World War even though the Canadian Forces began 
a professionalisation process. A white man from central Canada, moderately educated, and 
 
519 Peter Kasurak, ‘Concepts of Professionalism in the Canadian Army, 1946-2000: Regimentalism, Reaction, 
and Reform’, Armed Forces & Society, 37.1 (2011), 95–118 pp.95–9; Merwyn Sprung, The Soldier in Our 
Time: An Essay (Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1960) p.99. 
520 Kasurak, ‘Concepts of Professionalism in the Canadian Army, 1946-2000: Regimentalism, Reaction, and 
Reform’ p.104; Deborah Cowen, Military Workfare: The Soldier and Social Citizenship in Canada (Toronto: 
UTP, 2008) pp.136,151–3; Charles Cotton and Franklin Pinch, ‘The Winds of Change: Manning the Canadian 
Enlisted Force’, in Life in the Rank and File: Enlisted Men and Women in the Armed Forces of the United 
States, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, ed. by David Segal and Wallace Sinaiko (NY: Pergamon, 
1986) pp.236–40,245; Franklin Pinch, ‘Military Manpower and Social Change: Assessing the Institutional Fit’, 
Armed Forces & Society, 8.4 (1982), 575–600 pp.579-80. 
521 Cowen pp.153–4; Charles Cotton and Franklin Pinch, ‘An Overview of Findings from the CFPARU 
Applicant Survey, Summer 1975’ (Willowdale: CFPARU, 1975) p.12. 
522 Kasurak, ‘Concepts of Professionalism in the Canadian Army, 1946-2000: Regimentalism, Reaction, and 
Reform’ p.102; Cowen p.142,153–4; Robert Chevrier and Richard Parker, ‘Canadian Forces Applicant Profile: 
Phase 1. Socio-Demographic Characteristics’ (Willowdale: CFPARU, 1989) p.31; Pinch p.580; Franklin Pinch 
and Charles Cotton, ‘Expanding the Recruit Market for Other Rank Personnel, Report 76-5’ (Willowdale: 
CFPARU, 1976) pp.6–11. 
523 Hyatt pp.419–24. 
193 
with British roots remained the predominant profile.524 Between the 1990s and 2010s, the 
number of generals and admirals increased from 80 to 130. During that period, half came 
from central Canada and were between 25 and 39 years old. Moreover, more than 88 per 
cent had post-secondary degrees and less than 5 per cent represented social minorities.525 
The evolution of the socio-cultural background of the members of the military elite has 
responded to two main factors. The first is the impact of the professionalisation process. 
Modernist reforms influenced the production of younger and better prepared senior officers. 
However, they also caused the overrepresentation of the central region in the military elite. 
The second factor is the effect of endogenous socialisation. The applicants’ personal and 
family connections with the military started to play a significant role in the continuity of the 
officer’s profile. In the 1980s, about 60 per cent of the recruits had had some social contact 
with the military and 15 per cent came from families with a military background.526 Both 
factors contributed significantly to the preservation of values, beliefs, and attitudes within 
the military elite. 
The limited influence of generals and admirals in the strategic policy-making process is not 
only attributed to the fact that they do not have a direct representation in the cabinet. Despite 
professionalisation efforts, the cultural capital of senior officers has been insufficient to 
occupy a competitive position within the policy elite. During the Second World War, 
Canadian Forces were considered an army of citizens. They had little in common with the 
professional armies of the superpowers, even though they depended on the doctrine and staff 
training of the British Army. It was not until the conclusion of the conflict that Canadian 
Forces began to develop their standards regarding who should be officers and how they 
should be trained.527 Modernist current argued that officers should have ‘a serious study of 
the science of warfare […] detailed knowledge of economics, political science, commerce 
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and business administration’.528 By the early 1950s, the modernist reforms established the 
entry standard as high school graduation with a two-year service college programme for 
general service officers and four-year for technical support and Royal Canadian Air Force 
officers. However, problems began to arise in attracting competent applicants, especially for 
the Royal Military College and Canadian Army Staff College. Admission exams were 
removed, as less than 20 per cent of applicants passed. These problems demoralised and 
exhausted the officers, especially those who entered with university studies. By the 1960s, 
the officer corps lost prestige and influence in the government, a situation that reduced the 
attractiveness of the military career considerably.529 The cultural and intellectual 
deficiencies of the officers influenced the movement of real power within the Department of 
National Defence to the civil bureaucrats after the unification of the armed services in 
1968.530 
The professionalisation process led to the replacement of the regimental system of managing 
careers with a centralised personnel management model based on formal military education 
and merit-based promotion.531 Despite these advances, the problems persisted. Hidden 
structures emerged to influence promotions and appointments. Scholars argue that these 
practices produced severe failures in military planning and operations in the last decades.532 
Furthermore, academic problems continued. By the late 1980s, less than 20 per cent of 
personnel had a post-secondary degree or diploma and a quarter had less than high school 
graduation.533 By the 1990s, the problems extended to the Command and Staff College and 
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the National Defence College. These academies had a limited number of majors, the 
candidates were ‘not always the best’, and only produced ‘competent, solid, but conventional 
staff officers’. Less than half of the graduates were promoted.534 Until then, the academic 
qualifications of senior officers were defined by their knowledge in science, technical 
reflexes, and English language skills. By 1997, reports sent to the prime minister indicated 
that Canadian Forces had ‘a remarkably ill-educated officer corps, surely one of the worst in 
the Western world’.535 In response, the Royal Military College reformed its curriculum 
incorporating subjects oriented to arts, humanities, and social sciences, as well as the 
development of bilingual skills. The Canadian Forces College increased its emphasis on 
strategic studies and national security. This academy gained accreditation to offer a master’s 
of defence studies degree. These troubles had already been glimpsed by members of the 
Officer Professional Development Board since the 1960s. They argued that ‘gradually we 
find the professional Canadian officer isolating himself from his own society and viewing 
his military role in terms of Imperial defence and strategy, with little or no concern for the 
study of the strategic problems likely to face his own country’.536 The board maintained that 
officers needed extensive knowledge, beyond their branches and specialisations, to develop 
expertise on their primary function: the preservation of national security. The high command 
required a ‘broad understanding of the humanistic aspects of warfare’, including aspects of 
the social sciences and liberal arts. However, the board’s comprehensive assessment was 
overlooked during the second half of the twentieth century.537 In this way, the limited 
cultural profile of the officers has prevented them from competently integrating into the 
dynamics of the strategic policy-making process in which politicians and diplomats played 
a dominant role. 
Finally, it is essential to point out some practices that shape how the military interacts with 
the political elite. One of these is the internal dynamics of the National Defence 
Headquarters. The frequent tensions between the deputy minister of national defence and the 
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chief of the defence staff have their origin in the ambiguous assignment of roles. According 
to the National Defence Act and the Interpretations Act, the minister is responsible, through 
the deputy minister, for the ‘management and direction’ of the Canadian Forces; while the 
chief of the defence staff is in charge of its ‘control and administration’.538 In practice, the 
logic that governs this ministerial diarchy is driven by the interest of each actor to occupy a 
dominant position and influence the minister. This dispute is reflected in the bureaucratic 
wing’s attempts to institutionalise the subordination of the chief of the defence staff to the 
deputy minister since the 1970s. The differential between the cultural and social capital of 
bureaucrats and officers has inclined the balance of power towards the civilian side. This 
situation has generated resentment in the military, who have contended that the attitude of 
civil servants is as though like ‘if they were imperial proconsuls sent to administer occupied 
areas’.539 Also, members of the military elite argue that the ‘influence of civilian 
management philosophy and techniques’ has grown in the unified staff system. Officers 
claim that the bureaucratic preponderance has caused the ‘civilianisation’ of the headquarters 
and has influenced military personnel to perceive themselves as uniformed civilians, with a 
nine-to-five attitude towards work, and seeking pay parity with the public service. The result 
has been the gradual ‘downgraded of the military ethic’, as well as the erosion of the 
authority and control of unit commanding officers, including that of the chief of the defence 
staff.540 
Another aspect that drives how generals and admirals interact with the political elite is their 
political and ideological inclinations. According to the Queen’s Regulations and Orders, 
officers are restricted from engaging in political activities that aim to ‘maintain or change 
public policy at the federal, provincial or municipal level’.541 However, this rule does not 
prevent officers from having political-ideological preferences that condition their 
participation in the policy-making process. According to officer Tony Keene, it is ‘widely 
accepted by many in the military [...] that the Conservatives are the party of the Canadian 
Armed Forces’. He affirms that the officers’ inclination has been influenced by military 
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spending and support for veterans. Keene also asserts that, unlike conservatives, liberal 
governments have, since the 1990s, been characterised by budget cuts and increased military 
commitments, the ‘decade of darkness’ for Canadian Forces. He states that in the 2000s, the 
officers ‘were absolutely certain: Conservatives good, Liberals bad. End of story’.542 As will 
be analysed below, the relationships that the military elite developed with officers from the 
United States and other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation at the National 
Defence College and Canadian Forces College have shaped their Atlanticist and 
continentalist predispositions. The period from 1993 to 2015 not only portrays the 
dominance of these ideas within the military elite, but also the aversion that arose to the 
internationalist strategic approach due to the implications it had for the stability of the armed 
forces. 
5.1.4. Policy-making 
During the 1960s, Prime Minister Lester Pearson undertook a profound reform of the 
governmental structure to systematise the policy-making process, increase the decision-
making power of elected ministers, and lessen the political-administrative influence of 
unelected senior officials. The departmentalised cabinet system that had operated until then 
was replaced by an institutionalised model that was intended to bring political, diplomatic, 
and military elites into cabinet committees to discuss government policy.543 The Foreign and 
Defence Policy Cabinet Committee, and Security and Intelligence Cabinet Committee were 
the most relevant to the formulation of strategic policy. Both committees congregated 
ministers whose departments shared policy interests. The objective was to have a more 
rational, centralised, systematic, and vertical structure in which decision-making was the 
product of better planning, prioritisation, and programming. The reforms also aimed to 
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ensure that consensus resulted from the plurality of cabinet committees and the specialised 
advice of central agencies.544 
The starting point of the formal process of policy-making in the institutionalised cabinet 
system is the Priorities and Planning Committee or ‘inner cabinet’. This core body 
coordinates, supervises, and directs the rest of the cabinet committees. Its relevance lies in 
the fact that it is chaired by the prime minister and integrated by the chairs of the other 
cabinet committees to establish the general agenda of government policy. The role of central 
agencies is essential, as they provide specialised information, intelligence, and advice. For 
example, with the support of the Privy Council Office and the Department of Finance on 
budgetary matters, the Priorities and Planning Committee establishes a broad agenda that 
sets out the issues and objectives for the period of government. Likewise, the senior advisers 
of the Prime Minister’s Office support the prime minister throughout the process. Once the 
agenda is agreed, the Privy Council Office distributes it to cabinet committees, central 
agencies, and departments to initiate the policy-making process.545 
The second part of the formal process begins with the development of policy initiatives 
within each department. In this phase, communication between senior officials is vital to 
achieving coordination with the central agencies and among departments of the same cabinet 
committee. Once a policy proposal is generated, senior officials issue a ‘memorandum to 
cabinet’ to the Privy Council Office, which in turn distributes ‘briefing notes’ to the cabinet 
committee members, the Prime Minister’s Office, and the prime minister. These notes 
provide an assessment of the Privy Council Office, Department of Finances, and Treasury 
Board Secretariat on the strengths and weaknesses of the proposal. With this information, 
the cabinet committee members discuss the theoretical, practical, administrative, and 
political value of the project. In practice, the role played by the minister of the issuing 
department of the policy initiative is to defend and promote it. Likewise, support or rejection 
of the proposal usually depends on how it affects the interests of other departments. Finally, 
the Privy Council Office issues the ‘committee report’, which informs on the resolution of 
the cabinet committee. In case of approval, the policy initiative is promoted to the ‘full 
cabinet’ to be discussed and ratified by all cabinet ministers and the prime minister. At this 
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final stage, the duty of the ‘collective ministerial responsibility’ demands ministers to 
support all decisions and actions of the cabinet ministers, as well as defend the consensus on 
the direction of strategic policy.546 
During the second half of the twentieth century, the institutionalised cabinet system was the 
structural and operative framework of policy-making. However, each government has 
adjusted it based on the values and interests of the prime minister. These modifications are 
founded on the ‘prime prerogative ministerial’. This convention allows the prime minister 
to generate a shadow decision-making process that operates in parallel with the formal 
procedure.547 Moreover, it enables the prime minister to exercise full control over the 
government agenda that dictates the formulation of policies. The so-called ‘strategic prime 
ministership’ is the practice through which the prime minister defines the priority issues for 
her/his term of government.548 These dynamics not only give rise to an alternative policy-
making process but have also produced informal spaces and structures for decision-making. 
The creation and removal of cabinet committees according to the prime minister’s priorities 
are usually the most visible alterations. However, the most relevant structure is what 
academics refer to as ‘court government’. According to Savoie, this entity is composed of 
the prime minister, a few select ministers, and a cadre of senior advisors. This assembly 
monopolises decision-making in strategic matters.549 They operate from what is defined as 
‘the centre’, a space of power that houses the dominant forces of the Canadian government. 
Savoie illustrates this by stating that 
there is one individual, however, who can at any time upset the 
collective versus individual responsibilities and, with no advance 
notice, take an issue that would properly belong to a minister and her 
department and bring it to the centre. The Prime Minister can 
intervene in any issue–big or small–if he feels that his judgement is 
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required […] The important point here […] is that the Prime Minister 
can intervene in a departmental matter when and where he pleases.550 
These dynamics have undermined the influence of the inner cabinet and full cabinet, 
reducing them to a ‘kind of focus group for the prime minister’ or a ‘mini-sounding board, 
a slimmed-down caucus’.551 
Under a logic that oscillates between formality and informality; the configuration of the 
strategic policy-making field locates the prime minister as the most powerful participant in 
decision-making. On a second level are her/his political and administrative advisors. On the 
one hand, the Prime Minister’s Office establishes as a ‘partisan, politically oriented, yet 
operationally sensitive’ body.552 Within its organisation, the positions of chief of staff, 
principal secretary, and policy advisor tend to be the most influential, especially that of 
foreign and defence policy advisor. This capacity to influence is primarily determined by 
social capital and confidence granted by the prime minister. On the other hand, the Privy 
Council Office is ‘non-partisan, operationally oriented yet politically sensitive’.553 Within 
its structure, the positions of the clerk of the privy council and national security and 
intelligence advisor are the ones that provide the most relevant information for strategic 
decision-making. The degree of influence of these actors depends on their cultural capital 
and their political affinity with the prime minister. The Treasury Board Secretariat, 
Department of Finance, and Public Services and Procurement Canada, agencies directly 
linked to the management of government finances, are on a third level. Their ministers are 
responsible for advising the prime minister and cabinet ministers on the economic viability 
and budgetary impact of policy initiatives.554 
In that same third level, there are two departments whose portfolio has a direct impact on 
strategic policy choices. Their ministers occupy a central position within the Foreign and 
Defence Policy Cabinet Committee, and Security and Intelligence Cabinet Committee. 
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Firstly, the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. The minister of foreign 
affairs is one of the most important actors in the definition of foreign policy. She/he occupies 
a leading position vis-à-vis the minister of international trade and the minister of 
international development. Usually, these three ministers jointly promote foreign policy 
initiatives in the cabinet ministers. It should be noted that the actors who occupy these 
positions do not always come from the diplomatic corps. Sometimes they are politicians that 
belong to the prime minister’s closest team. Therefore, the influence of these ministers 
depends on their social and cultural capital, as well as their relationship with the prime 
minister.555 The second department on this level is the Department of National Defence. The 
minister of national defence is one of the leading players in the definition of security and 
defence policy. The development of policy proposals inside the headquarters is the result of 
interactions between the bureaucratic and military departmental wings. In the bureaucratic 
side, the deputy minister of national defence is directly responsible for policy advice, internal 
management, and inter-departmental coordination. In the military sector, the chief of the 
defence staff usually has a limited role in policy-making, since its primary function is the 
command, control, and administration of the Canadian Forces and their military strategy, 
plans, and requirements.556 Coordination between these two departments is essential for the 
formulation of a consistent strategic policy. 
Finally, it should be noted that the power of bureaucrats and legislators does not usually 
exceed the influence exerted by diplomats and military. In the case of civil servants, the 
institutionalised cabinet system reduced the weight of deputy ministers of the departments 
and enhanced the power of senior officials of the central agencies. Historically, the former’s 
influence has been ‘checked and balanced’ by the latter, considered the ‘guardians’ and 
‘superbureaucrats’ of the permanent administration of the government. The relevance of 
senior public servants has depended heavily on the trust granted by the prime minister and 
her/his cabinet ministers. The fact that career civil servants remain in the bureaucratic 
structure for long periods creates distrust in the political elite, especially when a different 
party comes to power. In recent decades, wariness has been one of the reasons for the 
reduction of the bureaucratic apparatus.557 In the case of parliamentarians, their limited 
capacity for influence is attributed to other factors. Within the Canadian Parliament, the 
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Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, and the House of Commons 
Standing Committee on National Defence are the permanent spaces through which members 
of the Parliament discuss government decisions on strategic policy. Eventually, special joint 
committees are created to review foreign and defence policies or to conduct investigations 
as part of the parliamentary oversight function on ministerial responsibility and military 
command. However, legislators are usually poorly equipped in a cultural sense to understand 
the dynamics of the structural environment and exert a real influence on strategic choices. 
Moreover, during the policy-making process, the role of parliamentarians is restricted to 
organising forums and consultations to issue recommendations to the government.558 As will 
be examined in the next chapters, the modifications to the policy-making machinery had 
implications for the evolution of Canadian strategic policy. 
5.2. Strategic approaches 
During the first half of the twentieth century, Canada initiated a process that would gradually 
turn it into a formally sovereign state. Even during the two World Wars, much of Canadian 
state behaviour was based on an imperialist strategic culture of British heritage which aimed 
to define how to consolidate and defend the new nation. At the same time, since the 1930s, 
new constructions emerged of the identity that should found the international security policy 
of an independent and sovereign Canada. The values and interests developed in the policy 
elite shaped new strategic approaches that replaced imperialism and started a dispute to reach 
the status of practical logic. Internationalism, Atlanticism, and continentalism established 
the parameters for the formulation of foreign policy and security strategies that would satisfy 
‘the necessity of maintaining unity at home, especially between the two founding nations; 
and living distinct from but in harmony with the world’s most powerful and dynamic nation 
– the United States’.559 As of 1945, these visions based on different state identities 
established the rules that would govern Canadian strategic behaviour. Internationalism 
sought the consolidation of Canada as a middle power through an active contribution in the 
construction and defence of the new international order. Atlanticism allowed Canada to 
promote Western values and generate a counterweight to American influence through its 
membership in the transatlantic alliance. Continentalism enabled Canada to develop a 
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strategic link with the United States to underpin its sovereignty through the contribution to 
continental defence.560 The relevance of these strategic approaches lies in their intangible 
force that has shaped the understandings and practices of the policy elite to date. These 
visions have been much more influential than other ideological corpora such as nationalism, 
isolationism, or neoconservatism.561 In the following sections, the enablers and drivers of 
the most dominant approaches in the strategic policy-making process are examined. The 
central argument is that the apparent irrationality of the Canadian strategic policy from the 
1980s to the 2010s was the product of an intricate process of transition from internationalism 
to continentalism as policy elite’s practical logic. 
5.2.1. Internationalism 
Internationalism is one of the most deeply rooted strategic conceptions within the political 
elite, especially in the diplomatic corps. This approach competed with Atlanticism and 
continentalism for the status of the practical logic of the strategic policy-making process 
during the second half of the twentieth century. The emergence of this notion is attributed to 
the ideas of Prime Minister Mackenzie King about the special status that should be granted 
to Canada in the post-1945 global order for its contributions to the Allied side during the 
Second World War. In 1944, King objected to the great allied powers about the exclusion of 
Canada from the central council of the new world organisation that was under construction: 
We would wish to have our own right of representation, […] at least 
as one of the medium powers that would be brought into the World 
Organisation in some relation which would recognise that power and 
responsibility went together and (would) recognise our individual 
position.562 
Before Parliament, King defined the role of ‘medium power’ that Canada was forced to 
assume in the face of structural restrictions: 
In determining what states should be represented on the Council with 
the great powers, it is […] necessary to apply the functional idea. 
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Those countries which have most to contribute to the maintenance 
of the peace of the world should be most frequently selected. The 
military contribution actually made during this war by the members 
of the United Nations provides one good working basis for a 
selective principle of choice.563 
In addition to functional justification, Canada’s aspiration was linked to a moral imperative 
based on the fact that the middle powers ‘could be entrusted to use their power responsibly 
in the interest of the world community’.564 The backing of diplomats and politicians, 
especially liberals, to King’s vision placed ‘middlepowermanship’ as the conceptual 
construction that guided the development of internationalism during the golden ages of 
Canadian diplomacy between the 1940s and 1970s.565 
Factors related to the international identity and internal character of Canada enabled this 
approach in the policy elite. The first factor was the external identity of medium power 
assumed by Canada. It should be noted that this identity did not respond to the position 
assigned or occupied in the international structure, but to the posture or ‘stature’ that it 
adopted. Various scholars agree that the middle power status self-assigned by Canada was 
the product of a strategy to generate an identity based on moral superiority. The purpose was 
to consolidate a distinctive identity that gave Canada privileges and legitimacy. In this way, 
the ‘Canadian insistence’ supported the middlepowermanship to place Canada as a leading 
actor in the international arena.566 The second enabler is the postmodern internal character 
that configures Canada’s role as ‘world citizen’. Values such as multiculturalism, the rule of 
law, pacifism, and liberal democracy have allowed Canada to distinguish itself from the 
United States and gain relevance beyond North America. This character has influenced the 
orientation of its foreign policy towards the promotion and defence of universal moral 
principles and the protection of common Western values, including through the collective 
and humanitarian use of military force. The international activism and voluntarism that 
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drives Canada’s actions project it as a distinct actor in the global system.567 Despite the 
conceptual gap between the two identity perspectives, their normative similarity has 
simultaneously fuelled the predispositions that constitute the internationalist strategic 
approach. 
Internationalism orients towards two main objectives. The first is political. The origins of 
internationalism illustrate that the status claimed by Canada responded to political issues, as 
it wanted representation in the global elite and recognition according to its external identity. 
The functional principle set forth by King reveals that the role of middle power assumed by 
Canada aimed to exert its influence in international affairs and to differentiate itself from 
other states. The addition of the moral imperative would allow the medium power status 
assigned to Canada by functional parameters to be more durable.568 Following the failure of 
Canadian representation efforts in the 1940s, the middlepowerhood was the means through 
which Canada managed to consolidate an external identity that would reposition it in the 
international structure and give it a place at the table of the superpowers. The inclusion of 
Canada in the G-7/8 in 1976 is just one example. The second objective is related to security. 
One of the underlying ideas of internationalism is that Canada can ensure its security through 
the construction and defence of an international order based on ‘functional, multilateralist, 
and institutionalist principles’.569 From this perspective, how Canada interacts abroad is 
mainly conditioned by economic and security interests. The ‘forward security’ thesis holds 
that the preservation of world trade and the prevention of global conflict are drivers of 
Canadian strategic behaviour.570 To achieve these goals, Canada has adjusted to the 
standards of behaviour that distinguish the ‘good international citizen’. The 
middlepowerhood has oriented internationalist predispositions towards multilateral 
cooperation, peaceful conflict resolution, international assistance, and niche diplomacy. This 
is why the Canadian internationalist diplomacy has distinguished itself by its responsible 
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leadership, collective commitment, moderate style, negotiating capacity, and humanitarian 
character.571 
Within this framework, United Nations peacekeeping operations are located as the pillar of 
the internationalist approach, since it satisfies the functional and moral principles that 
constitute the external identity of middle power that Canada wishes to project. The 
guidelines of liberal and defensive internationalism promoted by Pearson and Trudeau were 
fundamental so that, from the 1950s, the predisposition to get involved in all humanitarian 
missions was consolidated in the policy elite.572 Internationalism acquired the status of the 
Canadian strategic norm when Pearson received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his efforts 
to create a United Nations Peacekeeping Force during the Suez crisis. The symbolic impact 
of that milestone positioned peacekeeping as the ‘Canada’s métier’, a hallmark of foreign 
policy that would shape the self-perception of Canadians and the international identity of 
Canada as a ‘helpful fixer’.573 The humanitarian commitment of internationalism went 
beyond rhetoric, as Canada contributed significantly to all missions from 1948 to 1988. 
During the second half of the twentieth century, the leadership exercised in the United 
Nations’ humanitarian efforts provided Canada with a distinctive symbolic capital that 
strengthened its moral superiority and repositioned it in the international structure. The 
relevance acquired by the paradigm of human security after the end of the Cold War was the 
underpinning of peacekeeping as the axis of Canadian internationalism. However, the 
significant decrease in Canada’s participation since the 1990s portrays the emergence of 
selective internationalism due to the relevance acquired by domestic affairs, regional 
interests, and political, economic, and moral commitments with Western allies.574 This 
decline illustrates the interaction of internationalism with another of the most relevant 
approaches within the policy elite: Atlanticism. 
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5.2.2. Atlanticism 
Atlanticism is the second of the main approaches in the Canadian strategic policy-making 
since the 1940s. This vision replaced the imperialist strategic culture and acquired the status 
of practical logic within the political elite during much of the second half of the twentieth 
century. Its origins date back to the ideas expressed by the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs Louis St. Lauren in 1948. He claimed that 
the best guarantee of peace today is the creation and preservation by 
the nations of the Free World, under the leadership of Great Britain, 
the United States and France, of an overwhelming preponderance of 
force over any adversary or possible combination of adversaries. 
This force must not be only military, it must be economic, it must be 
moral.575 
By 1951, Prime Minister Pearson ratified that Canada’s North Atlantic policy pursued three 
strategic objectives: to promote liberal democracy, strengthen political-economic ties with 
its most reliable allies, and counterbalance the Anglo-American unilateralism through 
bolstering relations with France.576 St. Lauren’s vision and Pearson’s aims reveal that the 
ideological foundation of Atlanticism lies in Canada’s desire to vindicate its sense of 
transatlantic belonging and preserve its security through a close link with Europe. 
Canada’s North Atlantic external identity has been one of the foremost enablers of the 
Atlanticist approach. That notion is grounded in two domestic identity elements: liberal 
democracy and biculturalism. On the one hand, Canada’s strategic behaviour is interpreted 
as a projection of liberal-democratic norms, values, and principles prevailing in its political 
system. The predisposition towards multilateral cooperation and the promotion of liberal 
ideals arises from the federalist impulse and cosmopolitan values that constitute its political 
culture. Although the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation plays a central role in Atlanticism, 
the vision of St. Lauren unveils that Canada not only conceives it as a military alliance but 
also as a mechanism to promote liberal democracy and economic cooperation. This 
conception is illustrated by the so-called ‘Canadian article’ of the North Atlantic Treaty of 
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1949.577 On the other hand, the scepticism and aversion of the French-Canadian community 
towards militarism have played an important role in orienting Canada’s involvement in the 
military association towards the economic and moral spheres. French identity, rooted 
primarily in the Quebec community, has also influenced the strengthening and 
institutionalisation of relations with France. This link is significant because it reinforces 
Canadian socio-cultural roots and helps compensate for American and British influence.578 
Both identity factors allow us to understand the Canadian conception of the transatlantic 
coalition and the strategic relevance of the connections within it. 
Geostrategic interests and concerns are the drivers of the Atlanticist approach. The objectives 
of the foreign policy in the North Atlantic enunciated by Pearson justify the Canadian 
commitment in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The involvement in the military 
alliance is the means through which Canada aspires to strengthen its multilateralism, display 
its solidarity to its Western allies, enhance its international status, and to access the global 
elite. These goals explain the priority of participating in all the expeditionary missions of the 
transatlantic coalition since its creation, even over the United Nations peacekeeping 
operations.579 Canada’s Atlantic predisposition to actively participate in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation responds to its intention to mitigate the risk that Anglo-American 
unilateralism poses to its political independence and territorial integrity. The soft-balancing 
strategy against American influence is the backbone of this approach. Soft-balancing 
Atlanticism aims at reinforcing the structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and 
positioning Canada as a relevant player to avoid its marginalisation of international ‘high 
politics’ and to counter the pressures of the United States.580 Identity and geopolitics 
elucidate the relevance of the ‘North Atlantic quadrangle’, to which Canada has aspired 
within the transatlantic coalition.581 The effectiveness of this strategic notion depends 
 
577 Massie, ‘Making Sense of Canada’s “irrational” International Security Policy. A Tale of Three Strategic 
Cultures’ pp.640–1; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘The North Atlantic Treaty’ (Washington: NATO, 
1949) art.2, p.829. 
578 Massie, Francosphère: L’importance de La France Dans La Culture Stratégique Du Canada pp.237–8; 
Robin Gendron, Towards a Francophone Community: Canada’s Relations with France and French Africa, 
1945-1968 (Montreal: McGill-QUP, 2006) pp.145–6; John Holmes, ‘Le Canada Dans Le Monde’, Politique 
Étrangère, 33.4 (1968) pp.300–2. 
579 Massie and Vucetic pp.38–9. 
580 Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order 
p.21. 
581 Justin Massie, North Atlantic Quadrangle. The Importance of France in Canadian Strategic Culture, 1760-
1949 (Kingston: QUP, 2010) pp.109–111,228–9; Justin Massie, ‘Quadrilatère Transatlantique: Sources de 
Légitimité Politique de l’usage de La Force Au Canada’, Revue Internationale d’études Canadiennes, 37 
(2008), 83–114 p.94. 
209 
primarily on cooperation and solidarity with its natural allies within the alliance: United 
States, Great Britain and, especially, France. 
Soft-balancing Atlanticism is established as the belief of the Canadian policy elite that the 
close relationship with Europe allows Canada to strengthen its identity and preserve its 
security. The historical socio-cultural values shared with the United Kingdom and France, 
the common political-economic interests in the West, the geopolitical situation in the North 
Atlantic, and the threat posed by Anglo-American unilateralism underpin Canada’s 
involvement in the transatlantic alliance. One of the features of Atlanticism is the role that 
multilateralism plays as a fundamental diplomatic practice. The exercise of ‘multilateralism 
in action’ through mechanisms such as the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation is ‘central to protecting Canada’s interests’.582 A second trait is the status of 
the historical norm that it has acquired within the policy elite. The evolution of strategic 
policy reveals an implicit consensus between liberal and conservative decision-makers. 
Atlanticism has served as a ‘third way’ to compensate for the limitations and excesses of 
internationalism and continentalism.583 A third characteristic is how it interacts with other 
strategic cultures. On the one hand, Atlanticism tends to feed internationalist policies, since 
Atlanticism is considered one of its components. In contrast, the differences between the 
strategies embedded in Atlanticism and continentalism generate tensions and reduce their 
compatibility.584 As will be analysed in the following chapters, the Atlanticist strategic 
policy orients towards the preservation and improvement of Canada’s regional reputation 
and international status. The predispositions that constitute this approach will allow us to 
understand why the objective of positioning Canada as a relevant member in the transatlantic 
coalition has motivated the policy elite to contribute beyond what many Canadians 
considered necessary. 
5.2.3. Continentalism 
Continentalism is the third prominent strategic approach in the policy elite. This notion is 
based on the security and defence cooperation commitment that arose between Canada and 
the United States to address the threat posed by German national socialism in the 1930s. The 
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so-called ‘Kingston Dispensation’ of 1938 was the discursive act established the normative 
core of the continental alliance.585 During the historic meeting held at Queen’s University, 
American President Franklin Roosevelt said: ‘I give you assurance that the people of the 
United States will not stand idly by if the domination of Canadian soil is threatened by 
another Empire’.586 Correspondingly, Prime Minister King declared: 
We, too, have our obligations as a good and friendly neighbour, and 
one of these is to see that, at our own instance, our country is made 
as immune from attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably be 
expected to make it, and that, should the occasion ever arise, enemy 
forces should not be able to pursue their way either by land, sea or 
air, to the United States across Canadian territory.587 
The ‘neighbourly’ obligations recognised by both political leaders in the preservation of 
continental security were institutionalised during the Second World War. The Ogdensburg 
Agreement of 1940 gave rise to the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and the Joint 
Declaration on North American Defence Cooperation took place in 1947. The collaboration 
with the United States during the Cold War reflected a profound change in Canada’s strategic 
vision that did not respond solely to its intention to contribute to the Pax Americana. The 
Canadian policy elite shifted from the concerns that American annexationism produced to 
the perception that Canada’s security was inexorably tied to the superpower.588 
The roots of continentalism are located in internal and external identity factors. The domestic 
context, shaped by Canada’s geopolitical situation in North America, has produced two 
divergent external identities. On the one hand, the character of sovereign Canada. This is 
grounded in the preservation of its independence and political autonomy. Safeguarding these 
elements implies maintaining full control and authority over its foreign policy and national 
security. In contrast, the identity of allied Canada comes from the need to assure the United 
States that Canadians are not a threat and will not become a burden for its security.589 This 
identity dichotomy has led the policy elite to a double strategic dilemma. The first is whether 
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to cooperate or not to cooperate. Canada guarantees its reliability to the United States by 
contributing to its security and defence policy; otherwise, Canada exposes itself to American 
unilateralism. The second dilemma arises from the indivisibility of continental security and 
the impact of cooperation or non-cooperation on Canadian sovereignty. That dilemma leads 
decision-makers to assess how to contribute to continental defence in a way that meets 
American demands and prevents the erosion of Canadian sovereignty.590 The Cold War 
made it clear to Canada that ‘the Soviet Union was the ultimate threat, but the United States 
was the imminent danger’.591 Canadian experience during that period limited the policy 
elite’s willingness to modify the status of the continental alliance, as the risks of not adhering 
to American expectations were high.592 The identity enablers and strategic drivers of 
continentalism elucidate why the United States went from being perceived as a foe to 
obtaining the status of guardian and why the bilateral relationship evolved into the formation 
of a regional security community.593 
Two mechanisms are the institutional pillars of continentalism. Both portray the interaction 
between the two external identities of Canada and the strategic dilemmas facing its policy 
elite. First, the 1958 North American Aerospace Defence Command. Canada’s involvement 
is interpreted from two perspectives. One holds that Canada has managed to cooperate with 
the United States and safeguard its sovereignty through this structure, as it is Canadian units 
that patrol Canada’s airspace. This interpretation illustrates the ‘defence against help’ policy 
response. It argues that Canada needs to guarantee security throughout its territory; 
otherwise, it will have to bear the consequences of American unilateral aid.594 The other 
perspective recognises that this mechanism institutionalised the asymmetry of binational 
cooperation because Canada put its troops under American operational command in 
peacetime. Furthermore, academics agree that continental defence has been based primarily 
on American definitions and requirements. These two aspects erode Canadian 
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sovereignty.595 The second mechanism is the American-promoted Ballistic Missile Defence 
System. The direct or indirect involvement of Canada has also lacked consensus within the 
policy elite. On the one hand, decision-makers argue that Canadian participation prevents 
the United States from taking unilateral actions and gives Canada a voice in defending its 
territory. On the other hand, policy-makers believe that the contribution to the programme 
significantly corrodes Canada’s ‘soft-power’, morality-based external identity, and 
international room for manoeuvre, especially in matters of niche diplomacy. Given this 
dilemma, the Canadian government’s position has oscillated between supporting American 
nuclear strategies and promoting strategic arms control, depending on the support or 
rejection expressed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the United Nations. Also, 
this situation is to some extent manageable because Canada’s participation in North 
American Aerospace Defence Command gives it a de facto role in the Ballistic Missile 
Defence System. In other words, Canada has an underlying operational role, but the policy 
elite does not wish to assume the political cost of expressing openly full support to the 
programme.596 These two cases not only portray the dichotomous relationship that 
continentalism has with internationalist and Atlanticist approaches. They also illustrate the 
complex scenario in which Canada chooses to deploy a soft-bandwagoning strategy to 
preserve its national sovereignty and contribute to regional security. 
Soft-bandwagoning is the backbone of continentalism.597 The policy elite’s willingness to 
adopt this strategy is attributed to factors that guided the Canadian position during the Cold 
War. First, it allowed Canada to secure its image of a sovereign state before the pressures 
from the United States. It also revealed that Canada’s modest cooperation in the binational 
alliance maximised its national security. Third, it reassured the United States by contributing 
to continental security. Moreover, it enabled the Canadian government to manage the 
political costs derived from allying with the superpower. Finally, in terms of cost-benefit, 
soft-bandwagoning offered better returns than exerting direct balancing to American 
hegemony.598 The end of the Cold War and the emergence of neoliberalism strengthened the 
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soft-bandwagoning strategy and reoriented the binational alliance towards the economic 
sphere. The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement of 1987, the North American Free 
Trade Agreement of 1992, and the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America of 
2005 describe the deepening of regional integration. Scholars argue that the American fears 
about border security after 2001 and the relevance of border trade to the Canadian policy 
elite reoriented the continentalism from a strategy focused to ‘defence against help’ toward 
a one aimed to ‘defence against the lock-down’.599 In short, soft-bandwagoning has allowed 
the policy elite to cope with the identity and strategic dilemmas, as well as with internal and 
external pressures. Although Canada plays a marginal role in the framework of continental 
security and defence, its policy elite gains the psychological benefits generated by the 
recognition of Canadian sovereignty and the management of American pressures. In both 
the Atlanticist and continentalist approaches, Canada’s strategic policy was restricted to 
building alliances with American rivals, establishing a foreign policy that undermined 
regional security, and not developing military capabilities that threatened the stability of the 
United States. As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, the Canadian strategic 
policy from 1993 to 2015 underwent an intricate transition from internationalism to 
continentalism, in which Atlanticism played the role of the strategic wildcard of the 
Canadian policy elite. 
Conclusion 
The big picture generated throughout this chapter on the sociocultural context in which 
Canadian strategic policy was formulated from 1993 to 2015 allows us to understand its 
origin and development, particularly after the complicated economic environment of the 
1970s. Firstly, the institutional source of Canada’s strategic policy began a long process of 
change. The gradual adoption of neoliberal precepts that would allow the country to adapt 
to the emerging structural environment modified the social background, formal education, 
and daily practices of policy-makers. These changes had profound implications in the 
interpretations of politicians, diplomats, and soldiers on the conditions of the international 
system. Corporate links, administrative capacities, business skills, and pragmatic impulses 
were established as the basis of the renewed institutional culture and cultural reflexes of the 
policy elite from the 1980s onwards. Secondly, the traditional ideological source of the 
Canadian political elite lost its status as practical logic. The new rules and norms that defined 
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the dynamics of the nascent American-built neoliberal international order influenced the 
gradual modification of the parameters that governed the formulation of the strategic policy. 
Internationalism entered a phase of decline and generated political spaces for Atlanticist and 
continentalist notions to establish themselves as the leading providers of resources for the 
design of national security strategies. The review of the sources of Canadian strategic policy 
demonstrates that the social and cultural context played a crucial role in redirecting the 
Canadian policy elite’s responses to the disruptive changes in the broad structural 
environment during the consolidation of neoliberalism and unipolarity in the post-Cold War 
world order. 
The contribution of this study lies in its evaluation of the socio-historical context that housed 
the formulation of Canada’s strategic policy during the turn of the century. Likewise, the 
examination of the institutional and ideational sources that fuelled foreign and security 
policy makes a modest contribution to the disciplines of international relations and 
international history. The making of this culturalist analysis has resorted to the most relevant 
works in the academy on Canadian foreign policy, many of which have been developed from 
a structuralist perspective.600 The reflections and findings of this chapter contribute to the 
work of the emerging stream of academics such as Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, Srdjan 
Vucetic, and Justin Massie who have addressed the Canadian case from a constructivist-
structuralist approach.601 The results of this study provide the necessary understandings to 
construct the positional logic of the strategic policy-making field and to reconstruct the 
dispositional logic of the policy elite in the following chapters. These two elements are 
fundamental to comprehend the configuration of the practical logic that led to the evolution 
of foreign and security policy. Finally, it is essential to highlight that this analysis of the 
sociocultural context in which the ideas that nurtured the strategic policy were incubated 
allows us, in chapters six and seven, to elucidate how the social imagination of the policy 
actors influenced the strategic decisions that defined the behaviour of Canada in the 
international arena from 1993 to 2015. 
  
 
600 Nossal, Roussel, and Pacquin, Polit. Can. Foreign Policy; John Kirton, ‘The 10 Most Important Books on 
Canadian Foreign Policy’, International Journal, 64.2 (2009), 553–64; Kirton, Canadian Foreign Policy in a 
Changing World; Nossal, Roussel, and Pacquin, Politique Internationale et Défense Au Canada et Au Québec; 
Keating, Canada and World Order: The Multilateral Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy; Cooper, Higgott, 
and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order; Dewitt and Kirton. 
601 Nossal, Roussel, and Pacquin, Polit. Can. Foreign Policy; Kirton, Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing 
World; Nossal, Roussel, and Pacquin, Politique Internationale et Défense Au Canada et Au Québec; Keating, 
Canada and World Order: The Multilateral Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy; Cooper, Higgott, and 
Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order; Dewitt and Kirton. 
215 
Chapter six. The politics of strategic policy in Canada, 1993-

























Of all our dreams today, there is none more important – or so hard to realise 
– than that of peace in the world. May we never lose our faith in it or our 
resolve to do everything that can be done to convert it one day into 
reality.602 
 
Lester Pearson (Canadian Prime Minister, 1963-1968), 1957. 
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The 1980s were characterised by a significant increase in economic uncertainty and political 
tensions internationally. The beginning of the so-called ‘Second Cold War’ and the effects 
of the global recession put matters of national security at the centre of government speeches 
and public-sphere discourse. Since 1972, three currents of strategic thinking entered into 
conflict to establish themselves as the primary ideological source of the policy conceptions 
advocated to reorient the Canadian foreign and security policy. Internationalism, 
Atlanticism, and continentalism provided divergent strategic guidelines on how to address 
Canada’s security challenges. Each of these approaches influenced the decision-making 
process on diplomatic, commercial, and military matters in different ways. Taking into 
consideration the socio-historical context examined in the previous pages, this chapter 
focuses its analysis on the role of these three strategic conceptions within the policy elite and 
the effect of their interactions on the evolution of Canada’s strategic policy from 1993 to 
2006. In order to develop this study, particular attention is paid to the dispositional logic of 
the policy elite headed by the Liberal Party’s business liberals, as well as to the bureaucratic, 
national, and global dimensions that defined the dispositional logic in which Canadian 
strategic policy was formulated. How Canada’s policy elite responded to changes in 
structural conditions during the 1990s gives evidence that the internationalist strategic 
tradition underwent a process of weakening, in which the formulation of defensive strategies 
to consolidate its role as a salient middle power, distinguish itself from the United States, 
and gain relevance beyond North America lost importance. After the end of the Cold War, 
the unipolar and neoliberal international order was governed by new rules and norms that 
modified the way states interacted abroad, especially with the superpower. 
This chapter argues that practical logic based on an internationalist strategic notion gradually 
lost its influence on the definition of Canada’s external identity, the institutional culture of 
its government, and the cultural reflexes of its policy elite over a period marked by the end 
of the Cold War and the emergence of neoliberalism. This practical logic was subject to 
intense pressures since the early 1970s, as Atlanticist and continentalist strategic conceptions 
and neoliberal practices gained acceptance in the policy elite, especially in the political class. 
Since the beginning of Brian Mulroney’s government in 1984, it is possible to identify the 
influence of these ideological sources. However, it should be noted that internationalism did 
not lose its category of practical logic until the coming to power of the most right-wing 
faction of the Conservative Party in 2006. The primary conclusion is that, although the 
internationalist tradition managed to preserve the condition of practical logic in the 1990s, 
the political spaces that produced its weakening gave opportunities for Atlanticism and 
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continentalism to gain relevance in the formulation of strategic policy. One of the main 
contributions of this study is that it complements the vision provided by the realist analyses 
that predominate in the literature on the effects of the end of the Cold War on the state 
strategic behaviour.603 The culturalist approach deployed in this chapter facilitates 
interpretation of how the subjective understandings of the policy elite and changes in the 
systemic power structure redefined the parameters for the formulation of foreign policy and 
security strategies. A second contribution is that it reinforces a thesis that has recently gained 
acceptance about the Canadian case.604 This study shows that the weakening of the 
internationalist approach allowed Atlanticist and continentalist strategic notions to acquire 
more considerable influence in the definition of external identity and strategic policy. Within 
the framework of this thesis, this chapter fulfils the function of assessing the effects of the 
political imaginary of decision-makers on policy choices that delineated Canadian strategic 
behaviour during the advent of neoliberalism and the end of the Cold War. 
This chapter examines the cultural dynamics of Canada’s strategic policy-making process 
that distinguished the liberal governments that preceded the 2006 political transition. Part 
6.1 reviews the main features of the internationalist construction of Canada’s external 
identity that prevailed during the second half of the twentieth century. Furthermore, it briefly 
introduces the process of weakening defensive internationalism that created spaces for the 
resurgence of Atlanticism and continentalism since the 1980s. The second section 
reconstructs the dispositional logic of the policy elite to understand the role of the various 
notions of Canadian international identity in the formulation of strategic policy. 
Additionally, this section reviews the relationship between the institutional culture and the 
cultural reflexes of the circles with the most significant power in decision-making on foreign 
policy and national security. Part 6.3 constructs the positional logic of the field of strategic 
policy-making. It also conceptualises the external pressures that circumscribed the strategic 
choices of decision-makers. Likewise, it identifies the convergence of the various fields that 
comprised the structural context in which the strategic policy-making process took place. 
The last section analyses the interaction between the competing strategic visions that 
prevailed in the governments of Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin. Mainly, it examines how the 
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dynamic relationship between the subjective understandings of the decision-makers and the 
objective power structures defined the parameters of Canada’s strategic behaviour. 
6.1. Constructions of Canada’s international identity: 
internationalism 
The conviction of consolidating Canada as a sovereign nation was pervasive within the 
Canadian security establishment throughout the twentieth century. The end of the Second 
World War provided Canada with the opportunity to strengthen its political independence 
before the United Kingdom and its territorial autonomy before the United States. Because 
these ideas were central in the political imagination of the Canadian policy elite, they played 
a crucial role in defining what was feasible in strategic terms. The ‘middlepowerhood’ that 
Canada assumed was used to justify a range of policies encompassing from the promotion 
of international order through diplomatic means to continental defence through a military 
alliance with the United States. Simultaneously, it also set limits on policy choices. For 
example, it was unimaginable that Canada would act outside international norms or pose a 
threat to the United States. This is why the Canadian policy elite made a considerable effort 
during the second half of the twentieth century to ensure that strategic policy was based on 
an unquestionable legal position and an image of a reliable ally. This trend reflected various 
constructions of Canada’s international identity, as well as that of a middle power that 
respects international law. Nevertheless, it also raised questions about whether Canada had 
gone from aspiring to be a major power in the post-1945 international order to becoming a 
United States satellite in the post-Cold War unipolar system.605 
After the end of the Second World War, internationalism acquired the status of practical 
logic within the Canadian policy elite. This allowed Canada to abandon the imperialist 
strategic culture and build its own external identity of ‘good international citizen’. 
Internationalism emerged inspired by social liberalism promoted during the government of 
Prime Minister Mackenzie King from 1921 to 1948. This ideology also laid the foundations 
of the welfare state, a political-economic model that influenced government thinking and 
practice. Equality, freedom, and tolerance formed the conceptual bedrock on which Lester 
Pearson articulated the normative guidelines for the Canadian defence of the international 
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order.606 By the 1980s, the depletion of the welfare state, the effects of the global recession, 
and the return of conservatives to power triggered a process of weakening internationalism. 
This context allowed two other strategic approaches to gain relevance and dispute the status 
of practical logic. On the one hand, the Atlanticism, outlined by Louis St. Laurent in 1948, 
aimed to claim the Euro-Atlantic identity of Canada. The liberalism and biculturalism of 
Canadian society were its foundations. Atlanticism permitted Canada to promote Western 
values and multilateral cooperation. Through the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 
Canada managed to ally with those Western nations it considers its natural allies. The 
strength of this political, economic, and moral link enabled Canada to design soft-balancing 
strategies to counter American and British pressures, as well as to improve its structural 
position.607 On the other hand, continentalism was forged in the ‘Kingston Dispensation’ of 
1938 and consolidated itself during the Cold War. The identity of Canada as a North 
American country was its primary enabler. The projection of Canada as a sovereign nation 
and as a reliable neighbour were its main drivers. While one construction aimed at the 
preservation of political autonomy and territorial integrity, the other looked to provide 
confidence and calmness to the United States. This dichotomy moved the policy elite from 
being concerned about American annexationism to recognising that Canadian security was 
tied to the superpower. Continentalism established a framework for the development of soft-
balancing strategies.608 Taking into consideration these three constructions of Canada’s 
international identity, the weakening of internationalism is best understood in the light of the 
habitus of the Canadian policy elite, the review of which allows us to grasp the role of each 
construction in the strategic policy-making process from 1993 to 2006. 
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6.2. Habitus of policy elite: the business liberals 
The social liberalism that prevailed in the Canadian government since the 1950s entered a 
phase of exhaustion following the global recession from 1973 to 1975. The tensions among 
the cabinet ministers of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and the electoral defeat of the liberal 
John Turner in 1984 echoed the decline of social liberalism. The return of conservatives to 
power undermined two symbols of social liberalism: the political-economic model of the 
welfare state and the foreign policy of liberal internationalism. During the 1980s, the 
traditional philosophical division within the Liberal Party deepened and caused its shift from 
centre-left social liberalism to centre-right business liberalism.609 Considering this context; 
the review of the habitus of the policy elite that came to power from 1993 is useful to 
understand the role played by the renewed institutional culture and legalist-business reflexes 
in the weakening of internationalism. Of the three main constituencies responsible for the 
formulation of strategic policy, the political elite was the one with the best resources to adapt 
to the rules and norms of the post-Cold War international system. Three aspects were 
fundamental for the progressive marginalisation of diplomats and military of the decision-
making process. These factors were the result of the socio-cultural background, formal 
education, and daily practices of the members of the policy elite.610 
First, in the political-economic environment of the 1980s, it was less and less convenient to 
preserve Keynesian models and undertake balancing strategies against the growing 
American hegemony. A central skill that politicians and diplomats shared was the ability to 
negotiate, build consensus, and avoid conflicts. Their training in humanities and the 
influence of social liberalism made them aware of the relevance of international law to 
overcome challenges during the Cold War. However, as economic and continental issues 
gained importance on the government agenda in the 1990s, the political elite took control of 
decision-making and relegated diplomats and military. The political class was the guild best 
equipped to undertake a change in the political-economic model and its strategic policy. 
Their training in law and their growing business experience gave them enough socio-cultural 
capital to make decisions aimed at adapting Canada to the nascent American-built neoliberal 
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international order.611 In contrast, the symbolic and operative degradation of the diplomatic 
corps influenced its progressive marginalisation of decision-making. Also, although officers 
had a sophisticated cultural capital, their deep roots in liberal internationalism slowed their 
ability to adapt to new structural conditions.612 In the case of the military elite, the 
professionalisation process had improved their intellectual capabilities. However, social and 
cultural capital was not enough to project generals and admirals as competent actors. The 
military was the group with the least compatible socio-cultural equipment to contribute to 
policy-making.613 These traits of the policy elite are usually overlooked in the literature. 
Examining Canadian strategic culture from a practical perspective helps to understand the 
centralisation of power by the political elite and the loss of influence of diplomats and 
soldiers. 
The second reason politicians proved better able to adapt to post-Cold War structural 
conditions was their professional profile, especially that of business liberals. The intellectual 
formation of the members of this faction was a product of their legal training and business 
experience. These socio-cultural backgrounds reflected the convergence between a growing 
corporatist current and the historic legalist tradition of Canadian political culture. The data 
on the composition of the political elite between the 1980s and 2000s reveal a consistent 
increase in the number of politicians with legal training and business occupation.614 
Although they were a small group, the power acquired by business liberals is attributed to 
the fact that they occupied the most relevant positions in the field of strategic policy-making. 
From 1993 to 2006, a prime minister, two foreign ministers, two defence ministers, and two 
finance ministers were politicians with legal and entrepreneurial backgrounds. Moreover, a 
select group of ministers and senior advisors with that profile constituted the court 
governments of Prime Ministers Chrétien and Martin.615 The dual equipment that business 
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liberals possessed allowed them to continue prioritising respect for international law and be 
aware of the direction the global economy was taking. Since legal knowledge and business 
expertise were the comparative and competitive advantages of politicians, these attributes 
had an impact on the diplomatic and military spheres. For example, in the renewed 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, areas dedicated to international trade 
issues such as Team Canada gained great relevance. Also, the newly created Canadian 
Foreign Service Institute promoted the development of diplomatic skills in economic 
matters.616 In contrast, the Royal Military College and Canadian Forces College reinforced 
their curriculums with subjects in social sciences, liberal arts, and strategic studies to 
complement the technical skills possessed by the officers.617 The socio-cultural background 
and professional profile of political leaders allowed them to adapt much more quickly to 
internal and external pressures than diplomats and military. They also influenced the 
positioning of international trade and ‘niche diplomacy’ as pillars of strategic policy. 
The third factor that allowed the political elite to consolidate its dominant position in the 
field of strategic policy-making was the role played by the prime ministers’ distinctive 
reflexes in the configuration of the decision-making process. The conception of federalism 
and the way to exercise political power were some issues that divided the Liberal Party. 
Social liberals such as Trudeau and Chrétien favoured to a hard-federalism in which the 
federation should operate highly centralised in a mighty government to secure national unity. 
In contrast, business liberals like Turner and Martin opted for a soft-federalism in which the 
power of the federation should be decentralised to optimise government operation and 
discourage the alienation of the provinces, mainly Quebec.618 Both perspectives on the 
exercise of political power mirrored themselves in the design of the shadow decision-making 
process. In the case of Chrétien, his legalist and political reflexes influenced the pragmatic 
character of his ‘command mode’ of decision-making. Its compact cabinet system was only 
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made up of five committees. Chrétien eliminated the Priorities and Planning Committee, the 
Foreign and Defence Policy Committee, and the Security and Intelligence Committee. This 
structure allowed him to monopolise decision-making. His government worked as a ‘friendly 
dictatorship’, in a centralised and highly efficient manner, but with little tolerance for dissent 
and with a silenced debate.619 In contrast, Martin’s legalist and managerial reflexes shaped 
his light version of command mode of decision-making. His leadership style was a middle 
ground of those exercised by Brian Mulroney and Chrétien. Martin partially decentralised 
decision-making through seven committees. He re-established structures to discuss strategic 
issues such as the Canada-United States Relations Committee, the Global Affairs 
Committee, and the Security and Intelligence Committee. The fact that his exercise of power 
was ‘flat, lacking in hierarchical discipline’, created spaces for ministers to have greater 
participation in decision-making.620 The contrasts between Chrétien and Martin 
governments are relevant since they elucidate how their distinctive reflexes influenced the 
distribution of the power in policy-making in favour of political actors, many of them with 
a business background and corporate links. 
The result was the progressive erosion of defensive internationalism and the reorientation of 
strategic policy. Canadian policy shifted from the search for security through the defence of 
the international order (United Nations) towards security through regional alliances (North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation and North American Aerospace Defence Command).621 The 
noteworthy thing about this process is how members of the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade, most of them inclined to internationalism, adapted to the structures 
of the internal and external environment to implement selective and conditional policies 
aimed at niche diplomacy and international trade. Respect for international law and the 
stability of the global system remained a strategic commitment for Canada, as it guaranteed 
its security and underpinned its structural position as a medium power. However, the tactic 
used to keep that commitment alive was no longer the intensive deployment of troops in 
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peacekeeping operations but was the promotion of the concept of human security based on 
the principle of ‘responsibility to protect’ from the United Nations.622 In contrast, the reflexes 
of the military elite influenced them to oppose that proposal due to the implications it had 
for the stability of Canadian Forces. The limited training of officers in social sciences and 
liberal arts restricted their understanding of the legitimating power of ‘soft power and 
international law. The military elite was sceptical about that approach and reluctantly 
accepted policy change.623 1988 marked the end of a long period in which liberal and 
defensive internationalism occupied the status of practical logic of the policy elite and set 
the parameters for the design of national security strategies. 1993 marked the beginning of a 
period in which the political elite took the lead in defining a political-economic model and a 
strategic approach that would provide security to Canada in a nascent American-built 
neoliberal international order. This situation occurred because of the slight compatibility 
between the habitus of politicians and some diplomats allowed them to cooperate to define 
an approach that was more in tune with post-Cold War global norms. As seen in Figure 6-1, 
the examination of habitus has revealed the source of cultural reflexes of policy-makers and 
how they interact with broader structures to produce new policy practices and strategies to 
preserve national security. 
6.3. Fields of strategic policy-making: new strategic approaches 
for a new world order 
Three different fields constituted the structural environment in which Canadian strategic 
policy was formulated during the 1990s. The evaluation of each of them and their overlaps 
elucidates the exogenous forces that conditioned the strategic choices of the policy-makers. 
The field of international relations, the domestic socio-political field, and the bureaucratic 
field were the spaces in which the strategic policy was forged.  
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Figure 6-1. Habitus of the Canadian policy elite, 1993-2006 
(Reconstruction of the dispositional logic) 
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The end of the Cold War, economic crises, and political changes profoundly disrupted these 
three social spheres.624 Although each of these fields had its internal rules of operation, the 
changes experienced in one of them had repercussions in the other two. That systemic 
relationship allows us to consider that the character of the strategic policy was the response 
of the Canadian policy elite to the conditions of the three domains. It also enables us to 
examine the role that their reply played in the permanent reconfiguration of the three fields. 
This organisation of the structural environment provides a framework to track the evolution 
of strategic policy and amalgamates the most recurrent dilemmas and issues less understood 
by the Canadian policy elite. The speeches and practices that accompanied the birth of the 
American-centred global neoliberal order had repercussions both in the international and 
national realms. 
The field of international relations was the space for interaction between state and non-state 
actors. Its structure and dynamics were defined by the distribution of material power, the 
strategic policies of the participating actors, and the rules that outlined the character of the 
post-Cold War world order. The first two elements have been predominant themes in the 
literature. However, in recent decades, academics have returned to the foundations of 
classical realism and constructivism to focus again on the role of international norms in the 
configuration of foreign policy and national security practices.625 The impact of norms on 
state strategic behaviour allows us to understand the relationship of the medium powers such 
as Canada with the international order. The progressive easing of geopolitical tensions 
between the United States and the Soviet Union degraded practices based on nuclear threat, 
the use of military force, and strategies to balance American hegemony. This context gave 
rise to new approaches based on the niche diplomacy of ‘low politics’ issues.626 The result 
was the emergence of new regulatory standards for state behaviour and international 
relations. For example, the role attributed to the middle powers was that of facilitators, 
catalysts, and managers of the nascent global order. A central aspect of the new world 
politics practices was the emphasis on the power of global governance and the relevance of 
middle powers to generate consensus orientated to underpin the American-built neoliberal 
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international order.627 The old paradigm of multilateral institutions such as the United 
Nations was gradually overshadowed by forums such as the World Trade Organisation, G-
7/8, and G-20. Moreover, the advent of speeches on nuclear disarmament, environmental 
protection, promotion of democracy, and defence of human rights generated pressure for the 
adoption of approaches that policy elites could hardly ignore. Otherwise, acting outside the 
normative orthodoxy of the Western community raised the chances of being singled out as 
a ‘pariah state’ or ‘rogue state’, a threat to the stability of the global order.628 
The domestic field was defined by the economic, political, and social conditions of Canada. 
This sphere was dominated by the effects of recessions, political changes, and the end of the 
Cold War. The recessions of the 1970s and 1980s did not only responded to the economic 
cycle. They were also a symptom of the exhaustion of the Keynesian political-economic 
model of the welfare state promoted by the social liberals since the 1950s. The return of the 
conservatives to power in 1984 and the electoral victory of the business liberals in 1993 
gradually shifted the Canadian government to the centre-right of the political spectrum. That 
turn set the domestic order of the 1990s. One of its main features was the adoption of 
neoliberal principles, which influenced the thinking and practice of the policy elite. The 
emphasis on monetary policy in the early 1980s, the Canada-United States Free Trade 
Agreement of 1989, the North American Free Trade Agreement of 1994, and the growing 
dependence on the extraction and export of natural resources in the 2000s reflected a 
profound change in the orientation of Canadian politics.629 A second attribute was the 
reinforcement of Atlanticist and continentalist predispositions. The underpinning of the 
historical link with the United Kingdom and the strategic rapprochement with the United 
States was a priority for Canada to be in a position to protect the sovereignty of its Arctic 
waters during the final years of the Cold War.630 A third characteristic was the change of 
priorities in the Canadian government. After the recession of the early 1990s and the end of 
the Cold War, the reduction of the federal deficit, the promotion of free trade, the tax reform, 
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and the preservation of national unity were the most relevant issues for the government.631 
The economic, political, and social environment in which the strategic policy was formulated 
was the product of a trend originating in the 1980s that extended to the 2000s. The shift of 
the Canadian centre of power to the right of the political spectrum had severe implications 
for strategic policy, especially for the internationalist tradition and the diplomatic elite. 
The third field is the interdepartmental context in which strategic policy was formulated. 
The bureaucratic realm was defined by the centralisation of power in the court government, 
the shrinking of the influence of cabinet ministers in decision-making, and the erosion of the 
capabilities of the diplomatic corps and the armed forces. The political change of 1993 had 
a profound impact on the stability of the Canadian bureaucracy. The monopolisation of 
decision-making by prime ministers is attributed to the distrust they had for bureaucrats who 
came from conservative governments. That feeling unleashed a gradual bureaucratic 
politicisation, especially in the central agencies. The appointment of deputy ministers and 
diplomatic officers aligned to the vision of the prime ministers and without consulting the 
ministers became a regular practice.632 In the 1990s, the ‘strategic prime ministership’ 
marginalised the cabinet ministers from the policy-making process. Their functions were 
limited to attend administrative matters of their departments. The prime minister’s 
preferences and government agenda priorities substantially increased the influence of 
officials and senior advisors to the Prime Minister’s Office and the Department of 
Finance.633 In parallel, the diplomatic and military spheres entered a severe crisis. One factor 
was the recurrent change of foreign affairs and national defence ministers. Although both 
ministers belonged to the court government on some occasions, their limited knowledge and 
expertise on strategic issues affected their performance. This situation disrupted the 
continuity and consistency of the strategic policy. Another factor was the draconian budget 
cuts and increased responsibilities assigned to the diplomatic corps and armed forces. In tone 
with the idea of the ‘peace dividend’ promoted by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
and American President Ronald Reagan, the fiscal objectives of the Canadian government 
responded to the internal economic situation and the new conditions of the post-Cold War 
international environment. The renewed context devalued symbolic capital and eroded the 
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capabilities of diplomats and soldiers. Although both spheres were affected, the divergence 
between their cultural predispositions generated friction and hindered consensus. These 
discords produced interdepartmental tensions and inconsistencies in strategic policy.634 
During the 1990s, the influence of the military on strategic policy declined, while that of the 
diplomatic corps slightly increased thanks to the effective mobilisation of their socio-cultural 
capital.635 
Canada’s foreign and security policy evolved as the cultural practices of the policy elite 
adapted to the structural conditions of the three fields. The approaches that fuelled strategic 
policy moved away from the search for security through traditional methods based on broad 
multilateralism and a deep commitment in defence of the international order. The new 
approaches focused on the search for security through Atlanticist and continentalist 
predispositions based on selective and conditional multilateralism in favour of free trade, 
foreign investment, and regional alliances. Academics broadly agree that the end of the Cold 
War produced changes in the strategic behaviour of middle powers as Canada.636 However, 
this thesis requires expansion and deepening. While the cessation of the geopolitical 
confrontation between the Americans and Soviets was crucial for the easing of exogenous 
pressures on Canada, it does not fully explain why the policy elite responded in the way it 
did. A more comprehensive analysis should consider that the cultural context of the 
Canadian policy elite conditioned how they perceived their environment and made strategic 
choices. From that perspective, it is possible to interpret that Canadian politicians, diplomats, 
and generals were reacting simultaneously to the internal and external conditions of Canada. 
This aspect is often overlooked in the literature. Likewise, it is possible to affirm that the 
main problems that arose about Canadian strategic policy after the Cold War were the 
product of the inconsistencies of the political elite to adapt to changes in the broad structural 
environment.   
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Figure 6-2. Field of the Canadian strategic policy-making, 1993-2006 
(Construction of the positional logic) 
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As a synthesis, Figure 6-2 illustrates the construction of the positional logic of the field of 
strategic policy-making. The image is the product of the interpretation of the field rules, the 
mapping of the resources distribution, and the historicisation of social disputes. The review 
of the policy elite’s habitus and the strategic policy-making field provide the basis for 
examining the origins and evolution of Canadian strategic policy from 1993 to 2006 in the 
next section. 
6.4. Evolution of the strategic policy: in search of a new identity 
for the post-Cold War structural environment 
The evolution of Canadian strategic policy in the last two decades of the twentieth century 
shows the gradual erosion of defensive internationalism. This strategic approach aspired to 
preserve its status as the practical logic of the policy elite. Parallelly, the decline of the social 
liberals generated spaces for centre-right politicians to promote Atlanticist and continentalist 
ideas in order to establish a new dominant focus on the Canadian strategic policy. The global 
environment and national context were equally significant in making decisions on 
economics, foreign policy, and national security. The interaction between international 
power structures and the subjective understandings of the policy elite established parameters 
to produce strategies. The central argument of this chapter is that the evolution of the 
strategic policy from 1993 to 2006 described a process of weakening of defensive 
internationalism caused by the growing influence of the cultural predispositions of red Tories 
and business liberals since the 1980s. Tracking the interplay among the internationalist, 
Atlanticist, and continentalist notions allows us to identify three phases of this process: 
advent of a selective strategic approach, shrinking of internationalism, and search for a new 
identity. The following paragraphs examine the conditions of the domestic and international 
environment to understand the complex relationship between inner and outer dynamics that 
guided the evolution of Canadian strategic policy. 
6.4.1. Advent of a selective strategic approach, 1984-1993 
One of the theses that predominate in the literature is that the end of the Cold War was a 
determining factor in the change of Canadian strategic behaviour. However, this dissertation 
argues that the evolution of Canadian strategic policy in the 1990s was the product of a trend 
of a social, cultural, and political shift in Canada originated since the mid-1970s. The rupture 
within the Liberal Party and the effects of economic recessions were signs of the 
deterioration of the political project of the social liberals based on the welfare state and 
liberal internationalism. In the 1970 White Paper on Foreign Policy and the 1972 Third 
Option Policy, The Trudeau government recognised that Canada had limited capabilities to 
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meet all its international commitments, so it was necessary to reorient foreign policy.637 The 
electoral victory of the Progressive Conservative Party in 1984 marked the beginning of a 
long process of political, economic, and military transformation in Canada. The arrival of 
Mulroney to power catalysed the displacement of the Canadian government towards the 
centre-right of the political spectrum. Mulroney’s strategic vision was oriented towards a 
‘constructive Canadian internationalism’ in which free trade and Western defence played a 
central role.638 It is essential to point out that the political change of 1984 did not generate 
an abrupt break with the liberal internationalist tradition because the moderate 
predispositions of the so-called red Tories, who constituted the left-wing of the Progressive 
Conservative Party, were located in a middle ground between the two factions of the Liberal 
Party that came into conflict: social liberals and business liberals.639 In this context, it is 
possible to affirm that the Mulroney government represented the beginning of a process of 
change in the institutional culture and cultural reflexes of the policy elite. The result was the 
progressive establishment of neoliberalism and weakening of defensive internationalism. 
Mulroney catalysed the reorientation of the strategic policy promoted by Trudeau in the 
1970s, which analysts already categorised as a constructive internationalism.640 Two pillars 
sustained Canadian foreign policy since the beginning of the Mulroney government. One of 
the most evident was the premises under which the idea of constructive internationalism was 
promoted. Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark argued: ‘we must trade if we are 
to prosper […] our security interests demand that we play our part in Western defence and 
arms control and disarmament […] our values dictate that we help the poor, the hungry and 
the politically abused’.641 The second pillar, less recognised in the literature, was the cultural 
predispositions of the political elite. Red Toryism is an ideological variation of Canadian 
conservatism in which the historical link with the United Kingdom plays a central role. For 
the red Tories, the Canadian collective national identity, the belief in the common good, the 
maintenance of the social order, and the traditional institutions such as religion and the 
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monarchy are fundamental for the active protection of the state.642 The ideological splices 
between the red Tories and the social liberals prevented the 1984 political change from 
leading to the radical redefinition of strategic policy. Their coincidences were also 
manifested in Mulroney’s decision to preserve aspects of the welfare state and 
internationalist policy at the beginning of his tenure. However, both projects were gradually 
eroded by the evolution of the policy elite’s predispositions, the increasing pressures of the 
corporate elite, and the change in the structural environment throughout the 1980s. 
In trade matters, the strategic policy developed an internationalist character at the beginning 
of the Mulroney government. This feature is attributed to the weight acquired by commercial 
affairs within the Department of External Affairs and International Trade after the 
bureaucratic reorganisation of 1982.643 It also influenced the persistence of ideas about the 
need to diversify Canadian relations to lessen the vulnerability generated by the growing 
relationship with the United States.644 A more significant factor was the influence exerted 
by an internationalist current led by Secretary Clark and the Canadian Ambassador to the 
United Nations Stephen Lewis. They argued that Canada should assume humanitarian 
obligations and establish unique relationships with less fortunate nations.645 The enactment 
of the Act to Create the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada in 1985 and the establishment 
of the Caribbean-Canada Trade Agreement in 1986 were the first decisions aimed at 
expanding Canada’s ties with the economies of the Pacific Rim and the Commonwealth-
Caribbean. However, trade policy began to shift towards a continental approach at the end 
of Mulroney’s first term. The threats of American protectionism and the influence acquired 
by right-wing policy-makers disrupted the internationalist orientation of Canadian trade 
policy. Policy actors such as the Minister of Regional Economic Expansion Sinclair Stevens 
and the Minister of Finance Michael Wilson promoted the use of foreign aid as a means to 
develop new markets and link Canadian corporations with foreign companies. Also, they 
endorsed the idea of strengthening the commercial link with the United States.646 Although 
Mulroney had expressed his opposition to establishing a free trade agreement with the United 
States since the 1984 election campaign, the growing influence of right-wing policy actors, 
the pressures of the corporate elite, and the emerging neoliberal economic dynamics were 
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factors that motivated him to sign the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement in 1988 
and negotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1992.647 The evolution of trade 
policy in the 1980s reveals that the legalist cultural reflexes of internationalists were much 
more influential in decision-making during Mulroney’s first term. However, as the new 
American-built neoliberal international order emerged in the late 1980s, the corporatist 
current occupied an influential role in the field of strategic policy-making. 
In security issues, the strategic policy also developed an internationalist character at the 
beginning of the Mulroney government. One of the priorities was international disarmament. 
This objective was considered one of the few elements that prevailed from the 
internationalist ‘voluntarism’ and ‘idealism’ promoted by Trudeau.648 The liberal 
internationalism inertia and influence of the internationalist current explains the decision to 
remove the last American nuclear weapon from Canadian soil and the opposition to 
American intervention in Nicaragua in 1984. However, internationalist predispositions 
diluted throughout Mulroney’s first term. This situation caused Canada to cease its 
uninterrupted participation in the United Nations peacekeeping operations in 1988. The 
priority of disarmament allowed Mulroney to lessen the criticisms generated by the role of 
Canadian Forces in foreign policy, to manage the internal pressures exerted by the 
internationalist current, to compensate for the weight that the transatlantic alliance acquired, 
and to justify disagreements with the United States.649 Secretary Clark and Ambassador 
Lewis were the leading promoters of this cause that opposed aspects of American foreign 
policy. Mulroney defended his support to disarmament by arguing that it was a means to 
‘reduce the threat of war and enhanced the promise of peace’.650 Such was the relevance of 
the symbolism of this aim that Mulroney named Trudeau as his unofficial adviser on peace 
issues. As internationalism lost influence, Atlanticism established itself as the primary 
source of defence policy. The defence of the West was the second priority. The policy elite 
gave continuity to the categorisation of the Soviet Union as an ‘ideological, political, and 
economic adversary whose explicit long-term aim is to mould the world in its own image’.651 
As in 1964 and 1971, the White Papers on Defence of 1987, 1989, and 1992 revalidated the 
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Canadian commitment to defend the West.652 Upon assuming office, Mulroney made clear 
the direction of his policy: 
We in the Western alliance are prepared to defend ourselves against 
attempts to impose alien and odious systems. […] Soviet policy in 
Europe has been animated by two clear aims: the preservation of 
Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe; and the weakening of the 
Western alliance, especially the links between the United States and 
Europe. Political leadership must be ever vigilant to avoid 
becoming a pawn in this Soviet strategy.653  
Mulroney’s posture implied an increase in military spending in a way not seen since the 
Korean War.654 This vision was supported by the Minister of Defence Robert Coates, who 
was considered the most right-wing party and cabinet member.655 Canada’s involvement in 
all missions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation from 1984 to 1993, its active role in 
the meetings of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1985, and the 
signature of the Agreement on Arctic Cooperation of 1988 reflected the predominance of 
Atlanticist predispositions in the policy elite. In this way, the ambivalent security and 
defence policy of the 1980s evolved in a similar direction to trade policy. Canadian strategic 
policy moved from away from internationalism towards Atlanticist and continentalist 
approaches.  
This brief review of the evolution of strategic policy during Mulroney’s government 
provides elements to understand the origins of the weakening of defensive internationalism 
in the 1990s. The gradual transformation of the institutional culture and cultural reflexes of 
the policy elite in the early 1980s had repercussions on the policy choices in the final years 
of the Cold War. The persistence of legalist reflexes in the policy elite and the relative 
ideological affinity between social liberals and red Tories allowed the preservation of 
traditional internationalist practices such as the promotion of peace and multilateral 
diplomacy. The role of Canada in the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 
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and Commonwealth; its leadership in the Montreal Protocol in 1987; and its joining of the 
Organisation of American States in 1990 were proof of this. However, the change in the 
conditions of the international environment and the power acquired by right-wing policy 
actors with business reflexes influenced the strategic policy to turn towards a selective 
approach. That is to say; constructive internationalism became a reduced version of liberal 
internationalism. This selective approach generated spaces for continentalism to gain 
relevance in trade policy and for Atlanticism to predominate in defence policy. Analysts 
pointed out that the approach promoted by Mulroney reflected that structural reality had set 
limits on Canada’s ‘ability to act’. Critics designated Mulroney’s foreign policy as ‘a low 
point for Canadian internationalism unmatched in the last forty years of Canadian foreign 
policy’.656 It is not possible to deny that the end of the Cold War impacted on security 
dynamics in the North Atlantic and on Canadian strategic behaviour. From 1989, Canada 
began a decade of budgetary cuts to the defence sector, halted its military modernisation 
process, cancelled the increase in troops in West Germany, and began withdrawing its 
soldiers deployed in Europe.657 The economic recession and the growing government 
deficits in the early 1990s also played a significant role in the redefinition of strategic 
policy.658 However, as this section has shown, the change in cultural reflexes and 
predispositions of the policy elite in the 1980s significantly influenced how the policy elite 
interpreted the reconfiguration of the structural environment and responded with changing 
strategic priorities. The weakening of defensive internationalism was underway. 
6.4.2. Shrinking of internationalism, 1993-2003 
The 1980s marked the beginning of a process of cultural change within the Canadian policy 
elite that redirected the evolution of strategic policy. Chrétien’s arrival to power in 1993 
elicited anticipation that the principles of liberal internationalism would be restored in 
foreign policy. His political bond with Trudeau, his affinity with social liberalism, and his 
education in law gave sense to the policy guidelines of his political platform and government 
plan. In the context of the end of the Cold War and the economic recession, his government 
aspired to generate a contrast with Mulroney’s policy. Its main objectives were to reduce the 
budget burden generated by the defence sector, lessen the influence of the corporate elite in 
decision-making, and strengthen Canada’s international leadership through peacekeeping 
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operations.659 Chrétien also sought to distance himself from the Atlanticist and continentalist 
character that strategic policy acquired at the end of the Mulroney government. Chrétien said 
his government would adopt ‘a broader definition of national and international security’ and 
reject ‘a camp-follower approach in favour of pursuing a partnership with the United 
States’.660 The Prime Minister said that ‘the Government will ensure that Canada plays an 
active, internationalist role in the global arena’.661 However, this internationalist 
construction of Canada’s external identity was far from becoming a reality. The change in 
the predispositions of the policy elite, the dynamics of decision-making, and the new 
conditions of the post-Cold War structural environment undermined the restoration of liberal 
internationalism. The following analysis shows that, despite the attempts of the diplomatic 
elite and the social liberals to restore the internationalist tradition as the practical logic, the 
growing influence of business liberals and the pressures generated in the emerging neoliberal 
system prolonged the weakening of internationalism. Three periods portray the 
implementation of a reduced internationalism and the growing influence of the Atlanticist 
and continentalist approaches in strategic policy-making. 
An examination of the first months of Chrétien’s government reveals that the internationalist 
predispositions of the policy elite were weak and in the process of transformation. The liberal 
social vision and Keynesian reflexes that Chrétien embodied during the Trudeau government 
were diluted due to domestic pressures and external conditions.662 The North American Free 
Trade Agreement illustrates the most representative case. Trudeau’s ideas on commercial 
diversification as a strategy to reduce the vulnerability generated by the growing economic 
dependence on the United States fuelled Chrétien’s campaign proposals.663 He promised to 
renegotiate or renounce the tri-national agreement, arguing that Canada had given up too 
much in the negotiations. However, Chrétien’s attempt to promote renegotiation failed in his 
first month of government. One of the causes was external. The United States refused to 
renegotiate the treaty because the legislative ratification had been extremely complicated. 
Renegotiating the treaty involved restarting the problematic process. Also, Canada had few 
resources to impose its conditions on a hypothetical renegotiation.664 Another factor was 
domestic. Chrétien inherited a historic debt from the Trudeau and Mulroney governments. 
The magnitude of the federal debt influenced Chrétien to maintain the agreement because, 
 
659 Liberal Party, ‘Creating Opportunity’ (Ottawa: Liberal Party, 1993) pp.20,55,94. 
660 Liberal Party, ‘Creating Opportunity’ p.106. 
661 Government, ‘Speech from the Throne to Open the First Session Thirty-Fifth Parliament’ (Ottawa: 
Parliament, 1994). 
662 Lawrence Martin, Iron Man: The Defiant Reign of Jean Chrétien p.65. 
663 Lawrence Martin, Chrétien: The Will to Win pp.238–47. 
664 Lawrence Martin, Iron Man: The Defiant Reign of Jean Chrétien p.79. 
238 
despite its inconveniences, it would help Canada recover from the crisis and settle its debt.665 
This scenario also conditioned the cabinet configuration, the definition of priorities, and the 
orientation of foreign policy. First, Chrétien empowered business liberals like Martin and 
Roy MacLaren. Moreover, the Prime Minister limited the influence of social liberals with 
strong anti-free trade and anti-American predispositions such as Lloyd Axworthy who, 
within the Liberal Party, was considered the natural candidate to occupy the position of 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. André Ouellet’s surprise appointment in that position responded 
to Chrétien’s perception that Ouellet, unlike Axworthy, was a policy actor who was ‘unlikely 
to rock the boat’.666 Second, inspired by the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, Chrétien and Martin 
agreed to establish as a priority the reduction of the federal deficit to 3 per cent of gross 
domestic product.667 This objective involved the removal of the governor of the Bank of 
Canada and the implementation of severe budget cuts.668 Third, free trade acquired high 
relevance in foreign policy. While budget cuts deeply affected the diplomatic and military 
sectors, Chrétien created the First Team Canada Mission in 1994.669 This agency had the 
function of promoting Canadian business interests abroad to increase trade and 
investment.670 The efforts to create the Free Trade Area of the Americas from 1994 to 2003; 
the negotiations to reach the Canada-Central American Four Free Trade Agreement 
between 2001 and 2003; the free trade agreements signed with Israel, Chile, and Costa Rica 
between 1997 and 2002; the foreign investment promotion and protection agreements 
reached with 17 countries; and the 27 trade missions performed internationally demonstrate 
that global trade was a top priority in Chrétien’s foreign policy.671 Analysts agreed that ‘the 
government does not have the political energy to deal with anything else on the foreign 
policy agenda except trade’.672 The first years of the Chrétien government demonstrate that 
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the internationalist predispositions of the policy elite were faint and were in the process of 
redefinition. 
The evolution of security and defence policy during Chrétien’s first term also gives evidence 
of how the change in predispositions of the policy elite influenced the shrinking of 
internationalism. In 1993, Canada continued its involvement in United Nations 
peacekeeping missions in Western Sahara, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and the former 
Yugoslavia. However, the 1994 White Paper on Defence and 1995 White Paper on Foreign 
Policy revealed that Canada was in the process of implementing a selective, conditional, 
bounded, and passive foreign policy.673 This narrow approach was far from the broad, active, 
and humanitarian character that distinguished liberal internationalism.674 Foreign Minister 
Ouellet justified before the House of Commons that the new foreign policy was a response 
to the conditions of the post-Cold War world, in which power had dispersed and was defined 
by economic and non-military capabilities.675 This vision was in line with Chrétien’s ‘strong 
anti-military bias’, the aversion of his senior advisors to the use of force, and the austerity 
policy promoted by Martin.676 For Chrétien, ‘the greatest and most immediate threats facing 
Canada as the millennium came to a close were economic and psychological’.677 These ideas 
allow us to understand the origin of the character of the foreign policy, the budget cuts to the 
defence sector, and the reorientation of security policy. One of the most significant effects 
of this strategic policy took place between 1995 and 1997. During this period, Canada’s 
contribution to United Nations-sanctioned peacekeeping operations decreased considerably 
and was exceeded by commitments made in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation-led 
peacemaking missions.678 One of the causes of this strategic turn was the erosion of the 
symbolic capital of the military after the human rights abuse scandals in Kuwait in 1991 and 
Somalia in 1993. Both events generated harsh criticism and sharp questions from liberal 
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parliamentarians about the preparation of Canadian troops and the relevance of their 
deployment abroad.679 However, the evolution of the predispositions and interests of the 
policy elite was a more influential factor. The weakening of internationalism as the practical 
logic generated spaces that were filled by ideas inspired by Atlanticism and continentalism. 
While internationalism represented a budgetary burden, the relationship with the United 
States was profitable and the link with Europe allowed balancing the weight acquired by the 
relation with the superpower. Although academics argue that Chrétien’s selective and 
passive version of internationalism tended towards isolationism, the relevance acquired by 
the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the 
commitments made in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and the weight of regional 
trade in North America show that Atlanticism and continentalism were much more 
influential approaches in decision-making.680 
The character that the strategic policy acquired during Chrétien’s first term was the product 
of a process of adjustment in the predispositions of the policy actors to the structural 
conditions. The weakening of internationalism had zero counterweights, as the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs and National Defence aligned themselves with the vision of Chrétien, the 
Prime Minister centralised decision-making, and the liberal government had a strong 
parliamentary majority.681 From 1993 to 1996, few decisions were made to recover the 
tradition of liberal internationalism. One was the creation of the Global and Human Issues 
Bureau within the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development. Its purpose was 
to ‘recast the department’s thinking on emerging issues such as the environment, crime, and 
terrorism’.682 Another was the promotion of the ban on anti-personnel landmines. During the 
second term, this initiative became the primary means of preserving the internationalist spirit 
in foreign policy, as it was symbolically more effective and economically more affordable 
than United Nations peacekeeping operations. In this context, the appointment of Axworthy 
as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1996 is interpreted as Chrétien’s symbolic movement to 
balance the turn of foreign policy and to counter the criticisms generated by the reorientation 
of strategic policy. Scholars argued that the policy promoted by Chrétien had been ‘the most 
marked retreat from Pearsonian internationalism since the inception of the doctrine’, leaving 
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Canada ‘bereft of its internationalist focus’ and ‘only a short hop from […] isolationism’.683 
From 1996 to 2000, foreign policy reincorporated aspects of liberal internationalism through 
the so-called Axworthy doctrine.684 This doctrine held that Canada’s leadership in the post-
Cold War context depended on the use of its soft or cooptive power. Axworthy considered 
Canada a ‘value-added nation’ with the talent for ‘drawing upon its skills in negotiating, 
building coalitions, and presenting diplomatic initiatives’.685 These ideas promoted the 
reformulation of the strategic approach based on the concept of human security and the 
principle of responsibility to protect. In this framework, the initiative to ban landmines 
became relevant in foreign policy, despite the discomfort it generated within the Canadian 
Forces.686 Chrétien’s confidence in Axworthy allowed the Minister to have greater control 
over foreign policy than his predecessors. Axworthy’s leadership during the so-called 
‘Ottawa Process’ also allowed the Minister to personally promote the initiative until the 
signing of the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997.687 In this way, the foreign policy during Chrétien’s 
second term recovered elements of liberal internationalism. However, the priorities and 
interests of the policy elite went beyond the symbolic capital and soft power it provided to 
Canada. The political, economic, military, and moral link of Canada with Europe positioned 
Atlanticism as one of the key inputs to strategic policy in the final years of the twentieth 
century. 
Atlanticism was the second most influential ideological source in the establishment of 
Canadian security during Chrétien’s second term. Internationalism allowed Canada to 
expose its commitment to matters of niche diplomacy to preserve its structural position as a 
medium power and its external identity as a good international citizen.688 On the other hand, 
Atlanticism allowed Canada to express its solidarity with its main allies and for this to be 
taken into account by the superpowers in matters of ‘high politics’ of international 
security.689 The mixed nature that the strategic policy acquired generated contradictions, 
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inconsistencies, and criticisms. An example was Canada’s support for the installation of 
missile defence capabilities in Eastern Europe and the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation, although both cases contravened the spirit of the Ottawa Treaty symbolically 
and generated conditions for the resurgence of the Cold War.690 Another example was the 
role that Canada assumed in the transatlantic alliance since 1998. In that year, the number of 
Canadian troops deployed in peacemaking missions of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation exceeded Canada’s military contribution in United Nations peacekeeping 
operations.691 The third example confirmed that Chrétien’s Atlanticist and continentalist 
predispositions were well above the internationalist principles promoted by Axworthy. In 
1999, in the context of the Kosovo War, Canada’s involvement in the transatlantic alliance’s 
bombing in Yugoslavia was strongly questioned because the operation lacked the approval 
of the United Nations Security Council. For Chrétien, Canada’s involvement responded to 
the interests of preserving the good relationship it had developed with the United States and 
of expressing its support for its European allies. For Axworthy, Canadian participation was 
based on the legitimate use of force for humanitarian purposes to stop ethnic cleansing 
undertaken against Albanian citizens in Kosovo.692 These dichotomic reasons that justified 
the Canadian response to the international security environment portray the contrasting 
reflexes and predispositions that coexisted within the Canadian policy elite in the 1990s. 
Chretien’s position revealed that he had abandoned his legalistic reflexes and liberal social 
predispositions. The Prime Minister developed pragmatic reflexes and adopted distinctive 
neoliberal preferences of business liberals that prioritised the profitability of Canada’s 
foreign relations, especially with the United States and Europe. In contrast, Axworthy’s 
justification presented his diplomatic and legalistic reflexes in which respect for international 
law played a central role. Among the cabinet ministers, Axworthy was one of the few actors 
whose predispositions were still firmly rooted in the principles of social liberalism and 
liberal internationalism.693 The increasing dominance of business liberals in decision-
making and the gradual shift of Chrétien’s predispositions towards the centre-right of the 
political spectrum prevented internationalism from regaining its status as the practical logic 
of the policy elite. 
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The influence of Axworthy’s internationalism came to an end during the last years of 
Chrétien’s second term. Events such as the nomination of Axworthy for the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 1997, Canadian support for the creation of the International Criminal Court in 1998, 
the entry into force of the Ottawa Treaty in 1999, and the hosting of the general assembly of 
the Organisation of American States in 2000 projected the idea that internationalism was in 
the process of regaining its hierarchy within the policy elite. Even the appointment of Canada 
as president of the United Nations Security Council in 1999 and 2000 allowed Axworthy to 
promote the reduction of sanctions imposed on Iraq. Despite the tension that the proposal 
generated with the United States, the Minister maintained that it was necessary ‘to avoid 
making ordinary citizens pay for the actions of their leaders’.694 However, efforts to restore 
the activist and humanist dimension of internationalism were interrupted by Axworthy’s 
decision to withdraw from politics in 2000. This situation generated a power vacuum in the 
policy elite that was capitalised by Chrétien to promote John Manley, whom he considered 
his successor for the 2003 general election.695 Manley’s appointment as Foreign Minister 
was pivotal in the reorientation of strategic policy, as his continentalist predispositions and 
interests in economic policy were highly influential and contrasted with Axworthy’s 
internationalism and human security agenda. Moreover, his political bond with Chrétien 
conditioned him to prioritise the expansion of free trade and the improvement of the 
relationship with the United States.696 Like the prime minister, Manley had positioned 
himself in the centre-right of the Liberal Party because, as Lawrence Martin points out, 
‘seven years in big business circles have moved him from his more activist ways of old’.697 
This substitution had profound effects on the ideological balance of the cabinet. Atlanticism 
and continentalism were established as the most prominent ideological sources that shaped 
how Canadian decision-makers responded to the 9/11 attacks and the new conditions of the 
international security environment. 
The dominant Atlanticist and continentalist predispositions within the policy elite and the 
effects of the abrupt reconfiguration of the structural environment delineated the foreign and 
security policy during Chrétien’s third term. The strategic choices in 2001 demonstrate the 
reorientation of the strategic policy. The Canadian response to the 9/11 attacks consisted of 
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four main decisions. First, Operation Yellow Ribbon was intended to support the United 
States in controlling the emergency.698 Second, the invocation of Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty was oriented to enforce the collective defence clause.699 Third, the creation 
of the Canada-United States Smart Border Accord was aimed at ensuring the safe flow of 
people and goods at the border.700 Fourth, the sending of Joint Task Force 2 troops to 
Afghanistan secretly aimed to support the first anti-terrorist operations undertaken by the 
United States.701 Manley’s leadership in the Cabinet Committee on Public Security and Anti-
Terrorism, the Minister’s close ties with the American policy elite, the centralisation of 
decision-making in Chrétien, and the absence of internationalist counterweights were 
internal factors that significantly shaped the Canadian response. The decisions of the policy 
elite allowed them not only to provide unconditional and expeditious support to the United 
States but also to express their solidarity through the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. In 
addition to gaining political capital in the relationship with the United States and generating 
balance through the transatlantic alliance, one of the main objectives that the policy elite 
sought to address was to lessen the effects of the American reaction on border dynamics, 
especially in commercial matters. The 1988 and 1994 trade agreements significantly 
increased the Canadian economy’s dependence on trade with the United States, so closing 
borders was a serious threat to Canada’s national security. The interaction between these 
factors allows us to understand why the Canadian response did not fall within the logic of 
the ‘defence against help’ thesis, but instead on the premise ‘defence against the lock-
down’.702 The ideological configuration of the cabinet, the dependence on regional trade, 
and the post-9/11 international security environment were equally relevant in the 
reorientation of Canadian strategic policy towards an Atlanticist-continentalist approach. 
The evolution of Canadian strategic policy at the end of the Chrétien government reflected 
a series of apparent inconsistencies attributed to several factors. The proximity of the 
electoral period, the reorientation of foreign policy, the changes in the cabinet, the external 
tensions produced by the American declaration of War on Terror, and the internal pressures 
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generated by the social rejection of Canadian involvement resulted in what some realist 
academics identify as ‘anomalous’ policy decisions.703 By 2002, the dismissal of Martin, the 
appointment of Manley as Deputy Prime Minister, and the appointment of William Graham 
as Minister of Foreign Affairs meant a new reconfiguration in the balance of the 
predispositions of the policy elite. On the one hand, Graham represented the return of a 
political actor with moderate liberal internationalist preferences in favour of foreign policy 
based on values, the rule of law, multilateral cooperation, and respect for diversity.704 
However, on the other hand, the Atlanticist and continentalist predispositions of Manley, 
Chrétien, and his senior advisors retained the dominant position in decision-making.705 In 
this scenario, Canada’s refusal to participate in the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 
presumed the existence of an internationalist consensus within the policy elite, since the 
justification for not participating was that the operation lacked the approval of the United 
Nations Security Council.706 However, that decision was not inspired by internationalist 
ideas promoted by Graham or inherited by Axworthy. Like the Canadian unwillingness to 
participate in the American Ballistic Missile Defence System, the refusal to support the 
intervention in Iraq revealed that the willingness to cooperate with the United States had its 
limits. In order to lessen the tensions that this decision would generate in the bilateral 
relationship and despite its limited military capabilities, Canada chose to increase its 
commitment in Afghanistan by agreeing to lead the International Security Assistance Force 
in 2003.707 Superficially, both decisions seemed contradictory and irrational. However, from 
a constructivist analysis in the light of the dominant predispositions in the policy elite, it is 
possible to understand them.708 On the one hand, the rejection of intervention in Iraq was 
part of the soft-bandwagoning strategy that fuelled continental policy. On the other hand, 
the increase in participation in the Afghanistan War was part of the soft-balancing strategy 
that constituted the Atlanticist policy. Eddie Goldenberg, the senior policy advisor of 
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Chrétien, reveals that these decisions were based on the fact that within the policy elite it 
was considered that the invasion of Iraq was fed by a unilateral attitude of the United States, 
while the coalition in Afghanistan had the multilateral endorsement of the transatlantic 
alliance.709 In terms of cost-benefit, this combination was the one that gave the best returns 
to Canada in strategic terms, since it did not compromise it excessively with the United 
States and maintained the support of its European allies. Furthermore, Canada expressed its 
solidarity with its Western allies in both cases. This last period of government confirmed 
that internationalism had been reduced to a rhetorical discourse and the practice of 
commercial globalism. It also affirmed that Canadian strategic priorities had been redirected 
towards commercial interests with the United States and political priorities with European 
allies, especially France. This ‘anomalous’ strategic policy was only the beginning of a 
period of readjustment of Canada’s international identity to the new conditions of the post-
9/11 international environment. 
6.4.3. Search for a new international identity, 2003-2006 
The strategic policy of the Martin government prolonged the consolidation of a hybrid 
approach that emerged in Chrétien’s third term. Continentalism and Atlanticism continued 
to provide the best-valued ideas for the design of strategies aimed at adapting Canada to the 
post-9/11 structural environment. Axworthy’s efforts were insufficient to preserve the status 
of internationalism as the practical logic of the policy elite. For many foreign service 
officers, the period from 1996 to 2000 had been the last ‘high point’ of Canadian 
internationalist diplomacy.710 As of 2003, internationalism was reduced to two main 
functions. First, internationalism was used as a symbolic instrument that fuelled political 
rhetoric. The role played by this approach after the end of the Second World War and during 
the Chrétien government confirmed the popularity and usefulness of internationalist 
discourse.711 Martin’s political platform and government agenda set out the objective that 
Canada would strengthen its leadership in peacekeeping operations and its commitment to 
the principle of responsibility to protect.712 However, the facts reveal otherwise. Strategic 
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priorities were not focused on the humanitarian agenda and Canadian participation in United 
Nations missions dramatically decreased.713 As in the 1970s and 1990s, Martin 
acknowledged that Canada had limited material capabilities to fulfil all its international 
commitments, especially in military matters.714 The second function that internationalism 
played was the development of new markets globally to boost free trade and foreign 
investment. Martin’s government complemented the activities of Team Canada Mission 
through the Canada Corps.715 This agency, which was administered by the Canadian 
International Development Agency, aimed to promote good governance and the building of 
institutions in ‘failed and fragile states’.716 Beyond good intentions, this initiative resembled 
the ideas promoted in the 1980s about using foreign aid as a means to achieve economic 
goals.717 This similarity can be understood in the light of the business and mercantilist 
reflexes shared by the right-wing red Tories and the business liberals. The few achievements 
of internationalism outside the economic sphere were the support of the extension of the G-
8 to a G-20 and the diplomatic rapprochement with China.718 The shrinking of 
internationalism generated an identity vacuum within the political elite, which was filled by 
continentalist and Atlanticist constructions. That is, the predispositions of decision-makers 
ranged between two types of positions. The bilateral was in favour of cooperation with the 
United States on regional defence and international security to preserve the benefits and 
stability granted by free trade. The multilateral position was in favour of strengthening ties 
with the transatlantic alliance to manage the political cost and strategic weight generated by 
the collaboration with the superpower. Between 2003 and 2006, two cases demonstrate that 
the interaction between continentalist and Atlanticist predispositions with the structural 
environment drove the evolution of strategic policy and the search for a new international 
identity. 
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One of the issues that defined the character of the strategic policy was Canada’s stance 
towards the American Ballistic Missile Defence System. As mentioned earlier, the limits of 
the continentalist predispositions of the policy elite influenced the development of soft-
bandwagoning strategies. The implications for diplomatic freedom, incompatibility with 
arms control, rejection of Canadian society, impact on external identity, and political costs 
were factors that motivated the Canadian government’s refusal to get involved. Although 
during the Chrétien government it was claimed that Martin was one of the business liberals 
who supported Canada’s participation in the programme because of the economic benefits 
that it could generate, his position was moderated by assuming power.719 By 2005, Prime 
Minister Martin, Defence Minister Graham, and Foreign Minister Pierre Pettigrew openly 
expressed their rejection of Canada being part of the programme.720 However, this fact is 
interpreted as a political statement aligned with internationalist rhetoric because, in practice, 
Canada already played a role in the continental system. In 2004, the renewal of the North 
American Aerospace Defence Command was part of the Canadian strategy to restore the 
relationship with the United States following tensions caused by the Canadian refusal to 
participate in the intervention in Iraq in 2003. The renewal of the agreement implied 
authorisation for the North American Aerospace Defence Command to transmit missile 
warning information to the American command.721 Modest Canadian participation in the 
programme is interpreted as the measure through which the policy elite sought to project 
Canada, with limited political costs, as a reliable American ally and committed to continental 
defence. Likewise, the decision to allow the United States to monitor Canadian airspace 
responded to the logic of the ‘defence against help’ thesis, as it would allow Canada to 
expand its capabilities to monitor its territory and be taken into account in joint decision-
making. This decision would avoid unilateral measures by the United States in the face of a 
hypothetical threat.722 In this way, the Canadian position was defined by having one foot in 
and one foot out of the programme. The Canadian strategic stance reflected its simultaneous 
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support for the American nuclear strategy and the control of strategic nuclear weapons.723 
This apparent inconsistency demonstrates that the policy elite did not fully assume 
internationalist or continentalist predispositions. Canada was in the process of redefining its 
international identity.  
The second issue that guided the evolution of strategic policy was the role Canada played in 
the Global War on Terror. Atlanticism was the approach that predominantly fed the decision-
making process. In the case of the intervention in Iraq, the Governor General-in-Council 
ordered the deployment of the Canadian Forces in the Persian Gulf to support American and 
British troops, despite the initial refusal of the federal government in 2003.724 The lack of 
approval by the United Nations for the intervention and the incompatible positions of the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and France influenced Canadian deliberation. 
Academics and practitioners argue that in the negotiation process of Resolution 1441, 
Canada aligned itself with French opposition to the war. However, as soon as French 
preferences changed in favour of the war, Canada had few elements to oppose the position 
of its ‘natural’ allies.725 In contrast to the reluctant Canadian involvement in the American-
led intervention in Iraq, Canada gradually increased its involvement in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation-led operations in Afghanistan. According to Manley, the growing role 
assumed by Canadian troops in Kabul since 2003 and in Kandahar since 2005 was based on 
the Canadian search for influence, national security, international legitimacy, and stature.726 
However, the fact that Canada’s roles in the Afghanistan War lay mainly in the symbolic 
effect of its presence and not in the material impact of its participation allows us to interpret 
that the search for stature was the main reason for the policy elite to extend and intensify 
Canadian involvement. Before Parliament, Manley said that Canada’s ‘good fortune and 
standing impose on us both authority and obligations in global affairs’, so withdrawing from 
the theatre could ‘affect Canada’s reputation in the world’.727 In the context of both conflicts 
and considering the role of internationalist symbolism and economic interests, Iraq and 
Afghanistan became the primary recipients of Canadian assistance to promote the 
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development of security institutions and industrial infrastructure.728 The nature of the 
decisions that defined the Canadian role in the Global War on Terror shows that the policy 
elite aspired to underpin Canada’s reputation and stature as a relevant partner in the 
transatlantic alliance. Canadian involvement was considered more a gesture of transatlantic 
solidarity than a decision based on moral principles or continental cooperation. 
This review of the evolution of the strategic policy during Martin’s government makes it 
possible to understand the logic that prevailed in the decision-making process and the role 
played by the Atlanticist and continentalist approaches. The background, trajectory, and 
profiles of Martin, Graham, and Pettigrew allow us to elucidate that the dominant 
predispositions in the political elite were oriented towards strengthening political ties with 
Europe and improving the commercial relationship with the United States. External 
pressures generated by the international security environment and internal forces produced 
by the rejection of Canadian militarism conditioned the policy elite to have to balance 
between the two strategic priorities. On the one hand, the continentalist predispositions 
allowed Canada to make decisions aimed at projecting an image of a reliable neighbour 
committed to continental defence. The potential social rejection and political costs related to 
Canada’s open and full participation in the American Ballistic Missile Defence System were 
grounds for moderating and limiting Canadian involvement. On the other hand, Atlanticist 
preferences were fundamental to balance the strategic weight that cooperation and commerce 
with the United States acquired. The demonstration of Canadian solidarity with the United 
Kingdom and France through the transatlantic alliance explains why the Canadian policy 
elite preferred to participate in North Atlantic Treaty Organisation-led missions than in 
operations convened by the United Nations or the United States. Finally, it should be noted 
that the pragmatic and mercantilist reflexes that distinguished the policy elite led by business 
liberals explain why liberal internationalism was reduced to the implementation of 
commercial globalism to lessen the vulnerability generated by growing economic 
dependence on the United States. The period from 2003 to 2006 demonstrates that the 
shrinking of internationalism in the 1990s created spaces for the Atlanticist and 
continentalist strategic approaches to work in tandem to adapt Canada to the post-9/11 
structural environment. However, the policy elite failed to consolidate a consistent and 
sustainable construction of international identity for Canada.  
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Figure 6-3. Evolution of the Canadian strategic policy, 1993-2006 







To summarise, Figure 6-3 portrays the progressive consolidation of the continentalist 
strategic approach from 1984 onwards as a result of the weakening process experienced by 
liberal internationalism. As is reviewed in the next chapter, the revamped version of 
continentalism promoted by the conservative government of Stephen Harper allowed 
Canada to develop a solid external identity that would prevail until the mid-2010s. 
Conclusion 
The study undertaken in this chapter provides elements that allow a better understanding of 
the complex relationship between international and domestic dynamics that guided the 
evolution of Canadian strategic policy from 1993 to 2006. Since the end of the Second World 
War, the desire to consolidate Canada as a sovereign nation and a protagonist in the 
construction of the new international order was pervasive within the Canadian security 
establishment. For much of the second half of the twentieth century, Canada’s 
internationalist construction of external identity was a central element in the definition of 
the multilateralist, legalist, and humanitarian nature of its foreign policy, as well as in the 
design of defensive security strategies in favour of the preservation and promotion of 
universal moral values such as human rights and democracy. However, the changes in the 
conditions of the structural environment, the cultural dispositions of policy actors, and the 
positions they occupied in the social field in which the strategic policy was formulated 
prompted a process of weakening internationalism from the 1980s. The last two factors have 
usually been overlooked in the literature, although they are fundamental to understanding 
the origin and development of this process. Firstly, the positional logic of the policy elite led 
by the Liberal Party’s business liberals suggests that its institutional culture and cultural 
reflexes were the product of growing mercantilist rationality, which was promoted after the 
adoption of neoliberal economic policies. Secondly, the positional logic of the strategic 
policy-making field gives evidence that the preponderant role of the political class in 
decision-making was a crucial factor in the weakening of diplomatic and military 
capabilities, as well as in the redefinition of the guidelines under which national security 
strategies were designed. The changes in both components of practical logic allow us to 
understand the profound effects of neoliberalism on Canadian strategic thinking and practice 
from which decision-makers articulated official responses to changes in structural conditions 
after the end of the Cold War. 
The results of this tracking of the evolution of foreign, commercial, and security policies 
during the rise of neoliberalism support the argument that the practical logic based on an 
internationalist strategic conception gradually lost its dominion over Canada’s external 
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identity, the institutional culture of government, and the cultural reflexes of policy-makers. 
The weakening of liberal internationalism is identified as a multifactorial process in which 
political-economic pressures since the 1970s, the adoption of neoliberal measures in the 
1980s, and the end of the Cold War in the 1990s redefined the cultural roots and dynamics 
of the strategic policy-making. The undermining of internationalist predispositions in the 
policy elite and the preponderant role of the political class with a business background in the 
field of strategic policy-making were decisive aspects in the redefinition of Canada’s 
strategic behaviour throughout the 1990s. The primary conclusion is that, despite the effects 
of this weakening process, the solid foundations of internationalism in a large sector of the 
policy elite, especially in the diplomatic corps and social liberal politicians, allowed this 
strategic approach to preserve its status as practical logic until the 2006 political transition. 
This work has contributed to reinforcing an argument that has recently gained acceptance 
about the Canadian case. This study has shown that the weakening of the internationalist 
approach allowed Atlanticist and continentalist ideas to acquire greater relevance in the 
definition of Canada’s external identity and strategic policy.729 Likewise, this chapter has 
provided an alternative analysis of how the subjective interpretation of decision-makers on 
the structural conditions of the international system gradually altered the parameters for the 
formulation of security strategies in Canada. The structuralist-constructivist approach 
deployed in this study complements the realist theses that prevails in the literature on the 
change in state behaviour after the end of the Cold War.730 From the arguments presented in 
the previous pages, it is possible to understand in chapter seven how the erosion of 
internationalist predispositions created political spaces within the policy elite that allowed 
continentalist doctrines to play a more and more dominant role in shaping the Canadian 
strategic behaviour during the consolidation of neoliberalism and the Global War on Terror. 
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Chapter seven. The politics of strategic policy in Canada, 2006-

















‘My long-term goal is to make Conservatives the natural governing party 
of the country. And I am a realist. You do that two ways […] One thing 
you do is you pull conservatives, to pull the party, to the centre of the 
political spectrum. But what you also have to do, if you are really serious 
about making transformations, is you have to pull the centre of the political 
spectrum toward conservatism’.731 
Stephen Harper (Canadian Prime Minister, 2006-2015), 2008. 
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The 1990s were characterised by the emergence of a system of rules and norms that endowed 
the post-Cold War global order with a unipolar and neoliberal character. The new structural 
conditions had profound implications on the normative standards of state behaviour and the 
dynamics of international relations, especially those with the United States. The clearest 
example illustrates how international speeches and practices on the defence of democracy, 
the protection of human rights, and the promotion of free trade produced pressures on states 
to adopt modern doctrines that would allow them to adapt to the renewed international scene. 
The abrupt redefinition of the global security environment in 2001 and the disruptive change 
in Canadian politics in 2006 produced conditions that tempered the dispute between the main 
currents of strategic thinking to acquire the dominant role within the Canadian policy elite. 
The weakening of liberal internationalism in previous decades created political spaces that 
were gradually filled by continentalist notions, which redirected the evolution of Canada’s 
strategic policy. Based on the analyses of the socio-political context presented in chapter two 
and on the development of the strategic policy of the late twentieth century in the preceding 
paragraphs, this study focuses on assessing the cultural roots and dynamics that led the 
evolution of the Canadian foreign, commercial, and security policies from 2006 to 2015. 
This work puts attention on the habitus of the political elite, headed by the blue Tory faction 
of the Conservative Party, and on the domains that constituted the social field in which the 
strategic policy was created. The assessment of the interaction between the predispositions 
of the policy actors with the structural context from the 2000s onwards elucidates a process 
of rebuilding of the continentalist strategic notion in which the design of soft-bandwagoning 
strategies with the United States won more relevance every time. From the perspective of 
the conservative government, this was the best way to adapt Canada to the structural 
environment derived from the attacks of 9/11 and the economic crisis of 2008. 
The argument in this chapter is that the logic that shaped the practices of Canadian policy 
actors was increasingly based on a continentalist strategic approach due to political spaces 
created by the weakening of liberal internationalism and structural changes in the world 
system during the 1990s. After the political transition of 2006, continentalism became the 
foremost strategic knowledge regime in shaping the external identity, institutional culture, 
and cultural reflexes of Canada throughout consolidation of neoliberalism. This practical 
logic based on continentalist prescriptions was gradually promoted since the 1980s, as 
discourses and practices inspired by social liberalism lost importance for the political class. 
It is possible to identify the relevance that the continentalist ideological source obtained in 
the predispositions of a sector of the policy elite since the conservative government of Brian 
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Mulroney in 1984. However, liberal internationalism did not abandon its status as practical 
logic until the electoral defeat of the Liberal Party in 2006. The central conclusion is that 
only the continentalist strategic notion managed to acquire the category of practical logic of 
the policy elite after the political change, despite the internationalist resistance that prevailed 
within the Liberal Party and the diplomatic corps. One of the contributions of this work is 
that it provides a different assessment of how Canadian strategic policy was formulated to 
respond to the post-9/11 structural environment. In contrast to publications focused on 
structural factors, this analysis has deployed a culturalist approach to pay more attention to 
the role played by the sociopolitical context and ideological sources in the formulation of 
strategic responses to domestic and external pressures.732 The second contribution of this 
work lies in the tracking of continuity and the change in the cultural factors that delineated 
the parameters for the design of foreign policy and national security strategies. In the 
literature, few papers recognise and examine in depth the cultural factors that guided the 
evolution of the strategic policy towards a continentalist approach and promoted the design 
of soft-bandwagoning strategies with the United States.733 Within the framework of this 
dissertation, this chapter serves the purpose of evaluating the effect of the sociopolitical 
imagination of conservative policy-makers on the articulation of strategic responses and the 
definition of Canadian state behaviour during a period defined by the consolidation of 
neoliberalism, the global financial crisis, and the intensification of the War on Terror. 
This chapter presents a study in four sections on the cultural dynamics that predominated in 
the Canadian strategic policy-making process in the conservative governments after the 2006 
political change. The first section provides a brief review of the continentalist construction 
of Canadian international identity that regained strength within the policy elite in the late 
 
732 David McDonough, Canada’s National Security in the Post-9/11 World: Strategy, Interests, and Threats, 
ed. by David McDonough (Toronto: UTP, 2012); Don Macnamara, ‘Canada’s National and International 
Security Interests’, in Canada’s National Security in the Post-9/11 World: Strategy, Interests and Threats, ed. 
by David McDonough (Toronto: UTP, 2012); Alexander Moens, ‘NATO and the EU: Canada’s Security 
Interests in Europe and Beyond’, in Canada’s National Security in the Post-9/11 World: Strategy, Interests 
and Threats, ed. by David McDonough (Toronto: UTP, 2012); Andrew Lui, ‘Part One. “Interests All the Way 
Down”’, in Why Canada Cares: Human Rights and Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice (Québec: McGill-
QUP, 2012); Dan O’Meara and Alex Macleod, ‘Part 1: American Power and the Location of Global Order’, in 
Locating Global Order: American Power and Canadian Security after 9/11, ed. by Bruno Charbonneau and 
Wayne Cox (Vancouver: UBCP, 2010); Hussain, Pattnayak, and Hira. 
733 Massie and Vucetic; Wilhelm Mirow, Strategic Culture, Securitisation and the Use of Force: Post-9/11 
Security Practices of Liberal Democracies (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016); Kim Nossal, Stéphane Roussel, and 
Jonathan Paquin, ‘Dominant Ideas in Foreign Policy’, in The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: 
McGill-QUP, 2015); Joël Plouffe, ‘Stephen Harper’s Arctic Paradox’, Canadian Defence & Foreign Arrairs 
Institute, December (2014), 1–15; Justin Massie and Stéphane Roussel, ‘The Twilight of Internationalism? 
Neocontinentalism as an Emerging Dominant Idea in Canadian Foreign Policy’, in Canada in the World: 
Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy, ed. by Heather Smith and Claire Sjolander (Oxford: OUP, 2013); 
Massie, ‘Making Sense of Canada’s “irrational” International Security Policy. A Tale of Three Strategic 
Cultures’. 
258 
twentieth century. It also provides an introduction to the process of rebuilding soft-
bandwagoning continentalism that developed in parallel to the weakening of defensive 
internationalism since the 1980s. Part 7.2 evaluates the predispositions that made up the 
habitus of policy-makers to identify the role played by the different constructions of 
Canada’s international identity in the formulation of foreign and security policy. It pays 
special attention to the institutional culture and cultural reflexes of the more influential 
groups in decision-making. The third section maps the social spaces that hosted the policy-
making process to identify the endogenous and exogenous pressures that conditioned the 
design of strategies. Also, it identifies the overlapping fields that comprised the structural 
environment of the formulation of the strategic policy. Finally, part 7.4 analyses 
chronologically the interactions between the strategic approaches that contended to achieve 
the status of practical logic throughout the three terms of Prime Minister Stephen Harper. At 
the same time, it examines how the dynamic link between objective power structures and 
the subjective perceptions of policy-makers established the parameters that conditioned 
policy choices on national security. 
7.1. Constructions of Canada’s international identity: 
continentalism 
Canada managed to consolidate itself as a sovereign state after the end of the Second World 
War. The internationalism promoted by the social liberals was fundamental to position 
Canada as a middle power committed to the construction and defence of the world order. 
Assuming an identity as a ‘good international citizen’ allowed Canada to underpin its 
political independence from the United Kingdom and its territorial autonomy from the 
United States. However, the Cold War revived old ideas in the political imagination of the 
Canadian policy elite that played a pivotal role in redefining what was strategically possible. 
The internal identity of Canada as a North American country generated two dichotomous 
external identities that influenced Canadian strategic behaviour at the end of the twentieth 
century. On the one hand, the idea of projecting Canada as a sovereign state was used to 
justify a series of policies ranging from intense multilateralism in international institutions 
to the development of strategies to balance the growing American hegemony. However, 
Canadian strategic choices were constrained by geographical, political, and economic 
imperatives. For example, the need to show Canada as a reliable neighbour made it 
unthinkable to develop an external identity, international relations, and material capabilities 
that threatened American security. The strategic dilemma that arose due to the identification 
of the United States as an ally and threat demanded from a considerable effort from the 
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policy elite during the Cold War. They had to formulate policies that simultaneously ensured 
Canadian sovereignty and American tranquillity. The trend that originated after the end of 
the Cold War reflected the repositioning of the various constructions of Canada’s 
international identity. While internationalism entered a phase of weakening, continentalism 
gradually acquired the status of practical logic of the policy elite. This transition raised 
doubts about whether Canada had gone from aspiring to be a major power in the post-1945 
international order to becoming a United States satellite in the post-Cold War unipolar 
system.734 
The international identity that Canada adopted from 2006 is identified as a rebuilding of 
continentalism forged in the ‘Kingston Dispensation’ of 1938.735 The weakening of liberal 
internationalism in the 1990s and the return of conservatives to power in the 2000s generated 
conditions to develop an international identity based on values and interests that would allow 
Canada to adapt to the post-9/11 structural environment.736 The so-called Harper doctrine, 
fed ideologically by neoconservatism and neoliberalism, laid the foundations for the new 
Canadian continentalist identity. This conservative doctrine held that Canada should assume 
a moral position with its allies in favour of values such as democracy, free enterprise, 
individual freedom, human rights, and the rule of law.737 Harper argued that ‘foreign affairs 
should be fought on moral grounds’, attached to ‘social order’, custom, and religious 
traditions. For Canada, the preservation of historical values and moral ideas about right and 
wrong were vital to face the challenges posed by terrorism and its sponsors.738 
Continentalism aspired to provide Canada with an external identity of ‘rising power’ with 
the potential to become one of the ‘top global performers’. Under the premise ‘Canada first’ 
and an ‘entrepreneurial spirit’, Canada’s new interests aimed at asserting its sovereignty in 
the Arctic, renovate its armed forces, and repositioning itself in the world economically and 
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geopolitically. The military presence, an aggressive trade agenda, and moral clarity were 
essential to Canada being recognised as a ‘major player’ in a ‘shrinking, changing, dangerous 
world’.739 The reconstruction of material capabilities and bilateral relations were the means 
for Canada to preserve its sovereignty, protect its interests, and project its principles. The 
role of the United States as the ‘most important ally, customer, and neighbour’ of Canada 
was a significant factor in the configuration of continental identity.740 Restoring the special 
link with the superpower was crucial to guarantee binational trade and face the challenges 
of regional security, both fundamental issues to ensure Canadian national security. It should 
be noted that, as continentalism acquired the status of practical logic of the policy elite, 
internationalist practices were eradicated and Atlanticism continued to serve as an auxiliary 
approach to manage the relationship with the United States.741 Taking into consideration the 
three constructions of Canada’s international identity, the rebuilding of continentalism can 
be better elucidated in the light of the habitus of the Canadian policy elite. This following 
analysis allows us to grasp the role of each construction in the formulation of the foreign and 
security policy from 2006 to 2015. 
7.2. Habitus of policy elite: the neoconservative blue Tories  
During the last two decades of the twentieth century, the Canadian government gradually 
shifted towards the centre-right of the political spectrum. The 1980s marked the beginning 
of a long period of political transformation in Canada. The change of party in power, the 
renewal of the political-economic model, and the ideological reconfiguration of the two 
dominant political parties had profound implications in strategic policy. Just as the 
predominance of business liberals over social liberals impacted on the reduction of the 
welfare state and the weakening of internationalism in the 1990s; the preponderance of the 
blue Tories over the red Tories influenced the underpinning of neoliberalism and the 
rebuilding of continentalism in the 2000s. The rebirth of the Conservative Party in 2003 and 
its electoral victory three years later consolidated the tendency of change that originated in 
the 1980s. The result was the fading of liberal internationalism and the advent of 
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neoconservative continentalism in Canadian politics.742 Taking this background into 
consideration, the examination of the habitus of the policy elite that came to power in 2006 
enables us to understand the role played by institutional culture and cultural reflexes in the 
rebuilding of the continentalist strategic approach. Of the three groups responsible for 
strategic decision-making, the political elite was once again the best equipped in social, 
cultural, and symbolic terms to adapt to the conditions of the post-9/11 structural 
environment. Three factors explain the predominance of politicians, the repositioning of the 
military elite, and the marginalisation of the diplomatic corps in the policy-making 
process.743 
The first factor was the socio-cultural background of the political elite, mainly the right-wing 
of the renovated Conservative Party. The international environment of the 2000s was defined 
by the bloom of neoliberalism and the challenge to American hegemony. Since the late 
1980s, the attributes that gradually positioned politicians as the dominant actors in the 
policy-making process were their ability to interpret the political-economic changes, their 
exercise of political power to centralise decision-making, and their relationships with the 
corporate elite. Concerns about the national debt, the weight of trade with the United States, 
and the effects of the 9/11 attacks placed economic and continental affairs as priorities on 
the government’s agenda. In this context, conservative politicians had the best resources to 
respond to structural conditions. The blue Tories’ experience in business, training in 
economics, and corporative ties provided them with the socio-cultural capital required to 
make decisions that allowed Canada to monetise neoliberal reforms, stabilise its finances, 
and adapt to the new global environment.744 The so-called Harper doctrine redistributed the 
power of influence in decision-making between generals and diplomats. On the one hand, 
the change in priorities in the strategic agenda, the role assigned to Canadian Forces in 
foreign policy, and the tensions experienced with liberal governments were factors that 
improved the position of the military elite. Military officers established themselves as useful 
players in cultural and symbolic terms, able to advise politicians and implement strategic 
 
742 Peter Woolstencroft, ‘The Conservatives: Rebuilding and Rebranding, Yet Again’, in Canadian Parties in 
Transition, ed. by Alain Gagnon and Brian Tanguay (Toronto: UTP, 2017) pp.120–3,153–64; Farney and 
Rayside pp.6–7; Patten, ‘The Triumph of Neoliberalism within Partisan Conservatism in Canada’ pp.65–6; 
Horowitz pp.159–9. 
743 For a more detailed review of the composition of the Canadian policy elite, see Appendix G: Canadian 
Policy Elite, 2006-2015; and section 5.1. Social Dynamics of Strategic Policy-Making of chapter five of this 
thesis: The Sources of Canadian Strategic Policy. 
744 James Farney and Royce Koop, ‘The Conservative Party in Opposition and Government’, in The Blueprint: 
Conservative Parties and Their Impact on Canadian Politics, ed. by John Lewis and Joanna Everitt (Toronto: 
UTP, 2017) pp.26–9,157; Patten, ‘The Triumph of Neoliberalism within Partisan Conservatism in Canada’ 
pp.62–73; Bob Plamondon, ‘Mackay and Harper: New Leadership Brings Results’, in Blue Thunder: The Truth 
About Conservatives from Macdonald to Harper, ed. by Bob Plamondon (Toronto: GRM, 2013) pp.391–2. 
262 
policy.745 In contrast, the symbolic and operational erosion of the diplomatic corps that 
started in the 1990s persisted into the 2010s. The roots of liberal internationalism hindered 
diplomats’ adaptation to the new conditions of internal politics, regional security, and global 
economy.746 It should be noted that the role played by the socio-cultural background of the 
political elite in policy-making is usually an issue that is taken for granted in much of the 
literature. Its examination allows us to understand the reasons why politicians monopolised 
decision-making and selectively managed the involvement of military and diplomats. 
The second factor that clarifies the predominance of politicians in the policy-making process 
was their professional profile. The intellectual formation of the blue Tories was a product of 
their experience in business and studies in law, economics, or administration.747 However, 
the relevance that politicians acquired is not attributed solely to their cultural capital, as less 
than three-quarters of the cabinet ministers and ministers of state completed their 
undergraduate studies and less than a quarter were postgraduates.748 The power of the blue 
Tories was also a result of their managerial knowledge, business skills, and corporate ties. 
From 2006 to 2015, a prime minister, four foreign ministers, two defence ministers, and two 
finance ministers had business experience and training in law, economics, or administration. 
It should be noted that cultural capital was gradually eclipsed by socio-political capital 
during Harper’s mandates. The members of his inner circle were increasingly younger and 
less experienced. Young supporters with limited academic credentials became the base of 
Harper’s cadre of advisers.749 The cultural, social, and political equipment of the blue Tories 
allowed them to align with Harper’s strategic vision and understand the conditions of internal 
politics, regional security, and global economy. The monopolisation of power in the Prime 
Minister and the Prime Minister’s Office positioned conservative politicians as the 
predominant actors in decision-making, while the military and diplomats were gradually 
relegated to the implementation of strategic policy. Despite the reforms undertaken in the 
1990s within the diplomatic corps and armed forces to update the professional profile of 
their members, both elites had limited resources to take the lead in the policy-making process 
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developed under Harper. The professional profile of politicians allows us to understand their 
adaptation to internal conditions and external pressures. The professional profile of the 
military and diplomats did not match to the rules established by the prime minister for the 
operation of his policy-making machinery. 
The third factor that explains the dominant position of the political elite was the role played 
by their institutional culture and cultural reflexes. Neoconservatism and neoliberalism were 
the ideological sources that shaped government thinking and practice. The neoconservatism 
embodied by the blue Tories was aimed at promoting free trade, returning federal power to 
the provinces, and limiting the role of government in the economy.750 In contrast to the 
British roots of the red Tories, the blue Tories’ origins in the business elites of Montreal and 
Toronto influenced them to identify with the neoliberal precepts promoted by the republican 
and libertarian movements in the United States during the 1970s.751 This neoconservative 
vision combined with the neoliberal doctrine that drove economic openness, free trade, 
balanced budgets, and the reducing of the state.752 The product of this ideological amalgam 
was a set of pragmatic and managerial reflexes, as well as individualistic and mercantilist 
values. The decision-makers adopted pre-existing institutional trends in Canadian political 
culture, such as strong partisan discipline and the concentration of power in the prime 
minister. They also developed new practices that emerged with the Conservative Party, such 
as the rigid management of communication, the permanent campaigning, and neoliberal 
pragmatism.753 These aspects influenced the character acquired by the government 
organisation and strategic policy. Harper promoted an ‘individualised executive federalism’ 
in which he negotiated in a personalised way with the provincial premiers. The objective 
was to limit the size and scope of the federal government for the provinces to deal with their 
affairs.754 This model was replicated inside the cabinet. Under the logic of ‘divide and rule’, 
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Harper assumed control of the strategic decisions and relegated the ministers to deal with 
their departmental affairs. On rare occasions, the cabinet committees had significance in 
decision-making, as they usually operated as a focus group to plan the Question Period.755 
Furthermore, strategic policy moved away from internationalist multilateralism and adopted 
bilateralism in favour of the continental defence. Selectivity and conditioning were practical 
features of the new Canadian diplomacy. Neoconservatism and neoliberalism were the 
cultural inputs that shaped the reflexes that allowed politicians to adapt to the conditions of 
the post-9/11 structural environment. 
The predispositions that shaped the habitus of the political elite drove the profound 
reorientation of Canadian strategic policy towards a continentalist approach. The Harper 
government culminated the process of weakening internationalism that originated in the 
1980s. Canada abandoned multilateral policies, moved away from liberal internationalism, 
and significantly reduced its participation in the United Nations. In contrast, Canada saw in 
the selective strengthening of its links within its regional alliances a means to underpin its 
security and defence preparedness.756 The significant thing about this process of strategic 
change was how the policy elite, most of whom inclined towards continentalism, adapted to 
the structural environment to implement selective and conditional policies oriented to 
continental defence and free trade. The improvement of the relationship with the United 
States and the preservation of the links with Europe continued to be a strategic commitment 
for the Canadian political elite since they contributed much more than internationalism to 
enhancing Canada’s structural position and ensuring its security, mainly in the Arctic. To 
keep this commitment alive, the Harper government resorted to the renewal of Canada’s 
membership in the North American Aerospace Defence Command and the extension of the 
Canadian involvement in operations sanctioned by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 
especially in Afghanistan.757 In this context, the compatibility that arose between Harper’s 
realpolitik and the cultural and symbolic capital of the military elite improved the position 
of generals and admirals in the policy-making process. In contrast, the ideological links of 
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the diplomatic corps with liberal internationalism led the political elite to relegate diplomats 
from decision-making. The idealist roots within the Canadian foreign service limited their 
understanding of the relevance of ‘hard power’ and free trade in the structural environment 
of the 2000s.758 1993 marked the beginning of a period in which the political elite undertook 
the implementation of a new political-economic model and the search for a compatible 
strategic approach that would provide security to Canada. 2006 began a decade in which 
continentalism occupied the status of practical logic of the policy elite and established the 
parameters for the design of security strategies. The compatibility between the habitus of 
politicians and the military elite allowed them to rebuild an approach that adapted Canada 
to the conditions of the post-9/11 structural environment. By way of synthesis, Figure 7-1 
portrays the sources of the predispositions that shaped the habitus of the policy elite and how 
the cultural reflexes of the decision-makers interacted with the broader structures to design 
new security and defence strategies. 
7.3. Fields of strategic policy-making: Adapting strategic 
approaches to the twenty-first-century structural environment 
Three different fields made up the broad structural environment in which Canada’s foreign 
and security policy was formulated between the 2000s and 2010s: the field of world politics, 
the domestic socio-political field, and the interdepartmental field. The examination of these 
three social spaces and the identification of their intersections allows the conceptualisation 
of the internal and external pressures that conditioned the strategic decisions of the policy-
makers. The War on Terror triggered by the 9/11 attacks and the global financial crisis of 
2008 had severe repercussions in all fields.759 It should be noted that, although each social 
sphere operated under its own rules, the changes experienced in one of them affected the 
other two. This interrelation makes it possible to interpret that the character and orientation 
of the strategic policy was a reaction of the policy elite to the structural changes of the three 
fields.   
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Figure 7-1. Habitus of the Canadian policy elite, 2006-2015 
(Reconstruction of the dispositional logic) 
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This approach also demonstrates how the policy response affected the continuous 
reconfiguration of social spaces. The following paragraphs provide an overview that traces 
the evolution of strategic policy and considers the recurring debates within the policy elite. 
This section argues that the speeches and practices that accompanied the defence of the 
American-built neoliberal global order had consequences in the national and international 
context. 
The field of world politics was the arena of interaction among state and non-state actors. 
This social space was defined by the norms of the global neoliberal system, the foreign policy 
of the actors involved, and the distribution of material power. The international normative 
framework that emerged after the end of the Cold War had implications on the states’ 
external identity and strategic behaviour, especially on the middle powers. Traditional 
practices attributed to weak and non-Western states such as the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, sponsorship of terrorism, economic heterodoxy, and antidemocratic 
regimes were identified as threats to international stability.760 Transnational discourses and 
practices based on the ‘niche diplomacy’ of ‘low politics’ issues, such as democracy, 
environment, nuclear disarmament, and human rights, gained acceptance among the middle 
powers aligned to the world order.761 The 9/11 attacks put the post-Cold War normative 
framework to the test. In the context of the American-led Global War on Terror, the roles of 
the middle powers evolved in opposite directions. The consolidated medium powers such as 
Canada and Australia developed bandwagoning strategies towards the United States, with 
the dual purpose of defending the international order and preserving or improving their 
structural position. Meanwhile, the emerging middle powers such as Brazil, India, and South 
Africa undertook balancing strategies to counteract the influence exerted by the United 
States in their regions.762 These two types of strategic behaviour were a response to the 
erosion of the normative standards that governed international relations in the 1990s and the 
debate that arose in the American policy elite ‘between primacy and selective engagement; 
between a nationalist, unilateralist version of hegemony, and a liberal, multilateral version 
of hegemony’.763 The 9/11 attacks marked the beginning of a long transition from the 
unipolar order to a multipolar system. The gradual devaluation of institutions such as the 
United Nations positioned multilateral forums such as the World Trade Organisation, G-7/8, 
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and G-20 as the primary mechanisms to exercise the power of global governance and defend 
the neoliberal international order.764 In the case of Canada, the relationship with the United 
States, regional defence, and international trade were some priority issues in its strategic 
agenda. 
The economic, political, and social conditions of Canada delimited the domestic field. The 
effects of the attacks on the United States in 2001, the global financial crisis of 2008, and 
the Canadian political reconfiguration in the 2000s defined this domain. First, the 9/11 
attacks had repercussions in several sectors in the medium term. On the one hand, the 
‘American paranoia about the border’ generated pressures on Canada to strengthen its 
internal security; otherwise, it ran the risk of the United States taking unilateral measures 
that violated Canadian sovereignty and affected bilateral trade, especially at the border.765 
On the other hand, Canada’s interest in reaffirming its solidarity with its main allies 
motivated it to extend its military mission in Afghanistan. This decision resulted in an 
increase in military spending, the polarisation of public opinion, the division of 
parliamentary support, and the reconsideration of Canada’s role in the continental defence 
institutional framework.766 The second important factor in shaping the domestic field was 
the global financial crisis of 2008, which revived concerns about the deficit, caused cuts to 
the federal budget, affected foreign trade, and impacted the oil industry. The global recession 
halted increases in the defence sector budget which had restarted in 2002. This hindered the 
implementation of strategic agenda issues, such as the update of the military capabilities of 
Canadian Forces. The measures taken in the 1990s limited the impact of the recession on 
Canada to such a degree that it was considered the member of the G-7/8 that was most 
resilient to the crisis.767 Third, the Canadian political reconfiguration manifested itself in the 
domestic field in various ways throughout the 2000s. The renewal of the Conservative Party 
in 2003, the change of the party in power in 2006, the minority governments from 2004 to 
2011, and the electoral decline of the Liberal Party in 2008 portrayed the continuity of the 
trend that emerged in the early 1980s of a shift of Canadian power centre towards the right 
of the political spectrum. Beyond the tensions generated by this turn, the political context 
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opened spaces for the opposition to influence the strategic agenda.768 In summary, the 
conditions of the domestic field illustrate the change in values and interests that constituted 
Canada’s revamped international identity. 
The third field was the interdepartmental context in which the strategic policy was 
formulated. The bureaucratic framework was defined by the embrace of court government 
practices, the irrelevance of the cabinet ministers, the rehabilitation of the armed forces, and 
the worsening of the diplomatic corps crisis. The political change of 2006 did not alter the 
dynamics of the decision-making culture that emerged since the 1980s. The centralisation of 
power in the prime minister was again the result of distrust of bureaucrats affined to previous 
governments. Bureaucratic politicisation also prevailed, especially in central agencies, 
Crown corporations, and diplomatic posts.769 The strong prime ministerial-centred decision-
making undermined the influence of ministers, limited their roles in policy-making, and 
confined them to addressing departmental issues. The result was the excessive centralisation 
of power in the prime minister, the Prime Minister’s Office, and the Department of Finance. 
This setting made it easier for Harper to take full control over strategic policy.770 In parallel, 
relations between the military and diplomats with the centre of political power changed in 
contrasting ways. On the one hand, Harper’s relationship with the military elite improved 
dramatically. Beyond the mutual sympathy between military officers and conservative 
politicians, the roles assigned to Canadian Forces generated spaces for military advice to be 
considered.771 On the other hand, the crisis of the diplomatic corps of the 1990s was 
accentuated. In addition to the extension of budget cuts, the ideological incompatibility 
between the diplomatic tradition and the political vision relegated the diplomats from 
decision-making. Diplomats argue that ‘there was a dramatic change under the Harper 
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government, with a pivot towards a projection of militarism […] If you were a soldier, you 
could speak to the press, but we could not’.772 They also noted that 
the Harper government had created a noticeable climate of fear 
within the then Department of Foreign Affairs. Seasoned diplomats 
were particularly exercised about giving counsel that did not align 
with the government’s political or electoral agenda. […] they were 
expressly told their advice and policy ideas were not welcome. Their 
main task was to simply implement the government’s wishes – 
however ill-conceived […] We were told to shut up and do it […] 
just implement it.773 
From 2006 to 2015, the influence of diplomats on strategic policy decreased considerably, 
while that of the military establishment increased thanks to the relevance acquired by its 
symbolic and cultural capital.774 
This review demonstrates that the evolution of Canadian strategic policy was driven by the 
adaptation of the cultural practices of policy-makers to the structural conditions of the three 
fields. As of 2006, the policy elite abandoned strategic conceptions based on the idea that 
Canada could guarantee its security and preserve its international status through the defence 
of international order and broad multilateralism. The new values and interests of 
conservative decision-makers redefined the external identity and strategic behaviour of 
Canada. The new strategic approach was directed towards the preservation of Canadian 
security through practices that underpinned free trade and continental defence. One of the 
theses that predominate in the literature is that the change in Canadian foreign and security 
policy in the 2000s was a consequence of the structural effects of the 9/11 attacks and the 
War on Terror. However, the role of domestic factors has not been addressed in depth in the 
academy. While the so-called ‘strategic shock’ that the attacks represented was a milestone 
that reconfigured the international security environment and increased external pressures on 
Canada, that argument does not provide elements to understand the reasons why the Harper 
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government reacted the way it did during the 2000s and 2010s.775 A much more 
comprehensive and nuanced assessment must recognise that the broad structural 
environment in which the Canadian policy-makers operated conditioned their context 
interpretation and strategic choices. This amalgamation of factors elucidates two aspects. 
First, the decisions of the policy elite were a response to endogenous and exogenous 
conditions. Second, the central dilemmas of the policy elite arose from its inaccurate reading 
or weak adaptation to changes in the structural environment. In summary, Figure 7-2 shows 
the radiography of the positional logic embedded in the field of Canadian strategic policy-
making from 2006 to 2015. This construction synthesises an analysis of the prevailing rules, 
the distribution of resources, and the critical linkages. Based on this review of the policy 
elite’s habitus and the strategic policy-making field, the following section chronologically 
tracks the Canadian policy elite’s interactions with the broad structural environment. 
7.4. Evolution of the strategic policy: a renewed continental 
commitment for a new structural environment 
The evolution of Canada’s strategic policy following the 2006 political change demonstrates 
the rebuilding of soft-bandwagoning continentalism. After two decades of weakening liberal 
internationalism, a new version of continentalism based on neoconservative and neoliberal 
precepts positioned itself as the core approach in strategic policy. The eradication of 
internationalist thinking and practice led to Atlanticism being established as an auxiliary 
resource for Canada to interact beyond North America. Atlanticism played a role of reduced 
internationalism intending to manage the Canadian link with Washington in the post-9/11 
structural environment. In this framework, policy decisions on economic, diplomatic, and 
military matters were conditioned by domestic forces and external pressures. The dynamic 
relationship between the subjective interpretations of policy-makers and the objective 
distribution of power in the international arena delineated the course of the strategic policy-
making process. The central argument of this chapter is that the evolution of foreign and 
security policy from 2006 to 2015 portrays a process of rebuilding soft-bandwagoning 
continentalism driven by the renewed institutional culture and cultural reflexes of the 
conservative-led policy elite since 2003.  
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Figure 7-2. Field of the Canadian strategic policy-making, 2006-2015 
(Construction of the positional logic) 
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The tracking of the interaction between the different strategic notions within the policy elite 
makes it possible to elucidate the break with the tradition of liberal internationalism, the 
redefinition of Canada’s external identity, and the scope of the Canadian relationship with 
the United States. The following examination of the conformation of the national and global 
environments provides elements to understand the intricate correlation between endogenous 
and exogenous dynamics that redirected the Canadian strategic policy from the international 
activism towards a new pattern of continental cooperation. 
7.4.1. Breaking the internationalist strategic pattern, 2006-
2008 
During the final years of the Cold War, Canada aspired to redefine its international identity 
to adapt to the emerging norms that would govern international relations in the new unipolar 
order. For this reason, the policy elite abandoned defensive practices that fed the 
internationalist strategic pattern. The ‘something for everyone’ policy formula employed 
since the 1980s to preserve internationalist symbolism and satisfy continental interests was 
pointed out as inconsistent, anomalous, and irrational.776 The erratic strategic behaviour of 
Canada lasted to the 1990s due to slow changes in the predispositions of the policy elite. The 
social liberals’ gradual loss of political power and the decreasing influence of the diplomatic 
elite in decision-making triggered the erosion of the welfare state model and the policy of 
liberal internationalism. The post-Cold War structural conditions and the role played by the 
cultural reflexes of business liberals led Canada to develop strategies for coupling with the 
growing American hegemony based on commercial, selective, pragmatic, and conditional 
diplomacy.777 For the 2000s, the electoral victory of the Conservative Party consolidated the 
tendency of change that had begun in the 1980s. The displacement of the Canadian 
government to the right of the political spectrum and the growing predominance of 
continentalist predispositions and business reflexes within the political elite defined this 
trend. The reconfiguration of the structural environment following the attacks of 9/11 and 
the consolidation of the neoliberal political-economic model were factors that conditioned 
the evolution of the strategic policy throughout the Harper government. 
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The foreign and security policy promoted since Harper’s first term reflected a transformative 
character aimed at breaking with the tradition of liberal internationalism and the inertia of 
the strategic undefinition that prevailed since the 1980s.778 The ideological pillars that fed 
the values and interests of the new policy elite integrated by the blue Tories shaped Harper’s 
purpose to break with the internationalist strategic pattern. Neoconservatism was one of the 
pillars. This ideology influenced the Canadian foreign policy to renounce the ‘moral 
neutrality’ of liberals and base it on ‘the notion that moral rules form a chain of right and 
duty’.779 The conservative ideas of philosopher Edmund Burke oriented to the valuation of 
social order, moral customs, and religious traditions, especially those related to the 
evangelical Christianity, played a central role in Harper’s political imaginary.780 The Prime 
Minister agreed with Burke’s vision that conservatism was ‘a disposition to preserve and an 
ability to improve’.781 Neoliberalism was the second pillar. This ideology was compatible 
with Harper’s neoconservative vision, as the precepts of economist Friedrich Hayek would 
allow his government to ‘preserve’ the social hierarchy and ‘improve’ the Canadian 
structural position.782 Preston Manning, who was Harper’s political godfather, argued that 
his protégé’s strategic thinking was founded on the vision that ‘a more pure conservative 
grouping in the Thatcher-Reagan mould […] would project Albertan values into the urban 
middle classes’.783 Harper’s neoliberal affinity and sociocultural background explain the 
relevance acquired by the mining and oil industry, especially of Alberta, in his strategic 
project.784 There were two effects of these pillars that constituted the ideological core of the 
so-called Harper doctrine: the definition of a solid neocontinentalist identity and the 
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predominance of moral and business reflexes in strategic decision-making.785 These two 
aspects drove the evolution of the strategic policy from 2006 to 2008. 
Continentalism was the axis of Harper’s strategic policy. This approach provided the best 
resources to achieve the main objective of positioning Canada as a ‘rising power’, one of the 
‘top global performers’.786 The practical logic incubated in the policy elite laid in the idea 
that the strategic rapprochement with the United States would facilitate Canada to link its 
economic, security, and defence priorities with those of Washington. This alignment would 
allow Canada to enhance its structural position and increase its global influence.787 The 
continentalist strategic policy focused most of its efforts to two priority issues: ‘nurture its 
special relationship with the United States outside its traditional continental setting’ and 
‘defend Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic’.788 During Harper’s first term, several examples 
portray the process of aligning Canadian strategic priorities with those of the United States. 
Regarding security and defence, the most representative cases between 2006 and 2008 were 
the renewal of the North American Aerospace Defence Command agreement and the change 
in Canada’s position regarding its participation in the American Ballistic Missile Defence 
System. Like Martin in 2004, Harper avoided expressing his full commitment to the 
programme by claiming that Canada was ‘not yet ready’ to reopen the debate.789 However, 
both decisions were linked again, as the renewal of the agreement expanded the air warning 
capabilities to the maritime domain, particularly in the Arctic region.790 Paradoxically, the 
disruptive reorientation of Canadian strategic policy towards the United States was not 
without friction, especially in border matters. Harper’s sovereigntist reflexes and the 
character of post-9/11 American security policies generated tensions in three affairs between 
2006 and 2008. The claim of Canadian lands and waters in the Arctic, the softwood lumber 
dispute, and the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative were issues that revealed that Canada 
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should resort to auxiliary mechanisms that would allow it to manage the bilateral relationship 
and deal with the historic threat to its sovereignty: American unilateralism.791 
One of the few attributes that prevailed in Canada’s foreign and security policy following 
the 2006 political change was the role played by the Atlanticist predispositions. Although 
they played a secondary role, transatlantic cooperation and solidarity remained fundamental 
practices for policy actors. However, under the conservatives, the Atlanticist approach was 
valued and mobilised from a different perspective than the liberals. Under the new 
continentalist practical logic, the role of Atlanticism for Canada was not to generate a 
‘countervailing force’ to Washington but to acquire stature, reputation, and influence by 
showing its support for its ‘natural’ allies in the transatlantic alliance.792 Moreover, unlike 
the liberal conception, the foremost European ally for the blue Tories was not France, but 
the United Kingdom.793 Acquiring the status of salient member and major player within the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation involved abandoning liberal practices based on a 
minimal contribution. Conservatives renewed and expanded Canada’s commitment to the 
alliance, even more than many Canadians deemed necessary.794 The most unequivocal 
evidence on this strategic conception was the decisions of the Harper government concerning 
Canada’s involvement in the Afghanistan War. In 2006 and 2007, visits by Harper and 
members of his cabinet to Kabul and Kandahar marked a milestone in the evolution of 
strategic policy. The symbolism of the visits was twofold; not only was this Harper’s first 
trip as Prime Minister and this was also the first time a Prime Minister visited the front lines 
of a combat operation. Harper’s speeches during his visits expressed the significance of 
Canada’s participation in Afghanistan for the new policy elite. The Prime Minister told the 
troops that: 
Your work is about more than just defending Canada’s national 
interest. Your work is also about demonstrating an international 
leadership role for our country. Not carping from the sidelines, but 
taking a stand on the big issues that matter in the world. You cannot 
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lead from the bleachers. I want Canada to be a leader. […] There will 
be some who want to cut and run, but cutting and running is not my 
way and it is not the Canadian way […] We do not make a 
commitment and then run away at the first sign of trouble. We do 
not and we will not, as long as I am leading this country.795 
The importance acquired by Canada’s participation in Afghanistan to achieve the strategic 
objectives set by Harper allows us to understand the repositioning of the military elite, the 
sustained increase in military spending, and the motion issued to Parliament in 2006 to 
extend the mission of Canadian forces from 2009 to 2011.796 These elements established 
Atlanticism as the second most relevant approach in the formulation of foreign and security 
policy. Due to the incompatibility that arose between liberal internationalism and Harper’s 
continentalist project, it is possible to affirm that Atlanticism played the role of reduced 
internationalism. 
The strategic policy proposed by Harper during his first term represented a break with the 
symbols and practices of liberal internationalism that gave Canada an external identity of 
medium power and good international citizen since the end of the Second World War. Harper 
argued that he was not willing to replicate the approach through which liberal governments 
had ‘compromised democratic principles to appease dictators’.797 The ambitious strategic 
objectives of his government required a profound change in the narrative on the structural 
position and international role that Canada should assume. The pragmatic, realist, and 
entrepreneurial reflexes of Harper were crucial factors for the disruptive change in the 
Canadian strategic vision.798 The reconstruction of continentalism had several implications 
for the international identity of Canada. One of them was to give up the assumed position of 
middle power to aspire to be a major player. Another impact was to abandon idealism aimed 
at strengthening its pride and adopting realism oriented at increasing its influence. The third 
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implication was to abandon the ‘peacekeeper’ and ‘helpful fixer’ profile to project itself as 
a ‘valiant fighter’ and ‘courageous warrior’.799 Within this renewed framework, few 
elements endured from the internationalist strategic approach. The prevailing practices 
focused on the promotion of economic interests and the defence of moral values, many of 
them aligned with those of the United States.800 Between 2006 and 2008, the Canada-
Central American Four Free Trade Agreement negotiations; the signing of foreign 
investment promotion and protection agreements with Peru, Thailand, and Madagascar; and 
the formulation of the China Strategy were some of the commercial policy actions aimed at 
promoting free trade and expanding the presence of Canadian companies abroad. Likewise, 
the change in Canadian position in favour of Israel in the context of the Middle East conflicts, 
the condemnation of nuclear tests carried out by North Korea, the criticism of the human 
rights situation in China, and the economic support offered to combat AIDS and overcome 
humanitarian crises in Africa were some foreign policy decisions pointed at promoting moral 
values and political positions in countries where Canada could develop potential economic 
interests. The case of China was the most illustrative.801 The role that internationalism played 
in foreign policy showed that diplomatic policy, broad multilateralism, and the United 
Nations would be unnecessary policy elements of the conservative government’s agenda. 
The strategic policy of Harper’s first term also anticipated that throughout his government 
unilateralism and bilateralism would be implemented when possible, while multilateralism 
only when necessary.802 The simultaneous processes of breaking with the internationalist 
strategic pattern and building a new continentalist identity established the guidelines that 
drove the evolution of Canadian strategic policy for the rest of the Harper government. 
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7.4.2. Strategic reorientation towards North America, 2008-
2011 
Continentalist predispositions of the policy elite fuelled by neoconservative values and 
neoliberal interests gained strength during Harper’s second term. The Canada First Defence 
Strategy of 2008, Canada’s Northern Strategy of 2009, and Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy 
Statement of 2010 confirmed the break with the internationalist strategic pattern and the 
reorientation of the strategic policy towards North America.803 The domestic context in 
which foreign, commercial, and security policy evolved between 2008 and 2011 was similar 
to the environment that prevailed during the first term. Decision-making within the federal 
government was highly centralised by Harper and his minority government faced the 
parliamentary opposition led by the Liberal Party. Since 2006, the distribution of 
parliamentary forces had implications for the approval of federal budgets, the extension of 
the mission in Afghanistan, and the Softwood Lumber Deal; as well as in the rejection to the 
expansion of the measures established in the Anti-terrorism Act.804 However, the 
international environment had significant effects on decision-making. The rising tensions in 
the Arctic, the global financial crisis, the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan, the 
consequences of the invasion of Iraq, the political change in the United States, and Israel’s 
conflicts with Palestine and Lebanon were some events that conditioned the decisions of the 
policy actors and tested the scope of continentalism.805 The policy decisions made between 
2008 and 2011 demonstrate that the strategic vision of the Harper government continued to 
develop continentalist and Atlanticist strategies in which hard power was a fundamental 
element in raising the status and improving Canada’s structural position. Instead, 
internationalism was reduced to playing the role of a policy instrument aimed at diversifying 
commercial interests and promoting the moral values of the conservative elite. 
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The foreign policy implemented during the second term illustrates the continuation of 
Canada’s alignment with the dominant values and interests in Washington. Harper’s 
objective to improve the bilateral relationship, his friendship with American President 
George W. Bush, and the monopolisation of Canadian diplomacy by the Prime Minister 
delineated the continental nature of the foreign policy.806 An example was the change in 
Canada’s policy towards the Middle East between 2006 and 2012. The loss of influence of 
the diplomatic elite rooted in liberal internationalism undermined Canadian neutrality over 
conflicts in the region.807 The new continentalist vision implied assuming a partial position 
compatible with conservative values and American priorities. These factors explain why the 
Harper government declared Canada as an allied state of Israel willing to contribute to the 
establishment of the Jewish nation-state.808 Reducing the support provided to Palestine and 
designating Hamas as a terrorist organisation were some of the actions aimed at reaffirming 
Canada’s ‘courageous stand’ with the values of the Jewish community and American 
interests in the Middle East.809 Another case that simultaneously portrays the alignment with 
the United States and solidarity with European allies was the controversial recognition of 
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. In 2008, Foreign Minister Maxime Bernier 
declared that Canada joined the position of its ‘natural’ allies expressed in the United Nations 
Security Council on the recognition of Kosovo’s independence.810 Despite the tensions that 
this decision generated with the Serbian representatives in Canada, Harper said his decision 
was based on the terrible suffering of the Kosovars and the recognition of the declaration by 
the majority of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.811 It should be noted 
that the establishment of continentalism as the practical logic of the policy elite not only 
involved the development of policies aimed at reaffirming Canada’s external identity as a 
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North American state, but also renouncing internationalist symbols and practices that 
defined Canada as a middle power and good international citizen. Under the idea that 
internationalist diplomacy was unprofitable in political terms and limited Canadian 
industrial performance, the Harper government resigned from retaining its seat in the United 
Nations Security Council in 2010 for the first time in 50 years and abandoned the Kyoto 
Protocol in 2011 after 14 years of environmental commitment.812 Canada’s priorities were 
no longer in matters of global governance and niche diplomacy. Canadian interests were 
now in the North American continent and global trade. 
The trade policy that prevailed from 2008 to 2011 demonstrates the reduction of broad 
internationalist multilateralism to selective economic diplomacy. The weakening of the 
capabilities of the diplomatic corps through its exclusion from decision-making and severe 
budget cuts changed Canada’s approach to the world. The growing influence of policy actors 
with close ties to the corporate elite and solid entrepreneurial reflexes had a profound effect 
on redefining the way Canada interacted abroad.813 In the context of the growing 
globalisation driven by neoliberalism and the ravages of the global financial crisis, Canada 
launched an intense campaign to promote free trade between 2008 and 2011. During this 
period, Canada signed free trade agreements with the European Union, Peru, Colombia, 
Jordan, and Panama.814 In addition to the promotion of free trade in countries with a 
structural position lower than that of Canada, the expansion and consolidation of overseas 
markets were vital for Harper’s strategic project. The expansion of the extractive industry of 
northern Alberta and the sustained increase in Canadian oil exports to the United States and 
the European Union show that commercial diplomacy was one of the pillars of the Harper 
government’s strategic agenda.815 As in foreign and security policy, the contraction of 
internationalism generated spaces that were filled by continental initiatives. After twenty 
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years of free trade with the United States, Canada became the leading trading partner of the 
superpower. The dividends provided by the free trade agreements of 1988 and 1994 justified 
Harper’s intention to expand and deepen the commercial relationship with its neighbour.816 
Following the interruption of regional integration efforts between Canada, the United States, 
and Mexico through the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America in 2009, the 
Harper government reactivated negotiations with the United States for the renewal of a 
mechanism aimed at ‘pursue a perimeter approach to security in ways that support economic 
competitiveness, job creation, and prosperity’.817 Under this spirit inclined to promote 
regional integration in commercial and security affairs, in 2011, Harper and American 
President Barack Obama signed the Declaration on a Shared Vision for Perimeter Security 
and Economic Competitiveness; and announced the creation of the Canada-United States 
Regulatory Cooperation Council.818 The evolution of trade policy from 2008 to 2011 
demonstrates that internationalism was reduced to the exercise of selective economic 
diplomacy in which the maximisation of yields was the core purpose. 
The evolution of security policy during the second term followed the same reorientation 
trend towards North America. The policy documents published between 2008 and 2010 
confirmed that Harper’s government security priorities focused on two main issues.819 One 
was the Canadian mission in Afghanistan. The extension of military involvement in 
Afghanistan from 2009 to 2011 allowed Canada to revalidate its commitment and solidarity 
with the United States and the transatlantic alliance in the War on Terror.820 Several 
academics agree that this decision was unwise in strategic terms, as there was a significant 
disconnect between the means employed and the ends to be achieved.821 Taking into 
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consideration the predispositions of the policy elite and the ambitions exposed during the 
first term, it is possible to interpret that the objective of the mission’s extension was to 
strengthen Canada’s stature as a major player with global interests. However, the extension 
of the Canadian commitment proved counterproductive, as it generated unexpected costs, 
overstretched the military capabilities, and granted marginal political and symbolic benefits. 
The second priority was the defence of sovereignty in the Arctic. Like the mission in 
Afghanistan, the interests of the Harper government in this region went beyond rhetoric.822 
However, in this case, there was greater coherence between the objective of defending the 
sovereignty of external threats and the military and diplomatic means mobilised to achieve 
it.823 For example, military capabilities deployed in the Arctic were strengthened, and an 
alliance was sought with the United States and members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation to ensure the stability and security of the region in the face of actions 
undertaken by Russia since 2007. The Ilulissat Declaration of 2008 was one of the most 
representative policy decisions that sought to redefine the political order in the region.824 
Canadian policy in the Arctic was fuelled by a broad range of factors ranging from the 
potential natural and energy resources of the region to the neoconservative values that 
inspired the defence of Canadian sovereignty. These two strategic priorities demonstrate that 
the practical logic of the policy elite shaped by the Harper doctrine was aimed at 
consolidating Canada’s new international identity construction as a North American state 
willing to defend hemispheric territory and continental interests abroad. 
This review of the evolution of diplomatic, commercial, and security affairs during Harper’s 
second term reveals that Canadian strategic policy was in the process of reorientation 
towards North America. The breaking of the internationalist strategic pattern from 2006 to 
2008 generated political spaces and conditions to establish a new practical logic that would 
allow the political elite to respond in a better way to the conditions of the post-9/11 
international environment. In the context of the War on Terror and the global financial crisis, 
the Harper government saw in the extension of the military mission in Afghanistan and in 
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the intense promotion of free trade the most appropriate means to adapt Canada to 
international conditions and, mainly, improve its structural position. While these two 
priorities endowed strategic policy with neocontinental and neoliberal character, the defence 
of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic reaffirmed the neoconservative spirit of Harper’s 
policy. The so-called ‘Arctic card’ contributed to the break with the internationalist pattern 
as it represented a disruptive change in the strategic discourse and practice, as well as to the 
strategic reorientation towards North America since it aspired to consolidate the commitment 
with the United States in the continental defence.825 As discussed in the next section, the 
consolidation of continentalism as the practical logic of the policy elite shaped the pragmatic, 
selective, and conditional way in which decision-makers responded to the international 
environment during Harper’s last term. The defence of continental values and interests 
beyond North America drove the evolution of Canada’s strategic policy from 2011 to 2015. 
7.4.3. Defence of continental values and interests abroad, 
2011-2015 
Harper’s last term gave continuity to the trend of evolution of the strategic policy that began 
in 2006. The neoconservative values and neoliberal interests delineated since the beginning 
of the government continued to feed Canada’s new continentalist identity. Several domestic 
factors favoured this trend to gain strength between 2011 and 2015. The parliamentary 
majority of the Conservative Party, the electoral debacle of the Liberal Party, the 
incorporation of inexperienced advisers into the Prime Minister’s inner circle, and social 
unawareness about Canada’s situation abroad were factors that allowed Harper to erode the 
few existing counterweights, concentrate further the power of decision, and more freely 
implement his strategic policy.826 These factors influenced the responses formulated by the 
policy elite to events that shaped the structural environment, such as the effects of the 
financial crisis, the intensification of the War on Terror, the political crises in Ukraine and 
Libya, the conflicts of Israel in the Middle East, and the diplomatic tensions with Iran and 
Russia. In this context, the evolution of foreign, trade, and security policy during the third 
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term of the Harper government demonstrates that the continental identity that Canada 
developed was strong enough to encourage it to defend abroad the values and interests shared 
with the United States. 
The foreign policy of Harper’s last term was distinguished by further deepening its 
distancing from the internationalist strategic approach. Members of the diplomatic corps 
claimed that Canada had ‘abandoned the liberal internationalism that had so often 
characterised Ottawa’s approach to world affairs, replacing it with a new emphasis on realist 
notions of national interest, enhanced capabilities, and Western democratic values’.827 They 
also claimed that foreign policy had changed dramatically, ‘with a pivot towards a projection 
of militarism. We were not peacekeepers; we were warrior wannabes’.828 In addition to these 
realist and militaristic reflexes pointed out by diplomats, the underlying Manichaeism in the 
Prime Minister’s articulations explains many of his policy decisions.829 Harper’s strategic 
vision that shaped continentalist practical logic was based on the idea that Canada needed 
an appropriate foreign policy for a ‘dangerous world’, whose dynamics were the product of 
‘a struggle between good and bad’. For Harper, ‘the real defining moments for the country 
and for the world are those big conflicts where everything’s at stake and where you take a 
side and show you can contribute to the right side’.830 The Prime Minister maintained that 
Canada required ‘strong, principled positions in our dealings with other nations’, as the 
purpose was not ‘just to go along to go along and get along with everyone else’s agenda. It 
is no longer to please every dictator with a vote at the United Nations’.831 This set of reflexes 
and beliefs shaped the foreign policy decisions between 2011 and 2015, many of which 
coincided with the position of the United States. The rupture of diplomatic relations with 
Iran, the opposition to the recognition of the Palestinian state, the support given to Israel in 
the Gaza War, the imposition of sanctions to Russia after the Crimean referendum, and the 
campaign to exclude Russia from the G-7/8 were just a few decisions who exposed the 
Canadian commitment to the defence of continental values and interests beyond North 
America. 
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The last years of the Harper government also reaffirmed the new role that internationalism 
played in strategic policy. Since 2006, the conservative government demonstrated that 
commercial bilateralism and economic diplomacy were fundamental practices to improve 
Canada’s material capabilities and structural position. Three policy elements guided the 
efforts of the Harper government to satisfy Canadian self-interest and abandon liberal 
idealism. One was the Global Commerce Strategy of 2007, which aimed to expand Canada’s 
commercial network in emerging markets to strengthen its competitive position 
worldwide.832 The second element was the Canadian Foreign Policy Plan of 2012, in which 
the government recognised that Canada’s ‘influence and credibility with some of these new 
and emerging powers are not as strong as it needs to be and could be’, so it was necessary to 
redirect trade and diplomatic efforts towards Asia.833 The third was the Global Markets 
Action Plan of 2013, which renewed the interest in expanding Canadian businesses and 
investments abroad, especially in China.834 It should be noted that during the third term, the 
relevance of the appointment of Edward Fast as Minister of International Trade was based 
on the mandate ordered by the Prime Minister to prioritise trade affairs in foreign policy.835 
The redefinition of the relationship between foreign policy and international trade issues as 
of 2011 is interpreted as a response of the policy elite to address the effects of the global 
financial crisis, which had produced a dramatic reduction in the trade balance.836 Between 
2011 and 2015, Canada signed foreign investment promotion and protection agreements 
with ten countries, as well as free trade agreements with Honduras and Korea.837 In this 
context, the dominance of business reflexes and neoliberal impulses in the policy elite 
influenced the instrumentalisation of international assistance to achieve economic 
objectives.838 The growing disinterest in the agenda of the ‘failed and fragile states’ and the 
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reallocation of the budget for development projects to security and trade initiatives 
demonstrate the selective and conditional nature acquired by foreign aid.839 The premise of 
the action plan released in 2013 to develop a foreign policy based ‘on an equal footing with 
trade and diplomacy’ was far from reality.840 In practice, economic interests gradually 
positioned themselves as the central priority in the foreign policy of the Harper government. 
The predominance of continentalism in the strategic policy-making during the third term not 
only had an impact on the confinement of internationalism to the promotion of free trade and 
the development of new markets. The consolidation of continentalism also influenced the 
progressive contraction of Atlanticist predispositions that fuelled security policy. The 
continentalist and Atlanticist preferences of the policy elite allow us to understand the 
symbolic and material reasons of the 2010 announcement on the acquisition of 65 American 
F-35s military aircraft, a project promoted by the United States Department of Defence and 
backed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.841 These same strategic preferences also 
explain the Canadian participation in military intervention in Libya in 2011, which was led 
by the transatlantic alliance, supported by the United States, and approved by the United 
Nations.842 However, this year marked a breaking point in the role played by Atlanticism in 
security policy. In 2011, the Harper government decided to withdraw from two iconic 
programmes of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Airborne Warning and Control 
System and Alliance Ground Surveillance. The conservative government said the decision 
responded to economic interests, as it would generate savings to the Department of National 
Defence and allow the Canadian defence industry to develop its aerospace systems and 
surveillance capabilities.843 However, economic factors were not the only reason. The 
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resignation also responded to the contraction of the scope of Canadian participation in 
international affairs, including transatlantic ones. The shrinking internationalism that 
occurred as a result of Harper’s strategic vision and the dramatic budget cuts following the 
global financial crisis also had implications for reducing Canada’s involvement in the 
transatlantic alliance. The Harper government said that ‘in difficult economic times, this 
government believes in making tough, action-oriented decisions that are more essential to 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation member-states’ security than any other initiative’.844 The 
causes of this decision validate the argument about the role of reduced internationalism that 
Atlanticism played within the security policy. By 2014, the Canadian involvement in the 
United States-led international military intervention against the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant confirmed that Canada’s strategic priorities were firmly anchored in North America. 
How the security policy evolved from 2011 to 2015 makes it possible to clarify that the 
structural environment derived from the global financial crisis in the context of the War on 
Terror conditioned the policy elite to develop strategies in which Canada would assume a 
highly selective approach, even within the transatlantic alliance. 
The evolution of strategic policy during Harper’s third term portrays the culmination of a 
nine-year process in which Canada abandoned symbols and practices of liberal 
internationalism to adopt a continentalist construction of international identity. The 
consolidation of continentalism as the practical logic of the policy elite between 2011 and 
2015 was a product of the trend generated by the breaking with the internationalist strategic 
pattern. The force acquired by neoconservative values, neoliberal interests, business 
reflexes, pragmatic impulses, and realist conceptions allows us to understand why strategic 
policy intensified its reorientation towards an approach that allowed Canada to consolidate 
its alliance with the United States in favour of the continental defence. The last mandate also 
illustrates how the cultural reflexes of the blue Tories and the institutional culture of the 
Conservative Party shaped the responses of the policy elite to the structural environment 
produced by the global financial crisis and the intensification of the War on Terror. It should 
be noted that the final years of the Harper government exhibited a much more consistent, 
stable, and coherent strategic policy than those formulated and implemented by the red 
Tories, social liberals, and business liberals since the 1980s. 
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Figure 7-3. Evolution of the Canadian strategic policy, 2006-2015 






The consensus generated through the renewal of Canadian conservatism and the 
monopolisation of decision-making was undoubtedly a critical factor in the continuity of 
continentalist strategic policy. Likewise, Harper’s political ambitions explain the strengths 
of the ideological base that redefined Canadian strategic policy. The Prime Minister held: 
My long-term goal is to make Conservatives the natural governing 
party of the country. And I am a realist. You do that two ways […] 
One thing you do is you pull conservatives, to pull the party, to the 
centre of the political spectrum. But what you also have to do, if you 
are really serious about making transformations, is you have to pull 
the centre of the political spectrum toward conservatism.845 
As a synthesis, Figure 7-3 shows the gradual predominance that continentalism acquired 
within the political elite, as well as the effects it generated in the internationalist and 
Atlanticist strategic approaches.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has deployed a structuralist-constructivist approach centred on practice to 
examine the complicated interactions between endogenous and exogenous dynamics that 
redefined the character of Canadian strategic policy from 2006 to 2015. Since the 1980s, a 
double strategic interest was revived within the Canadian policy elite: to protect Canadian 
sovereignty from potential American unilateralism and project Canada as a reliable ally of 
the United States. Continentalist construction of Canada’s international identity gradually 
established itself as the backbone from which the bilateral, realist, and selective nature of 
foreign policy was defined. Likewise, the dichotomous strategic objectives influenced so 
that the parameters of the design of national security strategies went from favouring an 
Atlanticist soft-balancing approach towards prioritising continentalist soft-bandwagoning 
with the United States in the context of the War on Terror. This study identifies two decisive 
factors that, simultaneously with the weakening of internationalism throughout the 1990s, 
triggered the rebuilding of a strategic continentalist approach that allowed Canada to adapt 
to the conditions of the American-built neoliberal international order. The first factor was 
policy predispositions and their role in shaping the policy elite’s responses to strategic 
affairs. From the reconstruction of the dispositional logic of the policy elite led by the blue 
Tories of the Conservative Party, it is possible to elucidate that the origin of their strategic 
thought and political practice was in cultural reflexes fuelled by moral values and 
mercantilist rationale forged during the adoption of neoliberalism. The second factor was the 
reorganisation of the social space in which strategic decisions were made. Through the 
construction of the positional logic of the field of strategic policy-making, it is possible to 
recognise that the dominant role that politicians held and their affinity with the military elite 
not only allowed them to eradicate speeches and practices of internationalist diplomacy but 
also to establish new standards for the design of national security strategies. How the habitus 
of the policy elite and the field of strategic policy-making changed portrays the pervasive 
effect generated by the adoption of neoliberalism on the cultural roots and dynamics that 
founded the reactions of Canadian policy-makers to events such as the financial crisis and 
the War on Terror in the 2000s. 
The analysis of the evolution of Canadian foreign, trade, and security policy throughout 
consolidation of the neoliberal political-economic model strengthens the argument that the 
practical logic founded on a continentalist strategic notion gradually dominated the cultural 
reflexes of the political class, military elite, and an emerging generation of the foreign 
service. The process of rebuilding continentalism was the product of the norms and rules 
that redefined the interactions in the international system in the late 1980s, as well as the 
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effect that the adoption of neoliberal precepts had on institutional and ideological sources of 
strategic policy-making since the 1990s. The erosion of internationalism within the 
establishment of security and the dominant position occupied by politicians with 
conservative values and business interests in the field of strategic policy-making were factors 
that allow us to understand the causes of the considerable reorientation of Canadian foreign 
and security policy between 2006 and 2015. This study concludes that, despite the decreasing 
resistance exerted by liberal politicians and diplomats rooted in the internationalist strategic 
tradition, the force that the continentalist ideas gained among conservative politicians and 
soldiers enabled it to assume the status of practical logic after the 2006 political transition. 
One of the contributions of this work is that it provides a different interpretation of how the 
strategic policy was formulated to adapt Canada to the conditions of the post-9/11 structural 
environment. This practice-centred analysis complements the realist explanations that 
predominate in the literature on how the Canadian policy elite responded to structural 
pressures.846 Likewise, the structuralist-constructivist approach deployed in this work helps 
to identify the continuity and change in the cultural factors from which strategies based on 
alliance politics and cooperation practices with the United States were formulated. This 
chapter confirms the thesis that cultural factors led to the reorientation of strategic policy 
and promoted the design of soft-bandwagoning strategies that allowed Canada to strengthen 
its link and dependence with the United States from the 2000s onwards.847 The evidence, 
arguments, and reflections presented in chapters five, six, and seven provide a panoptic 
perspective that allows us to elucidate how the pervasive influence of neoliberalism was a 
critical factor that triggered the decline of internationalism and created political spaces that 
allowed a renewed continentalist strategic notion to play an increasingly dominant role in 
the formulation of foreign policy and the design of security strategies in Canada. This case 
study on the politics of Canadian strategic policy from 1993 to 2015 confirms that the 
emergence and consolidation of neoliberalism had profound repercussions on cultural 
elements such as the socio-historical context, socio-political imaginary, and institutional-
ideological sources from which the policy-makers made decisions that configured the 
Canadian strategic behaviour. Canada went from being an aspiring major player with broad 
global interests towards deepening its economic dependence and diplomatic cooperation 
with the United States because that guaranteed its own security.  
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Observing how our past appeared when it was the future can help us 
understand why events occurred as they did, how individuals became 
prisoners of their experiences and missed what was blindingly obvious to 
later generations, and occasionally saw with Cassandra-like clarity what 
was coming only to be ignored by their contemporaries. In short, the future 
of war has a distinctive and revealing past.848 
 
Sir Lawrence Freedman (British historian), 1995. 
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Since the mid-2010s, a plethora of distinguished journalists, commentators, academics, and 
practitioners have agreed that the neoliberal era, Western politics, the process of 
globalisation, and American hegemony are in a phase of decline.849 One of the most 
prominent articulations comes from the winner of the Nobel Prize for economics Joseph 
Stiglitz, who argues that ‘decades of free-market orthodoxy have taken a toll on 
democracy’.850 These types of arguments explain, to some extent, the changes in strategic 
policy that several countries have experienced in recent years, including Mexico and Canada. 
These changes in a ‘decade of inflexion’ are interpreted as a reaction of policy elites to 
respond to abrupt structural changes and adapt their states to the growing multipolarity of 
the world order. The current strategic change process mirrors what was happening in the late 
1970s, during the Cold War when the world was also on the verge of global economic 
collapse. 
This dissertation has addressed the politics of strategic policy of Mexico and Canada during 
the advent and consolidation of the neoliberal era. Tracking and analysing the evolution of 
strategic policy over three decades allows us to elucidate the role that culture played, where 
the ideas that fed it came from, and how they affected decision-making on strategic issues. 
One of the main conclusions of this research is that strategic culture was a fundamental factor 
in the reorientation of foreign policy and national security strategies since the late 1970s. 
Economic crises and social problems generated political spaces for the adoption of neoliberal 
precepts, which would trigger a profound change in the strategic thinking and political 
practice of decision-makers, as well as in the sociocultural context in which the strategic 
policy was formulated. The process of adopting neoliberalism developed parallel to the 
structural changes generated by the end of the Cold War. As geopolitical tensions between 
the superpowers subsided, the American-built neoliberal and unipolar international order 
acquired strength. The subsequent establishment of domestic neoliberal reforms and the 
redefinition of international relations, especially with the United States, generated a social, 
political, and cultural context that profoundly modified the predispositions of the policy 
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elites and the positions of the strategic policy-making field. In other words, beyond the 
structural changes produced by the end of the Cold War, the neoliberal political-economic 
paradigm incubated in the United States had a pervasive effect on the configuration of the 
context where Canadian and Mexican strategic policies were formulated and the sources that 
nurtured them from the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. 
The case study of Mexico confirms this first conclusion. Amid the Central American conflict 
generated by the tensions of the Cold War and during the Latin American debt crisis, the 
Keynesian model of shared development promoted by Presidents Luis Echeverria and José 
López Portillo in the 1970s entered a phase of decline. Likewise, nationalist foreign policy 
and defensive security strategies underwent a process of decay, as these were increasingly 
less suitable options for interacting abroad, particularly with the United States. The context 
of social instability and economic uncertainty generated political spaces that allowed, from 
the government of Miguel de la Madrid in 1984, the Mexican political elite to adhere to the 
precepts of the Washington Consensus and the neoliberal directives of the International 
Monetary Fund. The structural reforms promoted dramatically transformed the sociocultural 
context in which the strategic policy was formulated from the mid-1980s onwards. One of 
the most relevant changes was the adoption of continentalist predispositions and the 
development of orthodox technocratic cultural reflexes. The institutional culture also 
changed since it adopted methods of organisation and operation based on technical and 
instrumental rationality. This situation favoured the positioning of political and bureaucratic 
actors, related to the neoliberal doctrine and linked to institutions of the economic portfolio, 
as the dominant actors in decision-making on strategic issues. Miguel de la Madrid, Carlos 
Salinas, Ernesto Zedillo, Jaime Serra, Pedro Aspe, José Gurría, among others, exemplify the 
policy elite that embodied these reflexes and operated from institutions such as the Bank of 
Mexico and the Secretariat of Finance. This series of cultural factors triggered the 
progressive dismantling of the strategic approach of defensive nationalism. However, 
nationalism promoted by the left-wing current of the Institutional Revolutionary Party did 
not lose its status of practical logic until the electoral victory of the conservatives of the 
National Action Party in 2000. 
The evolution of Mexico’s strategic policy from 2000 to 2012 also supports the first 
conclusion. The consolidation of rules and norms that defined the unipolar and neoliberal 
nature of the post-Cold War international order, as well as the effect of the structural reforms 
of the 1990s on the institutional and ideological sources of strategic policy, were factors that 
consolidated the neoliberal economic-political model in Mexico from the 2000s onwards. 
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Likewise, foreign, trade, and security policy began to be increasingly dominated by a 
continentalist strategic approach because this notion was perceived as the most compatible 
to interact abroad and make the relationship with the superpower profitable. The process of 
dismantling defensive nationalism, the effects produced by the North American Free Trade 
Agreement of 1994, and the reconfiguration of the international security environment after 
the 9/11 attacks favoured that, from the administration of Vicente Fox in 2000 onwards, 
Mexican policy actors were even more willing to expand the bilateral agenda, regional trade, 
and security cooperation with the United States, and even consider the political-economic 
integration of North America; something unimaginable in the social imaginary of diplomats 
and military, leading exponents of Mexican nationalism. The dynamics governed by the 
neoliberal doctrine deepened the changes in the social and cultural context that housed 
strategic decision-making since the mid-1990s. For example, the habitus of the political elite 
consolidated their continentalist predispositions and gradually replaced orthodox 
technocratic reflexes with heterodox managerial reflexes. Likewise, the conservative 
government promoted an extensive reform in the bureaucratic machinery of policy-making 
in order to eradicate nationalist ideas and practices of the institutional culture. These changes 
consolidated politicians and bureaucrats with training and experience in business, as well as 
officials of the economic and commercial portfolio, as the most influential strategic decision-
makers. Vicente Fox, Felipe Calderón, Jorge Castañeda, Francisco Gil, Luis Derbez, among 
others, embodied these cultural reflections and operated from organisations such as the 
Secretariat of Finance, the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs and the Secretariat of Energy. The 
cultural factors that produced the dismantling of the nationalist approach simultaneously 
produced a process of building a strategic continentalist vision. The arrival of right-wing 
political actors of the National Action Party in 2000 created conditions for continentalism to 
acquire the category of practical logic of the policy elite because, apart from generating a 
distinction with the thinking and practice of the Institutional Revolutionary Party regime, it 
would allow the neoliberal reforms and the relationship with the United States to be 
profitable. 
The case of Mexico allows us to conclude that both external and domestic factors, as well as 
structural and ideational factors, reoriented Mexican strategic policy from 1988 to 2012. The 
tracking of the evolution of Mexico’s strategic policy reveals a great variety of changes in 
the socio-political context in which the strategic policy was formulated. One of them was 
the exhaustion of the Keynesian model of shared development and the establishment of 
neoliberalism. In parallel, foreign policy went from being based on a nationalist approach to 
being fuelled by continentalist doctrines. Likewise, the parameters of national security 
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strategies from which policy actors responded to changes in the structural environment went 
from being defensive against the American hegemony to soft-bandwagoning with the United 
States. Throughout this period, the dominant political culture in Mexico shifted from the 
centre-left to the right-centre of the political spectrum. The economic benefits promised by 
neoliberalism and the alliance with the United States in the post-Cold War unipolar system 
were some of the most relevant assumptions that prompted political actors to abandon the 
idea of defending the sovereignty of the old Spanish domain and the growing American 
hegemony. However, one of the few elements that prevailed played a crucial role in the 
scope of continentalist strategic policy. The nationalist ideas and practices that prevailed in 
the institutional culture and cultural reflexes in left-wing politicians, traditional diplomats, 
and in the military elite, was a sufficient factor to counteract the continentalist impulses of 
the technocratic elite. This fact, little recognised in the literature, explains the origin of the 
limits and scope of cooperation with the United States. In conclusion, the effect of 
neoliberalism on the cultural roots and dynamics of policy-making and decision-making was 
a crucial factor in the change of Mexico’s international identity and strategic behaviour 
between the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
The case study on Canada also validates the conclusion that cultural factors were decisive in 
the reorientation of Canadian strategic policy since the 1970s onwards. In the context of the 
Cold War and the global recession of 1975, the Keynesian model of the welfare state 
promoted by the political faction of the social liberals since the end of the Second World 
War experienced a phase of exhaustion. In parallel, the internationalist diplomatic tradition 
and defensive security strategies lost appeal within the policy elite, as they were less and less 
profitable and their effectiveness was limited in the dynamics of the new American-centric 
international system. Similar to the Mexican case, social, political, and economic instability 
during the last term of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau in 1980, generated political spaces that 
were quickly capitalised by right-wing political actors such as red Tories and business 
liberals. The adoption of neoliberal policies such as monetarism, free trade, and the intensive 
exploitation and export of natural resources gradually generated a change in the social and 
cultural context that housed the strategic decision-making processes from the mid-1980s 
onwards. For example, the predispositions that constituted the habitus of the policy elite 
gradually reoriented from internationalism to continentalism, and the cultural reflexes of the 
policy actors gradually changed from legalistic to entrepreneurial. The field of strategic 
policy-making also underwent severe changes in the 1990s, as the armed forces and the 
diplomatic corps were less and less relevant actors in strategic decision-making. Also, the 
institutional culture intensified the trend of centralisation of power in the Prime Minister that 
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originated since the 1960s. This environment favoured the establishment of politicians with 
corporative links and business experience and officers of the departments of the economic 
portfolio as the most influential actors in the formulation of strategic policy. Policy actors 
such as Brian Mulroney, Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin, Robert Coates Sinclair Stevens, 
Michael Wilson, Roy MacLaren, John Manley, among others, embodied these cultural 
reflexes and operated from federal bodies such as the Prime Minister’s Office, Department 
of Finances, Treasure Board Secretariat, and Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and 
Development. This set of aspects shaped the cultural context that intensified the weakening 
of the strategic approach of defensive internationalism in the 1990s. However, due to the 
deep roots of this strategic notion in the left-wing faction of the Liberal Party, in the 
diplomatic corps, and Canadian society in general, liberal internationalism did not lose its 
status as practical logic until the renewed Conservative Party came to power in 2006. 
How Canadian foreign and security policy evolved from 2006 to 2015, also supports the first 
conclusion of this thesis. After the end of the Cold War, the new structural conditions had 
profound implications on the normative standards of state behaviour and the nature of 
international relations, especially those with the United States. These conditions gave 
neoliberalism an appeal that political elites could not ignore. The configuration of the post-
9/11 structural environment and the profitability of neoliberal practices further consolidated 
this political-economic model as of the 2000s. At the same time, diplomatic, commercial, 
and security practices began to be increasingly based on a continentalist notion, since this 
strategic approach would allow Canada to improve its structural position, influence issues 
on the international agenda, and make effective neoliberal reforms. The process of 
weakening defensive internationalism, the effects produced by the Canada-United States 
Free Trade Agreement of 1988 and the North American Free Trade Agreement of 1994, as 
well as the pressures generated after the 9/11 attacks produced conditions where Canadian 
policy-makers were increasingly willing to deepen their bilateral trade and military 
cooperation with the United States, even beyond North America; an inconceivable situation 
for social liberals and traditionalist diplomats, leading promoters of liberal internationalism. 
Systemic dynamics caused by neoliberalism after the end of the Cold War intensified the 
changes in the sociocultural context in which the strategic policy was formulated since the 
mid-2000s. One of these changes occurred in the habitus of policy actors, as they 
strengthened their continentalist predispositions and their cultural reflexes acquired a 
moralistic, realist, pragmatic, selective and entrepreneurial character. Likewise, the 
weakening of the capacities of the diplomatic corps was extended, while the armed forces 
were rehabilitated and had a more significant role in decision-making and the 
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implementation of strategic policy. Also, the intensification of the trend of centralisation of 
decision-making power in the Prime Minister claimed the central role for politicians and 
bureaucrats with conservative values and business interests in the field of strategic policy-
making. Policy actors such as Stephen Harper, Joe Oliver, Peter MacKay, Maxime Bernier, 
David Emerson, and Gordon O’Connor, among others, embodied these cultural reflexes and 
operated from agencies such as the Prime Minister’s Office, Department of Finances, 
Department of National Defence, and Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and 
Development. Cultural factors that triggered the weakening of liberal internationalism in 
parallel opened up political spaces to promote the reconstruction of a more realist version of 
the continentalist approach. Similar to how it happened in Mexico, the arrival of right-wing 
political actors from the Conservative Party in 2006 established conditions for a renewed 
version of continentalism to assume the status of practical logic of the policy elite, as it 
simultaneously allowed the breaking of the distinctive strategic pattern of the Liberal Party 
and the improvement of the structural position of Canada. 
The case study on Canada’s politics of strategic policy demonstrates that beyond the external 
pressures generated by the reconfiguration of the structural environment after the end of the 
Cold War and after the 9/11 attacks, domestic factors of an ideational nature were crucial in 
the redefinition of Canadian external identity and strategic behaviour from 1993 to 2015. 
Similar to the case of Mexico, the evolution of Canadian foreign and security policy portrays 
various changes in the social and political context that hosted the creation of the strategic 
policy. One of them was the erosion of the Keynesian model of the welfare state and the 
adoption of the neoliberal paradigm. Simultaneously, foreign policy ceased to be fuelled by 
internationalist ideas to be delineated by a continentalist approach. The parameters under 
which security strategies were designed also changed, as they abandoned their defensiveness 
and soft-balancing to the American hegemony to be soft-bandwagoning with the United 
States. During the advent and consolidation of neoliberalism, Canadian politics shifted from 
the left-centre to the centre-right of the political spectrum. The profitability provided by the 
neoliberal model and the alliance with the United States was a central aspect that prompted 
the Canadian security establishment to abandon the doctrine of middlepowermanship, 
multilateral practices, and humanist ideals, which had provided Canada with a special 
symbolic capital after the end of the Second World War. Nevertheless, the resistance exerted 
by internationalist and Atlanticist predispositions in the background, as well as the role of 
permanent fears about American unilateralism, set the limits of conservative continentalism. 
The internationalist and Atlanticist beliefs and dynamics that persisted in Canadian society, 
left-wing of the Liberal Party, and diplomatic officers, were aspects that lessened the effects 
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of the realist reflexes and continentalist predispositions of the conservative elite. This fact 
validates the argument that predominates in the literature that the role of internationalism, 
and especially Atlanticism, has been to manage the strategic rapprochement in the bilateral 
relationship with the United States. In conclusion, it is possible to argue that the pervasive 
influence of neoliberalism on the institutional and ideological sources of the strategic policy 
was a crucial aspect in redefining how the subjective understandings of the Canadian policy 
elite interacted with the structures of global power. 
The central conclusion of this dissertation contends that neoliberalism had a profound impact 
on the ideas, beliefs, values, norms, rules, and practices that had defined the solid 
international identity and the firm strategic behaviour of Mexico and Canada until the early 
1970s. Towards the 1990s, the consolidation of neoliberalism, through domestic structural 
reforms and new standards of behaviour internationally, eroded the most deeply rooted 
strategic traditions in both countries and established the basis for the construction of a 
strategic approach compatible with the neoliberal paradigm in the unipolar international 
system: soft-bandwagoning continentalism. Following the findings of this study, it is 
possible to affirm that the strategic policies of Mexico and Canada were reoriented in a 
similar way, but in opposite directions. That is, while Canada had to shrink its international 
interaction to limit it to the regional level; Mexico had to open up to abandon its isolationism 
and aspire to integrate into North America. Likewise, it is possible to confirm that the 
residual reflexes of the traditional strategic approaches of Canada and Mexico continued to 
operate in the background since in both cases internationalism and nationalism established 
the limits of the alliance with the United States and the scope of regional integration. As 
portrayed in Figure C-1, the parallels between Canada and Mexico were not only in the 
direction of the reorientation of their strategic policies towards North America but also in 
the changes in the internal political culture from the left-centre towards the right-centre of 
the political spectrum. It should be noted that between 2006 and 2009, a period that marked 
the climax of the neoliberal period, North America was in the hands of conservative 
governments with deep continentalist predispositions. This political alignment limited 
frictions, facilitated understandings, coordinated agendas, and favoured cooperation in the 
region, mainly in commercial and security matters. 
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Figure C-1. Dispositional distribution of policy actors in the political spectrum 
 
Own elaboration. 
Finally, it is important to highlight three aspects that this dissertation has validated. First, the 
thesis held by various academics about the behaviour of the middle powers has been proven, 
especially after the end of the Cold War.851 Both case studies validate that the hegemony 
exercised by the United States influenced Canadian and Mexican policy actors to seek 
strategic resources to adapt and align their states to American orthodoxy, which centred 
around neoliberalism and globalisation. Partially, Mexico and Canada recognised that their 
economic stability and national security depended on their relationship with the superpower 
so that their strategic positioning was tied inexorably to the political position and strategic 
vision of the United States. Second, the alignment of Canada and Mexico to the strategic 
objectives of the United States in the north and south, respectively, validates the idea that 
both middle powers assumed a satellite role of the superpower, as that guaranteed them to 
preserve their status as ‘medium power’ and enjoy the economic benefits of being a supplier 
of raw materials and manufactured products to the largest market in the world. By the 2000s, 
Canada and Mexico became the largest trading partners of the United States. This fact, a 
product of the neoliberal reforms, conditioned the middle powers to a greater extent, 
 
851 Neack, ‘Pathways to Power: A Comparative Study of the Foreign Policy Ambitions of Turkey, Brazil, 
Canada, and Australia’; Jordaan; Neack, ‘UN Peace-Keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?’ p.193; 
Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order; 
Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, ‘Bound to Follow? Leadership and Followership in the Gulf Conflict’. 
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increased their dependence on the superpower and made it increasingly unthinkable that they 
designed defensive or balancing strategies to American power. This thesis confirms the 
argument that Mexico and Canada contributed to the construction and preservation of 
American hegemony during the neoliberal era.852 Third, this project has proven the relevance 
and usefulness of Bourdieu’s theoretical thinking in the discipline of international history 
and international relations. The identification of the components that governed the practical 
logic of the policy actors facilitated the understanding of the strategic decisions through 
which they responded to external events that reconfigured the structural environment. The 
framework of structuralist-constructivist analysis allows us to overcome the biases derived 
from the theoretical division between realism and constructivism. Furthermore, the practice-
centred approach also manages to overcome the structure-agency debate, because by 




852 Stephen Clarkson and Matto Mildenberger, Dependent America?: How Canada and Mexico Construct US 
Power (Toronto: UTP, 2011); O’Toole; Daniel Drache, Big Picture Realities: Canada and Mexico at the 
Crossroads (Waterloo: WLUP, 2008); Holmes, ‘Most Safely in the Middle’; Hawes; Dewitt and Kirton. 
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Appendix A. Mexican policy elite, 1988-2000 
A1. Specialised Cabinet in National Security, 1988-1994 
 
Table A-1. Evolution of the Canadian strategic policy, 2006-2015 
 
Own elaboration based on Roderic Camp, Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-2009 (Texas: UTP, 2011); 
Presidencia, Diccionario Biográfico Del Gobierno Mexicano (Mexico: FCE, 1994); Presidencia, ‘Sistema 
Internet de La Presidencia’, Internet Archive Wayback Machine, 1994 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A2. Specialised Cabinet in Foreign Policy, 1988-1994 
 
Table A-2. Members of the Specialised Cabinet in Foreign Policy, 1988-1994 
 
Own elaboration based on Roderic Camp, Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-2009 (Texas: UTP, 2011); 
Presidencia, Diccionario Biográfico Del Gobierno Mexicano (Mexico: FCE, 1994); Presidencia, ‘Sistema 
Internet de La Presidencia’, Internet Archive Wayback Machine, 1994 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A3. Specialised Cabinet in National Security, 1994-2000 
 
Table A-3. Members of the Specialised Cabinet in National Security, 1994-2000 
 
Own elaboration based on Roderic Camp, Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-2009 (Texas: UTP, 2011); 
Presidencia, Diccionario Biográfico Del Gobierno Mexicano (Mexico: FCE, 2000); Presidencia, ‘Sistema 
Internet de La Presidencia’, Internet Archive Wayback Machine, 2000 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A4. Specialised Cabinet in Foreign Policy, 1994-2000 
 
Table A-4. Members of the Specialised Cabinet in Foreign Policy, 1994-2000 
 
Own elaboration based on Roderic Camp, Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-2009 (Texas: UTP, 2011); 
Presidencia, Diccionario Biográfico Del Gobierno Mexicano (Mexico: FCE, 2000); Presidencia, ‘Sistema 
Internet de La Presidencia’, Internet Archive Wayback Machine, 2000 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix B. Mexican policy-making structure, 1988-2000 
B1. Cabinet system, 1988-1997 
 
Chart B-1. Organisational chart of the Office of the Presidency of the Republic, 1988-1997 
 
Own elaboration based on DOF 07-12-1988 Presidencia de la República, ‘Acuerdo Por El Que Se Crea La 




B2. Cabinet system, 1997-2000 
 
Chart B-2. Organisational chart of the Office of the Presidency of the Republic, 1997-2000 
 
Own elaboration based on DOF 19-12-1997 Presidencia de la República, ‘Acuerdo Por El Que Se 
Reestructuran Los Gabinetes Especializados Del Ejecutivo Federal Y Se Abroga El Diverso Que Creó La 
Oficina de La Presidencia de La República’ (Mexico: DOF, 1997). 
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Appendix C. Mexican policy elite, 2000-2012 
C1. Commission of Order and Respect, 2000-2003 
 
Table C-1. Members of the Commission of Order and Respect, 2000-2003 
 
Own elaboration based on Roderic Camp, Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-2009 (Texas: UTP, 2011); 
Presidencia, Diccionario Biográfico Del Gobierno Mexicano (Mexico: FCE, 2006); Presidencia, ‘Gabinete’, 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C2. Specialised Cabinet in National Security, 2003-2006 
 
Table C-2. Members of the Specialised Cabinet in National Security, 2003-2006 
 
Own elaboration based on Roderic Camp, Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-2009 (Texas: UTP, 2011); 
Presidencia, Diccionario Biográfico Del Gobierno Mexicano (Mexico: FCE, 2006); Presidencia, ‘Gabinete’, 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C3. Specialised Cabinet in Foreign Policy, 2003-2006 
 
Table C-3. Members of the Specialised Cabinet in Foreign Policy, 2003-2006 
 
Own elaboration based on Roderic Camp, Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-2009 (Texas: UTP, 2011); 
Presidencia, Diccionario Biográfico Del Gobierno Mexicano (Mexico: FCE, 2006); Presidencia, ‘Gabinete’, 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C4. Specialised Cabinet in National Security, 2006-2012 
 
Table C-4. Members of the Specialised Cabinet in National Security, 2006-2012 
 
Own elaboration based on Presidencia, Diccionario Biográfico Del Gobierno Mexicano (Mexico: FCE, 2012); 
Presidencia, ‘Presidencia’, Gabinete, 2012 <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/gabinete/> [accessed 25 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C5. Specialised Cabinet in Foreign Policy, 2006-2012 
 
Table C-5. Members of the Specialised Cabinet in Foreign Policy, 2006-2012 
 
Own elaboration based on Presidencia, Diccionario Biográfico Del Gobierno Mexicano (Mexico: FCE, 2012); 
Presidencia, ‘Presidencia’, Gabinete, 2012 <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/gabinete/> [accessed 25 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C6. Specialised Cabinet in Foreign Policy, 2006-2012 
 
Table C-6. Members of the National Security Council, 2006-2012 (first part) 
 
Own elaboration based on Presidencia, Diccionario Biográfico Del Gobierno Mexicano (Mexico: FCE, 2012); 
Presidencia, ‘Presidencia’, Gabinete, 2012 <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/gabinete/> [accessed 25 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C-7. Members of the National Security Council, 2006-2012 (second part) 
 
Own elaboration based on Presidencia, Diccionario Biográfico Del Gobierno Mexicano (Mexico: FCE, 2012); 
Presidencia, ‘Presidencia’, Gabinete, 2012 <http://calderon.presidencia.gob.mx/gabinete/> [accessed 25 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix D. Mexican policy-making structure, 2000-2012 
D1. Cabinet system, 2000-2004 
 
Chart D-1. Organisational chart of the Office of the Presidency of the Republic, 2000-2004 
 
Own elaboration based on DOF 04-12-2000 Presidencia de la República, ‘Acuerdo Mediante El Cual Se Crea 





D2. Cabinet system, 2004-2006 
 
Chart D-2. Organisational chart of the Office of the Presidency of the Republic, 2004-2006 
 
Own elaboration based on DOF 13-12-2004 Presidencia de la República, ‘Acuerdo Por El Que Se Establecen 





D3. Cabinet system, 2006-2012 
 
Chart D-3. Organisational chart of the Office of the Presidency of the Republic, 2006-2012 
 
Own elaboration based on DOF 04-12-2006 Presidencia de la República, ‘Acuerdo Por El Que Se Crea La 
Oficina de La Presidencia de La República’ (Mexico: DOF, 2006); DOF 21-01-2008 Presidencia de la 
República, ‘Acuerdo Por El Que Se Reestructuran Las Unidades Administrativas de La Presidencia de La 




D4. National security system, 2006-2012 
 
Chart D-4. Organisational chart of the National Security Council, 2006-2012 
 




Appendix E. Canadian policy elite, 1993-2006 
E1. Cabinet ministers responsible for strategic policy, 1993-1997 
 
Table E-1. Policy elite during the first mandate of the Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, 1993-1997 
 
Own elaboration based on Kenny William, ‘Cabinet Committees as Strategies of Prime Ministerial Leadership 
in Canada, 2003-2019’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 57.4 (2019), 466–86; Mutimer David, 
Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs: 1997 (Toronto: UTP, 2003); Lumley Elizabeth, 
Canadian Who’s Who 1997, Volume 32 (Toronto: UTP, 1997). Note: Until 2001, the Chrétien government did 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































E2. Cabinet ministers responsible for strategic policy, 1997-2000 
 
Table E-2. Policy elite during the second mandate of the Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, 1997-2000 
 
Own elaboration based on Kenny William, ‘Cabinet Committees as Strategies of Prime Ministerial Leadership 
in Canada, 2003-2019’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 57.4 (2019), 466–86; Mutimer David, 
Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs: 2000 (Toronto: UTP, 2006); Lumley Elizabeth, 
Canadian Who’s Who 2000, Volume 35 (Toronto: UTP, 2000). Note: Until 2001, the Chrétien government did 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































E3. Cabinet ministers responsible for strategic policy, 2000-2003 
 
Table E-3. Policy elite during the third mandate of the Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, 2000-2003 
 
Own elaboration based on Kenny William, ‘Cabinet Committees as Strategies of Prime Ministerial Leadership 
in Canada, 2003-2019’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 57.4 (2019), 466–86; Mutimer David, 
Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs: 2003 (Toronto: UTP, 2009); Lumley Elizabeth, 
Canadian Who’s Who 2003, Volume 37 (Toronto: UTP, 2003). Note: These policy actors were members of the 
ad hoc Cabinet Committee on Public Security and Anti-Terrorism, and ad hoc Cabinet Committee on Security 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































E4. Cabinet ministers responsible for strategic policy, 2003-2006 
 
Table E-4. Policy elite during the mandate of the Prime Minister Paul Martin, 2003-2006 
 
Own elaboration based on Kenny William, ‘Cabinet Committees as Strategies of Prime Ministerial Leadership 
in Canada, 2003-2019’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 57.4 (2019), 466–86; Mutimer David, 
Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs: 2006 (Toronto: UTP, 2013); Lumley Elizabeth, 
Canadian Who’s Who 2006, Volume 41(Toronto: UTP, 2006). Note: These policy actors were members of the 
Cabinet Committee on Global Affairs; Cabinet Committee for Canada-United States Affairs; and Cabinet 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix F. Canadian policy-making structure, 1993-2006 
F1. Cabinet system, 1993-1997 
 
Chart F-1. Cabinet system during the first mandate of the Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, 1993-1997 
 
Own elaboration based on Kenny William, ‘Cabinet Committees as Strategies of Prime Ministerial Leadership 
in Canada, 2003-2019’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 57.4 (2019), 466–86; David Johnson, 
‘Ministers, Deputy Ministers, and Cabinet Decision-Making Systems’, in Thinking Government: Public Sector 
Management in Canada, ed. by David Johnson (Toronto: Broadview, 2006) pp.231–4. 
326 
 
F2. Cabinet system, 1997-2000 
 
Chart F-2. Cabinet system during the second mandate of the Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, 1997-2000 
 
Own elaboration based on Kenny William, ‘Cabinet Committees as Strategies of Prime Ministerial Leadership 
in Canada, 2003-2019’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 57.4 (2019), 466–86; David Johnson, 
‘Ministers, Deputy Ministers, and Cabinet Decision-Making Systems’, in Thinking Government: Public Sector 
Management in Canada, ed. by David Johnson (Toronto: Broadview, 2006) pp.231–4. 
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F3. Cabinet system, 2000-2003 
 
Chart F-3. Cabinet system during the third mandate of the Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, 2000-2003 
 
Own elaboration based on Kenny William, ‘Cabinet Committees as Strategies of Prime Ministerial Leadership 
in Canada, 2003-2019’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 57.4 (2019), 466–86; David Johnson, 
‘Ministers, Deputy Ministers, and Cabinet Decision-Making Systems’, in Thinking Government: Public Sector 
Management in Canada, ed. by David Johnson (Toronto: Broadview, 2006) pp.231–4. 
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F4. Cabinet system, 2003-2006 
 
Chart F-4. Cabinet system during the mandate of the Prime Minister Paul Martin, 2003-2006 
 
Own elaboration based on Kenny William, ‘Cabinet Committees as Strategies of Prime Ministerial Leadership 
in Canada, 2003-2019’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 57.4 (2019), 466–86; David Johnson, 
‘Ministers, Deputy Ministers, and Cabinet Decision-Making Systems’, in Thinking Government: Public Sector 
Management in Canada, ed. by David Johnson (Toronto: Broadview, 2006) pp.234–7. 
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Appendix G. Canadian policy elite, 2006-2015 
G1. Cabinet ministers responsible for strategic policy, 2006-2008 
 
Table G-1. Policy elite during the first mandate of the Prime Minister Stephen Harper, 2006-2008 
 
Own elaboration based on Kenny William, ‘Cabinet Committees as Strategies of Prime Ministerial Leadership 
in Canada, 2003-2019’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 57.4 (2019), 466–86; Mutimer David, 
Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs: 2008 (Toronto: UTP, 2015); Lumley Elizabeth, 
Canadian Who’s Who 2008, Volume 43 (Toronto: UTP, 2008). Note: These policy actors were members of the 
Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Security, Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs, 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































G2. Cabinet ministers responsible for strategic policy, 2008-2011 
 
Table G-2. Policy elite during the second mandate of the Prime Minister Stephen Harper, 2008-2011 
 
Own elaboration based on Kenny William, ‘Cabinet Committees as Strategies of Prime Ministerial Leadership 
in Canada, 2003-2019’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 57.4 (2019), 466–86; Benner Bryan, 
Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs: 2011 (Toronto: ARPC, 2014); Browne, Lynn and 
Peroni Gwen, Canadian Who’s Who 2011, Volume 46 (Toronto: UTP, 2013). Note: These policy actors were 
members of the Cabinet Committee on Economic Growth and Long-Term Prosperity, Cabinet Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and Security, Cabinet Committee on Environment and Energy Security, and Cabinet 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































G3. Cabinet ministers responsible for strategic policy, 2011-2015 
 
Table G-3. Policy elite during the third mandate of the Prime Minister Stephen Harper, 201--2015 
 
Own elaboration based on Kenny William, ‘Cabinet Committees as Strategies of Prime Ministerial Leadership 
in Canada, 2003-2019’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 57.4 (2019), 466–86; Benner Bryan, 
Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs: 2015 (Toronto: ARPC, 2018); Lumley Elizabeth, 
Canadian Who’s Who 2015, Volume 48 (Toronto: UTP, 2015). Note: These policy actors were members of the 
Cabinet Committee on Economic Prosperity and Sustainable Growth, Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix H. Canadian policy-making structure, 2006-2015 
H1. Cabinet system, 2006-2008 
 
Chart H-1. Cabinet system during the first mandate of the Prime Minister Stephen Harper, 2006-2008 
 
Own elaboration based on Kenny William, ‘Cabinet Committees as Strategies of Prime Ministerial Leadership 
in Canada, 2003-2019’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 57.4 (2019), 466–86; David Johnson, 
‘Ministers and Cabinet Decision-Making Systems’, in Thinking Government: Public Administration and 
Politics in Canada, ed. by David Johnson (Toronto: Broadview, 2016) pp.146–9. 
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H2. Cabinet system, 2008-2011 
 
Chart H-2. Cabinet system during the second mandate of the Prime Minister Stephen Harper, 2008-2011 
 
Own elaboration based on Kenny William, ‘Cabinet Committees as Strategies of Prime Ministerial Leadership 
in Canada, 2003-2019’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 57.4 (2019), 466–86; David Johnson, 
‘Ministers and Cabinet Decision-Making Systems’, in Thinking Government: Public Administration and 
Politics in Canada, ed. by David Johnson (Toronto: Broadview, 2016) pp.146–9. 
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H3. Cabinet system, 2011-2015 
 
Chart H-3. Cabinet system during the third mandate of the Prime Minister Stephen Harper, 2011-2015 
 
Own elaboration based on Kenny William, ‘Cabinet Committees as Strategies of Prime Ministerial Leadership 
in Canada, 2003-2019’, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 57.4 (2019), 466–86; David Johnson, 
‘Ministers and Cabinet Decision-Making Systems’, in Thinking Government: Public Administration and 
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